

RISE OF THE
CHRISTIAN POWER IN INDIA

BY
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VOL. V

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PREFACE

In its issue of 8th May, 1924, the *Times Literary Supplement*, in the leading article on the *Legend of the American Revolution*, wrote :—

"The great Renaissance scholar Cardano said of the writing of history that it is of all literary arts the most difficult, since it demands not only style, but diligent research into the smallest matters, and a sound judgment. Moreover, he added, the historian who describes little things will bore his readers ; if he deals only with great things, he will deceive them, since all great things have their origin in little things. That, he concludes, is why so few histories are written."

In the preface to the first volume of this work have been mentioned the difficulties which have to be faced by an Indian writer of the history of the British period of his country. It is for those reasons, in addition to what Cardano has said, that so far no Indian writer has come forward to write a true history of that period. An historian must possess "facts" which he is required to treat as "chemical formulae" with "bloodless impartiality." His judgment should be sound and he should not be devoid of "scientific imagination." These are good ideals, though, as "every State wishes to promote national pride and is conscious that this cannot be done by unbiased

history," "history, in every country, is so taught as to magnify that country" (Bertrand Russell). No such effort has been made in the present work.

We are compelled at present to write in English, in which, however proficient an Indian may be, he is apt to commit slips which make colourless British critics of his works pronounce the Indian author as "unfamiliar with the English language." But those British critics seldom find fault with the performances of their compatriots who, for example, though ignorant of the languages in which the Memoirs of Babar and other Moghul Emperors are written, are appointed Professors in Indian Colleges and Universities to lecture on the Muhammadan period of Indian History, or write books with the help of translations made from oriental languages by their assistants.

The British period of Indian History has not been studied as yet by Indian scholars as critically as some of them have done the pre-British periods. But it is necessary for us to know the circumstances which have brought about the situation in which we find ourselves at present. The Britishers could not have acquired political supremacy in India but for the help they received from traitors amongst Indians. Why India reeks with traitors is a problem for consideration. It has been lack of patriotism which to some extent

accounts for it. Then want of forethought, foresight and, above all, desire for self-aggrandizement have been the principal factors in the production of traitors amongst us. The caste system of the Hindus may be partially responsible for it. But the number of traitors amongst Muhammadans, who have no caste system amongst them, has not been less than amongst Hindus bound down by caste restrictions.

Human nature is naturally weak, and those who encourage people to turn traitors and betray the interests of their country are as despicable creatures as the traitors themselves. How sublime is the prayer of Christ Jesus which he taught his followers: "Lead us not into temptations but deliver us from all evils." Had Christian diplomats acted on that prayer taught to them by their Saviour, it is questionable if they would have succeeded in bringing Indians into that situation in which they find themselves today.

Hindu women have cheerfully mounted the funeral pyre and reduced themselves to ashes rather than suffer themselves to be polluted by the touch of alien conquerors. But unfortunately similar praise cannot be given to Indian men holding responsible situations. Many of them betrayed the interests of the State, succumbing to the temptations of alien rulers. For the sake of "filthy lucre" they did dirty jobs for foreigners and by co-operating with them

did not hesitate to rivet the chain of slavery round the necks of their countrymen.

Traditions of virtuous women generally keep Indian women from deviating from the path of virtue. But patriotism not being taught to Indians from their cradle, it has not played the same part in the formation of the character of Indian men, as the ideal of chastity has done in that of Indian women.

The well-known American sociological writer Professor E. A. Ross says:—

"Subjection to a foreign yoke is one of the most potent causes of the decay of national character. Take, for example, the Hindoos. A Greek writer, Arrian, declares that 'they are remarkably brave, superior in war to all Asiatics; they are remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to a law suit and so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements. No Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.' This portrays the precise opposite of modern Hindoo character and the change can be accounted for only by the long subjection of the race to the rule of the foreigner.

"The character of the Greeks a century ago at the time of their struggle of liberation from the Turks was in glaring contrast to that of the classical Greeks. ...

"Even a domination which is just and benevolent may stunt the spiritual growth of a people. The British domination of Egypt makes for the material prosperity of the people but does not advance them appreciably toward the plane of self-government. The elite of the Hindoos feel that the alien dominion has a blighting

effect upon the higher life of the people of India." *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 132-133.

Slaves generally behave like dogs. The author was once told by a Maratha Brahman that "Indians are dogs." He did not understand him and so he asked the latter to explain his meaning. The Maratha Brahman said : "One dog cannot bear the sight of another dog, but every dog is faithful to his master." "So," he continued, "one Indian cannot bear the sight of another Indian, but every Indian is loyal to his foreign master."

That is a very good description of slave mentality.

Slave mentality fosters sneakishness, cowardice, love of ease and love of pleasure. The atmosphere of slavery promotes immorality in all forms. To be in the good graces of their masters, slaves will do any mean and despicable act.

They bring about the ruin of their own kith and kin by trying to please their masters and thus more and more firmly rivet the chain of slavery round the necks of their friends, relations and themselves.

Slaves are thus always traitors to their country. This lesson is brought home to us from the histories of those peoples who were born and brought up as slaves. An English poet has sung :—

"Rule Britannia, rule the waves
Britons never shall be slaves."

But Britons were at one time slaves. This is proved beyond the shadow of a doubt from historical evidence.

Thus, because they were slaves, there were traitors amongst the Britons and thus came to an end the rule of their Saxon Kings. Writes an English historian that

"In the time of a king called Ethelred the Redeless, eight years after Alfred's death, the Northmen came again with great conquering armies. He gathered many armies and fleets against his enemies, but owing to the treachery of his great men the English never won victories. Amongst the Thanes had arisen some very powerful nobles who had great lands of their own and great armies. These men would not join together to fight against the invaders but quarrelled among themselves. Sometimes when a battle was about to begin they deserted with all their soldiers, or pretended to be sick and would not fight. And when the Northmen attacked the lands of one or two of these nobles the others did nothing to help; they seemed pleased to see enemies doing harm to Englishmen. Among them were one or two true men who fought well for their country, but most of them were foul traitors not worthy to be called Englishmen."

"So the Northmen again did as they pleased with English houses and cattle and churches and murdered helpless countryfolk, until despair settled down upon the land, and men said one Northman was worth ten Englishmen."^{*}

* Piers Plowman Histories. Junior Book IV, pp. 80-81. London. 1913.

Men with slave mentality or slaves lack cohesion. There may be some good men among slaves—and that there were slaves who were good men is evident from the histories of ancient Greece and Rome where slavery was a recognised institution. Such good men may be compared to glittering particles of sand which are scattered about by every gust of wind. These glittering particles of sand would not unite to form adamantine rock.

Wolves go about in packs, but not so the dogs. Dogs are led in packs by their masters. So are the slaves.

It has not been by observing the Ten Commandments of the Bible that the British people have attained political supremacy in India. There was not much honesty when States were annexed on the pretext of *Lapse*. It is not in India alone but in Europe also that the aristocracy or well-to-do classes are often devoid of male heirs begotten of their body. This phenomenon has been the subject of discussion amongst biologists and economists. It may be that many members of the aristocracy, leading debauched lives, are not blessed with children. But the Hindu law in such cases provided a remedy by what is called "*Adoption*". Not to recognize adoption suggested foul play. An English writer says :—

"The doctrine of lapse was not quite new. John Bull has never been averse to taking possession of a nice

estate which cost him nothing. From 1836 to 1840, Loodiana, Ferozepore, Jaloun, and a few others had lapsed. But with Dalhousie in power, the number grew. And Providence seemed strangely kind to the advocates of lapse. The number of deaths amongst the princes, which deaths brought annexations, was remarkable. The assassin's dagger or the poison cup, at a certain time and amongst a certain type of prince, could hardly have been more fatal than was 'death from natural causes'. 'Minor absorptions can hardly be reckoned.'" P. 69 of Mr. Clarke's *British India and England's responsibilities*, London, 1902. See also p. 343 of Vol. V of *Rise of the Christian Power in India*.

Scheming and designing as the Britishers usually were, they knew how to conceal their ulterior designs. Thus it is stated by them that they were forced to assume political power in India, but that it was not their intention to do so. That their statement is not true is exposed by Colonel Malleison, who writes :—

"No one can deny that, however dimly the ultimate consequences may at the time have been foreseen by our countrymen, we fought for the position which we now occupy. It was with design that we crushed the hopes of the French ; with design that we conquered Bengal ; with design that we subdued Tippu ; with design that in 1802-3 we contested Hindustan with Sindhia and Holkar." P. xv, *Introduction to Final French Struggles in India*. London, 1878.

Then again, Britishers, like other "nations," are averse to the exposure of the shortcomings and

VICES OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS. Thus Malleison says :—

“ Some of my friends who read a portion of this book (Final French Struggles in India) in the pages of the *Calcutta Review*, have not hesitated to tell me that they regard as unpatriotic the attempt of an Englishman to search out and record events which may contrast favourably a rival nation with his own. But history is either a record of events which have happened or it is romance. If it assumes to be a record of events which have happened, it must record the evil as well as the good, misfortune as well as gain, defeat as well as victory. No one will dispute this broad axiom”. (*Ibid*, p. viii).

No one need, therefore, be astonished at the attitude of the Anglo-Indian journalists to my works, in labelling them “Biassed History,” “Rabid History”, &c., because truth being unpalatable to them, they want every one to write romance, rather than the true history of British India.

Britishers have not scrupled to blacken the memories of those Indian princes whom their compatriots had deceived and defrauded or with whose help they succeeded in establishing the Christian Power in India. Of course these princes being dead or held in captivity during their life time, could not answer their British accusers. It is an Italian saying that one hates the person whom one has injured. That accounts for the

attitude of the generality of Britishers towards Indians.

As for gratitude, as Lecky has observed, it is not to be found in politics. The rule of Britain in India being based on politics, gratitude is not to be expected from the average Britisher by the Indian, notwithstanding the fact that that rule was established with Indian money and mostly with Indian blood.

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RISE OF THE Christian Power in India

CHAPER LXVIII

Reflections on the East India Company's Charter of 1833

It was during the Governor-Generalship of Lord William Bentinck, that the Charter of the East India Company was renewed in 1833. A few reflections on that Charter are given below.

The early thirties of the nineteenth century were very stirring times in England. It was not any war or prospect of it that created the stir, but it was due to domestic causes. Industrial development had taken place to such a large extent, the urban population had so largely increased, education also was making such rapid strides, that Parliamentary Reform became absolutely necessary. Hence the Reform Bill was on the legislative anvil. But political reforms in England did not auger good for India. No greater mistaken notion

can be entertained than the theory broached by the late Mr. R. C Dutt when he said that

"the administration of India is determined by the current of opinions in England, that progress in India is stimulated by English progress, and that the history of India under British rule is shaped by those great influences which make for reforms in Europe. This is a fact which is often overlooked by the historians of India, but Indian history is unintelligible to us without this explanation. From the time of the great Pitt to the time of Mr. Gladstone, English influences have inspired the rulers of India. English history and Indian history have run in parallel streams."

No, just the reverse of the above is true. The interests of the people of England are not identical with, but diametrically opposed to, those of the people of this country. Their interests and our interests clash. Hence there can be no community of interests between the English and the Indian. So the more power the common people of England obtained, they did not turn it to account for the benefit of the natives of India but for their own gain. Sir John Malcolm, in his Political History of India, writes:—

"It has been well observed by an able anonymous author, who has written a history of the early period of the East India Company, that 'unlimited power in the hands of a single person may be prevented from degenerating into acts of tyranny by the terrors of ignominy, or by personal fears. But a body of men vested with authority, is seldom swayed by restraint of either kind; as

they derive, individually, but little applause from their best measures, so the portion of infamy which may fall to each for the worst public action is too small to affect personal character. Having, therefore, no generous inducement to follow virtue, the most sordid passions frequently lead them into vice. It is from this circumstance that the decisions of public bodies sometimes partake of that mortifying species of tyranny which is incapable of redress, and yet is beyond revenge. These observations may be applied, without the least injustice, to the actions of the Indian Company both at home and abroad. Avarice, the most obstinate and hardened passion of the human mind, being the first principle of commerce, was the original bond of their union, and humanity, justice and even policy, gave way to the prospect or love of gain.”*

Regarding the Reform Act of 1832, Mr. John Morley in his *Life of Mr. Cobden* writes that it

“stirred up social aspirations which the Liberal Governments of the next ten years after the passing of the Act, were utterly unable to satisfy.”

If we remember the above, we shall be able to understand that the Charter Act of 1833 following on the Reform Act of 1832 was more advantageous to the people of England than to those of India. Of course, on the occasion of the passing of that Act, much cant and idle talk were indulged in by those who professed radical views. The most noteworthy of these talkers was Mr. Thomas Babington

* *The Political History of India*, 3rd (1926) edition, pp. 21—22;

(afterwards Lord) Macaulay. Very noble thoughts are embodied in the speech which he delivered from his place in the House of Commons on the 10th of July, 1833. Macaulay was the only son of his father Zachariah Macaulay, a friend of William Wilberforce and the *Christian* Director of the East India Company, Mr. Charles Grant. T. B. Macaulay, from his very infancy, having come in contact with Mr. Charles Grant, must have imperceptibly, but silently and steadily, imbibed the latter's views on Indian questions. For Macaulay's famous speech of 1833 is in many respects almost a paraphrase, although in eloquent phrases, of Mr. Grant's pamphlet on the State of Society in Asia. Macaulay said :—

"To the great trading nation, to the great manufacturing nation, no progress which any portion of the human race can make in knowledge, in taste for the conveniences of life or in the wealth by which those conveniences are produced, can be matter of indifference. It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefit which we might derive from the diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. * * To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages."

Compare the above with what Mr. Charles Grant wrote in the pamphlet above referred to. He wrote :—

"In every progressive step of this work, we shall also serve the original design with which we visited India, that design still so important to this country,—the

extension of our commerce. Why is it that so few of our manufactures and commodities are vended there? Not merely because the taste of the people is not generally formed to the use of them, but because they have not the means of purchasing them. * * Let invention be once awakened among them, * * let them acquire a relish * * for the beauties and refinements, endlessly diversified, of European art and science, and we shall hence obtain for ourselves the supply of four and twenty millions of distant subjects. How greatly will our country be thus aided in rising still superior to all her difficulties; and how stable, as well as unrivalled, may we hope our commerce will be, when we thus rear it on right principles, and make it the means of their extension? * * and wherever, we may venture to say, our principles and language are introduced, our commerce will follow."^{*}

It was Mr. Grant's idea to teach the natives of India the English language, for it would be politically advantageous to England. Similar thoughts dominated Macaulay's advocacy of making English the medium of instruction in this country.

But Macaulay was not sincere when he grandiloquently said:—

"Are we to keep the people of India ignorant in order that we may keep them submissive? Or do you think that we can give them knowledge without awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition

* General Appendix to Report from Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company, London, 1832, page 88.

and to provide it with no legitimate vent? Who will answer any of these questions in the affirmative? Yet one of them must be answered in the affirmative, by every person who maintains that we ought permanently to exclude the natives from high office....

"It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it."

Regarding Macaulay, Mr. Digby in his "Prosperous British India", truly writes:—

"The climax is reached by Thomas Babington Macaulay, the Member for Leeds, who was in himself—as Law Member in India, as Member of Parliament afterwards—to show that much of what he said was of the tongue merely and not of the heart."

Macaulay was one of those regarding whom Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of Bombay, said:—

"Many of them are anxious for the improvement of the natives, provided it be effected in their own—the European fashion; but not one of them I ever met has a particle of real sympathy with any native who does not belong to the small anglicised class."

On Macaulay should be fathered the phrase "benevolent despotism," on which principle, according to him, the British administration of India should be conducted. He wrote:—

"We know that India cannot have a free government.

But she may have the next best thing—a firm and impartial despotism.”

But Macaulay said justly that:—

“Of all forms of tyranny I believe the worst is that of a nation over a nation.”

President Abraham Lincoln wrote:—

“There is no man good enough to govern another man. It is equally true that there is no nation good enough to govern another nation.”

A German author has also observed:—

“The weight of a foreign yoke . . . is more than ever galling if not supported upon a community of interests. The strong aversion which springs from the contact of characters fundamentally discordant can never be overcome even by consideration of the mutual advantages to be gained from the union, however great the advantages may be. Repugnance and animosity, purely sentimental in their origin, and impossible of suppression by any process of intellectual exercise, are influences as important in national as in individual life.”

History of the World, Vol. VIII, p. 144.

So the phrase “benevolent despotism” has hardly any meaning.

The framers of the Charter Act of 1833, among whom Macaulay played a very prominent part, wanted to govern India on the principle of “benevolent despotism.”* One has to read carefully

* Of course, much cant and nonsense is talked by those Britishers who say that England holds India in trust and for the benefit of the Indian people. Sir Bartle Frere

and between the lines of the above Act and he will be convinced that it was meant for the benefit of the people of England. This Act imposed on India very heavy financial burdens. India was already groaning under heavy taxes, but nothing was done to relieve her. It amplified and extended the provisions of the Charter Act of 1813 intended to benefit the Britishers. The framers of the Act having done so much for the welfare of their own co-religionists and compatriots, it was but natural for them to put on the mask of philanthropy to cover their ulterior designs. That mask of philanthropy is exhibited in section 87 of that Act. Of course they knew that it was not going to be given effect to.

in his convocation speech of the Bombay University in 1867 said:—

“From the days of Clive and Warren Hastings to this hour, there has ever been a continued protest on the part of those who mould the thought and direct the action of the British nation, against the doctrine that India is to be administered in any other spirit than as a trust from God for the good government of many millions of His creatures.”

A Christian judge of one of the Indian High Courts has recently said that India should be governed not in the interests of Indians but for those of Englishmen and that no one appointed the latter as trustors or trustees for Indians! India is a conquered country and therefore Indians have no rights and privileges.

This Act intensified the impetus to the exploitation of India. British India was then unable to pay the heavy expenses of the costly administration it was saddled with. Every year's budget showed a deficit. It was difficult to make both ends meet. Perhaps it was, therefore, that in a secret conclave of the honorable and Christian gentlemen who constituted the Liberal ministry of the day, the conspiracy to annihilate the then existing native principalities was hatched. We make this statement on the authority of General Briggs. In a letter to Major Evans Bell, dated 8th May 1872, General John Briggs wrote :—

"But perhaps I ought not to attribute so much to the personal or free action of Lord Dalhousie, for I have good reason to believe that in Lord Auckland's time, long before the appointment of Lord Dalhousie, there was a conclave of Whig Ministers and magnates at Lord Lansdowne's place, Bowood, to discuss the policy of upholding or of absorbing the Native States, and it was decided that we should avail ourselves of all opportunities for adding to our territories and revenues at the expense of our allies and of stipendiary Princes like the Rajah of Tanjore and the Nawabs of the Carnatic and Bengal. In this Direction the Bombay Government set the example by annexing the inconsiderable principality of Colaba, under the pretext that an adopted heir had no right of succession. This led the way to the more important and more impolitic cases, under Lord Dalhousie, of Jhansi and Nagpore. Lord Dalhousie

only acted on the policy prescribed by the Ministers in England." *Memoir of General John Briggs*, p. 277.

This only can satisfactorily account for the violation of the most sacred and solemn treaties which the British had entered into with the Native Princes of India, and also of that provision of the Charter Act of 1793 which solemnly declared :—

"That to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the *wish, honour and policy* of the nation,"

From what we have already said it must be patent to all that the Charter Act of 1833, like its predecessor of 1813, was meant to circumscribe the liberties enjoyed by the Indian people, to make their lot heavy, and to saddle them with the imposition of new taxes. Clause 87 of this Act was merely a make-believe sort of thing, meant as a blind to cover the ulterior designs of the people of England in India.

The India Reform Society, founded in England, on Saturday, the 12th of March, 1853, issued from time to time, tracts on Indian subjects for the enlightenment of the people of England. The first tract which this Society issued was headed "The Government of India since 1834." In it are brought together all the facts which prove that the East India Company did not govern India so well as to deserve to have

its charter renewed in 1853. A few extracts from this tract are given below :—

"The enquiry in hand, and the issue now raised by the effluxion of the Charter Act can not be better stated than in the language used by the late King. It denotes in the simplest terms, the purpose of the Statute—'the improvement and happiness of the natives of India, and by doing so, it enables the country and the legislature to apply to its success or failure, tests of the *most infallible description*. For there is *nothing* in this world so patent and certain, and easily ascertainable as good government. * * The first step in the enquiry is, therefore, to apply some of the tests of good government to the Government of India, as it has been administered under the system established in 1833.

"I. PEACE.

"Perhaps the most important of these tests is
PEACE. * * * *

"Now since 1834, the Government of India, as established in the preceding year, has, out of the nineteen years that have passed, been for fifteen of them in a state of war. * * *

"These wars were not necessary for the safety,—they have retarded the improvement, and diminished the happiness of the Natives of India, whilst they have exhausted the resources of the Government; but they were the natural result of the system established in 1833; for it wanted the responsibility and the 'correctives' which alone keep human rulers at peace.
* * * *

"Applying then, the test of Peace to the last twenty years, what opportunity, what means, what chances can

a Government occupied more or less with war for fifteen of those years, have had of working out the improvement and the happiness of the Natives? * * *

"II. FINANCES.

* * * * *; PECUNIARY PROSPERITY being the second great test of good Government everywhere.

"In England a deficit in the Treasury is the most heinous of all Government offences, * * * * * Turn to India, and what during the last fourteen years, do we find? Deficit—deficit—deficit. * * * * *

"When the present system of Government was framed in 1833, the military charges of India were about eight millions sterling, or 49 per cent of its net revenue. Twenty years of anticipated 'improvement and happiness' have now almost elapsed and the military charges now exceed twelve millions sterling, and eat up 56 per cent. of the net revenue. * * * * * These are the first results of the legislation of 1833, which arrest our path in clearing the way for legislation in 1853.

"III. MATERIAL IMPROVEMENTS.

"Of course, a system of government which in the last twenty years has gone on increasing its military expenditure from eight to twelve millions sterling, and thus adding to its debt, has had little to spend on what are, in such a country as India, the next evidence of good government—PUBLIC WORKS. * * * * * so that out of a revenue exceeding 21 millions sterling the rate of Government expenditure on public works has, according to Mr. Campbell, been 2¼ per cent, or less than £500,000 a year, spread over a country as large as Europe; * * * * *

"And of these sums so debited against public works, some portion is, it must be borne in mind, spent on barracks and purely military undertakings. The figures, too, include the cost of superintendence, which has some times wasted 70 per cent. of the outlay.

"IV. CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE.

"But, in spite of war, deficit, and want of roads, bridges, harbours, and public works,—in spite of this, the CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE may have improved during the last twenty years? Try the Act of 1833, then by this test. There can be none better or surer."

The writer then goes on to show from official accounts the miserable condition of the Bengal ryot under the Zemindary system,—the Madras ryot under the Ryotwary and the Bombay ryot under the composite system. Then he concludes as follows :—

"But it is on India as a whole that attention must be fixed; and how sad the condition of the cultivator is in Bengal, with a population of 40 millions, how far worse it is in Madras with its 22 millions and how bad it is in Bombay with its 10 millions, the evidence thus briefly produced ** will give some general idea of. It is not merely cultivation that is depressed; it is society itself that is being gradually destroyed. The race of native gentry has already almost everywhere disappeared; and a new danger has arisen—that in another generation or two, the cultivators will not be worth having as subjects. For moral debasement is the inevitable consequence of physical depression. This prospect may be deemed 'satisfactory' by the persons responsible

for it. But to India it is ruin and destruction ; to England it is danger and disgrace."

"V. LAW AND JUSTICE."

"The state of the LAW, the forms of legal procedure, and the ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—these form another test by which to try the legislation of 1833. And these, in the case of that Act, are a special and peculiar test. For law Reform was not only declared to be one of its most prominent objects ; but it contained large and costly provisions to advance that priceless object.

* * * * *

Then, as to the actual state and administration of civil law. In the Regulation Provinces there is nothing worthy of name of law : but to a system unworthy that sacred name, are appended cumbrous legal forms and legal tax. To enter into the courts of what is called justice, it is not only necessary that you should have a plaint, but money to pay (not lawyers but) the Government. So that to all the Company's subjects who cannot commence the search of justice by paying a tax to the Government, the doors of the courts are closed : for them there is neither law nor justice. And having money, what, when admitted, do they find ? Judges, as Mr. Campbell confesses, a scandal to the British name.

* * * * *

"For fifteen years has the criminal law, as administered by the Company's courts, been condemned by Government itself. It is just as fit for the Christian people of this realm as for the Hindu subjects of the Queen in India. * * * * *

"VI. POLICE,

"If there be little or no criminal law, there is, however, a POLICE. But it has, we quote the declaration of 1252 British and other Christian Inhabitants of Calcutta and Lower Bengal in their Petition to the House of Commons, 'not only failed to effect the prevention of crimes, the apprehension of offenders, and the protection of life and property; but it has become the engine of oppression and a great cause of the corruption of the people.' * * * *

"* * * * Tried then by the tests of law, justice, and crime, the legislation of 1833 has not resulted in the improvement and happiness of the natives of India."

"VII. EDUCATION.

"Measure the system of 1833 by the wand of Education, short as we may choose to make it, and the result is worse still. So paltry an item of expenditure is Native Education that it does not even constitute an item in the yearly Finance Accounts laid before Parliament. It is, therefore, impossible to say what percentage of a net revenue of twenty-one millions sterling, is spent on this means of promoting the improvement and happiness of the Natives. But this is well known, that, whereas in Hindoo times every village community had its school, our destruction of village societies or municipalities has deprived the Natives of their schools, such as they were, and has substituted nothing in their stead * * * * In short, out of these 22 millions of people the Indian Government yearly educates 160 ! And when in Bengal the richer natives do send their sons to England for education, the young men, returning competent for, are refused Government employment on the same terms and on the same rank as Europeans. Within the last five

years a Hindoo young gentleman carried off several medical prizes at University College, and received the Diploma of M. D. The Court of Directors, and individual Directors were applied to by some of the most eminent of the retired public servants of India to give Dr. Chuckerbutty a commission as Surgeon in a Native Regiment, but the request was refused. And by gentlemen, too, who, it stands in evidence, have at home spent out of Indian taxation during the last twenty years, the enormous sum of £53,000 in public banquets and more select house dinners. It is not by such educational expenditure, or by such treatment when native gentlemen do educate themselves, that 'the improvement and happiness of the natives of India' can be promoted.

"VIII. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATIVES.

"And the insufficiency of this Test of Education naturally brings us to another, *viz.* the EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES. In our earlier Indian career, Natives were employed in the most important and confidential posts of our government. Our regiments were officered by Natives; in many places we had Native agents and representatives; everywhere we were then obliged to make use of native talent. But in those days Indian patronage was not valuable, and Indian salaries were at least moderate. But, gradually this use of native ability was displaced, and every post of profit, of trust, of value, transferred, at enormous addition to the cost of government—to Englishmen, until at last it became part and parcel of our established policy. The legislation of 1833, however, attempted to remedy this monstrous injustice, by enacting that none should be excluded from any office by reason of religion, place of birth, descent, or colour. But so far from the enactment having reme-

died the wrong, 'this provision' was, according to Mr. Campbell, 'a mere flourish of trumpets and of no practical effect whatever as far as the natives are concerned.' Indeed, according to him, it has been prejudicial rather than advantageous to native employment; 'for,' he adds, 'the only effect has been to open to Europeans offices originally intended for natives.'

"The division between the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services is still kept up: though the covenant itself is absurd and ridiculous, now that the East India Company has nothing to do with trade. And the purpose for which it is maintained is to draw an artificial line by means of which the Natives may continue, however educated, able, and competent, to be excluded from all high and lucrative employment. The Act of 1833 declares that religion, birth, and colour shall not exclude any man from any office. But the Government of India refuses to allow any native, Hindoo, Mahomedan, or Parsee, admission into its covenanted service. Thus it defeats, by a rule of its own, the provision of the legislature of 1833, which particularly aimed at promoting 'the improvement and happiness' of the natives of India, by employing them in the public service; and by their employment reducing the cost of Government. Some few thousands—3,000 or 4,000 out of 150 millions—do indeed get small posts, worth on an average some £30 a year. But any real share in Government administration, trust, and responsibility, is denied the people of India. Yet, in Lord Grey's work on the *Colonial Administration of Lord John Russell's Government*, he is found boasting, how on the Gold Coast of Africa, the Governor summoned its Chiefs into council; and how, out of 'this rude Negro Parliament,' England is there creating an African nation.

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* * * *

"But in India, a people 'learned in all the arts of polished life, when we were yet in the woods,' less favored than the Fantees of Cape Coast Castle, are proscribed as a race of incompetent, helpless incapables, and condemned to everlasting inferiority in lands which their forefathers made famous.

"IX. POPULAR CONTENTMENT.

"Are then the people of India content with the working of the legislation of 1833? It would be strange if they were: and they are not. They do not rebel: they do not resist; they do not rise against the Indian Government; * * * *; for, under the British rule the power of the Government is too strong and well organised for a successful resort to these violent modes of manifesting public opinion. But now that the opportunity has arisen—now that there is a chance of improvement, they petition Parliament. And what say their petitions? That they are happy and prosperous? That they are satisfied with the results of the Act of 1833? That they regard its renewal with contentment and hope? Nothing of the sort. The very reverse, * * * *

"The people of Madras complain that the whole framework of society has been [overthrown, to their injury, and almost to their ruin.

* * * *

"They complain that salt, the only condiment for their tasteless rice, and without which neither they nor their cattle can live, is a Government monopoly,

"They complain that not only are they taxed for their shops in towns, and for stalls and sheds on road sides; but for each tool and implement, of their trades; nay,

for their very knives, *'the cost of which,'* they tell Parliament, *'is frequently exceeded six times over by the Moturpha [Tax] under which the use of them is permitted.'*

"They complain, that in order to raise revenue from ardent spirits, the Government is forcing drunkenness on them; 'a vice,' they add, 'forbidden by Hindu and Mohammedan law.'

* * * *

"If contentment, therefore, be a test of good government, the Act of 1833 has signally failed."

X. "HOME CONTROL.

"Another test yet remains. The Act of 1833 was proposed as a substitute for a constitution. If we cannot, it was then argued by Mr. Macaulay, on behalf of Lord Grey's Government, safely entrust the people of India with popular rights and privileges, we will at least have a constituency at home bound by their own interests to watch over and protect them; a constituency which, to use his exact words, *'shall feel any disorder in the finances of India in the disorder of their own household affairs;* Has this anticipation been realized—has this intention been fulfilled? No; disorders there have been for fifteen years in the finances of India: but those disorders have not been felt in the 'household affairs' of the proprietors of East India stock. Despite Indian deficits, English dividends of ten and a half per cent. have been regularly maintained and 'well and truly paid'. And thus India has lost that English security for good government which Mr. Macaulay announced it was a design of the Act of 1833 to establish.

"But it is unnecessary, * * to pursue the enquiry further. Enough has been sketched, * * to make rational, benevolent, and patriotic men hesitate when

asked to consent to a renewed of the Act of 1833: enough has been stated to make them doubt whether the present system of government is even capable of improvement; enough, we believe, to convince all impartial men that a new plan of Indian administration must be cast."

It was after passing the Act of 1833, that the Company deliberately took the step which had for its object the annexation of all the native states of India by any means—fair or foul—within their power.

CHAPTER LXIX

Macaulay in India

Macaulay was a needy adventurer who came out to this country to shake the pagoda tree and grow rich at the expense of the children of the soil some of whom he had not the scruple to abuse to his heart's content. In a letter to his sister, who shared his "exile" to India, Macaulay wrote on 17th August, 1833 :

"At present the plain fact is that I can continue to be a public man only while I can continue in office. If I left my place in the Government, I must leave my seat in Parliament too. For I must live; I can live only by my pen and it is absolutely impossible for any man to write enough to procure him a decent subsistence, and at the same time to take an active part in politics. * * I have never made more than two hundred a year by my pen. I could not support myself in comfort on less than five hundred, and I shall in all probability have many others to support. The prospects of our family are, if possible, darker than ever."

So he thought of coming out to India to make his fortune. The post of the Law Member was

"of the highest dignity and consideration. The salary is ten thousand pounds a year. I am assured by persons who know Calcutta intimately and have themselves mixed

in the highest circles and held the highest offices at that Presidency, that I may live in splendour there for five thousands a year, and may save the rest of the salary with the accruing interest. I may therefore hope to return to England, at only thirty-nine, in the full vigour of life, with a fortune of thirty thousand pounds. A larger fortune I never desired."

It should be noted that he also received £5000 a year as Law Commissioner. This vast sum was paid to him for nothing.

The appointment of Macaulay to the post of Law Member was of the nature of a jobbery. Prof. Horace Hayman Wilson in his edition of Mill's History of India writes:—

"The power of legislating for all persons and for all courts of justice was advantageously vested in the supreme Government; but it might be doubted whether the association of the Chief Justice as a legal member of the council would not have more effectively and economically answered the purpose, than the special appointment of *an individual from England unfamiliar with the law or the practice of the Indian courts and recommended by no remarkable forensic qualifications.*" (Mill and Wilson's *History of British India*, Vol. IX. p. 394. The italics are ours.)

Macaulay largely contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the genesis of the present unrest in this country. He entertained supreme contempt for everything Indian. His Minute on education was written in such a manner as to outrage the feelings of the people of India. He

who was not acquainted with any of the languages of this vast peninsula—nor cared to know anything of the literature of ancient India,—had yet the audacity to pronounce his contemptuous judgment on them!

Before Macaulay had come to India, a controversy had been going on among important personages, about the best method of imparting education to the natives of India. Two parties had been formed, called the orientalists and the occidentalists. The orientalists included such distinguished men as Horace Hayman Wilson and the Prinsep brothers. The best known man at that time amongst the occidentalists was the Revd. Dr. Duff. The orientalists were for giving an education to the people of this country exclusively in the oriental languages—both classical and modern. The occidentalists, on the other hand, ignored more or less the claims of the oriental languages, and wished that English should be made the medium of instruction. As far back as 1826 the great Raja Ram Mohun Roy had addressed a letter on the subject to Lord Amherst, the then Governor-General of India.* That great Hindu Reformer was an occidentalist, but not of the type of Macaulay. He was a patriot. He favoured the idea that English

* See my *History of Education in India under the rule of the East India Company*.

should be taught as a second language, but should not have been made the medium of instruction.

After his arrival in India, Macaulay also took part in the controversy. He presided over the deliberations of the two parties. The orientalists and occidentalists were equally divided, and the casting vote of Macaulay as President defeated the orientalists.

There can be no doubt that by making English the medium of instruction he wanted to benefit his own country, and at the same time to denationalise the people of India. He wrote to his father in 1836 :—

“It is my firm belief that if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolator among the respectable classes in Bengal, thirty years hence”.

See my *History of education in India under the Company*, pp. 80 and 105.)

Macaulay's object was to undermine the social and religious institutions of India. This is now recognised by the better class of English journalists. *The Indian Daily News*, for instance, wrote in its leader on March 29, 1909, that—

“Lord Macaulay's triumph over the Oriental School, headed by Dr. Wilson, was really the triumph of a deliberate intention to undermine the religious and social life of India.”

Thus it would appear, that in all that he did in and for India Macaulay was not swayed by any

consideration or motive of philanthropy or altruism, but by selfishness—if not quite sordid, at the best enlightened.

The post of the Law Member was created and the natives of this country were saddled with the heavy burden of his pay and allowances, because he was expected to make such laws and regulations as would ensure peace and prosperity in India. In their letter, dated 10th December, 1834, the Court of Directors wrote to the Government of India :

“His (that is, the Law member's) will naturally be the principal share, not only in the task of giving shape and connection to the several laws as they pass, but also in the mighty labour of collecting all that local information and calling into view all those general considerations, which belong to each occasion, and of thus enabling the council to embody the abstract and essential principles of good government in regulations adapted to the peculiar habits, character, and institutions of the vast and infinitely diversified people under their sway.”

Judged by the above standard it must be unhesitatingly pronounced that one and all the Law Members from the time of Macaulay downwards were not fitted for the office to which they were appointed and that they neglected, however unintentionally, the duties appertaining to the post.

Had the Court of Directors been sincere in their professions, they should have appointed an Indian and not a Britisher to the then newly

created post of Law Member, for none but an Indian can be thoroughly acquainted with the peculiar habits, character, and institutions of the vast and infinitely diversified people of India.

Lord Bentinck's minute, dated 31st July, 1834, shows the difficulties of the situation in which the Law Member was placed:—

"It is to this particular point, the exclusion of the fourth member from the ordinary sittings of the council, to which I wish particularly to advert as detracting very much from his usefulness, if not incapacitating him from the very important duties confided to him by the Legislature. Mr. Macaulay has never been in India; and he and his successors, like the greater part of the past and probably of future Governors and Governor-Generals, ... as a stranger to the country for which he is to play the principal part, in making laws and regulations, he certainly may give most useful advice to the council *** Where is he to gain his practical knowledge of the state of society; of its manners, its feelings and its customs? How is he to discover what there is to remedy, to reform, or to preserve? How is he to discover the abuses or the imperfections of our administration in any of its branches, revenue, judicial, or police? How is he to become acquainted with the effect of the existing laws and institutions upon the immense population? He must learn all this somewhere, or he will be a poor legislator. From the people themselves, the main objects of his care, he will learn nothing. They are not consulted, and hitherto they have had no means of making themselves heard. With them he can have little intercourse, and to the greater part of the European residents, any correct information upon all these details is as inaccessible as to

himself. He can only learn his lessons in the same way that all Governors, who have been strangers, have done before him, by following, day by day, the reports of all the functionaries of the Empire..... *The proceedings of the Government contain the only real record of present life, and of the actually passing condition of India, although I must admit that these must remain but a very imperfect index either to the feelings of the people, or to the effect of our laws and regulations, until the natives themselves can be more mixed in their own government and become responsible advisers and partners in the administration.*"

One of the duties of the Law Member was to make laws for the natives of India. This was the effect of the Charter Act of 1833. It has been shown in the last chapter that the laws made did not make for the peace and prosperity of India, and the happiness and enlightenment of its people.

Macaulay drew up the Indian Penal Code. British rule in India had in many respects its prototype in British rule in Ireland. Burke described the Irish Penal Code as

"well-digested and well-disposed in all its parts; a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man."

The above is more or less applicable to the Indian Penal Code also. The judicial system which British rule introduced in India was the best calculated to give insecurity to life and

property and to encourage corruption and litigation. The Marquis of Hastings observed, in a despatch from the Directors to the Bengal Government, dated February, 1819 :—

“The present state of landed property in Bengal may be brought under review as connected with the judicial administration, since it appears to have originated more from the practical operations of legal decisions than from the fiscal regulations of this Government. The powers which have been assumed by the auction purchasers have completely destroyed every shadow of a right in the tenants, and reduced a happy and comparatively rich peasantry to the lowest stage of penury and indigence. We seem to have accomplished a revolution in the state of society, which has, by some unexpected fatality, proved detrimental to general morals, and by no means conducive to the convenience of our Government; since the first establishment of the zillah Courts in 1780, and from the regular organisation of them in 1793, a new progeny has grown up under our hands; the principal features which show themselves in a generation so formed, beneath the shade of our regulations, are the spirit of litigation, which our judicial establishment can not meet, and a morality certainly much deteriorated. If in the system or the practical execution of it, we should be found to have relaxed many ties of moral or religious restraint on the conduct of individuals, to have destroyed the influence of former institutions, without substituting any check in their place, to have given loose to the most forward passions of human nature and dissolved the wholesome control of public opinion and private censure, we shall be bound to acknowledge that our regulations have been productive of a state of things

which imperiously calls upon us to provide an immediate remedy for so serious a mischief."

The Charter Act of 1833 tried to provide a remedy by the appointment of Mr. Thomas Babington Macaulay as Law Member of the Supreme Council of the Government of India. Regarding Macaulay's Penal Code, Mr. W. Theobald, a Calcutta Barrister, told the Select Parliamentary Committee on Colonisation and Settlement (India) on the 2nd April, 1885:—

"The principle of English law is that every person who exercises a power or an authority given by law, must exercise that power or authority according to law and that is a universal principle; and then whether a breach of the law is to involve penalties or simply damages depends, I apprehend, by the principles of English law, merely on the character of the injury. If it is a general injury, or public injury or injury of a serious character, then a breach of the law comes under our penal law; if it is a mere private matter which admits of compensation by damages, then it belongs to the civil law. Now here are the two provisions of Mr. Macaulay's Code;—

'Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is or in good faith believes himself to be commanded by law to do it.'

"Now that establishes an irresponsibility for what is done contrary to law; on what ground? Simply that the person who violates the law, in good faith believes he is acting according to law. *It is monstrous*; I think it does not require any comment. * * *

"The popularity of this code in England rests I be-

lieve, mainly on the authority and high name of Mr. Macaulay; * *. The second proposition in Mr. Macaulay's Code is, 'Nothing is an offence which is done by a person, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of any power given to him by law.'

"I confess I do not quite see in what is the operation of that distinct from the former exception, but it is a principle unknown to and utterly at variance with English law, it establishes an irresponsibility upon the part of all persons having powers of any kind by law, and places them in a state of irresponsibility, notwithstanding a breach of the law; and that merely on the ground of supposing that they were doing right and that there was no malice towards the persons whom they have injured. That is a monstrous principle..... There is, for instance, the right of private defence. I apprehend the law of England on the right of private defence is a most satisfactory law..... The Penal Code is very different."

Of course, the witness was a native of England, and he objected to those sections of the Code which affected the interests of his compatriots in this "land of regrets." Had he been an Indian, he would have condemned the Code in no measured terms. The Code was calculated to degrade the natives of India, though it is difficult to find out to what extent, if any, it was deliberately intended to do so. Every definition of an offence in it is so comprehensive, that many an innocent act might be construed by it into an offence. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Code, especially in

the General Exceptions, which may provide as excellent loopholes for the escape of the really guilty, should occasions arise for it.

Then turning to the question of punishment: How severe are the punishments laid down in the Code for all sorts of offences is a well-known fact. In no other civilised country under the sun, are offenders so severely punished as they are in India. The principle underlying the law is—once a jail-bird, always a jail-bird. There is an attempt to outcast the criminal from society, no idea of reclaiming him as a citizen. The Code is like an iron machine whose business is to forge fetters for the Indian. It depresses him in spirit and has made him less than a man.

Macaulay looked upon India much in the same way as a landlord looks upon his serfs. He wrote :—

“We know that India cannot have a free government. But she may have the next best thing—a firm and impartial despotism.”

He had no heart, no sympathy for the longings and ambitions of educated India, nor had he ever tried to understand them. His idea was to bind India with the fetters of legislation, albeit the chain might be gilded. In his famous speech of the 10th of July, 1833, Macaulay said :—

“I believe that no country ever stood so much in need of a code of laws as India ; and I believe also that

there never was a country in which the want might so easily be supplied. * * * It is a work which especially belongs to a Government like that of India, to an enlightened and paternal despotism."

Mr. Digby observes in his *Prosperous British India*, p. 26 :—

"The climax is reached by Thomas Babington Macaulay, then member for Leeds, who was in himself as Law Member in India, as member of Parliament afterwards—to show that much of what he said was of the tongue merely and not of the heart."

John Bright, in his speech delivered in the House of Commons, on 3rd June, 1853, said :—

"I was not in the House when the Right Hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay) brought forward the Bill of 1833, but I understand it was stated that the Law Commission was to do wonders; yet now we have the evidence of the Right Hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control that the Report of the Law Commission has ever since been going backwards and forwards, like an unsettled spirit, between this country and India. Mr. Cameron in his evidence said ... that the Court of Directors actually sneered at the propositions of their officers for enactments of any kind, and that it was evidently their object to gradually extinguish the Commission altogether. Yet the evidence of Mr. Cameron went to show the extraordinary complication and confusion of the law and law administration over all the British dominions in India."

For nearly twenty years, the various natives of Great Britain who filled the office of the Law

Commissioner or Member of the Council of India did absolutely no work, but they drew during that period the aggregate amount of 35,68,805 Rupees from the Indian revenues.

If the proverb of the mountain in labour bringing forth a mouse is applicable to anything in this world, it is to the labour of the Law Commission. The mouse which was after all brought forth was the India Penal Code. Of late years, the genus to which the mouse belongs has been credited, rightly or wrongly, with the transmission and propagation of the plague. The Indian Penal Code has proved the propagator and transmitter of a sort of moral plague in India. Steps should be taken to destroy this sort of plague, as they have been to destroy rats.

CHAPTER LXX

Sir Charles Metcalfe's Administration (1835-1836)

From the retirement of Lord William Bentinck from India in March 1835 till March 1836, Metcalfe acted as Governor-General of India.

It is not presuming too much to say that he would have followed in the footsteps of Wellesley, had he an opportunity to do so. One of his papers—the very first printed by Kaye in his “Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe”—is a special pleading for the policy pursued by his patron and condemnation of that of Sir George Barlow. Extracts from this paper are given below:—

“The Governor-General (Sir G. Barlow), in some of his despatches, distinctly says that he contemplates in the discord of the native powers an additional source of strength, and, if I am not mistaken, some of his plans go directly and are *designed* to foment discord among those states. * * Lord Wellesley's desire was to unite the tranquility of all the powers of India with our own. How fair, how beautiful, how virtuous, does this system seem; how tenfold fair, beautiful, and virtuous when compared with the other ugly, nasty, abominable one. * * *

“There is a loud cry that we are in danger from

extended dominion. For my part I can contemplate universal dominion in India without much fear."

But he was never confirmed in the appointment of Governor-General of India. The authorities of the East Indian Company, it is alleged, were displeased with him, for his liberating the Indian press. Kaye says:

"The intelligence of what he had done reached them whilst the question of the Governor-Generalship was still an open one. It may have in some measure influenced the decision, * * " (*Lives of Indian Officers*). Vol. I, p. 430)

He was no friend of the natives of India, as is evident from his recorded opinions, extracts from which have already been given before. So his appointment as *pucca* Governor-General of India would not have advanced the interest or happiness of Indians.

CHAPTER LXXI

Lord Auckland's Administration (1836—1841)

When the Peel ministry was formed in 1835, their choice fell on Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone as a fit successor to Lord William Bentinck. In the Elphinstone memorial meeting held on February 16, 1860 at Willis's Rooms, King-street, St. James's, London, Lord Ellenborough said that:

"With the entire concurrence of the late Duke of Wellington, on the formation of Sir Robert Peel's ministry in 1835, he (Lord Ellenborough) had offered to Mr. Elphinstone the high office of Governor-General of India, but the state of his health prevented him from accepting that distinguished position. He had more than once thought how different might possibly have been at that moment our position in India had he been enabled to hold the situation then offered to him."

Elphinstone has recorded in his journals, the real reason why he declined the offer of the Governor-Generalship of India. This has been already quoted in a previous volume.

After Elphinstone's refusal, Sir Robert Peel's Government appointed Lord Heytesbury as Lord William Bentinck's successor. But with the change of the ministry, his appointment was cancelled. In "East and West" for August, 1905 (pp. 795—808.)

a journal at that time conducted by the well-known publicist, Mr. B. M. Malabari of Bombay, Dr. R. Garnett, commenced an article on "a forgotten episode of Indian History," by writing that

"The supersession of Lord Heytesbury, appointed Governor-General of India by Sir Robert Peel's ministry of 1834-35, by the Government which succeeded them in the April of the latter year, attracted much less attention than might have been expected at the time, and has received but little notice from historians."

Dr. Garnett assigns the cause of Lord Heytesbury's supersession to his pro-Russian proclivities. He says:—

"In our opinion, the principal cause of Lord Heytesbury's supersession by the Melbourne ministry, and of the opposition's languor in espousing his cause, was the suspicion, under which he lay, of Russian sympathies. Although at that time, Russia was twice as far from our Indian frontiers as now, the apprehensions and suspicions of her designs were in many quarters more acute than they are at present,"

But to our mind Lord Heytesbury's sympathies with Russia do not seem to be a sufficient cause for his supersession. We suspect that he did not approve of the policy which had then been in vogue to annex Indian states on every possible occasion. Sir John Cam Hobhouse was so much in favour of this, that he was greatly pleased when the Raja of Satara died, for it afforded an opportunity to the Company to annex that principality

(see Story of Satara, p. 232). It was perhaps this consideration which led Hobhouse to write to the King to revoke Lord Heytesbury's appointment. In his letter dated May 1st, 1835 to the King, he wrote

"That it has appeared to your Majesty's confidential servants that if Lord Heytesbury were to proceed to India, his appointment would be, if not formally, at least virtually, their act and they would be justly considered responsible for his Lordship's administration of the Indian Government. As they would not venture to incur such responsibilities except for an individual possessed of their entire confidence, (which cannot be said to be the case with respect to Lord Heytesbury), and as they would not wish to press any other appointment upon the Court of Directors, at the present moment, Sir John Hobhouse would respectfully submit to your Majesty the propriety of waiting for the arrival of Lord William Bentinck before taking any final steps towards deciding upon his successor".

Dr. Garnett in concluding his article writes:—

"It only remains to add that as foreshadowed in Hobhouse's letter to the King, the Governor-Generalship was kept open until Lord William Bentinck's arrival in England in September, when Sir J. Auckland was appointed, . . ."

Thus Lord William Bentinck had a voice in settling the appointment of his successor. Metcalfe and he were not friends, for the former differed from the latter in many essential points of Indian administration, and especially the removal of press

restrictions, which was not palatable to Lord William Bentinck, who, no wonder, did not therefore recomment him to be his successor.

The nobleman who was appointed to succeed Bentinck as Governor-General of India was the Earl of Auckland, whose family surname was Eden. He came out to India accompanied by his two sisters, one of whom was the Hon'ble Miss Emily Eden, whose journal "Up the Country" has delighted, for its literary charm, generations of natives of England, as testified by the several editions the work has run into.

The diabolical plot which was masqueraded under the scheme of the navigation of the Indus in the regime of Lord Bentinck was now to be unraveled and it was revealed to the world in the shape of the first Afghan War. Lord Auckland's administration is an important landmark in the history of British India, because that which has been called the "scientific frontier" has been since his time the object which the Christian rulers of India have been in search of, and like the will-o-the-wisp it is leading them on and on without its being ever discovered. Improvement in the internal administration of the country, as well as the interests and happiness of the millions of the population of India has been sacrificed for the sake of this never to be determined "scientific frontier." If Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, Chitral and a portion

of Afghanistan have been made to lose their independence, and the chain of subjugation is pressing heavily round the necks of the inhabitants of those regions, it is on the ostensible ground that for the imperial interests of England, a "scientific frontier" should be delimited for the Indian Empire.

Afghanistan, which was the scene of action and whose politics was the theme of discussion during the regime of Lord Auckland, was at that time ruled by that astute statesman Dost Muhammad Khan. He had ascended the throne amidst carnage, which used to be the normal state of affairs in that country, not inaptly styled the Switzerland of Asia, whenever any one asserted his claim to its sovereignty. Dost Muhammad being successful, Shah Sooja, the late sovereign, had to leave Afghanistan, and as a wanderer on the face of the earth, at last found an asylum at Ludhiana, living as a fugitive on the bounty of the East India Company.

Lieutenant Burnes, who had navigated the Indus and presented Runjeet Singh with the horses and the coach, received the permission of the Governor-General of India to travel into and explore Central Asia. He received his passports at Dehli, from whence he started on the 3rd of January, 1832. For his companions he had Dr. Gerard, who had made his name by his explorations in the Himalaya, Pandit Mohun Lal, a Cashmiree

Brahmin, who was one of the first alumni of the Dehli College, and a Mahomedan surveyor named Mahomed Ali. Alexander Burnes safely accomplished his journey—traversed Afghanistan, where he was received with great hospitality by every man of rank and importance and especially by its ruler Dost Muhammad, when he passed through Cabul. After a year's sojourn in Central Asia, he returned in 1833, when he proceeded to England.

In England, he was lionised. He himself wrote in one of his letters to his mother,

"I am killed with honours and kindness and it is a more painful death than starvation among the Usheks."*

He had an interview with King William the Fourth. He has himself recorded the conversation he had with his Majesty. He writes :—

"His Majesty immediately began on my travels, and, desiring me to wheel round a table for him, he pulled his chair and sat down by mine. Hereon I pulled out a map, * * I began, and got along most fluently. I told him of the difficulties in Sindh, the reception by Runjeet, &c., but William the Fourth was all for politics, so I talked of the designs of Russia, her treaties, intrigues, agencies, ambassadors, commerce, &c., the facilities, the obstacles regarding the advance of armies—*
*17

The King then got up, (and said) :

* Kaye's *Live of Indian Officers*, Vol. II, p. 26.

"I trust in God that your life may be spared, that our Eastern Empire may benefit by the talents and abilities which you possess. You are entrusted with fearful information : you must take care what you publish. My ministers have been speaking of you to me, in particular Lord Grey. You will tell his Lordship and Mr. Grant all the conversation you have had with me, and you will tell them what I think upon the ambition of Russia. * * * * Lord Grey thinks as I do, that you have come home on a mission of primary importance——second only to the politics of Russia and Constantinople. * * Lord Grey tells me that you have convinced him that our position in Russia is hopeless." (*Ibid*, p. 27).

Here then was the genesis of the First Afghan War. The authorities wanted to interfere in the politics of Afghanistan on the ostensible pretext of Russia's advance towards India. Burnes returned to India and a few months' after his return, arrived Lord Auckland as Governor-General of India. Kaye writes that Auckland :—

"had met Burnes at Bowood, had been pleased with his conversation, and had formed a high opinion of the energy and ability of the young subaltern. When, therefore, the first rude scheme of a pacific policy in the countries beyond the Indus took shape in his mind, he recognised at once the fact that Burnes must be one of its chief agents. So the Cutch assistant [Burnes] was placed under the orders of the Supreme Government, and directed to hold himself in readiness to undertake what was described at the time, and is still known in

history, as a 'commercial mission' to Caubul. Commerce, in the vocabulary of the East, is only another name for conquest. * * and this commercial mission became the cloak of grave political designs." (*Ibid*, p. 33).

So Burnes proceeded at the close of the year 1836 to Caubul at the head of the "commercial mission." Sir John Kaye does not hold Auckland so much responsible for this mission as his predecessor. He writes in a footnote to page 34 of Vol. II of his *Lives of Indian Officers* (Edition of 1867):—

"Lord Auckland, it should be stated, received this as a legacy from Lord William Bentinck, with whom Burnes had been in communication in India, and in correspondence during his residence in England. Whilst at home, Burnes had ceaselessly impressed on the King's ministers, as well as on the Directors of the Company, the importance of not neglecting, either in their commercial or their political aspects, the countries beyond the Indus: * * In one letter to Lord William Bentinck, he wrote that Lord Grey took a too European view of the question, and considered it chiefly 'in connexion with the designs of Russia towards constantinople'; whilst Lord Lausdowne, having "a mind cast in so noble a mould, looked with more interest on the great future of human society than on our immediate relations with those countries." "

Lord Bentinck was restrained from declaring war on any state (except that of Coorg) because of the financial embarrassments in which the Com-

pany's affairs had been placed by the Burmese War. But he was no lover of peace, or friend of the non-Christian and coloured races of Asia. His councillors also took their cue from him, and so when the authorities from the King downwards in England, were brought to book by Burnes on the Central Asian question from the same standpoint as himself, they found no difficulty to induce Auckland to do what suited their views best, Writes Kaye:—

"Lord Auckland was not an ambitious man—quiet, sensible, inclined towards peace, he would not have given himself up to the allurements of a greater game, if he had not been stimulated, past all hope of resistance, by evil advisers, who were continually pouring into his ears alarming stories of deep-laid plots and subtle intrigues emanating from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and of the wide-spread corruption that was to be wrought by the Russian gold." (*Ibid*, p. 34).

The object of the "commercial mission" was to induce Dost Muhammad to throw in his lot with the English against Russia. The Mission entered Caubul on the 20th of September 1837, and was, by orders of the Afghan sovereign, received with great pomp and splendour. But the object of the mission was not achieved. The English wanted to gain every possible advantage from the alliance with the Afghan ruler but not to concede to him anything in return. Dost Muhammad had been shorn of some of his most

valuable eastern districts, especially the fertile valley of Peshawar, by Runjeet Singh. He asked the English as one of the conditions of the alliance that they would exert their best offices to have all those districts of which he had been dispossessed by the Sikh ruler to be restored to him. In this he was not asking too much. He saw before his eyes how the English had prevented Runjeet Singh from acquiring Sindh. The same considerations applied to his case also. But it was not the interest of the Christian Government of India to help the Afghan ruler in his demand. The Sindian was a pusillanimous creature compared to the Afghan and the Sind Government was not so strong as that of Caubul. It was very easy for the English to acquire Sind at any time that suited their convenience. But it was not so with Afghanistan. A century had not yet rolled its course since the Afghan Kingdom had extended as far as the banks of the Jumna. The Sind Ameers as well as the Sikh Chiefs were the vassals of Afghanistan. Marquess Wellesley was always afraid of an invasion from that quarter. To weaken Afghanistan was the policy of that Governor-General. To achieve this end, he intrigued with the rulers of Persia, Sind and the Punjab.

Although at the time of which we are speaking Afghanistan was not so strong as it had been dur-

ing Marquess Wellesley's regime yet it was not to be trifled with, or treated with contempt. So it was not the interest of the English to make Afghanistan a strong power. Moreover, they knew that on the death of Ranjeet Singh, the Punjab would come into their hands and so eventually also the districts of Afghanistan which that Sikh sovereign had acquired from Dost Muhammad. J. P. Ferrier, a French author, whose history of the Afghans was translated by Captain Jesse and published by John Murray of London in 1858, has truly observed:—

"I have no doubt that the English, foreseeing that the Punjab would ere long be theirs, supported Rnnjeet in his spoliations." (P. 276).

Under these circumstances it was not the policy then of the Christian Government of India to accede to the request of Dost Muhammad. They were intriguing and conspiring even to subvert Dost Muhammad's dynasty, because that Afghan was a capable sovereign and hence as a tall poppy he was an eyesore to them and deserved to be cut down. So it was not their interest to make the commercial mission a success.

To achieve their end, they had a tool ready at hand whom they wanted to make use of as a puppet. The ex-King Shah Sooja was a pensioner of the Company. They wanted to depose and dispose of Dost Muhammad and reinstall Shah Sooja on the

throne of Caubul. So while Burnes was trying his best to promote the British alliance with the Ameer, writes Kaye that:—

“Other counsels were prevailing at Simla—that great hot-bed of intrigue on the Himalayan hills—“*. They conceived the idea of reinstating the old deposed dynasty of Shah Soojah, and they picked him out of the dust of Loodhianah to make him a tool and a puppet, * * *” (*Ibid*, p. 36.)

But without a war Shah Soojah could not be re-instated. So the Christian jingoes of Simla determined to go to war with Dost Muhammad.

This first Afghan war derives its importance not so much from the numbers of battles fought, or the success attending one or the other contending party as from the curious sidelight it throws on the national character of the English of those days and on the tortuous course of their diplomacy—certainly not of oriental diplomacy. In the first place, those who ever pinned or even now pin their faith on the genuineness of the Parliamentary books—whether blue or white—were undeceived by the manner in which those books are manufactured. The so-called honourable members of Parliament, whether nobles or commoners, did not consider it inconsistent with their fine sense of honour and honesty, to garble documents and deliberately misrepresent facts and publish lies to the world. The garbled version of the Burnes correspondence

published in the parliamentary papers relating to the First Afghan War very clearly establishes what we have said above. In those papers Burnes was made to appear as favoring the war with Afghanistan. The deliberate lies contained in these papers would never have been known but for their exposure made by the father of Burnes. Great was the sensation caused in England by this exposure, which may be judged from the publications of those days.

As said above, in the parliamentary papers Burnes was made to appear as favoring the war, because Dost Muhammad was not friendly to the English. The reverse of this was the real fact. The passage reproduced below was deliberately suppressed and not published in the official correspondence. On the 30th December 1837, Burnes wrote from Caubul to Mr. Macnaghten:—

“The present position of the British Government at this capital appears to me a most gratifying proof of the estimation in which it is held by the Afghan nation. Russia has come forward with offers which are certainly substantial. Persia has been lavish in her promises, and Bokhara and other states have not been backward. Yet, in all that has passed or is daily transpiring, the *Chief of Caubul declares that he prefers the sympathy and friendly offices of the British to all these offers, however alluring they may seem, from Persia or from the Emperor*—which certainly places his good sense in a light more than prominent, and, in my humble judgment, proves that, by an earlier attention to these countries,

we might have escaped the whole of these intrigues, and held long since a stable influence in Caubul."

Similarly other passages which placed Dost Muhammad's conduct in a favorable light were deliberately omitted from the published correspondence. Thus when the Russian officer Captain Vickovich was alleged to have brought letters from the Czar to Dost Mahammad, seeking an alliance with him, the latter went to Burnes for counsel and guidance. Burnes reported the incident to the Supreme Government of India. But the passages in the correspondence which were favorable to Dost Muhammad were not printed.

Regarding the garbled manner in which the parliamentary papers regarding the first Afghan War were issued, Kaye writes with just indignation :

"I cannot, indeed, suppress the utterance of my abhorrence of this system of garbling the official correspondence of public men—sending the letter of a statesman or diplomatist into the world mutilated, emasculated—the very pith and substance of them cut out by the unsparing hand of the state-anatomist. The dishonesty by which lie upon lie is palmed upon the world has not one redeeming feature. If public men are, without reprehension, to be permitted to lie in the face of nations—wilfully, elaborately, and maliciously to bear false witness against their neighbours, what hope is there for private veracity? In the case before us the *suppressio veri* is virtually the *assertio falsi*. The character of Dost Mahomed has been lied away; the character of Burnes has been lied away; Both, by the mutilation of the

correspondence of the latter, have been fearfully misrepresented—both have been set forth as doing what they did not, and omitting to do what they did. I care not, whose knife—whose hand did the work of mutilation. And, indeed, I do not know. I deal with principles, not with persons; and have no party ends to serve. The cause of truth must be upheld. Official documents are the sheet anchors of historians—the last courts of appeal to which the public resort. If these documents are tampered with, if they are made to misrepresent the words and actions of public men, the grave of truth is dug, and there is seldom a resurrection. It is not always that an afflicted parent is ready to step forward on behalf of an injured child, and to lay a memorial at the feet his sovereign, exposing the cruelty by which an honourable man has been represented in state documents as doing that which was abhorrent to his nature. In most cases the lie goes down unassailed and often unsuspected, to posterity, and in place of sober history, we have a florid romance. ”

The “commercial mission” was a failure. “Burnes asked for every thing; but promised nothing. He had no power to make any concessions.” So Burnes with the commercial mission left Caubul on the 26th of April, 1838 and in a few days’ time arrived at Simla.

The Russian agent was biding his time and after the departure of the English “commercial mission”, his influence was paramount in the court of the Afghan ruler. Kaye says:—

“Burnes went; and Vickovich, who had risen greatly in favour, soon took his departure for Herat, promising

everything that Dost Mahomed wanted—engaging to furnish money to the Barukzye chiefs, and undertaking to propitiate Runjeet Singh."

The fiat had gone forth at Simla that war should be declared against Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad be deposed and Shah Sooja be reinstalled on the throne of Caubul.* So when

* Mr. Keene in an appendix to his history of India gives the genesis of the first Afghan war. He says that:—

"By the courtesy of the India Office in allowing access to the despatches of the period—never before published, or only in an imperfect form—the whole facts of the case are now, for the first time, forthcoming.

In concluding the Appendix, he writes:—

"From the papers it can only be concluded that the mind of Lord Auckland had been gradually influenced, until he became impressed with the necessity of substituting the Saduzai dynasty—the 'Duranic Empire' as it was called—for the Amirate of the Dost, led thereto by fear of Persia and Russia. But it appears almost equally certain that the British Ministry made that policy their own; not merely by adoption but by prior suggestion and subsequent encouragement, so that they would even have enjoined it on the Governor-General if he had not originated it himself. Without seeing private correspondence, long since beyond reach, no more can be known; but Palmerston did much of his work, it is understood, by that channel, in India known as 'semi-official.'"

"Captain Burnes did not cease to press on the attention of government the danger from Persia and Russia; and his desire for action was admirably seconded by

Burnes reached Simla the conspirators in that summer capital of India prevailed upon him

"not to spoil the 'great game' by dissuading Lord Auckland from the aggressive policy to which he had reluctantly given his consent." (Kaye's *Lives*. II. p. 36).

Burnes was not a strong-minded man. He yielded to the persuasive eloquence of that arch-

letters he received from England. I have a note in which is written, 'I send you a letter to read from the chairman of the directors, who in truth wishes to *walk on*. I wish they would be moved who are nearer.' This letter from the chairman was certainly a singular one, for it announced no less than a determination to take the Punjab, Captain Burnes being promised the conduct of the expedition. Sir John Hobhouse, in his speech to the House of Commons on the 23rd June, 1842, states that 'a despatch to Lord Auckland at the end of October, 1838, instructed his lordship in council to pursue *very nearly* the same course, which, it afterwards appeared, he had adopted without knowing our opinions.' It appears, therefore, his lordship did not pursue *quite* the course recommended by Sir John Hobhouse and the Secret Committee, and it is not impossible the slight error was made of marching to Kabul instead of to Lahore—at least, such may be inferred from this letter of the chairman, who was one of the Secret Committee. This letter was sent by Captain Burnes to Lord Auckland through the private secretary, Mr. Colvin, and came back with the expression of his lordship's approval."

Mason's *Travels*, Vol. III, pp. 471-472.

conspirator, Macnaghten, a model Christian to boot, and a distinguished linguist, and J. R. Colvin, whose voice was paramount in the council of the Supreme Government.

The war being decided upon, a proclamation was issued which was a tissue of falsehoods of the most audacious kind conceivable.

But before the issue of this proclamation a Treaty, what is known as Tri-partite, was concluded between the East India Company on one hand and Runjeet Singh and Shah Sooja on the other. This Treaty is the most nefarious transaction that ever disgraced the diplomatic annals of any nation or country. By it the existence of the state of Sindh was doomed. Runjeet Singh was an unwilling party to this treaty, but perhaps he calculated upon securing some advantages for his principality from this diplomatic blunder on the part of the Anglo-Indian government of India.

From the military and strategical viewpoint also, this expedition to Afghanistan was a blunder. As a military genius, Runjeet Singh must have seen through it. He had a series of grievances against the British Government of India. He had been prevented from extending his influence over the country situated between the Sutlej and Jumna and more recently he saw how the Company's Government brought Sind under their sphere of influence, forbidding him, as it were, to move

in that quarter. All these things were rankling in his breast and he thought here was an opportunity for him to pay the British Government of India in their own coins and with simple and compound interest also. But, unfortunately, he died shortly after the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty to which he was a party.

It is unnecessary to mention in detail the movements of troops from various quarters—from the Bombay side, which navigating the Indus passed through Sind and Baluchistan and also from Northern India, which passed through the Punjab and Khyber Pass, and their entrance into Afghanistan. It is equally unnecessary to name the various military officers who were in command of these troops.

But it is necessary to allude to the manner in which the Ameers of Sind were treated by the British Government of India on the occasion of this expedition into Afghanistan. Without the consent of the Sind Ameers of Hyderabad, the British troops forced their passage up the Indus and through their country, and when they resented the conduct of the Christian Government of India which was against all precedents of International Law and which no existing treaty with them allowed, they were threatened with extermination. *Nolens volens* they submitted.*

* Kaye writes :—

"Injustice ever begets injustice. It was determined

But the British Government were not content with forcing the passage of their troops through the territory of the Ameers, but contributions were also exacted from them. They were made to look upon themselves as vassal of Shah Sooja—their King whom they were asked to support with money. A new treaty was forced upon them. Regarding this transaction it is recorded :

"Captain Eastwick seized the opportunity to administer the black dose of his mission to his hosts...The Amirs listened composedly, ... When the reading was over, the Biluchis showed great excitement. At this time a

by the Simla Council that Shah Soojah and the Army of the Indus should be sent through the country of the Ameers. To accomplish this, it was necessary that, in the first instance, an existing treaty should be set aside. When the Ameers consented to open the navigation of the Indus, it was expressly stipulated that no military stores should be conveyed along the river. But as soon as ever Lord Auckland had resolved to erect a friendly power in Afghanistan and to march a British army across the Indus, it became necessary to tear this prohibitory treaty to shreds, and to trample down the scruples of the Ameers." (*History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I. p. 398).

* * * *

"The Ameers were known to be weak; and they were believed to be wealthy. Their money was to be taken; their country to be occupied; their treaties to be set aside at the point of the bayonet but amidst a shower of hypocritical expressions of friendship and good will." *Ibid*, Vol. I. p. 401.

slight signal from their Highnesses would have been sufficient to terminate the lives of all our party under the swords of the barbarian and remorseless Biluchis, ... Mr. Nur Mohamed first observed, in Biluchi, to his two colleagues, 'Cursed be he who puts reliance upon the promises of the Feringees;' and then, addressing himself seriously to the British representative, he spoke thus in Persian; 'your treaties, I believe, are changeable at your pleasure and convenience; is this the way to treat your friends and benefactors? You asked our permission to allow your armies a free passage through our territories. We granted it without hesitation, Had we known that, after the entrance of your army into our lands, you would threaten our safety, and enforce another treaty upon us, demanding an annual tribute of three hundred thousand rupees, and a ready payment of two million one hundred thousand rupees for the immediate expense of the army, we would, in such case, have adopted measures for the security of our country and persons....'

"Captain Eastwick heard all this with calmness, and gave brief replies in Persian and Arabic proverbs, Mr. Nur Mohamed smiled, and spoke to his cousins in Biluchi, and then, with sigh, he said to Captain Eastwick, 'I wish I could comprehend the meaning of the word 'friend' which you use. We cannot give a decisive reply to your present demands at once'" (*Autobiography of Lutfullah*, pp. 294-296).

Regarding the treatment meted out to the Ameer of Khyrpoor, a French author, J. P. Ferrier, says:—

"When the British forces entered Sindh, the venerable chieftain (Mir Rustam of Khyrpoor) acceded to all the sacrifices imposed upon him. When asked by the English

to *lend them during their operations in Afghanistan* the fortress of Bukkar,....the demand appeared to him too humiliating. 'It is,' he said, 'at once the bulwark and the heart of my country, and my honor forbids that I should trust that in the hands of strangers.' Nevertheless he allowed himself to be persuaded.... He *lent* them the fortress of Bukkar—it has never been out of their hands since, and to recompense his generous conduct towards them they despoiled him five years afterwards of the rest of his territory, and possessed themselves also of that of his brothers and nephews. The officers of General Napier invaded even the harems of these unfortunate princes and carried off the treasures, jewels and even the clothes of their women."

Is it any wonder then that the Sind Ameers were provoked to intrigue and conspire against the Government of India, against whom they had legitimate grievances?

The excesses committed by British officers on the line of march will be understood from the following recorded by an English author accompanying the British force. He narrates what followed upon the capture of a number of wild Baluchis in the act of carrying off some of the camels of the expeditionary force:—

"Every day was now destined to have its catastrophe: ten Beloochees had been summarily executed on this ground by Colonel Sandwith of the First Regiment of Native Cavalry, under written orders from Sir John Keane, as his Excellency passed with the Bengal Column. The first order was a verbal one, but Colonel Sandwith, not liking it, required a written one, and received it on

half a sheet of note-paper. He has had the wisdom to preserve it. The poor wretches had their elbows secured, and were made to sit on the ground; when each had a bullet sent through his brain from a carbine. Lieutenant Lock, the officer who superintended the execution, spoke very feelingly of what he had been no willing agent in. Some of them, he said, sat quietly down and submitted to their fate; some resisted, and, to keep them quiet, the execution party fastened their heads together by their long luxuriant hair, which served to secure them for their destruction. Two young lads seemed horrified to bewilderment by their fears, and implored for mercy, seizing the feet and knees of the superintending officer, but they were made to sit down. Ere the fatal volley exploded, they were endeavouring to embrace, leaning their heads against each other, weeping bitterly their last farewell. ””

The troops led by British officers entered Afghanistan and like Cæsar they could have exclaimed that they went, they saw and they conquered. The *ostensible* object with which the Government of India had proclaimed the war, was now gained. Shah Sooja was reinstalled on the throne of his ancestors and he was a mere puppet in the hands of his allies.

Dost Muhammad was made a prisoner and sent to India.

The objects for which the war in Afghanistan had been undertaken, were now accomplished, and

* *Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of Indus in Sindh and Kabul*, in 1838-39. By P. H. Kennedy, 2 vols. London, 1840. Vol. II, p. 228.

had the British been honest and sincere in their declarations, they should have immediately cleared out of Afghanistan. It was difficult for the Afghans to understand the British policy.

Writes Mohan Lal in his *Life of Dost Mahomed Khan* :—

"We neither took the reins of Government in our own hands, nor did we give them in full powers into the hands of the Shah. Inwardly or secretly we interfered in all transactions, contrary to the terms of our own engagement with the Shah; and outwardly we wore the mask of neutrality. In this manner we gave annoyance to the king, on the one hand, and disappointment to the people on the other." (P. 313).

"Whatever we might boast of our diplomatic success during the campaign of Afghanistan, we were certainly very wrong in not keeping up our adherence, even for a short time, to those engagements and promises which we had so solemnly and faithfully made to the various chiefs, in return for their taking up our cause and abandoning their long known and established masters. Our letters, pledging our honour and Government to reward and appreciate their services for our good, were in their hands; and as soon as we found that the chiefs of Candahar were fled, and there was no necessity for wearing longer the airy garb of political civilities and promises, we commenced to fail in fulfilling them. There are, in fact, such numerous instances of violating our engagements and deceiving the people in our political proceedings, within what I am acquainted with, that it would be hard to assemble them in one series." (Pp. 208—209)

The "game" which the British were playing in Afghanistan was of the same nature as they had

successfully played in India, ever since the battle of Plassey. The position of Dost Muhammad was that of Siraj-ud-dowla, and of Shah Sooja that of Meer Jaffer. Just as the British held the military occupation of Bengal, so their stay in Afghanistan was of the nature of a military occupation. Sir William Macnaghten, the ambassador or the chief of the Political Staff in Afghanistan, had his prototype in Clive. In fact that model British Civilian was copying that arch forgerer Clive in his dealings with the people of Afghanistan.

In India it is very easy to play off caste against caste, and creed against creed. Hence the administration of India can be carried on without much difficulty on the doctrine of "Divide et impera." But it was somewhat difficult to act upon it in Afghanistan, because the Afghans after all had no system of caste, and they were votaries of one creed. Yet Macnaghten and his assistants left no stone unturned to act on the doctrine of 'Divide et impera' and other maxims of Machiavellian policy in their dealings with the people of Afghanistan. In Mohan Lal they found a tool ready at hand to give effect to their nefarious scheme. In his *History of the Afghan War*, Kaye writes :—

"The Moonshee (Mohun Lal) seems to have been endowed with a genius for traitor-making, the lustre of

which remained undimmed to the very end of the War." (P. 459 of Vol. I. Fourth Edition of 1890).

"This Mohun Lal had other work entrusted to him He was not directed merely to appeal to the cupidity of the chiefs, by offering them large sums of money to exert their influence in our favour. He was directed, also, to offer rewards for the heads of the principal insurgents. As early as the 5th of November [1841], Lieutenant John Conolly, who was in attendance upon Shah Soojah in the Balla Hissar, wrote thus to Mohun Lal :—

"Tell the Kuzzilbash chiefs, Shereen Khan, Naib Sheriff, in fact, all the chiefs of Sheeah persuasion, to join against the rebels. You can promise one lakh of rupees to Khan Shereen on the condition of his killing and seizing the rebels and arming all the Sheeahs, and immediately attacking all rebels. This is the time for the Sheeahs to do good service. Tell the chiefs who are well disposed, to send respectable agents to the Envoy. Try and spread "nifak" among the rebels. In everything that you do consult me, and write very often."

"And in a postscript to this letter appeared the ominous words, 'I promise 10,000 rupees for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs.'" (*Ibid*, p. 202).

"But the Moonshee, perplexed by doubts rather than burdened with scruples, did not see very clearly at first how the chiefs were to be taken off; so he wrote to the envoy that 'he could not find out by Lieutenant Conolly's notes how the rebels are to be assassinated, but the men now employed promise to go into their houses and cut off their heads when they may be without attendants'.

"The victims said to have been first marked for the assassin's knife were Abdoolah Khan and Meer Musjedjee." (*Ibid*, pp. 218—219).

The policy which they were acting upon was not so much "oriental" but "occidental" in its nature.

The scandalous conduct of the politicals and other officers of the British race should also be referred to here. It will be well to express their conduct in the words of one of their own compatriots, the renowned historian of the War in Afghanistan.

"The temptations which are most difficult to withstand, were not withstood by our English officers. The attractions of the women of Caubul they did not know how to resist. The Afghans are very jealous of the honour of their women; and there were things done in Caubul which covered them with shame and roused them to revenge. The inmate of the Mahomedan Zenana was not unwilling to visit the quarters of the Christian stranger. For two long years, now, had this shame been burning itself into the hearts of the Caubulees; and there were some men of note and influence among them who knew themselves to be thus wronged. Complaints were made; but they were made in vain. The scandal was open, undisguised, notorious. Redress was not to be obtained. The evil was not in course of suppression. It went on till it became intolerable and the injured then began to see that the only remedy was in their own hands. It is enough to state broadly this painful fact." (*Ibid*, pp. 143—144)

The natives of Afghanistan saw their harems invaded, their women ravished, their country plundered, and everything which they held sacred, dese-

erated. The sight which met their eyes day after day was enough to make their blood boil with indignation at the conduct of the British. It was much more than the flesh and blood of any man, especially of the proud Afghan, could put up with. Long centuries of subjection have made Indians peace-loving creatures. But the haughty Highlanders of Afghanistan, whose necks never chafed under any foreign yoke, could not tolerate the misdeeds and high-handed proceedings of the English any longer in their country. They had formed a very low opinion of the English. They found them to be wanting in all sense of honour, honesty and morality.

So the Afghans, who had suffered long and patiently, seeing that the English did not fulfill all the promises which they had made, revolted against them and determined to clear their country of their hated presence. The puppet whom the English had set up was an object of great abhorrence to them. Shah Sooja, according to their mode of thinking (and it must be admitted that it was the right one too), was the cause of all their troubles and miseries. He should be removed from their country. So the throne of Caubul restored to Shah Sooja through the aid of the English, was not a bed of roses to him. No, the restored throne cost him his life. The poor fellow, when he made up his mind to bid adieu to his native land for

ever and return once more to the place of refuge he had found in the Company's territory, and when he was on his way thither, was shot like a dog by one of his infuriated countrymen.

Another man whom the inhabitants of Afghanistan hated most bitterly was Sir Alexander Burnes. They looked upon him as a mean and despicable wretch, who, after having sojourned in their country and been treated with most lavish hospitality, betrayed them and brought on all the calamities from which they were suffering. He appeared to them to have been a spy. International Law allows spies to be given the shortest shrift. So Burnes deserved a traitor's death. And this was what actually befell him. He was murdered in broad daylight by the infuriated mob of Caubul.

Macnaghten could not play with safety the role of Clive in Afghanistan or the English just what they had done in Bengal some eighty years previously. Afghanistan was made too hot for them, and as prudence is the best part of valour, they considered their safety lay in retreat from that country. So they promised to restore Dost Muhammad to the throne of Afghanistan. A treaty to that effect was made with Dost Muhammad's son Akbar Khan. The behaviour of the English was anything but honest and straightforward in their dealings with the Afghans. Especially their envoy, Macnaghten, had become infamous

from his brutal and inhuman conduct, and the nation to which he belonged could not be safely trusted by the Afghans. So the latter demanded hostages of the English as a guarantee that they would fulfill their promises by clearing out and restoring Dost Muhammad as ruler of Afghanistan.

But Macnaghten was not honest in his professions and the proposals which he made to Akbar Khan. He meant treachery. Kaye, as an apologist of his compatriot Macnaghten, writes:—

"It is not easy to group into one lucid and intelligible whole all the many shifting schemes and devices which distracted the last days of the envoy's career. It is probable that at this time he could have given no very clear account of the game which he was playing. His mind was by this time unhinged—his intellect was clouded; his moral perceptions were deadened."....

But his treacherous conduct cost Macnaghten his life. Macnaghten had a conference with Akbar Khan in which he was shot dead by that Afghan chief. Of course, English historians have accused Akbar Khan of treachery. But Syed Feda Husain, a recent Muhammadan writer, after consulting the contemporary records of that period, has recorded his opinion that treacherous conduct should not be attributed to Akbar Khan but to the Envoy. In a review of his work, entitled "Nairang-i-Afghanistan," in *The Modern Review* for February 1907 (p. 224), we read:—

"Macnaghten wrote to Akbar Khan assuring him of

his friendship and asking for an interview and concluded his letter by warning Akbar Khan against some of his sirdars and advising him to get himself rid of them. He at the same time wrote to these very sirdars inciting them against Akbar Khan. Akbar Khan on receiving this letter called a council of his sirdars and showed it to them. Then the sirdars, too, brought forward their letters and the 'diplomacy' of Macnaghten was exposed. Akbar Khan kept quiet for the time being and arranged the interview as described by Macnaghten. When Macnaghten went to meet Akbar Khan, he ordered a portion of his troops to lie in ambush, instructing their commander to rush forward at a given signal. When the interview took place, Akbar Khan began to reproach Macnaghten for his treachery and asked him to explain the meaning of those letters, written to himself and his sirdars. When Macnaghten was trying to explain his conduct, an Afghan came running to Akbar Khan and, speaking in Pashtu, informed him of the movement of English troops, which had been deputed to lie in ambush. On this both Akbar Khan and Macnaghten stood up and an altercation ensued. The first shot was fired by Macnaghten and he was killed by Akbar Khan. Now, if these facts are correct, small blame attaches to Akbar Khan for killing Macnaghten. And incidents such as these go a long way to explain the distrust and hatred with which the Afghans regard the 'Feringhees.' "

Thus then perished Shah Sooja, Burnes and Macnaghten—the triumvirate who were the principal actors in the drama of Afghan politics. The British force which occupied Afghanistan was now compelled to retire from that country.

The retreat began in the depth of winter and

after the British had been sufficiently humiliated by having to keep in the custody of the Afghan authorities some of their officers with their wives as hostages. But the retreat proved more disastrous to the English than any field of battle. All those men, women, children and followers who sallied out of Caubul on their way back to India, except in one solicary instance, either perished on the road or were made captives by the Afghans. That solitary instance was of that Dr. Brydon, who arrived at Jelalabad and reported his belief that he was the sole survivor of an army of some sixteen thousand men.

Such then was the story of the first attempt made for the establishment of the British supremacy in Caubul and its failure with great humiliation. The first Afghan War was not only a blunder but a crime and a sin. "The wages of sin is death." It proved more than death to the British. Their prestige was gone and the reputation of their being ever successful in military strategy or Machievellian diplomacy was blasted as if for ever. Kaye in concluding his chapter on the retreat from Caubul writes:—

"It would be unprofitable to enter into an inquiry regarding all the minute details of misdirection and mismanagement, making up the great sum of human folly, which was the permitted means of our overthrow. In the pages of a heathen writer over such a story as this would be cast the shadow of a tremendous Nemesis.

The Christian historian uses other words, but the same prevailing idea runs, like a great river, through his narrative; and the reader recognises one great truth, that the wisdom of our statesmen is but foolishness, and the might of our armies is but weakness, when the curse of God is sitting heavily upon an unholy cause. 'For the Lord God of recompenses shall surely requite'."

The procedure of the British to retrieve their reputation for military skill, and the means adopted to rescue the prisoners of their creed and race from the hands of the Afghans and the manner in which they wreaked their vengeance on the Moslem Highlanders, belong properly to the regime of another Governor-General and not that of Lord Auckland. So we close here the first part of the narrative of the Afghan War.

CHAPTER LXXII

Lord Ellenborough's Administration. (1842-1844)

Lord Auckland's administration, especially the war in Afghanistan ending in disasters unparalleled in the history of Anglo-Indian government, as well as the critical situation of the Indian finances, made him very unpopular with almost every section of people in England and India. The muddle and confusion in which the Afghan and Indian affairs were thrown required a man at the helm of the supreme local government in India who was well acquainted with Indian politics and not a mere novice in Indian statecraft. The authorities at home thought that they had such a man in Lord Ellenborough. His lordship had three times held the office of President of the Board of Control, East India Company, a situation which corresponds to that of the Secretary of State for India in modern times.* He had also taken part in the debate in

* In his speech before departing for India, at the dinner given in his honour by the Court of Directors of the honourable East India Company, November 3, 1841, Lord Ellenborough said:—

“Sir, it is one of the advantages I derive from having

Parliament on the occasion of the renewal of the East India Company's charter in 1833.

The war in Afghanistan was a very unpopular one. The authorities wanted to terminate it and withdraw the British forces from that country with as good grace as possible. Lord Ellenborough had always denounced that war in terms of severe censure. On September 15, 1841, he wrote to Her Majesty the Queen Victoria as follows:—

“It appeared that the political and military charges now incurred beyond the Indus amounted to 1,250,000£ a year; that the estimate of the expense of the additions made to the army in India since April 1838, was 1,138,750£ a year; and that the deficit of Indian revenue in 1839-40 having been 2,425,625£, a further deficit of 1,987,000£ was expected in 1840-41.

“Your Majesty must be too well informed of the many evils consequent upon financial embarrassment and entertains too deep a natural affection for all your subjects, not to desire that in whatever advice your Majesty's confidential servants may tender to your Majesty with respect to the policy to be observed in Afghanistan, they should have especial regard to the effect which the protracted continuance of military

three times held the office of President of the Board of Control, first through the confidence of my noble friend [the Duke of Wellington] and since twice through the confidence of my right honourable friend Sir Robert Peel, that I proceed to India with some knowledge, and therefore, with no ungenerous distrust, of those I am appointed to govern.”

operations in that country, still more any extension of them to a new and distant field, would have upon the finances of India, and thus upon the welfare of eighty millions of people who acknowledge your Majesty's rule."

So the choice of the authorities naturally fell on him and he was accordingly appointed Governor-General of India to succeed Lord Auckland. His policy in governing India was foreshadowed in his speeches, especially that of July 5th, 1833, delivered from his place in the House of Lords. On that occasion, his lordship is reported to have said:—

"No man in his senses would propose to place the political and military power in India in the hands of the natives.* * * *

"Our very existence in India depended upon the exclusion of the natives from military and political power in that country. We were there in a situation not of our own seeking, in a situation from which we could not recede without producing bloodshed from one end of India to the other. We had won the Empire of India by the sword, and we must preserve it by the same means, doing at the same time everything that was consistent with our existence there for the good of the people."^{*}

Yes, Lord Ellenborough was an ardent advocate of holding India by the sword. So when he was appointed Governor-General, he turned for advice

* Hansard, Vol XIX. third series, page 191.

to the two brothers, the Marquess Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington.*

*In his speech before departing for India, at the dinner given in his honour by the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, Nov. 3, 1841, he said:—

“If there be anything, however, which gives to me advantages over other men in the prosecution of that sole object of a good Government, the conferring of benefits upon the people, it is that, placed thirteen years ago at the head of the India Board by the noble duke near me [the Duke of Wellington], I have from that time to the present communicated confidentially with him upon all great questions relating to India, and I have endeavoured to make myself acquainted with the general views and principles according to which he thought those questions should be decided. * * It is my greatest satisfaction—it is my highest pride, that I proceed to take upon myself the government of India in the possession of his confidence. It is the best support that Government could receive.”

Ellenborough was always for war and not peace. Lord Colchester, who edited his letters and correspondence, wrote in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1899 (p. 238):—

“It is quite true that Lord Ellenborough’s ambition was to be a military statesman. A boy during the earlier part of the great war with Napoleon, approaching manhood at the commencement of the Peninsular struggle, he had originally desired to enter on a military career, and when at the wish of his father he gave up such aspirations for Parliamentary and political life, he desired to influence military as well as civil affairs by the

The parts which these two brothers played in the closing years of the eighteenth and the first few years of the nineteenth centuries in robbing millions of Indians of their independence and firmly imposing the yoke of the rule of England on their necks, are such well known facts of British Indian history that they need not be dilated upon here. Elleuborough's guides, friends and philosophers were then the two brothers named above. He tried to emulate their examples and follow in their footsteps.

But the diplomatists of the Christian countries of the West know how to cover their ulterior designs. Lord Ellenborough was no exception to that rule. He very loudly proclaimed that as Governor-General of India he would govern that country upon peace principles and do everything in his power to direct the due cultivation of the arts of peace. At the dinner given in his honour by the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, November 3, 1841, before departing for India, Lord Ellenborough said :—

To terminate the war with China by a peace honourable to the Crown and desirable in its provisions to establish tranquility on both banks of the Indus—in a word, *to restore peace to Asia*, and with peace, 'that sense of entire security, without which peace itself is

power of speech, which, as he said, was the great instrument of an English statesman."

almost valueless, from that peace, so secured, to draw the means of creating a surplus revenue, the best guarantee of public improvement, and of liberal, even *honest* Government—in possession of that surplus revenue, to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the Mahomedan Emperors, in their great works of public utility, to perfect and extend the canals of irrigation * * gradually, I say, gradually and cautiously, and with due circumspection and regard for the feelings and even the prejudices of the natives of India, to impart to them whatever of the useful knowledge we have ourselves inherited or acquired, and thus to elevate the character and extend the happiness of that great and faithful people.”

The sentiments regarding the promotion of the happiness of the natives of India were very noble but they were never carried into execution. Hence his saying that “*henceforth my first duty is to the people of India*,” should be regarded as a mere hypocritical expression of one trained in the school of Machievellian diplomacy.

It has been said above that he turned for advice and guidance to the two brothers, the Marquess Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington. Wellesley was still alive, and the advice which he gave to Ellenborough may be judged from the memorandum from which the following extracts are made:—

“Although I never evinced a warlike policy in India as suitable to our condition or calculated either for our safety or our glory, I was not ignorant that our tenure

of India originally rested on a military basis, and must be preserved by the maintenance of our military strength.

"The condition in which I found our army was, therefore, a total departure from the first necessary principles of our existence among the Powers of India, and I proceeded instantly to correct that vital defect.

"This is the first object which must be brought under the consideration of the Governor General of India. * * * *

* * "At all times, therefore, the British power in India should possess, and maintain in activity and discipline, an adequate army (as it was termed in my time) 'in the field.'

"The principal stations of the army should be on our northern and western frontiers.

* * * *

"Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Cabul, with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Shooja had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England ; although perhaps the ends of criminal justice may require the presence of a British force there for some time. I hope this point will be left entirely to your discretion.

"In a case somewhat similar I was enabled to bring the murderers of Mr. C. Zerry and other officers to justice. If your Lordship can do the same by the murderers of Sir W. Macnaghten, I shall rejoice."

Ellenborough was on more intimate terms with the Duke of Wellington than with the Marquess Wellesley. Their correspondence relating to Indian affairs has been edited and published by Lord Colchester, to which very frequent reference will be made.

It is necessary here to say that Ellenbrough tried to act on every letter of the advice given to him by Wellesley. Of course it was impossible to retain Afghanistan while the Punjab and Sind were still independent. So it was a counsel of perfection on the part of Wellesley to tell Ellenbrough to "reject Afghanistan and Cabul."

Before leaving England, he marked out the Punjab and Nepal as the states whose independence he was desirous of destroying and annexing them to the British dominions. In his letter, dated October 15, 1841, to the Duke of Wellington, he wrote:—

"I have requested Lord Fitzroy to employ him [Lieut. Durand] at once in obtaining all the information he can with respect to the Punjab, and making a military memorandum upon the country for your consideration. I am most anxious to have your opinion as to the general principles at least upon which a campaign against that country should be conducted.

"Lieutenant Durand will likewise make a memorandum upon the frontier country of Nepaul, and recall to your recollection the circumstances of the war with that state."

Again, he commenced his letter of 26th October to the Duke of Wellington as follows:—

"I trust that the necessity will not arise while I am in India of making war either on the Punjab or on Nepal, but I wished, before I left England, to have your general opinion as to the plan upon which any such war, if necessary, should be conducted, in the same manner in

which I obtained many years ago, for the future use of the Government of India, your opinion as to the plan upon which any new war with the Burmese should be conducted.

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"What I desired, therefore, was your opinion, founded, as far as it could be, upon the imperfect geographical information which can be given to you as to the best mode of attacking the Punjab. The Sikh Army is generally collected about Lahore. They have, however, a force of 8,000 or 10,000 men, very mutinous and lately coerced by Afghans, in and about Peshawar."

The views expressed in the above letters of 15th and 26th October 1841, when compared with his speech of 3rd November 1841, extracts from which have already been given above, would lead one without any difficulty to conclude that Ellenborough was a very apt pupil of Talleyrand, according to whom language has been given unto us to conceal and not to express our thoughts.

Ellenborough arrived in Calcutta on the 28th February, 1842 and immediately assumed the office of the Governor-General of India. He prepared a Memorandum on the position of India, dated March 18, 1842, for the information of Her Majesty the Queen Victoria. Regarding the Afghan War, he wrote:—

"The division of the [British] army which is at Candahar is incapable of making any extensive movement,

either in advance or retreat, by the almost total want of camels and other animals."

* * *

"At Peshawar there is a Sikh army, hostile to the Afghans, but hostile to the British troops, too,

"The events which have recently occurred in Afghanistan render the termination of the war with China an object of the greatest importance and of the most pressing nature."

Ellenborough left Calcutta for the Upper Provinces to be near the frontier. By April 1842, the British forces under Major-General Pollock had retrieved some of the lost ground in Afghanistan, had forced their passage through the Khyber Pass and were in possession of Ali Musjid.

The British protege, Shah Shooja, was murdered on the 5th April, 1842. So Ellenborough thought it prudent to withdraw altogether from Afghanistan and leave the Afghans to manage their own affairs. In his letter from Benares, dated 21st April, 1842, he wrote to the Queen:

"Your Majesty's troops being redeemed from the state of peril in which they have so long been placed by their scattered positions, their imperfect equipment, and their distance from their communications with India, it will become a subject for serious consideration whether they shall again advance upon Afghanistan by a new and central line of operation; or whether it will not be more advisable, our military reputation having been re-established, to terminate, in conjunction with the Sikh Govern-

ment, those operations in pursuance of the Tripartite Treaty to which that Government was a party."

Again, on May 16, 1842, he wrote from Allahabad to the Queen that

"The Shah was murdered at Cabul on the 5th of April. Under present circumstances, considering the divided state of Afghanistan, it has been deemed prudent to abstain from recognising any succession."

He was desirous of seizing this opportunity to put an end to the Tripartite Treaty which came into existence in the regime of his predecessor Lord Auckland. Of course he never thought that such a measure would be a gross breach of faith. He wrote to the Queen from Allahabad on 7th June 1842:—

"It has appeared that the present state of things in which there exists in Afghanistan no constituted authority capable of executing the Tripartite Treaty, is the most favourable for the declaration by the Governments of India and of Lahore that that treaty is at an end, * * "

With the nations of Europe, although they are worshippers of Christ, who taught his followers "to love those that hate you, to bless those that curse you" and also to turn the left cheek to those who smite you on the right, revenge is sweet. So to avenge the murder of Sir W. Macnaghten, Ellenborough meditated treachery. He wrote to the Queen Victoria on the 17th August, 1842, that,

"He has deemed it proper to instruct Major-General

Pollock, in the event of Mahomed Akbar Khan's coming into his hands without any previous condition for the preservation of his life, to subject that chief to trial and, if he should be convicted, to punishment for murder of Sir W. Macnaghten in the same manner in which the major-general would deal with any other person accused and convicted of murder under similar circumstances."

Again on Oct. 5, 1842, he wrote to the Queen:—

"Lord Ellenborough has authorised the offering of a reward for that chief's (Akbar Khan's) delivery to the British army. He is to be considered only as the murderer of a British minister, not as a general at the head of a national force."

It can be easily guessed how Akbar Khan would have been dealt with, had he fallen into the hands of the British, who were thirsting for his blood.

With the successes achieved by General Pollock over the Afghans at Ali Musjid, Ellenborough was willing to exchange prisoners of war and withdraw altogether from Afghanistan. Such seem to have been his instructions to General Pollock. But that officer went beyond his instructions. Writing to the Duke of Wellington on 7th June, 1842, he said:—

"A greater difficulty exists in the influence of the political agents, the men anxious for revenge, and the others naturally clinging to the hope of relieving the prisoners. All these, since his arrival at Jellalabad, have got round Major-General Pollock; have led him to misunderstand the plainest instructions, to miscalculate

the value of objects, and to act upon the passion of others, not upon his own reason."

The Iron Duke was much enraged with the conduct of General Pollock. In reply to the above letter he wrote to Ellenborough, 6th Aug., 1842:—

"But it is astonishing that General Pollock should not have obeyed your instructions in respect to the exchange of prisoners. If an exchange had been effected, you might have withdrawn the troops, at any time, and nobody could have whispered a camp hint."

Bnt Pollock disobeyed the orders of Ellenborough and marched on to Cabul, where, to show the spirit of Christian charity, he ordered his troops to commit excesses. Referring to this conduct of Pollock, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Ellenborough on February 4, 1843:—

"I am much more uneasy about the thanks to General Pollock than I am about those to yourself. I cannot understand how a man who knows what soldiers are made of, could think of giving an order for the destruction of the bazar and two mosques at Cabul, and not be sensible that such destruction must and would be followed by the pillage and destruction of the town itself: and that if he thought proper to do the former, he did not put himself at the head of half the army and see the destruction effected, and to take care to protect the town from the pillage and destruction which it was certain must be the consequence by the other half of the army."

Although the British troops were victorious, it was impossible for them to remain long in Af-

ghanistan without those scenes being re-enacted which led to the murder of Macnagten and Burnes. So the British, flushed with victory, did not dictate any terms to the Afghans, did not ask for the surrender of the persons of the murderers of their Envoy and chief Political, or of those who violated the honor of their women. Prudence was considered the best part of valor, and so they made haste to withdraw from Afghanistan and set unconditionally the ex-Amir Dost Muhammad at liberty. Ellenborough, in his letter dated 15th November, 1842, wrote to the Queen:—

“Your Majesty will likewise find annexed to this memorandum the general order whereby it was made known that, the British prisoners having been recovered from the Afghans, all the Afghan prisoners would be set at liberty, including Dost Mahomed and his family, as soon as the armies had crossed the Indus.”

“Lord Ellenborough trusts that your Majesty will approve of this act, at once of policy and of clemency. * * Dost Mahomed may recover his former authority, but he has suffered severely, and his whole object will be to maintain himself in Cabul. He may give trouble to the Sikhs at Jellalabad ; but they think they can make arrangements with him which will lead to their quiet occupation of that place, and it is with their entire concurrence that Dost Mahomed is released.”

Lord Ellenborough considered a demonstration necessary. He wrote to the Duke of Wellington from Allahabad on May 17, 1842:—

“At Hyderabad and in Scinde, as well as at Nepaul

and in the Saugor district and in Bundelcund, I see the indication of the change with respect to our power, which the disasters at Cabul have created in all men's opinions, and this makes me more anxious to get back the army from Afghanistan. I have made the most of the victory of Jellalabad. I have issued general orders a little in the French style; but they have their effect. I have given honours and rewards with a large hand; and my old colleague, Sir W. Casement, tells me that the general order I enclose is worth 10,000 men. I do all I can to gratify the officers and soldiers, and I really think I may depend upon the most zealous support of the whole army."

In the eleventh century, Mahmood Ghaznavi in one of his invasions of India, removed the gates of the Temple at Somnath as a booty to his native place. Mahmood was a barbarian and as his country was devoid of any works of art, the carving and decorative art exhibited on the gates, in short their beauty, captivated the fancy of that iconoclast, and removing them to his native place, it is said that they were made to serve as gates to his mausoleum. As a trophy of their triumphs in Afghanistan, the British troops brought these gates with them to India. To make a demonstration, the gates were carried in regular procession from Afghanistan through the Punjab and it was proposed to restore them to the temple at Somnath to which they originally belonged. But the gates did not proceed any further than Agra.

There was a deep policy in carrying the gates in regular procession throughout Hindustan. Lord Ellenborough was anxious to conciliate the Hindoos.* He believed that it was altogether impossible to reconcile the Mahomedans to the

* Ellenborough wrote to the Queen in October, 1842 :—

“The gates of the Temple of Somnauth have been brought away by Major-General Nott.

“These gates were taken to Ghuzni by Sultan Mahmood, in the year 1024. The tradition of the invasion of India by Sultan Mahmood in that year, and of the carrying away of the gates, after the destruction of the temple, is still current in every part of India, and known to every one. So earnest is the desire of the Hindoos, and of all who are not Mussulmans, to recover the gates of the temple, that when, ten or twelve years ago, Runjeet Singh was making arrangements with Shah Shoojah for assisting him in the endeavour to recover his throne, he wished to make a stipulation that when Shah Shoojah recovered his power he should restore the gates to India, and Shah Shoojah refused.

“Lord Ellenborough transmits for your Majesty’s information a copy of the address he intends to publish on announcing that the gates of the temple will be restored.

“The progress of the gates from Ferozepore to Somnauth will be one great national triumph, and their restoration to India will endear the Government to the whole people.”

British rule. For nearly a thousand years there has not been much love lost between the votaries of the Cross and the Crescent. The Christians even to this day have not given up their spirit of crusades against the followers of Islam. And Lord Ellenborough as a Christian could not conceal his antipathy towards Moslems. Writing to the Duke from Simla, on October 4, 1842, Ellenborough said ;—

“ I could not have credited the extent to which the Mahomedans desired our failure in Afghanistan, unless I had heard here circumstances which prove that the feeling pervaded even those entirely dependent upon us. Here there is a great preponderance of Mahomedans. I am told that the guns produced absolute consternation visible in their countenances. One Ayah threw herself upon the ground in an agony of despair. The Commander-in-Chief observed it amongst his own servants. I fired forty-two guns for Ghuzni and Cabul ; the twenty-second gun—which announced that all was finished—was what overcame the Mahometans. The Hindoos, on the other hand, are delighted. It seems to me most unwise, when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which are faithful, * * I would make the most of our successes and of the recovery of the gates of the temple, treating it ostensibly as a great military triumph, but knowing very well that the Hindoos will value it as the guarantee of the future security of themselves and their religion against Mussalmans. All those who best know India tell me that the effect will be very great indeed, and I think it will.”

Again, writing to the Duke on January 18, 1843, Ellenborough said :—

“I have every reason to think that the restoration of the gates of the Temple of Somnauth has conciliated and gratified the great mass of the Hindoo population. I have no reason to suppose that it has offended the Mussalmans ; but I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race is fundamentally hostile to us, and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindoos, * *.”

All the fuss regarding the gates of Somnath was a stroke of policy, for it was considered expedient to conciliate the Hindoos. Now, it is a fact that those gates were not the gates of Somnath. Perhaps Lord Ellenborough knew as much. Therefore all the grand procession with which the so-called gates of Somnath were paraded throughout Hindoostan was got up for the sake of political expediency.*

But Christians of the orthodox type in England were enraged with the conduct of Ellenborough for the reverence he showed to the

* Lord Ellenborough's hatred of the followers of the creed of the Crescent may be perhaps accounted for by his wife deserting him and living with an Arab Chief, named Shaykh Mijiwal El Mezrab of Damascus, whom Lady Burton refers to as “Lady Ellenborough's Bedawin husband” (The Life of Sir Richard Burton, Vol I, p. 180).

The “franko-phobia” of the Marquess of Wellesley also was explainable on a similar ground.

gates of a heathen temple. In the Parliament, as well as outside it, he was severely criticised for his conduct. On the ninth of March, 1843, Mr. Vernon Smith, Member for Northampton, made the following motion :

"That this House, having regard to the high and important functions of the Governor-General of India, the mixed character of the native population, and the recent measures of the Court of Directors for discontinuing any seeming sanction to idolatry in India, is of opinion that the conduct of Lord Ellenborough in issuing the General Orders of the sixteenth of November 1842 and in addressing the letter of the same date to all the chiefs, princes, and people of India, respecting the restoration of the gates of a temple to Somnauth, is unwise, indecorous and reprehensible."

The motion was rejected by 242 votes to 157. Lord (then Mr.) Macaulay delivered a speech condemning Ellenborough in no measured terms. He said that

"The charge against Lord Ellenborough is that he has insulted the religion of his own country and the religion of millions of the Queen's Asiatic subjects in order to pay honor to an idol, * * The Mahometans are a minority, but their importance is much more than proportioned to their number: for they are an united, a zealous, an ambitious, a warlike class. * * Nobody who knows anything of the Mahometans of India can doubt that this affront to their faith will excite their fiercest indignation. Their susceptibility on such points is extreme. Some of the most serious disasters that

have ever befallen us in India have been caused by that susceptibility."

Ellenborough justified his conduct on the ground of political expediency. Writing to the Duke on 22nd March, 1843, he said:—

"I do not care what may be said about the Somnauth gates. The measure was a politic measure for India—and I ought only to look to India. * * If I were to abstain from doing anything here which could be disapproved by gentlemen over their firesides in England, I should lose India. You know better than any one the difficulties I found on my arrival. *I have only been able to meet those difficulties by acts and language which, even in India, I should not myself have adopted under ordinary circumstances.*"

The words put in italics indicate the Machiavellian policy he pursued in his administration of India.

The first Afghan war ended. It cannot be said that it reflected any credit either on the military or the civil service of India. Neither the general in the field nor the statesman in the cabinet, could be congratulated on the part he played in this nefarious transaction. The occidental diplomatist, saturated with the principles of Machiavelli and hence not playing a straightforward game, was stewed in his own juice as it were. But the Christian Government of India spent money like water, because that money did not come out of the pocket of any Christian.

native of England but of the heathen natives of India. They were generous with other people's purse. And their apparent success was due to this lavish expenditure in Afghanistan and to the bribing of the Afghans. The first Afghan War was not only a blunder and a crime but a positive sin.

CHAPTER LXXIII

The Annexation of Sind.

The British ought to have been grateful to the Ameers of Sind for the help they rendered them in the Afghan War. But it has been truly observed that there is no gratitude in politics.

Every act of the Sind drama shows scenes of enormity and foul play on the part of the British actors. According to the treaty of 22nd August, 1809, between the British Government and Sind, it was stipulated that—

"Art. 1. There shall be eternal friendship between the British Government and that of Sindh, * *"

"2. Enmity shall never appear between the two states.

"3. The mutual despatch of the Vakeels of both Governments, namely, the British Government and Sindhian Government shall continue.

"4. The Government of Sindh will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sindh."

But the British violated the spirit of the treaty and coveted the land of the Moslem rulers of Sind when under the euphemistic phrase, "Navigation of the Indus," they surveyed that river without the consent of the Ameers. It is recorded by Sir

James Mackintosh in his journal dated 9th February, 1812, that,

"A Hindoo merchant, named Derryana, under the mask of friendship, had been continually alarming the Sind Government against the English mission. On being reproved, he said that although some of his reports respecting their immediate designs might not be quite correct, yet this tribe never began as friends without ending as enemies, by seizing the country which they entered with the most amicable professions."

"A shrewd dog," said Mackintosh.

So when Burnes ascended the Indus, a Syud on the water's edge lifted up his hands, and exclaimed,

"Sind is now gone, since the English have seen the river, which is the road to its conquest."

The English meant to annihilate the independent existence of Sind when they concluded that Tripartite Treaty with Maharaja Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah. Kaye writes:—

"that unhappy tripartite treaty between Shah Soojah, Runjeet Singh and the British Government—the source, Heaven only knows, of how much injustice and how much suffering—was entered into in a most evil hour. From that hour of the 26th day of June 1838 the Ameers may date their ruin. From that hour they virtually ceased to exist as independent rulers. The fourth article of the treaty ran in these words: 'Regarding Shikarpore and the territory of Sindh lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by what may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy

relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the 'Ameers of Sindh?—no,—'the Maharajah.' The Ameers of Sindh were from this time forth to be treated as mere non-entities—weaklings to be turned to the best possible account. * *

"The Ameers of Sindh were not parties to the treaty, but because the British Government entered into a treaty with Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah, the operation of a previous treaty with the Ameers of Sindh '*must necessarily be suspended.*' And this is British faith !

"It is well for the strong to accuse the weak of subterfuges and evasions—to charge meanness and dishonesty upon the party who were driven to these straits ; but is it, we ask, less perfidious to violate treaties as a bully than to violate them as a sneak ? The British were the first to perpetrate a breach of good faith. They taught the Ameers of Sindh that treaties were to be regarded, only so long as it was convenient to regard them. What wonder that these instructions 'returned to plague the inventor ?'...

"The wolf in the fable did not show greater cleverness in the discovery of a pretext for devouring the lamb than the British Government has shown in all its dealings with the Ameers."*

In the *Autobiography of Lutfullah*, edited by E. B. Eastwick, F. R. S., F. S. A. (3rd edition, London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1858) it is stated that—

"In January 1839, a new treaty was forced on the Amirs of Sind. Captain Eastwick read it to their Highnesses in Persian. "The Amirs listened composedly,

* *The Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, pp. 220—225

though marks of displeasure could be traced on the face of Mir Nur Mahamed. He changed color, becoming now red, now pale as a ghost. When the reading was over, the Biluchis showed great excitement. At this time a slight signal from their Highnesses would have been sufficient to terminate the lives of all our party under the swords of the barbarian and remorseless Biluchis, many of whom stood at our head with naked scimitars, in the same way as the executioners do at the moment of the performance of their horrid duty. Mir Nur Mahamed first observed, in Biluchi, to his two colleagues, "Cursed be he who puts reliance upon the promises of the Feringees ;" and then, addressing himself seriously to the British representative, he spoke thus in Persian : "Your treaties, I believe, are changeable at your pleasure and convenience ; is this the way to treat your friends and benefactors ? You asked our permission to allow your armies a free passage through our territories. We granted it without hesitation, depending upon your friendship under your honorable promises. Had we known that, after the entrance of your army into our lands, you would threaten our safety, and enforce another treaty upon us, demanding an annual tribute of three hundred thousand rupees, and a ready payment of two million one hundred thousand rupees for the immediate expenses of the army, we would, in such case, have adopted measures for the security of our country and persons. You know we are Biluchis, and no traders to be frightened easily. We do not govern the country alone, but the interest of the whole of our clan is involved in the government." Captain Eastwick said, "Necessity has no law" ; "Friends must aid friends in emergencies." * * * Mir Nur Mahamed smiled, * * * and then with a sigh, he said to Captain Eastwick, "I wish I could

comprehend the meaning of the word 'friend' which you use." Pp. 277, 278, 279.

But it was reserved for Ellenborough to annex Sind, violating all the recognised laws of nations. The reasons which marked out Sind as the victim of the English may be summed up as follows :—

1st. The Ameers of Sind were reputed to be very wealthy and their treasuries overflowing with gold, silver, and other precious metals and stones, that is, what is called in the Bible "filthy lucre." The greedy Christians could not resist the temptation of possessing them and they knew they could be masters of all these good things of the world very easily and without much bloodshed. Writes Sir Charles Dilke in his *Greater Britain* :—

"It is in India, when listening to a mess-table conversation on the subject of looting that we begin to remember our descent from Scandinavian sea-king robbers. Centuries of education have not purified the blood ; our men in India can hardly set eyes on a native prince or a Hindoo palace before they cry, 'What a place to break up !' "What a fellow to loot !"

2nd. The possession of Sind would help the English in their military operations on the North-Western frontier, as their troops could be easily transported by the river Indus. This would also be beneficial to their trade and commerce in that region. Writing to the Duke of Wellington from Allahabad on 7th June, 1842, Ellenborough said :—

"Such I wish to make our position on our North-

Western frontier. I have written for more information than I have as to the island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur. That town of Sukkur must be our *tele-du-pont* upon the right bank of the Indus and the island a citadel. I have asked the Court to send me six more steamers for the Indus. I have ordered round to the Indus the two in the Euphrates, and there are now, I think, two, if not three, there, with from seven to ten iron steamers. I can command the river from its mouth to Ferozepur. *I do not intend to give up Kurachee.* Thus I shall be able to throw troops from Bombay upon the right bank of the Indus, and Kurachee being our port, I hope the day will come when our iron steamers from that place will take officers arriving from Aden and Suez up at once to the Sutlej."

3rd. In Indian politics, the English, whenever they wished to swallow up any principality or deprive any people of their independence, had their bogey to start with, that is, they feared Russian or French intrigue in India. With the battle of Waterloo, one should have thought that no one in his senses would have believed that the French any more contemplated establishing an empire in India. Yet the Duke of Wellington, who seems to have advised Ellenborough to annex Sind, gave as the principal reason for such a step that the French might be intriguing at the mouth of the Indus! For to Ellenborough he wrote on February 4, 1843:—

"I am very anxious about the mouth of the Indus. I don't like and am very jealous of the proceedings of

the French Government in all parts of the world. If their object was to promote their own objects and the commercial and the political interests of France, I should not so much mind them, notwithstanding that even these objects require and deserve our attention. But what I see of them is everywhere, in every spot in which a French agent could be introduced or even a subject of France, if only in the shape of a missionary, to intrigue, and excite the community against the interests and influence of the British Government. * *

"There is no part of the East in which they could intrigue with more advantage, and occasion more excitement against the British Government, than among the tribes on the Lower Indus, and between the mouth of the Indus and the Persian Gulf. You may rely upon it that you will ere long have a French frigate in that quarter, whose operations it will be the duty of the admiral to observe afloat, while your agents in Scinde, Beloochistan, Kelat, &c., will observe them in shore."

The arguments on which the Iron Duke based the above premises are ludicrous, to say the least. For he wrote:—

"The French Government have always had connections with the Sikhs. An Italian officer, who was heretofore in the service of Buonaparte, and has since been in the service of Runjeet Singh, but had returned to Europe, has within the last three months taken leave of Louis Phillipe previous to his return to Lahore.

"His course should be observed. The religion, the social state, and the politics of the Sikhs render them by far the most appropriate allies for the French of any in that part of Asia, and if once they could establish themselves on the Indus, you would have them allied with

the Sikhs, their officers in the Sikh army, the politics of Lahore under their direction."

In the above also was thrown out not a gentle but a broad hint for depriving the Sikhs of their independence.

The Iron Duke was dishonest in all that he wrote in the letter to Ellenborough, extracts from which have been given above. Maharaja Runjeet Singh, that military genius and ambitious prince whom the English styled the Lion of the Punjab, was now dead, and in his lifetime he was prevented from gaining a footing in any part of Sind. So to talk of the Sikhs intriguing with the French at the mouth of the Indus was not true.

The Duke of Wellington also gave strategical reasons for the occupation of Sind. In his letter of 30th March, 1842, he wrote to Ellenborough:

"Hyderabad ought to be maintained, and such other parts in Sindh, particularly on the left bank of the Indus, as will tend to secure that possession. The Government of Bombay ought, besides, at all times, to have gun boats and others propelled by steam in that river, so as to command its navigation and to prevent the passage of freebooters from the right to the left bank. The security of Scinde, which will be promoted by the possession of the passage by the island of Bukkur, will tend to give further security to the left flank of the army on the Sutlej, which might be considered to be in a position not to be attacked by any force which could be brought against it from Central Asia."

4th. One of the reasons for war with the Ameers of Sind and annexing that province was the defeats which the British had sustained in Afghanistan and the disasters that had befallen them in that country. To quote Kaye:

"But the real cause of this chastisement of the Ameers consisted in the chastisement which the British had received from the Afghans. It was deemed expedient at this stage of the great political journey, to show that the British could beat some one, and so it was determined to beat the Ameers of Sindh. It is true that two victorious armies had marched upon Cabool through the Eastern and Western countries of Afghanistan and carried everything before them, but it was deemed expedient immediately to withdraw those armies and the scurrying home through the passes might look, or by many be conceived to look, like a virtual acknowledgment of inability to occupy the country, and therefore, in some measure, an acknowledgment of defeat. To remedy this evil it was determined to show that the British army could hold Sindh. A few more victories were required to re-establish our reputation and the Governor-General resolved, that the Ameers, who a few months before had spared our army when they might have annihilated it, should be the victims of this generous policy."

(*Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, p. 232).

The Duke of Wellington concluded his letter of 30th March, 1842, the letter in which his advice that "Hyderabad ought to be maintained," etc.—has already been quoted above, by saying:

"And I earnestly recommend to you to adopt measures which will give to your Government the advantage of appearing to be and of being in readiness to maintain the British Government and power in India. These, with the other measures recommended in this letter, will all tend to the same object, that of relieving your government from the consequences of the impression produced by the recent disasters north of the Indus.

"Your position is an unfortunate one, and it is painful to consider of it. But I think that I have suggested to you the measures best calculated to restore our strength, to secure our position, to acquire the confidence of our subjects, our dependents, and our allies, and particularly of our army, by the re-establishment of its discipline and subordination, the restoration of its military spirit and confidence.

"If you should succeed in these measures, you will save the British nation from the ruin and disgrace of the loss of this great empire, and you will acquire throughout the world the reputation and respect which you deserve.

"It is impossible to impress upon you too strongly the notion of the importance of the restoration of our reputation in the East. Our enemies—in France, the United States, and wherever found—are now rejoicing in triumph upon our disasters and degradation. You will teach them that their triumph is premature."

Reading the whole of the above letter of the Iron Duke between the lines, it is evident that he wanted Ellenborough to make war on somebody to show to the world that the British troops had not been cowed down by their disasters in Afghanis-

tan. It is also clear that he threw out a broad hint that Sind should be attacked, because it would succumb very easily to the British arms.

5th. Perhaps the most important consideration which led Ellenborough to annex Sind was that its rulers were Mussalmans. His Christian lordship's expressed antipathy and hatred towards the followers of Islam has already been mentioned before. To weaken the power of the votaries of Islam, to make them feel their inferiority to the Christians, was the avowed policy of the authorities. It was, therefore, that it was considered expedient to annex Sind and make the Ameers prisoners and pensioners of the East India Company.

But some pretext or pretexts were needed to swallow up the principality of Sind. It was soon discovered that the Ameers violated treaties, and that they entertained hostile intentions against the English! For these alleged faults, they were deprived of their principality and sent into captivity; the inmates of their harems insulted, assaulted and brutally robbed of their ornaments; and their hoarded treasures plundered.

That the pretexts were false, no one knew better than Ellenborough himself. Writing to the Iron Duke from Agra on 22nd March, 1843, he said:—

“I hardly know how I could have accomplished the object of retaining possession of a commanding position

upon the Lower Indus without a breach with the Ameers. We could hardly have justified our remaining at Kura-chee; we could not have justified our remaining at Bukkur, after the termination of the war in Afghanistan, without a new treaty. What had occurred was sufficient to show that upon our retiring from the Indus, the existing treaty for the free navigation of that river would have been violated in every particular. ...

"It was really impossible for me to form a decided opinion as to the authenticity of Persian letters—that could be much better decided on the spot; and being satisfied that, if the letters were genuine, we were justified in requiring new terms, and that policy required us to avail ourselves of the opportunity of coming to a new settlement if we were justified in doing so, I left the matter in Sir Charles Napier's hands."

After the above blunt and brusque confession of Ellenborough, it is needless to inquire into the alleged violation of treaties on the part of the Ameers, or of their treasonable correspondence with the King of Persia, or the hostile intentions against the British which have been attributed to them. The alleged misdemeanours and violation of treaties of the Ameers were thoroughly exposed in the controversy regarding Sind which took place in England both in the Parliament and the press of that country as pure fabrications. The reader interested in the subject is recommended to peruse the following publications named in the footnote* to convince him of the utter falsity of

* 1. Correspondence relative to Sindh, 1838-1843,

the pretexts which, according to the Christian jingoes, justified the war on the Ameers of Sind.

Wrote Sir John Kaye in the first volume of the *Calcutta Review* (p. 219) regarding the violation of treaties by the Ameers:—

“It would seem as though the British Government claimed to itself the exclusive right of breaking through engagements. If the violation of existing covenants ever involved *ipso facto* a loss of territory, the British Government in the East would not now possess a rood of land between the Burhampooter and the Indus.”

The chosen instrument for the spoliation of Sind was one Sir Charles Napier, who, like Ellenborough, was a protege of the Iron Duke. Why, of all mortals, Napier was chosen, is a puzzle difficult to solve. This man was known to possess a very violent temper, to be of insubordinate disposition and very quarrelsome. Yet this was

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty, London. 1843.

2. Correspondence relative to Sindh [Supplementary to above] 1844.

3. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 72. No. 3. London, 1844.

4. The conquest of Sindh, a commentary. Parts I and II. by Lieut. Col. J. Outram, C. B. 1846.

5. Eastwick's Dry Leaves from Young Egypt.

6. The *Calcutta Review*, vol. VI, The Sindh controversy. Napier and Outram.

the man regarding whom Ellenborough wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 17th November, 1842 ;—

"I am quite charmed with Sir Charles Napier."

Napier was chosen because he was ready to execute the dirty job with which he was entrusted.

It should be remembered that Napier was sent to Sind to supersede Major Outram, who had been the British Envoy in the Court of the Ameers during the period of the Afghan War. He rendered important services to his Government during that critical period—services which were pronounced by the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone to have been such as "it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy."

There must have been some strong reasons which led to his supersession by Napier. Official documents do not throw any light on this point. But we suspect that the character which Outram was credited with possessing as being a straightforward and honest man, and not an occidental diplomatist, made Ellenborough shrink from communicating to him the nature of the dirty work which he had in contemplation. As he could not reasonably expect Outram to be a tool of his Machiavellian policy, Ellenborough was compelled to supersede him. Napier was in the confidence of Ellenborough. The precise nature of his instructions with which the Governor-General used to favour him is not known, because the correspon-

dence between them was not of a public but of a private character. His Lordship writing to the Duke of Wellington on March 22, 1843, said :—

"My correspondence with Sir C. Napier having been more of a private than of a public character, although all made official, I may have been less careful in the choice of expressions than I should have been had I written in the name of the Secretary."

It is not improbable that only such of the correspondence was made official as suited the convenience of the Government of the day.

From all that we have said, it is perhaps not unreasonable to infer that Lord Ellenborough instructed Napier to provoke the Ameers to hostilities. That perhaps accounts for the attitude he assumed towards them and the studied manner in which he ill-treated and ill-used them.

Napier and his Christian colleagues and underlings indulged in all sorts of intrigues and conspiracies to subvert the authority of the Ameers and achieve their vile end. They succeeded in raising a traitor in the camp of the Ameers in the person of Ali Morad, the Ameer of Khairpoor and a near relation of the other Ameers of Sind.

It would be too long and tedious to narrate all the political and military transactions of Napier which were admirably calculated to provoke hostilities. And in the end, they succeeded. The Moslem Ameers were compelled to fight the Christians for

their very existence. But they were no match for Napier in all those arts which go under the designation of occidental diplomacy. There were traitors in their camp who were in the pay of the British. So it was not difficult for Napier to be triumphant in the battle of Meeane fought with the Ameers on the 17th February, 1843. It is recorded by Sir Richard Burton that

"Neither of our authorities tell us, nor can we expect a public document to do so, how the mulatto who had charge of the Amirs' guns had been persuaded to fire high, and how the Talpoor traitor who commanded the cavalry, openly drew off his men and showed the shameless example of flight. When the day shall come to publish details concerning disbursement of 'secret service money in India,' the public will learn strange things. Meanwhile those of us who have lived long enough to see how history is written, can regard it as but little better than a poor romance."^{*}

After the battle the victorious European soldiers behaved in a manner of which any human being ought to feel ashamed. The privacy of the Zenana was violated and the inmates of the Ameer's harems were cruelly treated and robbed of their valuable ornaments. A French writer has recorded :—

"The officers of General Napier invaded even the harems of these unfortunate princesses and carried off

^{*} Life of Sir Richard Burton by Lady Burton. London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1893. p. 141.

the treasures, jewels and even the clothes of their women." *History of the Afghans*, by J. P. Ferrier, translated by Captain Jesse, London. John Murray (1858 : p. 287)*

"A writer signing himself as "a traveller" wrote in the *Tribune* of Lahore in September, 1893, a letter on "the Conquest of Sind," from which the following extracts are made :—

"A story I heard from Captain S—referred to the cruelties practised on the inmates of the Amir's Zenana after Napier's victory. Wives of Sergeants and other European soldiers were sent into the Zenana, and these Christian women delighted in most brutally tearing away rings from the noses and ears of the Zenana ladies. The harem ladies were not only plundered of their ornaments they had on their person, but their noses and ears were horribly mutilated. Of course, in histories written by Englishmen, to glorify the deeds of their countrymen, these things are never mentioned, but these barbarities throw those of the Native Sepoys during the Mutiny into the shade. Whatever the native sepoys did, they did in the excitement of the hour. Whereas on the helpless, innocent Zenana inmates of the Amir, the cruelties were perpetrated in cold blood by Christian folks when all the excitement of the battle was over. There are many an unwritten chapter in the history of India for the last 250 years. If all the feats of strategists and diplomatists be brought to light, what a curious story they would tell of the mightiness and strength of the conquerors' sword.

"Captain S—served in India during the Mutiny. He is a linguist and a traveller known throughout the scientific world. His father was a military officer who

Sind was annexed to the British dominions and Sir Charles Napier was amply rewarded for what he himself described as "a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of *rascality*," for, as he said, "we have no right to seize Scinde, yet we shall do so." *

took part in the Sind Campaign. So his authority there will be very few to challenge.

"The conquest of Sind is not very old. There are men living in whose memory the events of that memorable conquest are still fresh. It is a pity that our educated countrymen do not try to collect the historical materials they have still within their reach. In my sojourn through Sind, nothing struck me so much as the wandering minstrels and their ballads. Some of these men are very old. I met one who was bordering upon eighty. These ballads are chiefly historical, and are principally composed in Baluchi. I suggest to the educated youth of Sind to collect these ballads, as they will throw a flood of light on the past history of their province."

* At p. 323 of *Lights and Shadows of Military Life*, edited by Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sindh wrote :—

"Our object in conquering India, the object of all our cruelties, was money. More than a thousand millions sterling are said to have been squeezed out of India in the last sixty years. Every shilling of this has been picked out of blood, wiped and put into the murderers' pockets ; but wipe and wash the money as you will, the damned spot will not out."

But then the gallant writer did not anticipate the

Of course the Christian philanthropists of England affected to be shocked at the inhuman manner in which the Moslem Ameers were treated by their co-religionists and compatriots in India. They shed very copiously crocodile tears over the fate of the fallen Ameers. But perhaps they were all secretly glad that Sind had become a part of the British dominions, because

cruelties he had to inflict on the helpless inmates of the Amirs' harem in the "Christian" conquest of Sindh.

Sir Charles Napier was greatly proud of his being born a Christian. In his proclamation of the 6th August, 1844, as Governor of Sindh, he said :—

"Be it known to all the Mahomedan inhabitants of Scinde, that I am the conqueror of Scinde, but I do not intend to interfere with your religion. I respect your religion, but it is necessary that you should also respect mine. We both worship *one* God," &c.

In the truly "Christian" spirit, Sir Charles Napier wrote to the fallen non-Christian Ameers on March 18, 1843 :—

"You must recollect that your intrigues with Meer Sher Mahomed give me a great deal to do. I am also much surprised by the falsehoods which you tell if you give me any more trouble, . . . I will cast you in prison as you deserve. You are prisoners and though I will not kill you, . . . I will put you in irons on board a ship. You must learn, Princes, that if prisoners conspire against those who have conquered them, they will find themselves in danger." (P. 49. Supplementary Sind Parliamentary Papers, 1844).

it added to the dominion over which the sun never sets, where their "boys" would be provided for and which would be a market for the goods manufactured by the nation of shopkeepers.

CHAPTER LXXIV

Ellenborough's Treatment of the Sindhia

Sind and Sindhia have no affinity with each other, although the names sound alike. But Ellenborough tried to treat both of them alike. The territory ruled by the house of Sindhia was always eagerly coveted by the British rulers of India. That principality was the richest and strongest of all the Mahratta States which went to form the Mahratta Confederacy. Under the guiding influence of its celebrated chief Madhoji, it had acquired almost the supreme power in India, for that chief held the Moghul Emperor of Dehli his captive. The most sanguinary battles fought by the English on the Indian soil in the early part of the nineteenth century were with the army of Madhoji's successor, Dowlat Rao Sindhia. Again, it was to coerce that chief that Marquess Hastings ostensibly undertook the war against the Pindarees.

How Lord Bentinck intrigued to annex the State of Sindhia, in order to connect Agra with Bombay has already been mentioned before. An intrigue of the same nature with a similar object

in view was again indulged in by Lord Ellenborough.

It should be remembered that the ruler of the State of Sindhia was not till 1843, like other native princes of India, a mere feudatory of the East India Company. He was considered to be a more or less independent sovereign. Thus in the report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1832 (on Political or Foreign), it was stated :

"Within the Peninsula, *Scindia* is the only Prince who preserves the semblance of independence." (P. iv.)

Before that Committee on the 16th February, 1832, the historian, Mr. James Mill, regarding Sindhia, said, that

" He neither at present has subsidiary alliance with us, nor do we include him among the protected states : in that respect he stands alone :..."

Before the same Committee on the 27th February, 1832, Major Close in reply to the question,

" What is the relation in which Scindia stood to the Company ?"—said ;—" He was independent."

Then he was asked, " Has he no treaty with the Company ?"—" Yes, there are several treaties, but they are not such as to abrogate his independence, or to place him in acknowledged submission to the British Government."

This fact is important to remember, because it

shows that the Government of India had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.

Unfortunately for that State, a few months after the arrival of Ellenborough in India as its Governor-General, its ruler Junkojee Sindhia breathed his last on the 7th February, 1843 and all of a sudden. About that time the Machiavellian policy of that Governor-General in Sind was bearing its desired fruit, for that province was shortly after annexed to the British dominions. Ellenborough determined to follow the same policy and with the same object in view with the House of Sindhia.

Junkoji died childless and had made no arrangement for the succession. Here was an opportunity for the lynx-eyed British to seize and turn it to their advantage. Junkoji's widow was a girl of only eleven. So the duty of selecting a successor to Junkojee fell on the Gwalior Durbar. The chiefs of that state elected a near relation of their departed sovereign in the person of a boy of eight years named Bhageerut Rao as the successor. This boy on being adopted assumed the name of Jiajirao Sindhia. The widow of Junkojee, although appointed regent, being herself a minor, the real power of governing the state fell into the hands of the Durbar. If government in the Western countries is a success because it is vested in the representative Assem-

blies or Parliaments, it was no less so in those native States of India which were governed by Durbars. And the Gwalior Durbar was governing and would have governed the state well, had it not been interfered with by the Government of India.

Lord Ellenborough cherished ulterior designs on this state. So from his camp at Delhi, he wrote to Queen Victoria on 19th February, 1843, that

"having received intelligence on the 9th instant of the death of the Maharajah of Gwalior, he immediately determined on proceeding to Agra, instead of Meerut, in order to be near Gwalior, where the Maharajah having died without heirs and the widow to whom the right of adopting a son belongs being only eleven, it could not but be a subject of anxiety in what manner the government would be carried on, and the necessity might possibly arise for instant intervention.

"Hitherto everything has been conducted at Gwalior peaceably and properly. The boy, about eight years old, nearest in blood to the late Maharajah, has been adopted, with the consent of the chiefs and army, and every deference which could be justly expected has been evinced towards the British Government."

There was nothing then to complain of against the conduct of the Gwalior Durbar. Why did the Governor-General write then that "the necessity might possibly arise for instant intervention?" His words indicated more than what appeared on

the surface. This is evident from what follows in the letter above referred to. Ellenborough continued:—

“ Still the necessity exists for appointing a regency, and for some time there must be a difficulty in carrying on any new administration. Lord Ellenborough therefore adheres to his intention of proceeding to Agra, and has made some change in the disposition of the regiments in order to have with him old corps upon which he can entirely depend * * * ”

Accordingly, Lord Ellenborough proceeded to Agra and commenced his campaign of intrigues against the Gwalior State. Mr. John Hope, in his sketch of the House of Sindhia, writes:—

“ As Lord Ellenborough had firmly resolved, though his resolution was not then made known, first to disregard the rights of this state, and afterwards deprive it of its independence, the preliminary step would necessarily be to set aside the Maharanee on the ground of her infancy, and to put up in her place as Regent a person who would cheerfully do the bidding of the British Government. The election was in the hands of the Durbar. Now there was only one individual in that council who would lend himself to carry out an anti-national policy, and he was called the Mama-

* To the Duke of Wellington he wrote at the same time:

“ I decided on going to Gwalior instead of Meerut as soon as I heard of the Maharaja's death; and I adhere to my purpose, although I do not now apprehend that there will be any difficulty about putting things into order there. The circumstance of my being so near will steady any new government of which I may approve.”

Sahib. Accordingly the Resident laid aside the principle of non-intervention which hitherto had guided his conduct and strained every nerve to effect this man's election." (P: 42)

Mr. Hope in his work has given a graphic sketch of the nature and character of this Mama Sahib, who was an upstart and whose manners were repulsive. Yet Ellenborough did not scruple to write to Her Majesty the Queen Victoria in his letter dated Agra, 21st March, 1843, the following lie:—

"The movement of Lord Ellenborough to Agra immediately on his receiving the news of the death of Sindhia has apparently had the desired effect of establishing without contest a strong government at Gwalior in the person of Mama Sahib, who feels that the support which has been given to him by the British representative has practically given to him the regency."

Mr. Hope writes:—

"The opposition candidate who, if there had been no interference, would have been elected by acclamation was the Dada Khasjeeewalla. Just at this critical time arrived a letter from his Lordship which conveyed these words:—'The Governor-General would gladly see the Regency conferred upon the Mama-Sahib.'"

So the Mama-Sahib was "elected" the Regent of Gwalior. But he did not command the respect of any body in that State. Yet his Lordship had the audacity to write to Her Majesty on 20th April, 1843, that—

"The administration of the new regent at Gwalior has been carried on with tranquillity."

But the creature of the Governor-General did not long enjoy the sweets of office or the favor of that British autocrat. He had to leave Gwalior. Lord Ellenborough in his letter of 8th June, 1843, informed the Queen:—

"Until the 20th of May everything at Gwalior wore a favourable appearance, and the authority of the regent never appeared to have a stronger foundation than the day before the intrigue commenced which has ended in his downfall. The regent had effected a marriage between his niece (a child of six years of age) and the Maharajah, who is nine. The marriage seemed to have been agreeable to the widow of the late Maharajah, the Maharanee—who is herself only twelve—but probably it was represented to her Highness that the regent, having managed this marriage, would, in the name of the minor Maharajah, supersede her authority in the State. Whatever the cause, her Highness gave her whole support to the faction hostile to the regent and advanced sums for the payment of the troops from the Treasury. After discussions which lasted a fortnight, the regent was dismissed, all the chiefs having been brought over to the faction hostile to him.

"The British Minister at Gwalior has advised the regent to retire from that place in obedience to the Maharanee's orders. * *

"These events are very much to be deplored. They may have very injurious results upon the tranquillity of the common frontier of the British territory and that of the Gwalior State. Lord Ellenborough still hopes, however, that no outrage will occur which will render

necessary the bringing together of troops for the vindication of the honor of the British Government."

Let us turn to Mr. Hope for what he has to say regarding the ejection of Mama Sahib from Gwalior. He writes:

"There happened to be, at this time, a little disturbance in a distant part of the country between a party of villagers and some sepoys, and the Resident called on the Mama to cause the apprehension of the native officer who was in command of the men; but, unluckily, power to act was just the one thing which the Regent most wanted. He was helpless, and the temper of the Resident was chafed. What was, then, to be done? The latter addressed himself to Lord Ellenborough and suggested the calling in of British troops from Agra. The answer seemed to make 'confusion worse confounded.' 'I intrust the use of troops to the discretion of no one except my own.' The pear was clearly not ripe, and nothing was done.

"And now another and an awkward embarrassment appeared, which seemed to set the very teeth of the Regent as if he were in perfect terror. A slave girl, whose name was Narungee, who had never been permitted to go outside the walls of the Zenana, had erected, it was gravely said, the standard of revolt in the palace We, then residing on the spot, could never believe that she was anything better than the ordinary slaves; but if we are to give credence to the affrighted Mama, she must have been a Gorgon in disguise for she deposed the nominee of the great Autocrat of India, packing him out of the country with all his baggage, without even the common Asiatic ceremony of the beat of a tom-tom.

"We confess, indeed, that we are inclined to regard the ejection of the Mama-Sahib as a very great blunder, as it gave a fresh motive to Lord Ellenborough to mature some other scheme, which . . . proved far more certain to cause the collapse of the independence of this State than the worst acts of a wretched imbecile could possibly bring about. We believe, in fact, that if Lord Ellenborough did not actually rejoice over the expulsion of his nominee, * * * * still, perceiving that from him nothing great could be derived, the only umbrage which he felt, perhaps, was the apparent contempt done to his dignity, which the overthrow of his favourite would seem to display." (Pp. 46-49).

The vacancy caused by the flight of the Mama Sahib was to be filled. The Durbar proceeded to elect its chief and the choice unanimously fell on the Dada Khasjeeewalla. But this man was not invested by the Governor-General with the powers of the Regent which the Mama Sahib possessed. Writes Mr. Hope:—

"It was on the 24th of May, 1843, that the Mama took flight; and on the 26th, the Maharanee, who now occupied the throne as Regent, ordered the Durbar to assemble to elect a Minister. This national council made choice at once of the Dada Khasjeeewalla. Vacillation of purpose was one of the remarkable traits in the character of the Governor-General, and an instance of it was to be given now. He who had refused to recognise the Maharanee in February on account of her tender years, hesitated not to acknowledge her as Regent in May; but no power under heaven would have prevailed on him to countenance as Minister, the ill-fated chamberlain. A wit,

. . . once said, that 'Women's faults are two—Nothing's right they say, nothing right they do.' It was so with this man. The same number of faults, though in their character different, had all the native Chiefs in India, whenever their respective territories chanced to be coveted. They had, it was alleged, in stereotyped letterpress, a weak system of government on the frontier, and a strong system of government in the interior. . . .

"It is a matter", writes the Governor-General, 'of paramount importance that there should exist in Gwalior a government willing and able to preserve tranquility along that extended line (meaning the frontier), for the British Government cannot permit the growing up of a lax system of rule, generating habits of plunder along its frontier.' When this is written in despatches, the evidence of approaching danger is strong and undissembled; but what will the reader think when we tell him that the province of Bundelkhand, which was under our control, and the two rich provinces of Saugor and Nerbudda, which were absolutely British territory (the frontiers of which bordered on the frontiers of Scindea's dominions), were at this time, and had been for two years, in a state of open insurrection, and that on the very day that this threatening despatch was penned by Lord Ellenborough, Scindea's contingent of 2,000 men were keeping our rebels from destroying the wealthy town of Khimlassa, which was distant 100 miles from the Gwalior Capital, and which belonged to the British Government, whilst the most active and able officer of the Maharanee's army, Colonel Salvadore, with his men, was saving from destruction Balabehut, another town of ours, which the rebels were about to fire." (Pp. 50-52).

The next act in this Gwalior drama was the removal of the Resident from that State by the

Governor-General. Colonel Spiers, who was the Resident at this time at Gwalior, was perhaps not a man after Ellenborough's heart. So the Governor-General adopted diplomacy, certainly not oriental, but occidental in removing him from Gwalior. Writing to the Queen on June 27, 1843, he said:—

"The retirement of the late regent from Gwalior has removed all present apprehensions of collision with the troops of Gwalior. The British Resident has, in pursuance of his instructions, removed to his house at Dholepore, about thirty miles from Gwalior, and out of the Gwalior territory.

"The last accounts give reason to expect that the attempt by the successful faction to remove from the palace the brigade which has for some years guarded it may lead to a contest.

"Under all circumstances the most proper position for the British Resident seems to be that which has been taken at Dholepore, whence he will not return to Gwalior without specific instructions; and Lord Ellenborough's present impression is that the Resident should not return until there shall be a government at Gwalior possessing the appearance of good intention and stability, or until the Maharanee and the Chiefs shall earnestly desire his aid for the establishment of such a government."

Of course according to the law of nations, the removal of an Envoy from a foreign Court means declaration of hostilities. So Ellenborough meant mischief when he took the above step. But his hypocrisy, duplicity and want of veracity

regarding the removal of Colonel Spiers from Gwalior, are well exposed by Mr. Hope :—

"We are now in the height of the rainy season, and it was necessary at once, if ever, that matters should be 'coming up * * * on the top of a floodtide.' The Governor-General thus addressed the Resident :—'The great heats usually lead you at this season to absent yourself from Gwalior, and I see no sufficient reason for your now departing from your usual course.' The idea was not bad in itself, if such a very small game was worthy a great Governor-General to play : but the fact was just the other way The Resident felt that he *must* acquiesce, He accordingly told the Durbar a little fib, and this was that he required 'change of air.' Nothing had *then* transpired to lead him to apprehend a storm ; nothing to show very clearly duplicity ; nothing to raise the fear of another 'humane bit of rescality.'" (Pp. 54-56),

Lord Ellenborough was bent upon mischief. Colonel Spiers was not going to be a pliant tool in his hands. So he was removed. His successor was Colonel Sleeman, best known for the influence he had over Thugs and Dacoits. *

* In his "Story of My Life", the celebrated novelist Captain Meadows Taylor writes :—"Had I been allowed to remain (in the civil employ), I should have been the first to disclose the horrible crime of Thuggee to the world ; but it fell to the good fortune of Major Sleeman to do so afterwards."

Colonel Sleeman appears to have been a favoured child of fortune.

But Colonel Sleeman was specially selected by Lord Ellenborough, because his Lordship thought that officer would be a willing instrument in his hands in helping him in the absorption of the principality of Gwalior. Colonel Sleeman possessed the reputation of being a philanthropist. But Johnson might have as well said that the last refuge of scoundrels is philanthropy instead of patriotism. Sleeman was a catcher of thugs and thieves. If the adage "set a thief to catch a thief" be true, then Sleeman illustrated the truth of that proverb in his own life. He played the same game at Gwalior which a few years later on he played at Lucknow. As his doings paved the way to the annexation of Oude, so his doings at Gwalior were designed to bring about the same object. But in both cases it is a well-known fact that he did not advocate annexation.

From his known antipathy to the House of Sindhia, Sleeman should not have been chosen to fill the situation of Resident at Gwalior. In his "Rambles and Recollections" Sleeman wrote:—

"As a citizen of the world I could not help thinking that it would have been a great blessing upon a large portion of our species if an earthquake were to swallow up this Court of Gwalior and the army that surrounds it."

With his bias against the principality of Gwalior Colonel Sleeman was considered by

Ellenborough a very 'safe' man for the Residency at Gwalior.

The new Minister, Dada Khasjeeewalla, was an able man. But because he was an able man, therefore he was an eye-sore to Ellenborough. It was an English minister, Sir John Gorst, who from his place in the House of Commons in 1891 said that able men like tall poppies were to be suppressed.

So then Dada Khasjeeewalla was marked out for his victim by Ellenborough. His lordship wrote to the Queen on 13th August, 1843 :—

"At Gwalior, the chief of the successful faction which lately expelled the regent, whose appointment had been sanctioned by the British Government, has apparently strengthened himself by paying the arrears of pay due to the troops, and by compelling the retirement, not unattended by violence on the part of the soldiers, of almost all the European and half-blood officers in the service of the State. He has replaced, in situations from which they had been removed by the late Maharajah, on the representation of the British Resident, many persons notorious for their hostility to British interests, and for their connection with plunderers upon our frontier. The example of a successful defiance of the British Government at Gwalior has led the weak Holkar to pay less attention to our expressed wishes. Disturbances are expected on the borders of Berar, and it is hardly possible that the vicinity of the ungoverned districts belonging to the Gwalior State should not lead to much disposition to plunder along our frontier and that of our allies.

"The new minister at Gwalior appears to exercise a very strict control over the conduct and persons of the widow of the late Maharajah and of the present minor sovereign. He avows that the reports of Lord Ellenborough's approaching return to England and the certainty of the retirement (from ill-health) of Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland and of Mr. Clerk from the North-West Provinces, lead him to think that he shall have all his own way.'

"Under these circumstances, the members of the Indian Government have unanimously decided upon the formation of an army at Agra (of about 12,000 men besides artillery), which will be commanded by Sir Hugh Gough; and other measures are in contemplation for the purpose of enabling the Government to concentrate a much larger force. * *

"Your Majesty will readily perceive that the continued existence of a hostile Government at Gwalior would be inconsistent with the continuance of our permanent influence in India, by which alone its peace is preserved."

Ellenborough very unmistakeably struck the note of war against Sindhia's Government. In his letter to the Queen dated Calcutta, September 19, 1843, he again referred to Dada Khasjeeewalla as follows:—

"The Dada Khasjeeewala, with whom every measure of an offensive or hostile character originated, still retains his influence over the Ranee, and directs affairs. It would appear that he now conceals from her Highness the real purport of the communications addressed to her by the British minister.

"Upon the whole the state of India requires now, as

indeed it always must, the exercise of extreme vigilance on the part of the Government, and the constant preparation for the field."

The nature of the crime with which the Dada Khasjeeewala was charged, has been explained by Hope as follows :—

"It was said . . . that the Minister of the state had intercepted a letter from his lordship to his dear young 'Sister' the Maharanee, . . . 'A high crime against the Maharanee, declared the Governor-General. The letter was written in the Persian language, and the Maharanee, a child of thirteen, could neither read nor write any language at all. There was only one man in the Capital who, by virtue of his hereditary office of 'Great Chamberlain and keeper of the crown jewels' could enter the most sacred of the female apartments, and that man was the Dada Khasjeeewalla. * * * Who then, except this man, had the privilege to open and read the Governor-General's letter . . . ? To suppose that this man, the favorite of the palace, cared to keep in ignorance a child, not out of the nursery, of the contents of a letter, albeit they conveyed censures upon himself, is in the last degree Quixotic. The only thing that can be said to explain the whole affair is '*delenda est Carthago*'; and, that being so, that this charge, contemptible as we regard it, would do as well as any other," (Pp. 53-59.)

Lord Ellenborough had no right to interfere with the internal administration of the State. Yet he treated the existing treaties with Gwalior as so much waste paper, when he demanded to make over to him the Gwalior minister for punishment.

In vain the Durbar asked the Governor-General to reconsider his demand, for it struck at the very honour of the Raj, and they went so far as to place him in confinement and appoint in his place one Ram Rao Phalkea, who had fought for the English by the side of Lord Lake. But this did not appease the wrath of Lord Ellenborough, who assembled one army on the north and another on the east frontier of Scindhia's dominions for the purpose of invasion if that minister were not delivered to him. The Gwalior Durbar had to bow down to this show of force and give up the Minister, who was banished for life and died ten years afterwards in Benares.

Ellenborough's expressed desire was acceded to. But still he was not satisfied. He wanted to go to war with the State of Gwalior and have it annexed to the British dominions. He wrote to the Queen from Barrackpoor, Nov. 20, 1843:—

"At Gwalior the usurping minister has been seized by the chiefs and troops of the party opposed to him; but there is still no appearance of a settlement without authoritative intervention of the British Government, and seeing the urgent necessity of effecting such settlement in a secure and satisfactory manner, Lord Ellenborough will proceed on the 25th instant to Agra, which he will reach on the 11th of December, and find the army assembled."

The mere seizure of the person of the minister did not satisfy his Lordship, who wanted to get

the minister banished altogether from the State. He wrote to the Queen from camp Dholepore on December 19, 1843:—

"The hostile minister, the Dada Khasjeeewalla, was immediately delivered up upon the receipt by the Maharanee of the letter of which a copy is enclosed for your Majesty's perusal. He is a prisoner in the camp, and will be sent to the Fort at Agra."

Ellenborough misrepresented matters when he wrote that "the Dada Khasjeeewalla was immediately delivered up." But, as said above, this was not true.

But Ellenborough was not still satisfied. He wrote in his letter of 19th December, 1843, to the Queen:—

"The only remaining difficulty is apparently that of effecting the disbandment and disarming of a disaffected portion of the Gwalior army.

"In this measure the Chiefs would gladly co-operate; but they may not be able to effect it without our active aid, or at least without the support they would derive from the near approach of our army. . . .

"The existence of an army of such strength in that position must very seriously embarrass the disposition of troops we might be desirous of making to meet a coming danger from the Sutlej."

Here the British lord let the cat out of the bag. He wanted to take the Punjab and as he had written to the Duke of Wellington in his letter dated Agra, April 22, 1843:—

"Depend upon it, I will never, if I can possibly avoid it, have two things on my hands at a time."

so he decided to crush Gwalior first.

Mr. Hope says:—

"The Dada having been given up, there was then an end of the *causus belli*. Nothing of the kind. 'I have found,' said his Lordship to the new Minister. Ram Rao Phalkea, who had been sent by the Durbar to Agra to wait on him. 'a clause in a treaty made with Dowlut Rao Scindea at Boorhanpoor, which obliges the British Government, if at any time Scindea should be unable to cope with his enemies, to afford him military assistance. It is true, indeed, that the clause carefully guards against the danger of a great military power forcing its unsolicited assistance on a very weak one by the insertion of the words *on the requisition of the Maharajah* ; but it is impossible, on account of his tender years, for Gyajee Scindea to make the requisition, and, as I am the only judge of his necessities, I shall march my army to Gwalior.' * * * Ram Rao Phalkea was astounded and replied.... 'as nothing whatever had been mooted on the Boorhanpoor treaty, he had brought with him no copy of it to refer to; ... and that the invasion of a friendly state on such a pretext was quite a strange anomaly in the conduct of the Honorable Company.' * * But all his arguments, all protestations failed, as would those of a goose who with equal pertinacity declined the profered aid of a hungry fox." (Pp. 66—67).

Ellenborough thus expressed his intentions in the letter to the Queen from which extracts have been given above:—

"The late Maharajah of Gwalior had allotted certain

revenues for the maintenance of a corps of about 1400 men, to be commanded by British officers, and constantly stationed in the Gwalior territory. This corps has done excellent service, and it is proposed to obtain from the Gwalior State the assignment of further revenues for the purpose of raising very considerably the amount of this useful force.

"It is proposed to procure the consent of the Gwalior State to the placing under British administration the district of which the revenues will be so assigned to the extent at least of giving to the British Government the power of nominating and removing persons in authority, and thus securing the real co-operation of all for the maintenance of order."

Ellenborough knew that he had no right to dictate terms to the Sindhia. He told a brazen-faced lie to Ram Rao Phalkea when he pretended that such a right existed under the Burhanpoor treaty. Says Mr. Hope:—

"Respecting the clause in the Boorhanpur treaty on which the Governor-General pretended to justify the invasion, it cannot be controverted that there was no such treaty in existence. That which had been made in 1804, containing a stipulation of the kind alleged, was signed to meet the difficulties arising from the inroads of the Pindarees, but abrogated the following year to serve our own interests. The whole thing was a barefaced sham, and was, as Mr. Thornton well described it, owing to 'the facility with which the surrender of the Dada had been yielded, under the influence of *terror* imposed by the march of the British force, that a change in the policy of the Governor-General was effected, and the deter-

mination arrived at to employ that *terror* as an instrument for obtaining ulterior objects.' " (Pp. 71-72.)

So Ellenborough, without any *causis belli*, invaded the territory of Sindhia, for he crossed the frontier and marched his troops into the principality of Gwalior. The peace-loving people of this Hindu State could not believe that their hearths and homes would be invaded by orders of the British Governor-General. They were therefore quite unprepared and so the Sindhia's frontier was crossed without any difficulty by Ellenborough. That eminently "Christian" judge of Her Majesty's High Court of Agra, Mr. William Edwards, in his "Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian", writes, for he was with Lord Ellenborough:—

"We were thus enabled to cross the Chumbul without opposition, an operation which had that river, with its precipitous banks, been defended, could not have been effected without heavy loss."

But when the people saw that the Governor-General was thirsting for their blood, they very hurriedly prepared for fighting the British troops. So the battles of Maharajpore and Punniar were the result.

Both these battles were fought on the same day *i.e.*, 29th December, 1843. Of course, fortune favoured the British arms, for besides good luck they had been preparing for the battles since some time previously, and they had more troops and were

well-versed in the Machiavellian art of raising traitors in the camp of their enemy, and their resources were almost inexhaustible. But the English generals did not show much of military strategy in the battle of Maharajpore. The manner in which they had disposed of their troops would have resulted in a disaster but for certain circumstances which turned in their favor.*

Some of the atrocities perpetrated in these two battles by the British have been described by Mr. Hope, who writes:—

"Some Mahratta sepoy, twenty or thirty in number, having discharged their last cartridge, were fleeing from the field, but, finding themselves surrounded by our troops, they rushed into a natives house, the family having fortunately abandoned it, and barricaded the doors. Some of our men set fire to the thatched roof and these miserable sepoy were burnt to ashes. As long as a month afterwards the walls of the house and the charred remains of the men could be seen by any traveller just as they had been left on the day of the battle—deliberately allowed to remain by an angry people with a view to cause a feeling of deeper hatred than ever against our race. At the intercession of an European officer, a personal friend of Ram Rao Phalkea, the

* Edwards narrated the fight in detail. See pages 66 *et seq* of his "Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian."

See also Ellenborough's description in his letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated camp Gwalior, Jan. 21, 1844, in Lord Colchester's History of the Indian administration of Lord Ellenborough, pp. 412 *et seq*.

minister, the walls were taken down, the remains removed, and the soil ploughed for cultivation, to prevent the spot from being visited as the place of martyrs." (Pp. 74-75).

He also mentions an atrocious deed that happened at the battle at Punniar.

"A young Portuguese officer, as soon as his regiment had been dispersed, went up, on the field, to one of our brigade-majors, and presenting his sword, asked to have his life spared. The brigade-major declined the sword, and expressed his willingness to do all he could, and desired him to keep close to his side. Unhappily, the Major was on horseback, while the Portuguese was on foot. A demon in the rear had kept his tigerish eyes on the poor fellow, and a chance occurring, he plunged a bayonet through his body, making an exclamation while doing so in language too frightful to repeat. It may be added that Scindea's contingent was, with exquisite taste, made to act against that state of whose salt the officers and men of that body had long partaken, some of the latter being of the same village and country from which Gyajee Scindea had recently come." (Pp. 75-76).

And these were the men who were talking of humanity. Writes Mr. Hope:—

"The day before a shot was fired, Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation in the English language, intended, we presume, for the people of England, in which he explained his intentions. In it we find that his Lordship was much moved by sentiments of pity towards the Maharaja; by a determination to brook no hostility to the British Government by *individuals* at his Court; and by a desire to have—which is the old story when the

appetite for a native State is particularly sharp—a *quiet frontier* To maintain unimpaired the position we now hold is a duty, not to ourselves alone, but to *humanity* The adoption of new views of policy, weakness under the name of moderation, and pusillanimity under that of forbearance, would not avert from our own subjects, and from our own territories, the evils we let loose upon India, and the only result of false measures would be to remove the scene of a contest, altogether inevitable, from Gwalior to Allahabad, there to be carried on with diminished force, a disheartened army, and a disaffected people If a contest were altogether inevitable, why should it be at Allahabad? Well, we will unravel the mystery. It was all owing to a Napoleonic instinct! It was surmised, that the recent demise of Runjeet Singh would lead to struggles for the masterdom of the Punjab; that a proud army at Lahore might even venture to cross the Sutledge and try its mettle against British soldiers; and that it was just possible that we might have to fall back upon Allahabad. There we should find the Gwalior army ready to kick us nearer to Calcutta, and it was clear that, under this marvellous change of fortune, our force would be 'diminished,' our army 'disheartened,' and the people 'disaffected.' So then, 'pity towards Gyajee Scindea'; the determination to brook no hostility by individuals at his Court, and the desire to have 'a quiet frontier' were what the lawyers call false colourings and pretences, the real motive being Napoleonic strategy, which taught Lord Ellenborough to destroy even an unoffending army rather than allow it to exist in his rear." (Pp. 69-71).

After the easy victories gained at Maharajpore and Punniar, the principality of Gwalior lay at

the feet of Lord Ellenborough. He must have compared himself to Alexander or Caesar, Napoleon or Wellington. He could have wiped out the existence of this principality.* But what was his motive for not doing so? Mr. Hope has tried to answer this question by saying:—

“We are perfectly certain, though the fact does not admit of positive proof, that it was the fear of rousing once more the resentment of powerful individuals in Parliament that just turned the scale and no more in favor of Sindhia.”

The annexation of Sindh was very unpopular and Lord Ellenborough was condemned by the Parliament and the press of England for it. So he was obliged to be moderate with Gwalior. Had Gwalior been annexed, a general rising of the native States would have been the probable result. This is hinted at by Ellenborough, for in his letter of 16th February, 1844, he wrote to the Queen:—

“Lord Ellenborough has reason to think that the

* Mr. Thornton, in his history of India, writes that “the issue of his Lordship’s official papers appeared to have had no other purpose, but to give expression to a feeling of triumph, and to gratify a desire of treating the Gwalior State as a conquered country. * * * Judging from the language held on the subject, it seems to have been thought an act of extraordinary lenity that the State should have been suffered to exist at all!”

moderation evinced in the treatment of the Gwalior State after the recent victories has produced a favourable impression upon the minds of the native princes of India, and has conciliated them towards the British Government ; while the victories will, for the present at least, have the effect of putting an end to all ideas of resistance to British power."

But a new treaty was forced upon Sindhia and the State of Gwalior was shorn of much of its importance. It lost its independence and became a feudatory of the British Government.

CHAPTER LXXV.

Annexation of Kythul.

Kythul was a Cis-Sutlej Sikh State which entered into treaty with the British Government in 1809. Maharajah Runjeet Singh was threatening the existence of the Sikh States situated in the Dooab between the Sutlej and Jumna, and so the rulers of those States sought the protection of the British, which was readily granted. But those Sikh chiefs exchanged King Log for King Stork, for the conditions imposed on them for the alliance were very harsh. The first Earl of Minto, during whose regime these alliances were effected, was an astute lawyer and so he knew how to get these men in his grasp and entrap them.

But those chiefs never dreamt when they entered into alliance with the British that their states would be annexed to the territory of the East India Company for want of heirs. For, according to the Hindoo law, they knew they could always adopt heirs in the event of the failure of a progeny. This is exactly what the British interpreters of the Treaty would not admit. So when the Kythul Chief died, his State was annexed by Ellenborough. But this annexation

was expressed by the euphemistic phrase "lapse." The State had not been originally granted to the Kythul Chief by the British that it could have "lapsed" to them.

However, it was not without some difficulty that Kythul State was acquired by the British. Ellenborough in his letter dated Agra, April 20, 1843, to the Queen wrote:—

"The Chief of Kythul, one of the protected Sikh States within thirty miles of Kurnaul, having died without heirs, four-fifths of his territory lapsed to the British Government, and the remaining fifth became the property of the distant branch of the family. A political officer was sent with a small escort, afterwards increased to 300 men, to receive possession of Kythul, which belongs to the lapsed portion of the territory, but he was met by passive resistance on the part of the female relations and the ministers of the late chief. The military retainers of the State flocked to Kythul, and a most indiscreet disposition of a part of the small cavalry escort having been made, attack was invited, and the consequence was the repulse of the whole force with the political officer with some loss, and its retirement to Kurnaul.

"Lord Ellenborough, on being informed that troops would be wanted, had directed that so large a force should be taken as would preclude the chance of any collision. Unfortunately the collision took place, through the indiscretion of the officer at Kythul, before the direction could be acted upon. On the 14th, however, 1800 troops were assembled at Thanesir, and on their arrival on the 16th within eight miles of Kythul it was found that the town and fort were evacuated by the

armed retainers on the 15th. The ministers and the merchants of the place had come into the British camp on the 14th.

"What has happened is very much to be regretted, although it has been repaired.

"The affair might have become very serious had not the place been so soon approached by a preponderating force after the unfortunate collision on the 10th."

CHAPTER LXXVI.

Intrigues Against the Punjab.

Maharaja Runjeet Singh died in 1839 when Auckland was the Governor-General of India. After his death there was anarchy as it were in the Punjab. The distracted state of that land was very coolly seen by the British. They did not move their little finger to put down the disturbances which were of almost daily occurrence in that province of the five rivers. There are reasons to believe that the British were the real authors of these disturbances. The *British Friend of India*, published in London, wrote in its issue of December, 1843, as follows :—

“We have no proof that the Company instigated all the king-killing which has been perpetrated in the Punjab since Runjeet died ; but, bearing in mind their trade, and the wonderful success which has attended their operations in that line, in Bengal, in the Carnatic, and elsewhere ; both amongst the Moghuls and the Mahrattas, with Rajahs and Nabobs, we must say that we smell a rat ; we strongly suspect the Company’s corrupt influence has been employed in framing and fomenting these plots, which it is the interest and desire of the Crown and people of Britain rather to have counter-acted, but a mercenary Company, wielding a hireling army, cannot live but by plunder. but,

we see too clearly, that backed as it necessarily now is, by all the resources of Britain, Lahore will be sacked, the Kingdom rent in pieces." (Pages 247-248).

The British, since a very long time, had been very eagerly looking forward to the day to become masters of the hoarded wealth of Runjeet Singh as well as of his dominion. To achieve this end they had been intriguing and conspiring against the Punjab. Ellenborough even before his departure from England had marked that province as one of his victims. Reading his Indian letters to the Queen and the Duke of Wellington, edited by Lord Colchester, between the lines, there can be no doubt that the British instigated all the disturbances in the Punjab in order to weaken it and then to easily annex it.

The Duke of Wellington, whose protege Ellenborough was, also had his eyes on the Punjab. Writing to Ellenborough on 30th March, 1842, he said :—

"Looking at our position in the North-West, I see upon the river Sutlej a short line of defence, covered by the Punjab and its rivers, with the Government of which country we are in alliance. It is true that the Sikh Government is in an unsettled state, and not what it was when governed by Runjeet Singh at the commencement of the war in Afghanistan. But the weakness of the government, or the absence of all government, in the Punjab, and the possibility of hostility in that part of the Sikh State, would be an additional inducement to the British Government to attend to the defences of our

own weakest frontier, even if the consequences of the state of confusion in the government of the Punjab should eventually require the active interference of the British Government in order to settle the government of a country where tranquillity is so essential to its own protection and safety." * * *

"While these measures should be in the course of execution, it would be necessary that an army should be assembled towards the Sutlej. * *

"An army in this position might maintain itself. It might move forward into the Punjab, whether as an offensive movement, with a view to conquest, or as one defensive, with a view to attack its enemy at the passage of some of the rivers in that country, or to threaten the communications of an enemy advancing from the North-West."

Writing to Lord Fitzgerald on 6th April, 1842, his grace the Iron Duke said :—

"I am very glad to see such good accounts of the state of the Sikh Government. It must be very desirable to maintain its existence in the Punjab. But this I must say, if we are to maintain our position in Afghanistan, we ought to have Peshawar, the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and the passes between that post and Cabul."

The Iron Duke after all blurted out the necessity for taking the Punjab. No wonder that his protege, Lord Ellenborough, should have tried his best to create dissensions and distractions in the Punjab in order to get it converted into a British province. The Machiavellian policy that he was following to get his object accomplished, his

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lordship has himself narrated with brutal frankness in some of his letters to the Duke and the Queen. Thus in his letter of 7th June, 1842, he wrote to the Duke:—

“I have already, as you are aware, said what I could to dissuade the Sikhs or rather Dhian Singh and Gholab Singh, the Jummoo Rajahs, from their wild views of conquest beyond the Himalayas. * * I have at the same time not discouraged another folly of theirs—that of advancing their frontier towards Cabul. * * If they accede to this arrangement, and endeavour to carry it out, we shall have placed an irreconcilable enemy to the Afghans between them and us, and hold that enemy to the Afghans, occupied as he must be in defending himself against them, in entire subjection to us by our position upon the Sutlej, within a few marches of Umritsir and Lahore. Such I wish to make our position on our North-Western frontier.”

Again he wrote to the Duke on October 18, 1842 :—

“I agreed to permit the Sikhs to occupy Jellalabad on our retiring from it, * * You will see into what a false position their ambition leads them. They will be obliged to keep their principal force in that quarter, and Lahore and Umritsir will remain with insufficient garrison, within a few marches of the Sutlej, on which I shall, in twelve days, at any time, be able to assemble three European and eleven native battalions, one European regiment of cavalry, two regiments of Native cavalry and two irregular cavalry, and twenty-four guns.

“The state of the Punjab is, therefore, under my foot. I only desire, however, that it should be faithful and

innocuous. The conflict of parties in the Punjab will render it more dependent every year, and, indeed, he who knows it best does not think the Government can last a year. I intend to be most courteous and liberal to both parties, and to wait till I am called in."

In his letter of January 18, 1843 to the Duke, he thus described the Sikh army :—

"A return mission was sent to Lahore, and most cordially received. The Maharaja paraded 65,000 men and 200 guns; but it took eight hours to get them into line, and when placed they did not move. Half the guns were without draught. The irregulars are said to have been very fine. The troops are disciplined, some in the French, some in the English, and some in the Sikh manner, and there is no subordination. The arrival of General Ventura is anxiously expected by the army. I am glad all is safe before he comes."

It is not improbable that General Ventura was an emissary in the pay of the British with the Sikh army. When General Ventura returned, he had some communication with him. So he wrote to the Duke on 20th October, 1843 :—

"Ventura anticipates a long anarchy, from which the ultimate refuge will be in our protection; I agree with him."

Regarding what he called the "game," he wrote in the same letter to the Duke :—

"The time cannot be very distant when the Punjab will fall into our management, and the question will be what we shall do as respects the Hills. Probably the Hills will be very much divided under separate

governments, and I look to the protection of our Government being ultimately extended to the Sikhs of the Plains and the Rajpoots of the Hills, and the Mussalmans of Mooltan, precisely as it is now to the Sikh Chiefs on the left of the Sutlej. The Khalsa lands are worth half a million, and the payments from the Jagheer may be as much. There would also be lapses of estates. *I do not look to this state of things likely to occur next year, but as being ultimately inevitable if we do not bring on union against ourselves and indisposition to our rule by some precipitate interference. I should tell you, however, that there is, as there long has been, a great disposition, even in quarters not military, to disturb the game."*

The words put in italics, used with brutal frankness, need no comments. On 16th February, 1844, Ellenborough wrote to the Queen:—

"Rajah Heera Singh remains at Lahore without power over the army. One regiment is already arrived at Lahore from Peshawar against orders, in order to extort more pay, and it remains unpunished. Other regiments at Peshawar threaten to leave it, and it seems doubtful whether this mutinous desertion of Peshawar by the Sikh troops may not enable the Afghans to reoccupy it,

"In the hills, Rajah Gholab Singh is extending his power with his usual unscrupulous disregard of the rights of others and of the supremacy of the State he pretends to serve. This conduct, however, makes him very odious to the Sikhs at Lahore. * *

"...It is to be hoped that the state of the Punjab may not render necessary in December next an operation beyond the Sutlej; but every prudent preparation will be made

with a view to enabling the army to undertake that operation whenever it may become necessary. *It must be always viewed as a measure which can only be deferred.* Your Majesty may be assured that Lord Ellenborough is fully aware of its magnitude and its importance. He knows that it cannot be devoid of great risk, and that, under all circumstances, it must be of a protracted character. Lord Ellenborough knows your Majesty's earnest desire to maintain peace and your Majesty may at once rely on his doing everything which can prudently be done to avoid war and at the same time to secure success in a war should it become inevitable."

One looks in vain in the public records to find anything to show that Ellenborough ever took any steps to avoid war. On the contrary he did everything that lay in his power to provoke the Sikhs to hostilities. We find him writing to the Queen on the 21st April, 1844:—

"Lord Ellenborough cannot but feel that the termination of the present state of things in the Punjab is essential to the security of the British power in India; *but he will wait, cautiously preparing our strength for a contest he would willingly defer, but which he considers inevitable.*"

Writing to the Duke of Wellington on 20th April, 1844, he said:—

"We can only consider our relations with Lahore to be those of an armed truce.

"I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and *that we may have no attack to repel till November, 1845.* I shall then be prepared for anything.

In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves."

The words put in italics are very significant ones. The Sikhs crossed the Sutlej about the time which according to Lord Ellenborough's calculation would be convenient for the British to receive them. Does it not show conclusively the deep scheme of the British in bringing on the war with the Sikhs?

Ellenborough was very jubilant over his successful Machiavellian policy which he followed towards the Sikhs. He wrote to the Duke on May 9, 1844 :—

"The destruction of Soocheyt Singh has had the effect of entirely separating the Hills, under Gholab Singh, from the Plains, still ruled in a manner by Heera Singh. *Everything is going on there as we could desire, if we looked forward to the ultimate possession of the Punjab.*

"I expect that by the end of December there will be on the Sutlej seventy boats of about thirty-five tons each, exactly similar and each containing everything necessary for its equipment as a pontoon. They will bridge the Sutlej anywhere, and when not so used they will convey our troops up and down, and save us an enormous charge for the hire of boats."

After reading the above no one could say that Ellenborough did anything to avoid rupture with the Sikhs. Nay, his letter to the Queen dated 10th June, 1844, from which extracts are given below, would lead one to suspect that the

British instigated some of the Sikhs residing in their territory to make raids on the Lahore State.

"Your Majesty will have already become acquainted with the issue of the conflict which took place on the right bank of the Sutlej within a march of Ferozepore, on the 7th of May, between a large body of the troops of Heera Singh and the force which was apparently accompanying Bhae Beem Singh to Lahore, for the purpose of substituting Uttur Singh for Heera Singh as vizier.

"This Bhae Beem Singh was deemed a holy man, and regarded with much superstitious reverence by the Sikhs. Uttur Singh was the surviving brother of Ajeet Singh, the murderer of the late Maharajah. He had been a refugee at Thanesir, near the Jumna, in British territory, since the death of his brother, and only joined Bhae Beem Singh a day or two before the battle.

"Bhae Beem Singh, Uttur Singh, and Cashmeera Singh (an adopted son of the Late Runjeet Singh) were killed.

"The troops of Heera Singh have been induced to fight under the impression that Uttur Singh was invading the Punjab in alliance with the British Government....

"It is much to be regretted that Uttur Singh should have been permitted to move from Thanesir to the Sutlej with the known object of acting against the Lahore Government. This error of the British agent renders it impossible to protest against the violation of the strict letter of the treaty which was committed by the Sikhs, whose troops were sent to the left bank to intercept Uttur Singh; and under all the circumstances, it has been deemed expedient to make no representation upon the subject, but to allow the whole matter to be forgotten."

This letter is written by one trained in the

school of occidental diplomacy of Machiavelli and Talleyrand. But there is moral certainty, that the raid on the Lahore Government was instigated and aided by the British. Had the raid been a success, the British Government would have been benefited by it. But as it turned out to be a failure, of course, Ellenborough had to deny any connection with it.

Lord Ellenborough did not remain in India to witness the contest with the Sikhs which he considered inevitable. He should be charged with creating disorder in the Sikh raj. His correspondence was not published till 1874. Otherwise, Mir Shah-mut Ali would not have written in the following strain in his well-known work on the *Sikhs and Afghans*, published in 1847 by John Murray of London :

"It was indeed highly mortifying to every friend of both governments to see the successor of so celebrated a ruler as Ranjeet Singh, so miserably treated ; and that the British Government, which had made so many pledges of friendship and professed such a sincere and lasting regard for the government of his father, should have remained a passive spectator of the bloody deeds of his grandson to destroy the rightful authority of his own son. What is the world to think of such a policy ?"

Then in a footnote, the author adds :—

"The motive was *non-interference* ; but its undoubted effect was anarchy and confusion, brought about by a succession of personal struggles for power which, having

caused the extermination, by the assassination of each other of the principal actors, destroyed the vital principle of the state, and led to an assumption of its authority by a mutinous soldiery, productive of a state of disorganisation in its affairs, on which we have *ultimately* justified a *military interference* in them, which a timely exercise of our political influence would have averted." (P. 545)

The Ellenborough correspondence would have also greatly strengthened the conclusions at which Captain Cunningham, the author of the history of the Sikhs, arrived as to the causes of the first Sikh War.

CHAPTER LXXVII

The Nizam

Ellenborough had his attention directed to the rich Mahomedan principality of the Deccan. With his pronounced antipathy to and hatred of Muhammadans, whom he always tried to reduce to political non-entity, he would have gladly exterminated the existence of the State of Hyderabad (Deccan) like that of its namesake in Sind, had he got any opportunity to do so. His correspondence shows that he was trying to seize any opportunity to absorb that State. Thus he wrote to the Queen from Agra on May 11, 1843:—

"The financial difficulties of the Nizam's Government are become very serious, and it may become absolutely necessary to adopt some measure for his relief. Lord Ellenborough would willingly defer any such measure until it might be made the condition of some decided improvement of the relations between the British Government and that of the Nizam, having for its object the condition of his Highness's dominions."

The significance of the diplomatic language in which the above letter is clothed is too apparent to need comment.

The following extract from his letter to the Queen dated Allahabad June 27, 1843, reveals the

hostile intentions that he entertained against the State of Hyderabad :—

“Some persons engaged in the insurrection of 1841 and 1842 have proceeded to Berar from Hyderabad in the Deccan, and numerous Arabs are entertained there. The day cannot be distant when it will be absolutely necessary to interfere with the strong arm for the expulsion of the Arabs from the Nizam’s dominion, in which they now occupy half the forts; but Lord Ellenborough deems it advisable to do one thing at a time, and circumstances do not yet allow of our devoting our force to the permanent pacification of the Deccan.”

How he wanted to absorb the Nizam’s principality is evident from his letter to the Queen dated August 13, 1843 :—

“The financial difficulties of the Nizam’s Government have led to the resignation of the old minister, and their tendency is to place the whole of his Highness’s dominions for a series of years, if not permanently, under the British administration, in consideration of a loan of a million, which must be advanced for the payment of the troops and of debts to bankers and others. The decision of the Nizam upon the several propositions submitted to his Highness will be known in a few days.”

Lord Ellenborough’s hands were too full with affairs in Northern India to deal that blow to the Nizam’s dominions which he had intended.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

Ellenborough and Nepaul.

Even before his departure from England, Ellenborough had marked out Nepaul as his intended victim. Ever since his arrival in India, he kept a very watchful eye on all the political transactions of that State. There can be no doubt that he was eagerly looking forward for an opportunity to deprive it of its independence. But fortunately for the heathen natives of that principality, the Christian Governor-General had no opportunity to impose the yoke of subjugation on their necks.*

* In his letters to the Queen Victoria as well as the Duke of Wellington, Ellenborough has very frequently mentioned all that was passing in Nepaul and of which he could get any information. See pages 32, 37, 41, 58, 63, 69, 79, 88, 114, 157, 195 and 200 of Colchester's Ellenborough's Indian Administration.

CHAPTER LXXIX

The State of Jytpore

There was one other small state whose independent existence was wiped out by Ellenborough. That small state was Jytpore in Bundelkhand. Sleeman, who was Political Agent of Bundelkhand at that time, should be held responsible for this act of spoliation. Ellenborough wrote to the Queen on 19th December, 1842 :—

“In Bundelcund the two forts belonging to the Rajah of Jytpore, who, in the course of the last summer, evinced hostility to the British Government, were taken possession of, without resistance, on the 27th of November.

“The Raj of Jytpore has been confiscated and given to the most popular chief in Bundelcund. The grounds upon which this has been done, and the probable effects of the measure, will be shown to your Majesty by the enclosed copies of letters to and from Major Sleeman.

“The camp of the Rajah of Jytpore was attacked on the 7th instant, and he made his escape with about ten followers.”

It need hardly be added that the whole transaction was high-handed and certainly not one of justice. After this no wonder that Sleeman was such a *persona grata* with those Governors-General

who wanted to absorb the principalities of any native sovereigns. This accounts for his appointment to the Residency at Gwalior and later at Lucknow.

CHAPTER LXXX

Ellenborough's Treatment of the Moghul Emperor

Ellenborough was no friend of Muhammadans, and consequently could not have been of the Moghul Emperor of Delhi. Up to his time, every Britisher in India used to pay his homage to the titular Emperor of Delhi. But he stopped this and thus lowered the dignity of the descendant of Babar and Akbar. Mr. Edwards in his "Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian" writes :—

"The Governor-General immediately issued instructions, forbidding the presentation in future to the King of any offerings by British subjects, and directed me to ascertain the average annual amount of gifts received by his Majesty for the past ten years, in order that an equivalent amount should be added to the royal stipend from the British treasury in future." (P. 57).

It should be remembered, as stated by the same writer in another place of his work (p. 307), that

"Up to 1842, the Governors-General who visited Delhi were in the habit of presenting, through their Secretaries, a nuzzur of 101 gold mohurs to the Emperor as a mark of fealty and acknowledgment of holding the British territories in India subject to his authority. It is scarcely, therefore, to be wondered at that the

Imperial house of Delhi never lost, in native estimation, its position of dignity and importance."

No wonder that the Delhi people joined the Mutineers in 1857 to avenge the wrongs and injuries that had been inflicted on the representative of the House of Babar.

Ellenborough had in contemplation to further lower the dignity of the Moghul. This is evident from the correspondence between him and the Duke of Wellington. The latter in his letter dated Walmer Castle, September 27, 1842, wrote to Ellenborough :—

"However inconvenient to retain the Moghul and his palace, and his court and retainers, in the town, I should prefer to leave them there than to incur the odium of removing them, and of exposing—particularly the Moghul and his family—to the inconvenience and expense, and degradation in the eyes of those attached to him, of a forced removal.

"In my opinion, the principle on which the works at Delhi are constructed is a good one.

"It appears to me that the palace of the Mogul would be under the guns of this citadel." * *

In reply to the above letter, Ellenborough wrote on December 18, 1842 :—

"* * I had already come to your conclusion that it would be an unadvisable step to do anything having the appearance of violence towards the old king. With his successor, my successor may be able to make some arrangement for the transfer to us of the citadel, *To have in our hands the ancient seat of empire, and to*

administer the government from it, has ever seemed to me to be a very great object."

Had Ellenborough remained a few more years in India he would have done what he had expressed in the words which we have italicised in the above extract. The humiliation of the king of Dehli would have been then complete.

CHAPTER LXXXI

Ellenborough and Oude

As said so many times before, Ellenborough was no friend of Muhammadans. He annexed the Muhammadan state of Sind. He had his eyes on the Nizam's dominion in the Deccan. He humiliated the Moghul king of Dehli in the estimation of others. But then there was the Musalman kingdom of Oude. Almost every Governor-General looked covetously to that kingdom. The Muhammadan kings of Oude used to be bled by Christian Governors-General of India. Ellenborough also bled him, and it was, therefore, perhaps that he did not propose to annex that kingdom to the British dominions during his regime.

The king of Oude used to be the wet-nurse of the British rulers of India. So he was made to act again towards Ellenborough. Writing to the Duke of Wellington in September 16, 1842, the Governor-General wrote :—

"I have got the King of Oude to lend 10 lacs more."

Of course, it was not convenient for Ellenborough to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs and therefore, he left the kingdom of Oude out of consideration of annexation in his time.

CHAPTER LXXXII

Recall of Ellenborough

Ellenborough's foreign policy was an aggressive one. He had for his prototype the Marquess of Wellesley, whose example he was desirous of closely imitating, as indeed on whose advice he was acting. During his tenure of office of two years and a half, proportionately he fought more battles than Wellesley during the same period. His lordship in the speech delivered at the dinner given in his honour by the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, November 3, 1841, said, that he was going out to India

*"to restore peace to Asia, and with peace, that sense of entire security, without which peace itself is almost valueless; from that peace, so secured, to draw the means of creating a surplus revenue, the best guarantee of public improvement, and of liberal even of honest government—in possession of that surplus revenue, to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the Mahometan Emperors, in their great works of public utility, to perfect and extend the canals of irrigation." * * **

But all the time he was in India, he did nothing to restore peace to Asia or improve the condition of the people of India. He took no step 'for creating a surplus revenue.' He enhanced the

tax on salt in order to promote the happiness of the people of India.

His conduct in the administration of India was such that it called forth the censure of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. In his letter of 5th April, 1843, the Duke of Wellington informed Ellenborough why the authorities at home were not pleased with him. He wrote:—

"It appears that the Court has stated several grounds of complaint with you. I say nothing of the gates of Somnauth, which is, I think, made a *cheval de bataille* to acquire popularity for the cause. * *

"The Court then complains of your continued absence from the seat of your Government, Fort William, and of the consequent separation from your Council. It complains of large expenses to be incurred for forming new cantonments, barracks, and stations for the army, European troops as well as native, without previously taking the pleasure of the Court, or giving to it the requisite information of the necessity for the new and expensive establishments, of the amount of the expense which they will occasion, or enabling the Court to acquire such information by the perusal of the reports recorded on the proceedings of the Court in the usual course, and the deliberations of the members of the Court thereupon, before any such plans could be adopted and ordered for execution, even if the previous sanction of the Court should not, according to order, have been applied for."

Again in Parliament also his conduct was censured. The Duke writing to Ellenborough on 5th July, 1843, said:—

"The opposition in Parliament had, at a very early

period of the session, endeavoured by sarcasm, and observations upon passages and words in your general orders and letter upon the gates of Somnauth, to ridicule your pacific professions, to place them in contrast with your conduct in Scinde, and to draw the conclusion that, notwithstanding your blame of the conduct of your predecessor in office, you were acting with views of conquest inconsistent with the declarations and principle of the law."

The conduct of Lord Ellenborough in the administration was such that the Court of Directors were compelled to recall him. He was an autocrat and wished to govern India not with "benevolent" but absolute "despotism." In his letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated April 22, 1843, he wrote:—

"Our only danger is from England, because people there will think that India can be governed according to their own last new notion, and still more will believe that the press of India tells one word of truth. Then against us, too, we have the jobbing and little-mindedness of the Directors, intriguing and caballing against a Government nominally their own, because it will not make patronage practically their own, India can only be governed by great views, and as India; and these gentlemen would have me govern it on little views, and as England; but that I will not do."

So after all the autocrat had to deliver the Government of India into the hands of Lord Hardinge on 1st August, 1844.*

* Sir Robert Peel, in a private letter to Hardinge, wrote :

"Ellenborough has been here some days. We have

made him an Earl, and given him the Red Ribbon. I have met him twice at Windsor Castle. Lord Lonsdale is willing and wishes to relinquish the Post Office. I wrote to Lord Ellenborough a few days since offering him that office and a seat in the Cabinet, or, if he preferred it, an attempt on my part to induce the Duke of Buccleuch to take the Post Office, leaving the Privy Seal vacant for Ellenborough. Ellenborough, perhaps wisely, declined both proposals, in a friendly letter, intimating, however, that his head has been so full of grand conceptions and schemes with great results, that Post Offices and Privy Seals were beneath his notice. I think he will find that he has erroneous notions of his position. His return here has not caused the slightest sensation. There is no curiosity, among this most curious people, to see so great a performer on the Indian theatre. He will not infect the people of this country with the love of military glory. If you can keep peace, reduce expenses, extend commerce, and strengthen our hold on India by confidence in our justice and kindness and wisdom, you will be received here on your return with acclamations a thousand times louder and a welcome infinitely more cordial than if you have a dozen victories to boast of, and annex the Punjab to the overgrown Empire of India."

CHAPTER LXXXIII

Lord Hardinge's Administration (1844-48)

A certain British officer, under the pseudonym of 'Carnaticus', wrote in the *Asiatic Journal* for May, 1821.

"We must at once admit that our conquest of India was, through every struggle, more owing to the weakness of the Asiatic character than to the bare effect of our own brilliant achievements; and empire after empire rolled in upon us when we were merely contemplating the protection of our trade, or repelling insult. Kingdoms have been vacated for us, as if by magic spell; and on the same principle we may set down as certain, that whenever one-twentieth part of the population of India becomes as provident and as scheming as ourselves, we shall run back again, in the same ratio of velocity, the same course of our original insignificance."

The scheming nature of the English stands in bold relief in the manner in which they succeeded in bringing about the war with the Sikhs. Even in the lifetime of Maharaja Runjeet Singh the English were conspiring against him. After his death during the regime of Lord Ellenborough the scheming English were making warlike preparations and fomenting dissensions amongst the Sikhs in order

not to disturb the "game". The "game," according to Ellenborough, would not be fully prepared before November, 1845. Although he had to leave India before that time, yet the "game" was not to be given up. His departure from India did not mean that the policy which he was pursuing or which dominated his administration was to be given up. In his letter of July, 2, 1844, to the Duke of Wellington, Ellenborough wrote :—

"Immediately on the receipt of the news of my removal I advised the Government to send letters by express to all native Courts, to assure them that the change would not affect the policy of the Government, which would be altogether maintained by my successor. I wrote myself to the principal Residents to the same effect, * *"

In the same letter he also wrote :—

"I remain to receive Sir Henry Hardinge. All the public letters to England, which he cannot have seen, have been copied for him, and sent to Madras."

Sir Henry Hardinge was a kinsman by marriage of Ellenborough. So he, like Ellenborough, did not disturb the "game," but like him followed the same course.* The authorities in England expected

* In his letter to Major Broadfoot, dated Calcutta, June 17, 1844, Lord Ellenborough wrote :—

"You will have heard that the Court of Directors have thought fit to recall me. My successor will carry out all my views. He is my most confidential friend, with whom I have communicated upon all public subjects for thirty years".

to go to war with the Sikhs and therefore selected Hardinge, who was a soldier statesman. Hardinge's biographer, his own son, writes (p. 48, *Hardinge, Rulers of India Series*):—

"Without doubt the selection of a distinguished soldier, who also possessed the experience of a Cabinet Minister, rather pointed to the anticipation of war. A few years before, on the receipt of the news of the Kabul disasters (1842), Sir Henry Hardinge had been pressed to accept the command of the Indian army, which for urgent private reasons he was compelled to decline. Now, on being offered the higher office of the Governor-General, he felt it an imperative duty to waive all personal considerations."

Hardinge was ambitious and therefore he accepted the office of Governor-General. Sir Charles Napier, who knew Hardinge well, wrote about him:

"His ambition is unbounded, and though he would have faced the Directors fearlessly, and the press too, any day in the week, if it suited his purpose, he did not, because his ambition is to glide into elevation: *he has wound and will wind like a serpent up the pillar of fame.*" (Life of Sir Charles Napier, Vol. IV, p. 205).

It is clear that Sir Robert Peel's ministry, in anticipation of the war with the Sikhs, appointed Sir Henry Hardinge as Governor-General of India. And from the day of his assuming the duties of that office he applied himself assiduously to the amassing of troops and making other necessary warlike preparations on the then North-Western

frontier. A writer in the *Quarterly Review* for June, 1846, wrote :—

"That he (Hardinge) kept his eye on the Punjab, and was neither regardless of the confusion which its affairs were falling into, nor of the consequences to which this might possibly lead, is most certain. He had already directed the works at Ludhiana and Ferozpur to be strengthened, and raised the garrison of the latter place from 4000 to 7000 men. The former was held by about 6000; and at Ambala, where Gough's head quarters were established, and among the cantonments in the rear, there were about 7500 of all arms."

His son, in the biographical sketch (p. 76) already referred to above, has given in a tabular form the increased preparation made by Lord Hardinge in the different cantonments on the North-West frontier. The table is reproduced below :—

Post.	Strength as left by Ellenborough.	Strength at first breaking out of war.	Increased preparation made by Lord Hardinge.
Ferozpur	4566 men 12 guns	10472 men 24 guns	5876 men 12 guns
Ludhiana	3030 " 12 "	7235 " 12 "	4205 " 0 "
Ambala	4113 " 24 "	12972 " 32 "	8859 " 8 "
Meerut	5873 " 18 "	9344 " 26 "	3972 " 8 "
Whole Frontier, exclusive of Hill Stations.	17612 " 66 "	40523 " 94 "	22911 " 28 "

Ellenborough had ordered fifty-six boats to be built on the Indus. When these were ready, they were brought up to Ferozpur in September, 1845, by order of Sir Henry Hardinge.*

* The Governor-General's private secretary, who happened to be his own son, in a long and confidential

In his letter of April 20, 1844, Ellenborough had written to the Duke of Wellington:

"I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and that we may have no attack to repel till November, 1845. I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves."

So by November, 1845, warlike preparations on the part of the British were complete. And as by the middle of that month the Sikhs proclaimed war and after a few weeks' time actually crossed the Sutlej, there is but one conclusion to be

letter, dated February 20, 1845, wrote to Major Broadfoot: "It is not desirable that the purposes to which these boats can be applied should unnecessarily transpire. * *

"But if any inquiry should be made hereafter, your answer will be that this flotilla of boats is not at present required on the lower Indus, that our commissariat arrangements do require the employment of boats between Ferozapore and Sukkur for the supply of the latter place with grain and that these boats are purposely adapted for military as well as trading purposes, and form part of our military means and establishment on the Indus applicable to any purposes for which they may be required either on that river or on the Sutlej: to which you may add several iron steamers which it is convenient to the Government to employ on these rivers for the conveyance of troops, stores, and supplies; and of course available for the offensive as well as for defensive objects, not unnecessarily entering into these explanations, but stating the truth if explanation be proper." (*The Career of Broadfoot*, p. 284).

drawn from these events, that the first Punjab War was a pre-arranged affair, just like the different parts assigned to the actors on a theatrical stage by the stage-master. The stage-master in this instance was the British trained in the school of occidental diplomacy of Macchiavelli.

The Lahore Durbar, who were controlling the affairs of the Punjab, did not wish to go to war with the British. Their intentions were quite pacific, and accordingly they asked the British Agent, Major Broadfoot, for a British force to be permanently stationed at Lahore. That is to say, they were desirous of what was euphemistically called by Lord Wellesley "subsidiary alliance" with the British. But this was not convenient to the English, and so they did not accede to this request of the Durbar.

From the warlike preparations on the part of the British, from the dispatches and letters of that period, it is as clear as anything could be that it was the British who wanted war and not the Sikhs.

The occupant of the throne of Runjeet Singh before the outbreak of the War was an infant named Duleep Singh. Whether he was the son of the "Lion of the Punjab" is a very disputed point. The mother of Duleep Singh was Rani Jhinda. Her moral character resembled more that of the Empress Catherine of Russia than that

of Queen Elizabeth of England. One of her favorites was Lal Singh. This man was made Vizier of Duleep Singh, that is to say, he was now the Prime Minister of the Sikh Raj. The British intrigued with this man who was the virtual ruler of the Punjab and the paramour of the Queen-mother.

The Commander-in Chief of the Sikh forces at this time was a Brahmin by name Tej Singh. This man was not a native of the Punjab but of the district of Saharanpur. He rose from very humble circumstances and was therefore ready to do anything for "glittering gold." Accordingly the British intrigued with him and made him their tool in serving their end.

The Rajput chiefs of the hills on whom Runjeet leaned for support and who had been ennobled by him also proved treacherous to the cause of the Sikhs. Of the three Jummoo brothers, Dhyan and Suchet had met with violent deaths and so did Heera, the son of Dhyan Singh. Only one of these brothers, Gulab Singh, was surviving on the eve of the first Sikh war. His treachery to the Sikhs will be narrated further on.

Even in the pages of the eloquent and highly colored version of the account of the Rajputs written by Tod, one looks in vain to find a man of that race who may be set down as a far-seeing statesman. The degeneration of the Rajputs by

the beginning of the nineteenth century was so complete owing to debauchery of all kinds, that the estimate formed of them by Sir Henry Lawrence does not appear to be unjust or wide of the truth. He wrote in a letter to Sir John Kaye, dated Mount Aboo, June 19th, 1854 :—

"You are right in thinking that the Rajputs are a dissatisfied, opium-eating race. Tod's picture, however it may have applied to the past, was a caricature on the present. There is little, if any, truth or honesty in them, and not much more manliness." (Life of Sir H. Lawrence by Sir H. Edwardes and H. Merivale, vol. II, p. 256)

The Rajputs, who from motives of pride practised infanticide, were not ashamed to give their daughters to Mahomedan chiefs and nobles to grace their harems as wives or rather as concubines.

When the Moghul Empire was *in extremis* we do not find Rajputs making common cause with the Marathas, Jats and Sikhs to re-establish Hindu supremacy in India. The man who treacherously captured Shivaji and brought him a prisoner to the camp of Aurangzeb was also a Rajput of the name of Jai Singh. No wonder that the memory of that incident rankling in the breasts of patriotic Marathas made them in the zenith of their power carry fire and sword through Rajputana. Tod, ignoring these circumstances, has painted the Maratha conquerors of Rajputana in the darkest color possible.

So the Dogra Rajput, Gulab Singh of Jammoo, was only acting on the traditions of Rajasthan when he treacherously behaved towards the Sikhs. The British chose him as one of their vile tools for carrying out their designs on the Sikh Raj.

The British agent on the North-Western Frontier at Ludhiana during the last days of Lord Ellenborough's Governor-Generalship in India was one Colonel Richmond.* This officer did not satisfy his Lordship with his diplomatic skill. So Ellenborough recommended his removal from the then North-Western Frontier. He was to be replaced by one Major Broadfoot, an officer who had distinguished himself in Afghanistan and was afterwards appointed to the charge of the Tenasserim Provinces in Burma.* But his appoint-

* Lieutenant Colonel Havelock, in his letter to Major Broadfoot, dated Simla, September 9, 1844, communicating to that officer his appointment as Agent for the North-Western Frontier, wrote:

“* * to put emolument out of the question, our North-West Frontier is the point of all others the most attractive to a soldier. You are wanted there; for not only is our information defective, but Col. Richmond, though a very fair regimental officer, is by no means a man of calibre for such a charge, * *” (*Loc. Cit.* p. 215).

Major Broadfoot solicited Lord Ellenborough to be appointed to military service and Northern India, for he preferred war to peace. In his letter dated Mergui, December 13, 1843, to Lord Ellenborough, Broadfoot wrote:

ment to the North-West Frontier was ordered and made by Sir Henry Hardinge. Writing to Lord Ellenborough from Amballa, on November 18, 1844, Broadfoot said :

"My appointment to this situation I can not but consider as being as much due to your Lordship as if directly made by you ; for to Sir Henry Hardinge I was, of course, unknown, save through your Lordship. My only anxiety is, that I may be able to do justice to the nomination. * *

"From Sir Henry Hardinge I have received the greatest and most marked kindness. It is to you I owe it, and I felt on that account the more pleasure in it, being more generally than any one else but Durand known as an *Ellenborough man*." [*Loc. Cit.* p. 241.]

He was chosen because he seems to have been a past master of occidental diplomacy and also being "too prone to war." At the time of his

"I have had some severe illness of late, but recently have had slight apoplectic attacks, which make it almost certain that I must for a time, if not permanently, quit the coast. Rest, or a change to military service with the climate of Northern India, would speedily restore me, * *

Had my health not thus given way, I could not have ventured to make this request, greatly as Your Lordship knows I desire to serve again in the field, especially during Your Lordship's government, * * I could not recover if the army were in the field, and I am idler elsewhere." (*Loc. Cit.* p. 202).

This letter leaves no doubt that Broadfoot was appointed an agent because Ellenborough wanted war with the Sikhs and also because Broadfoot was considered the proper diplomatist to bring it about.

appointment to the above post. Broadfoot himself in the letter to Ellenborough from which extracts have already been given above, wrote, that "on our [English] side, there is in general a desire for war."

Major Broadfoot was playing the part of an occidental diplomatist so well that Sir Henry Hardinge wrote to Lord Ellenborough on Dec. 23, 1844, that "Broadfoot is in his element on the frontier."

Even after his departure from India, Ellenborough was very keenly watching what he had described as the "game" in the Punjab. In a letter to his protege, Broadfoot, Ellenborough wrote from London on 7th May, 1845:—

"Our friends on the other side of the Sutlej have been doing apparently all we could desire, or nearly so; but still, I fear, they will be alarmed by the close neighbourhood of so many of our troops, and make up their quarrels if they can." (*Loc. Cit.* p. 307).

His Lordship did not wish that "our friends" that is, the Sikhs, should make up their quarrels. Broadfoot, as "*an Ellenborough man*", was also doing all that his Lordship could desire. The quarrels in the Punjab were evidently being fomented by the British.

From the day Broadfoot took charge of the agency on the Frontier, he was doing all that was well-calculated to exasperate and provoke the Sikhs

to make rupture with the British. Captain Cunningham, who, as he states in his *History of the Sikhs*, "had free access to all the public records bearing on the affairs of the frontier," has very scathingly exposed some of those acts and doings of Major Broadfoot which provoked the war with the Sikhs. He writes:—

"One of Major Broadfoot's first acts was to declare the Cis-Sutlej possessions of Lahore to be under British protection equally with Putteecala and other chiefships, and also to be liable to escheat on the death or deposition of Maharaja Dhuleep Singh. This view was not formally announced to the Sikh Government, but it was notorious, and Major Broadfoot acted on it...."

"Further, the bridge-boats which had been prepared at Bombay, were despatched towards Ferozpoor in the autumn of 1845, and Major Broadfoot almost avowed that hostilities had broken out when he manifested an apprehension of danger to these armed vessels, by ordering strong guards of soldiers to escort them safely to their destination, and when he began to exercise their crews in the formation of bridges after their arrival at Ferozpoor." [Pp. 297 et seq.]

The author of the "Career of Major Broadfoot", a brother of that occidental diplomatist, has tried to refute these statements and assertions of Cunningham. But it must be admitted by all impartial critics and judges that that author has failed in his attempt. The above-named work is, however, very important, as the letters and correspondence published in it throw considerable light

on the nature of occidental diplomacy practised by Broadfoot to provoke the war with the Sikhs.

The then Governor-General of India, Sir Henry Hardinge, in a note on the memorandum by Mr. Clerk on the Lahore State wrote on 14th August, 1845 :

"If we are forced into war, let the rupture be caused by some prominent aggressive act. An offence to our dignity offered by a weaker Power would not be ground broad enough to occupy ; * * (*Loc. Cit.* p. 323).

Again, writing to Lord Ellenborough, on October 23, 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge said :—

"The Punjab must, however, be Sikh or British : * * The delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question : *at the same time we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given.*"* (*Ibid.* p. 355.)

* Even as early as January 23, 1845, Hardinge, writing to Ellenborough, said :

"Even if we had a case for devouring our ally in his adversity, we are not ready and could not be ready until the hot winds set in, and the Sutlej becomes a torrent. Moderation will do us no harm, if in the interval the hills and the plains weaken each other ; but on what plea could we attack the Punjab, if this were the month of October, and we had our army in readiness ?

"Self-preservation may require the dispersion of this Sikh army ; the baneful influence of such an example is the evil most to be dreaded ; but exclusive of this case, how are we to justify the seizure of our friend's territory, who in our adversity assisted us to retrieve our affairs ?" [*Loc. Cit.* p. 276]

It is a significant fact that while "no cause of war" was given by the Sikhs, the British were making warlike preparations which could not befool anybody as to their intentions. As an occidental diplomatist, Major Broadfoot was trying to make every act of the Sikhs appear as a violation of the treaty, and aggressive in its nature and hence provocative of war. Writes the author of the career of Major Broadfoot:

"About the very time that the preceding letter was written [March, 1845], there occurred the first serious violation of our frontier. It was serious, not from the strength of the party which crossed the Sutlej without leave, but from the fact that it was a deliberate attempt to ascertain whether we were in earnest as regarded recent warnings addressed to the Durbar.

"Broadfoot was in camp at Tira, a considerable place on the old road from Ludhiana to Ferozpur, when the news reached him that a party of Sikh cavalry had crossed the river and taken up a position at Talwandi, a village near Harike Patan and not far from Sobraon * * * (*Ibid.* p. 298.)

What Major Broadfoot's brother calls a first "serious violation of our frontier" was no such thing at all, as will appear from what Captain Cunningham says regarding this incident. The historian of the Sikhs writes:—

"Again, a troop of horse had crossed the Sutlej near Ferozpoor, to proceed to Kotkupoora, a Lahore town, to relieve or strengthen the mounted police ordinarily stationed there; but the party had crossed without the

previous sanction of the British agent having been obtained, agreeably to an understanding between the two governments, based on an article of the treaty of 1809, but which modified agreement was scarcely applicable to so small a body of men proceeding for such a purpose. Major Broadfoot nevertheless required the horsemen to recross; and as he considered them dilatory in their obedience, he followed them with his escort, and overtook them as they were about to ford the river. A shot was fired by the English party, and the extreme desire of the Sikh commandant to avoid doing anything which might be held to compromise his government, alone prevented a collision." (P. 296).

Major Broadfoot's brother is guilty of gross perversion of truth when he says that this "first serious violation of our frontier * * was a deliberate attempt" on the part of the Durbar, etc. That this was no such thing is evident from Captain Cunningham's statement of the case quoted above. Of course Major Broadfoot tried to make a mountain out of a mole-hill and exaggerated the trivial offence, if any, of the Sikhs in order to make out a case and go to war against them. His letter to the Governor-General, therefore, can not be considered to contain the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Major Broadfoot's treatment of the Sikhs was contrary to all usages of international law. He left no stone unturned to provoke them to hostilities. The Lahore Durbar complained that

"the British had in four instances broken the treaty

of friendship. The cases cited were: that Hakim Rai and his sowars had been treated with indignity; that Lal Singh, Adalati, had not been allowed to cross the Sutlej; that the Lahore Ahlkars had been disrespectfully used; and that Suchet Singh's gold had not been handed over to the Durbar."

(The Career of Major Broadfoot, p. 357).

The charges of the Lahore Durbar against the British were grave. They were such as the British never attempted to refute.

The Lahore Durbar regretted and stood aghast at the ungrateful nature of the English. For,

"The Darbar had at great cost twice invaded Afghanistan for the benefit of the British. That English armies had traversed the Punjab to the detriment of its people and government, an injury which had been patiently borne by the Durbar. That we had been permitted to occupy Ferozpur, which by right belonged to the Durbar, on condition of keeping no more troops than were necessary for the management of the district, but that in spite of this, a great army was collected. Nor was this the only innovation since Col. Richmond's time; the passage of the Durbar's troops across the river had been forcibly prevented, and Lal Singh, Adalati, had been prohibited from crossing though sent on duty by the Durbar." (*Ibid*, p. 338)

But gratitude never formed a marked trait in the character of any Christian nation and more particularly of the English, for they are reared on politics.

The Lahore Durbar were composed of men who

as Asiatics in the simplicity of their hearts credited the English with the possession of feelings of gratitude. They were not acquainted with the nature and extent of the designs which the English cherished towards the Punjab. Had the English possessed any sense of gratitude they would have strained every nerve for the maintenance of the integrity of the Raj of Runjeet Singh. Writing to Broadfoot, from Calcutta, on 19th January, 1845, Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Currie said :—

“If a genuine descendant of Runjeet were on the throne, with a capable minister, or even a tolerable aristocracy out of which to form a government, it might be a question with us whether, in return for Runjeet's steady friendship, and his forbearance from taking advantage of us at times when he might have done so with present impunity to himself and infinite damage to us, we should aid his descendant in putting down the opposition of his own army and destroying hostile factions in his country. But in the present state of affairs in the Punjab such a measure is quite out of the question. It would be madness in us to think of expending blood and treasure to bolster up the puppet Dhuleep Singh, or to set up such a government as could be formed out of the elements that now exist at Lahore, which must owe its continuance henceforth to our power alone.” (*Loc. Cit.* p. 268)

The author of the “Career of Major Broadfoot” in publishing Mr. Currie's letter from which the above extract has been given, says that it

"is interesting because the writer's official position specially qualified him to express an opinion on the foreign policy of the Indian Government."

So what does the above extract mean? The English had good reasons to believe that Duleep Singh was not "a genuine descendant of Runjeet." * Knowing this, why did the British Government insist on recognising no one else as ruler of the Punjab save Duleep Singh? Of course, the English with their characteristic philanthropy were not to interfere in the affairs of the Punjab and so they connived at, if not fomented, all the disorders and anarchy in that province. But if they were sincere even in this declaration of their views, what was the meaning of Major Broadfoots informing the Lahore Darbar,

"That the Governor-General had recognised Dhulip Singh as the sovereign, and would be no party to permitting any other successor to Ranjit." ? (p. 72, Hardinge [Rulers of India Series.])

Do not all these facts go to prove that the English had their designs on the Punjab and therefore they would not recognise any one else save Duleep Singh as the successor of Ranjit? And because Dulip Singh was not "a genuine descendant

* The birth of Duleep Singh was considered of so little consequence as not to merit report to the British till some years after its occurrence. (See the "Career of Major Broadfoot", p. 224.)

of Ranjit," therefore they did not render him any assistance to maintain himself on the throne of the Punjab.

The British were not only making warlike preparations, but their agents Major Broadfoot and his assistants were intriguing with the ministers and servants of the Lahore Durbar to secure their ends. They had also their emissaries in the Punjab.*

Rajah Gulab Singh of Jummoo, Rajah Lall Singh, the minister of the Sikh Durbar, and Sirdar Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief of the Sikh army, were the vile instruments chosen by the English to intrigue with.

Even during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Ellenborough, there are reasons to suspect that the English were trying to use Gulab Singh as a tool to accomplish their nefarious schemes regarding the Punjab. But Hardinge succeeded remarkably in his intrigues with that hill Rajput. Writing to Ellenborough on 20th February, 1845, Hardinge said:—

"Golab Singh has again written to us, delighted to enter into terms with us. The first overture was a voluntary offer of his own, through a confidential emissary. The letter I now allude to is in answer to the intrigue of a Frenchman, a Mons. de St. Amand, a great scamp, who took it into his head to go to Jummoo from Loodiana, and after two days' delay, finding he could get no employment pretended he came

* The Career of Major Broadfoot, p. 246.

on a mission from Captain Mills to propose an alliance with the Raja and the conquest of the Punjab. The Raja's letter by his own emissary had been previously received and rejected. The Frenchman impudently wrote to Capt. Mills from Jummoo that his proposals were accepted, and the Raja has now sent us a letter entreating us to lose no time. Broadfoot will show up the impostor, and M. de St. Amand will have his nose cut off or be hanged." (Broadfoot's Career, p. 282).

Of course, the above letter is written in very guarded and diplomatic language. But it need not deceive any one save a child or a fool as to the intrigues which the English were carrying on with the Dogra Chief. The Frenchman would not have been so impudent as to write to Captain Mills had he not received instructions from him on the subject. The Frenchman had neither his nose cut off nor was hanged. Then the whole world knows how Gulab Singh was rewarded after the conclusion of the First Sikh War. This fact alone is sufficient to prove that the English had been intriguing with him.

In the same letter to Ellenborough, Hardinge wrote:—

"Our assistants on the frontier will persist in dabbling in the intrigues of the Punjab, and I fear I must withdraw—and perhaps—"

Captain Nicolson, who was one of the assistants on the frontier, intrigued with Lal Singh. Writes Captain Cunningham (p. 305 f.n.):—

"It was sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lall Sing was in communication with Captain Nicolson, the British agent at Ferozpur, but owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known."

Lord Ellenborough had written to the Duke of Wellington on April 20, 1844:—

"I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and that we may have no attack to repel till November, 1845. I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meanwhile we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves." (Colchester's *Ellenborough*, p. 435).

November, 1845, was now approaching and the English had also quietly strengthened themselves on the frontier. Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General of India, had written to Ellenborough from Calcutta on 23rd January, 1845, that

"In the midst of this anarchy on the frontier, you will ask why am I here (Calcutta)?

"The longer I can stay here, the better our chance of keeping the Sikh government on its legs." (Broadfoot's *Career*, p. 277).

As it was no longer necessary to keep the Sikh government on its legs, so Sir Henry Hardinge moved in the middle of October towards the frontier.

The warlike preparations of the English on, as well as the movement of the Governor-General of India towards, the frontier left no one in the

dark as to the real intentions of the English towards the Sikhs. The former had done everything in their power to provoke the Sikhs to war. But the Sikhs bore everything patiently, because they were conscious of their weakness. The Christians did not find, and could not invent, any pretext yet for "devouring" their heathen ally. They had now to leave to their emissaries to accomplish that which was so dear to their hearts. These emissaries goaded on the Sikhs to violate the frontier and go to war against the English. Writes Captain Cunningham, the historian of the Sikhs (p. 299):

"Had the shrewd committees of the armies observed no military preparations on the part of the English, they would not have heeded the insidious exhortations of such mercenary men as Lal Singh and Tej Singh, although in former days they would have marched uninquiringly towards Delhi at the bidding of their great Maharaj. But the views of the government functionaries coincided with the belief of the impulsive soldiery, and when the men were tauntingly asked whether they would quietly look on while the limits of the Khalsa dominion were being reduced, and the plains of Lahore occupied by the remote strangers of Europe, they answered that they would defend with their lives all belonging to the commonwealth of Govind, and that they would march and give battle to the invaders on their own ground."

In a footnote to the above, Captain Cunningham adds:—

"The ordinary private correspondence of the period contained many statements of the kind given in the text." (P. 300).

Captain Nicolson, one of the Assistants on the frontier, wrote to Major Broadfoot on November 23rd, 1845 :—

"Knowing that the Durbar and our government were in friendly relation—at least, that I had never been told the contrary—and in spite of that relation finding the head of the Durbar consenting to a hostile march against its allies, and those supposed to be friendly to us the most active in bringing that march about; the doubt *did* occur to one (not knowing anything of any cause of difference between the governments) whether the Durbar might not be consenting to the march of the army against us with your knowledge, and to afford a chance of safety to the Maharaja and his mother and to the Ahlkars, now threatened with death by the troops if they consent to any terms of accommodation."

Of course, as an occidental diplomatist, Major Broadfoot had to deny all that his assistant had alleged in his letter to him. But the denial should be taken for what it is worth. Captain Nicolson, who from his situation at Ferozpur must have possessed some knowledge of the nature of the intrigue between the British Government and some of the servants of the Sikh Darbar, would not have ventured to write in that manner to Major Broadfoot had he not good reasons to suspect that the Agent had been trying to raise traitors in the camp of the Sikhs and to corrupt their leaders.

There were some Christian adventurers of different nationalities of Europe in the employ of Runjeet Singh. These adventurers [professing the Christian

religion were unscrupulous, treacherous and ungrateful to a degree which could hardly be conceived of by non-Christian Asiatics. Hyder Ali as well as the Maratha princes had kept them in the service of their states. We cannot blame them for employing these foreign adventurers.

But these European adventurers were never true to those whose salt they ate. They were even ready to cut the throats of their masters, because they happened to be non-Christian and coloured persons. Hence it was their creed not only to deceive their employers and leave them in the hour of their need, but to betray them to their enemies.

After the death of Ranjeet Singh, the military council of the Sikhs learning a lesson from the past did well in dismissing these European adventurers from the service of the state. This is as it should have been. One of these European adventurers was named General Ventura. After his dismissal from the service of the Sikhs, he commenced intriguing against them. Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Currie in a letter to Major Broadfoot written from Calcutta on January 19, 1845, said :—

“I have had two or three long conversations with Gen. Ventura ; ** The old Frenchman wished to give some valuable information to Sir Henry [Hardinge] to make him friendly to his interests.” (Loc. cit. p. 270).

There is no doubt then that General Ventura rendered valuable services to the British in their conspiracy against the Sikhs. Corrupted with promises and gold of the British, the Sikh leaders played into the hands of the designing and scheming foreigners and the pretext which the Governor-General was wanting to "devour our ally" was very easily supplied. The Sikhs were made to cross the Sutlej and the British who had been prepared to receive them (for the month of November 1845 was now over) were delighted beyond measure, for it furnished them with the *causis belli* of the war.

Major Broadfoot's biographer, his brother, writes that

"Both the Governor-General and the Agent, following implicitly the policy and opinion declared by Ellenborough, desired beyond everything to maintain the Sikh power in the Punjab, as the best possible barrier of British India against Afghanistan and the other Musalman states." (Loc. Cit. p. 416)

That neither Ellenborough nor Hardinge wanted to maintain the Sikh power in the Punjab is evident from their correspondence and the policy they pursued towards the Sikhs. It is anything but true then to say that the British "desired beyond everything to maintain the Sikh power in the Punjab."

CHAPTER LXXXIV

The Sikhs Cross the Sutlej : The First Sikh War

Sir Hugh Gough was the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army on the eve of the first Sikh War. Lord Ellenborough had no confidence in him, and one of the reasons which induced his lordship during the period of his Governor-Generalship in not going to war with the Sikhs was the fact of Sir Hugh Gough's being the Commander-in-Chief in India at that time. In his letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated Calcutta, April 20, 1844, he wrote :—

"I ought not to conceal from you that the anxiety I feel not to be called too suddenly into the field is much increased by a want of confidence in Sir Hugh Gough, who, with all his personal courage and many excellent qualities, certainly does not appear to possess the grasp of mind or the prudence which is essential to the successful conduct of great military operations. He would do admirably, I have no doubt, at the head of an advanced guard." (Colchester's *Ellenborough*, p. 435).

Ellenborough, who, even after his departure from India, was watching the "game" in the Punjab, wrote to Major Broadfoot from London,

on 7th May, 1845, suggesting to bring up Sir Charles Napier of Sind fame, to command the troops in the war with the Sikhs.*

Much of the disasters which befell the British forces was attributed to Sir Hugh Gough being in supreme command of the troops. Writing to Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister of the day, after the battle of Ferozeshah, Sir Henry Hardinge said :—

"It is my duty to Her Majesty, and to you as the head of the Government, to state, most confidentially, that we have been in the greatest peril, and are likely hereafter to be in great peril, if these very extensive operations are to be conducted by the Commander-in-Chief. These are painful avowals for me to make to you, and *not* to communicate to him. I rely on your friendship to justify the disclosure of my sentiments, in a case where the safety of India is at stake. Gough is a brave and fearless officer, an honourable and amiable man, and, in despite of differences, a fine-tempered gentleman, and an excellent leader of a brigade or a division. He deserves every credit for his heroism in the field, but he is not the officer who ought to be entrusted with the conduct of the war in the Punjab. If I am afraid of making this avowal of my opinion to you, I am unfit for my present office. I respect and esteem Sir Hugh Gough, but I cannot risk the safety of India by concealing my opinion from you."

But it was not so much the incompetency of the Commander-in-Chief which accounted for the

* Major Broadfoot's Career, p. 507.

disasters which befell the British arms as the contempt which the British cherished for their Sikh opponents and quondam allies. The estimate which Ellenborough had formed of the Sikh soldiers has already been given above. For nearly half a century the English had been scheming and designing against the Sikhs. According to some of the European adventurers and travellers in the Punjab, it was the easiest thing in the world to defeat the Sikhs and conquer the Punjab. George Thomas had given such an opinion in the time of Marquess Wellesley and Jacquemont had also repeated it during the Governor-Generalship of Lord William Bentinck. So forming a very contemptuous opinion of the military character of the Sikh soldiers, the foreigners trusted for their success more to the intriguers and traitors whom they had raised in the camp of the Sikhs than solely to the operations of their swords and guns.* Of course their occidental diplomacy bore

* Captain Cunningham in his history of the Sikhs (p. 301) writes :—

“In 1842 the Sikhs were held, as has been mentioned, to be unequal to cope with the Afghans, and even to be inferior in martial qualities to the population of the Jummoo hills. In 1845 the Lahore soldiery was called a ‘rabble’ in sober official despatches, and although subsequent descriptions allowed the regiments to be

the desired fruits, but then the British did not estimate properly the military strength of their opponents.

The Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, was marching to the frontier, when the news reached him of the Sikhs having crossed the Sutlej. From his camp Lushkuree Khan ke Serai, dated 13th December, 1845, the Governor-General issued a proclamation which amounted to a declaration of war—a document, which, as usually written by occidental diplomatists, abounded with lies and half truths.* He declared the possessions of Maha-

composed of the yeomanry of the country, the army was still declared to be daily deteriorating as a military body. It is, indeed, certain that English officers and sepoy equally believed they were about to win battles by marching steadily and by the discharge of a few artillery shots rather than by skilful dispositions, hard fighting and a prolonged contest,"

* "Declaration of war of 1845. *Proclamation by the Governor General of India.* Camp, Lushkuree Khan ke Serai, December 13th, 1845.

"The British Government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjab.

"In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British Government and the late Muharaja Runjeet Singh, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British Government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Muharaja.

"The same friendly relations have been maintained

raja Duleep Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

with the successors of Muharaja Runjeet Singh by the British Government up to the present time.

"Since the death of the late Muharaja Shere Singh, the disorganized state of the Lahore Government has made it incumbent on the Governor General in Council to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier: the nature of these measures, and the cause of their adoption, were at the time, fully explained to the Lahore Durbar.

"Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore Government during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar, the Governor General in Council has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two States, for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown on every occasion, the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Muharaja. Dhuleep Singh, whom the British Government had recognized as the successor to the late Muharaja Shere Singh.

"The Governor General in Council sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh Government re-established in the Punjab, able to control its army, and to protect its subjects; he had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the Chiefs and people of that country.

"The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British frontier, as it was alleged, by the orders of

Mr. William Edwards, who was with the Governor-General when the news reached him of the Sikhs having crossed the Sutlej, writes that Sir Henry

"directed me to spread out before him the map of the North-West Provinces, and point him out Delhi.

the Durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

"The Governor-General's agent, by direction of the Governor-General, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The Governor-General, unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh Government, to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the Government of the Muharaja, or to induce collision between the two States.

"When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the Governor General considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier, to reinforce the frontier posts.

"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

"The Governor General must therefore take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace.

"The Governor General hereby declares the possessions of Muharaja Dhuleep Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

I at once did so, remarking that Delhi was now far in our rear, distant from the frontier, and its importance, in a political point of view, had long passed away. 'Never mind,' replied his lordship, 'I want to see all the roads leading to it, for I have just received a letter from the Duke of Wellington, in which he urges me most strongly to look after Dehli, reinforce its garrison,

"The Governor General will respect the existing rights of all Jagheerdars, Zemindars, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British Government.

"The Governor General hereby calls upon all the Chiefs and Sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British Government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these States. Those of the Chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly.

"The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British Government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

"All subjects of the British Government, and those who possess estates on both sides the river Sutlej, who, by their faithful adherence to the British Government, may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

and watch all roads leading to it, for the Sikhs would certainly make for it, and if it fell into their hands, the place would, from the prestige attending its name, become at once a rallying point for the disaffected all over India, and the result might be most disastrous." (*Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian*, p. 81).

So the garrison of Delhi was strengthened.

Had there been no treachery in the camp of the Sikhs, they would have after crossing the Sutlej gone straight for Ferozepore.

But instead of attacking Ferozepore, Raja Lal Sing, to keep up appearances with the faithful soldiers of the Khalsa, led them on, and the result was the battle fought at Moodkee on the 18th December.

As a result of the treachery of Lal Singh, the Sikhs were defeated and lost heavily. But the Sikh soldiers fought bravely and like devils. They inflicted heavy losses on the British troops. There was every likelihood of the Sikhs utterly crushing the British, had there not been any traitors in their camp. Instead of shot and powder the Sikh soldiers were supplied with mustard

"On the other hand, all subjects of the British Government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore State, and who disobey the proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side the Sutlej confiscated, and themselves declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government."

seeds and flour. Of course, it was not possible for them to fight with these.

After the battle of Moodkee, the Sikhs retired to Ferozeshah, where a very severe battle was fought, in which the English met with disasters unparalleled in the history of their warfare in India.

The Sikhs did not take advantage of the disasters they had inflicted on the English at Ferozshah.*

The English passed a very anxious night on the battlefield at Ferozeshah. Writes the author of the "Career of Major Broadfoot" (p. 395):—

"It is not a matter of surprise that some officers were

* See p. 97 of "Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian," by Wm. Edwards, who attributes the inactivity of the Sikhs to the treachery of their leaders. He writes:—"Had they advanced during the night, the result must have been very disastrous for us, as our European regiments were much reduced in numbers, and our ammunition, both for artillery and small arms, almost expended. It was inexplicable at the time to us why this fresh army had failed to advance and reinforce their comrades. Subsequently at Lahore, however, I was informed that their leaders had restrained the men on the pretext that the day was inauspicious for a battle, it by no means being the intention of the regency that their troops should be successful, but, on the contrary, be destroyed by the British, so as to get rid of them for ever."

unequal to the emergency, and suggested retreat on Firozpur: * * * *

"In case of disaster, which was far from impossible, the Governor-General sent orders to Mudki, where Mr. Currie was in charge of official papers of the Government of India, and Mr. Cust of the records of the Agency, for the destruction of all State papers. Sir Henry's son Charles, who was private secretary, being a civilian, was ordered off the field. Major Somerset conveyed the order, and was mortally wounded about five minutes afterwards. Mr. Hardinge passed the night with Major Brind's battery, and rejoined the Governor-General next morning immediately after the Sikh Camp had been carried. Prince Waldemar of Prussia and his suite were also desired to leave the field, but not before Dr. Hoffmeister had been killed."

But Captain Cunningham, in a footnote to his valuable History of the Sikhs (p. 309), truly observes :—

"Perhaps neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lal Singh and Tej Singh were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs, and hence the anxiety of the one on whom the maintenance of the British dominion intact mainly depended."

But anyhow the English won the battle, and they offered thanks to God for their success. *

* In a notification dated 25th December, 1845, the Governor-General called upon the troops to render acknowledgment to God, and the Calcutta Christian authorities subsequently circulated a form of thanksgiving.

"Unholy is the voice of loud thanksgiving over slaughtered men."

The Governor-General was not satisfied with having raised traitors like Lal Sing and Tej Sing in the camp of the Sikhs. Writes Cunningham (p. 311 f. n.):

"The anxiety of the Governor-General may be further inferred from his proclamation, encouraging desertion from the Sikh ranks, with the assurance of present rewards and future pensions, *and the immediate decision of any lawsuits in which the deserters might be engaged in the British provinces.*"

In that battle of Ferozeshah, many eminent English officers and soldiers met with death, including that adept in occidental diplomacy Major Broadfoot.

The news of the disasters which befell the British began to be circulated all over the country. Mr. William Edwards writes in his "*Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian*" (p. 84) that

"Rumours of the most alarming and disastrous character now began to circulate. It was reported that both the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief had been killed, our army annihilated, and the Sikhs in full march on Delhi."

It was feared that the protected Cis-Sutlej Sikh States would rise against the English and throw in their lot with the Khalsa soldiers. Puttealah was the most important Cis-Sutlej

Sikh State. It was necessary for the English to intrigue with the ruler of that state in order to prevent him from joining the Sikhs. Mr. William Edwards was sent to that state to play the part of an occidental diplomatist. He writes that he received

"the Governor-General's instructions to proceed instantly to Puttialah to install the young Maharajah on the throne, in the place of his father, who had suddenly and mysteriously died, it was feared by poison, on account of his steady adherence to British interests.

"The principality of Puttialah was in consequence of this Chief's death in a very excited and disturbed state and it was considered of the greatest importance to secure the fidelity of his son and successor, as, should the state become hostile to us, the main army's communication with its rear, which passed chiefly through Puttialah territory, would be cut off, and the results might be very disastrous. I was instructed, therefore, to use my best endeavours to induce the young Chief to continue to follow his father's example, and with his subjects remain faithful to British interests." (*Ibid*, p. 87).

With specious promises and other means so characteristic of occidental diplomacy, Mr. William Edwards succeeded remarkably in his mission to Puttialah*

* "I added that although I was not authorized to say so, I felt confident that if the Maharajah and his people remained steadfast to our interests, his Highness would be rewarded by the enlargement of his territory, and by the

Two more battles—of Aliwal* and Subraon—were fought before the English could force their passage across the Sutlej and enter the Sikh territory and proceed to Lahore. But owing to

bestowal upon him of some of the lands which would become British territory on the successful termination of the war. Finally, I said that I would take upon myself to promise, on the part of the Government, that if the Maharajah aided us by forwarding supplies, and keeping open our communications with the rear—that the present salute to which his Highness was entitled would be increased in future to such a number of guns as would not only raise his rank above all other Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States, his former compeers, but place him at once on a level with the great and ancient Rajas of Hindustan.” (pp. 92-93).

* “It has been said that the descriptions of the Peninsular battles received additional grandeur from the spirit-stirring pen of the narrator, that many who witnessed them could scarcely recognise them when dressed in the glowing language of the soldier-historian. Much has been said of Aliwal, but candid witnesses give a far different account from that written at the time.

“I wandered over the field with one who had been present at the engagement; he assured me, and his testimony has been corroborated by many others, that a fruitful imagination was at work when the official account was drawn up. His words were: “Aliwal was the *battle of the despatch*, for none of us knew we had fought a battle until the particulars appeared in a document, which did *more* than justice to every one concerned.

“But the public gulped it down, and like many of our

treason the Sikhs were defeated in both the battles. That of Subraon was altogether a shameful affair, for the English won the victory by the sacrifice of all sense of honor, honesty, conscience and humanity. To quote Cunningham again :—

"The first object was to drive the Sikhs across the Sutlej by force of arms, or to have them withdrawn to their own side of the river by the unconditional submission of the chiefs and delegates of the army; for, until that were done, no progress could be said to have been made in the war, and every petty chief in Hindustan would have silently prepared for asserting his independence, or for enlarging his territory on the first opportunity The English, therefore, intimated to Gulab Singh their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty in Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the Raja declared his inability to deal with the troops,..... the views of either party were in some sort met by an understanding that the Sikh army

Indian battles and Indian blunders, the final issue of the struggle disarmed criticism.

"As an Irishman would say, 'we gained a disadvantage at Budiwal, by the baggage of the army falling into the hands of the enemy; *that* no exaggeration could well turn into a victory; but shortly afterwards, a few shots, and the charge of a squadron or two in pursuit of a host of retreating Sikhs, were magnified into a grand combat, and thus the plain of Aliwal has been recorded as the scene of one of India's Marathons." *Wanderings of a Naturalist in India* by Andrew Leith Adams, M. D., Surgeon, 22nd Regiment. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1867.

should be attacked by the English, and that when beaten it should be openly abandoned by its own Government and further, that the passage of the Sutlej should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid open to the victors. Under such circumstances of discreet policy and shameless treason was the battle of Subraon fought" (p. 324).

Even Mr. William Edwards writes that, when the Governor-General was at Ferozepur,

"emissaries from Rajah Lall Singh* arrived and gave us valuable information respecting the enemy's position..... The Sikhs made a gallant and desperate resistance, but were driven towards the river and their bridge of boats, which, as soon as the action had become general, their leaders, Raja Lall Singh and Tej Singh, had by previous consent, broken down, taking the precaution first to retire across it themselves," (Pp. 99-100).

* Both Lord Hardinge and Sir Henry Lawrence denied that they had anything to do with Lal Singh and Tej Sing before the first Sikh war. In his memoir of Sir H. Lawrence, Kaye writes :

"If this was done, it was strange, indeed, that neither Lord Hardinge nor Sir Henry Lawrence knew anything about it. Both were men of the highest honour; and I cannot believe that either told me an untruth." (Lives of Indian Officers, vol. II, p. 293).

There is little doubt now, that both the above-named officers told horrid lies when they denied that the battles of Mudki, Subraon, Aliwal and Ferozshah were not bought off by bribing Lal Sing and Tej Sing.

The battle of Subraon resembled the "battue" practised in European countries. The Sikhs were the game of British officers and men. No humanity was shown to the Sikhs, who were wantonly and cruelly massacred. Writes Cunningham:—

"the enemy was pressed towards the scarcely fordable river; yet, although assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh offered to submit, and no disciple of Govind asked for quarter..... But the warlike rage, or the calculating policy of the leaders, had yet to be satisfied, and standing with the slain heaped on all sides around them, they urged troops of artillery almost into the waters of the Sutlej to more thoroughly destroy the army which had so long scorned their power. No deity of heroic fable received the living within the oozy gulphs of the oppressed stream, and its current was choked with the added numbers of the dead and crimsoned with the blood of a fugitive multitude."

"Such is the lust of never-dying fame. But vengeance was complete; the troops, defiled with dust and smoke and carnage, stood mute indeed for a moment, until the glory of their success rushing upon their minds, they gave expression to their feelings, and hailed their victorious commanders with reiterated shouts of triumph and congratulation." (P. 328).

Mr. William Edwards has also described the manner in which the faithful Khalsa soldiers were betrayed by Raja Gulab Singh. He writes:—

"When the Sikhs were defeated at Moodkee, Ferozeshuhur and Allewal, the army lost all confidence in Rajahs Lall, Tej Singh, and their other leaders, whom

they accused of conspiring with the British Government for their destruction, and invited Gulab Singh to place himself at their head. The Rajah promised compliance, and arrived in due time at Lahore with a large body of his own hill troops, in whom he could place implicit reliance. He persuaded the Durbar to allow him to garrison the fortress at Lahore with these men, while the Sikhs then occupying it were ordered to proceed to join their brethren on the Sutlej Gulab urged the army not to attempt attacking the British until he joined them, and this he evaded doing, on one pretext or another, knowing full well that in due time the British would attack and capture the position at Subraon." (P. 104).

Charles Viscount Hardinge, the eldest son and private secretary in India of the then Governor-General by whose order or connivance the brave Sikhs who fought for their faith and their land of birth were cruelly dealt with, defends the inhumane conduct of those officers and men who were his coreligionists and compatriots. He says:—

"It may be asked why such indiscriminate destruction was dealt out to so gallant a foe. The men's passions were roused. * * The men vowed vengeance, and inflicted it. Moreover, had not the Khalsa army been annihilated at Subraon, they would have rallied again and protracted a contest north of the river, which it was desirable on the grounds of humanity should, if possible, be brought to a close."^{*}

* P. 119 of the Monograph on Hardinge in the Rulers of India Series,

Amongst the faithful soldiers of the Khalsa who died on the battlefield of Subraon fighting for their faith and commonwealth should be mentioned the name of Sham Singh of Attaree. Writes Cunningham:—

“But the ancient Sham Singh remembered his vow; he clothed himself in simple white attire, as one devoted to death, and calling on all around him to fight for the Gooroo, who had promised everlasting bliss to the brave, he repeatedly rallied shattered ranks, and at last fell a martyr on a heap of his slain countrymen.” (P. 327).

The four battles on the Sutlej brought the first Sikh War to a close. The army raised by the genius of Maharaja Runjeet Singh and for whose efficiency he spared no pains and no expenses, if not altogether annihilated, was mostly destroyed. Of the captured Sikh guns, the Governor-General wrote:—

“We have now taken in battle 220 pieces of artillery, of which 80 pieces exceed in calibre anything known in European warfare. The weight of the Sikh gun in proportion to its calibre is much heavier than ours, and the range of the six-pounder is longer. The recoil on the carriage is less, and their guns do not heat so rapidly as ours in firing.”

Had Runjeet Singh engaged in war with the English, the contest would have most probably resulted in his favor. With his brave soldiers, with his excellent guns, it is a wonder why he did not fight the English. The sack of Delhi was

a day-dream with the Sikhs, and the Khalsa soldiers would have most enthusiastically followed his lead had he chosen to lead them to the invasion of the British territories. But then Runjeet Singh was no statesman and, illiterate as he was, he could not form any conception of the ruin he was bringing down on his Raj when he hugged the British to his breast and did exactly as they desired him to do.

CHAPTER LXXXV

The Sikh Raj Loses its Independence

After the battle of Subraon, when the British treated their Sikh opponents in the most inhuman manner possible, Lord Hardinge lost no time in crossing the Sutlej, and marched towards Lahore. Mr. William Edwards writes :—

"In the afternoon of the 10th, when the action was completely over, and not a Sikh remained on our side of the river, the Governor-General returned to his camp at Ferozepore. That night, when writing letters from his dictation in his tent, I remember in reply to some earnest remonstrance against the supposed folly and rashness of crossing our army at once into the Punjab, his lordship saying, 'Depend upon it I am right, for the safest and the wisest course, when you have knocked the wind' out of your enemy, is to go right at his heart at once before he has time to recover.'"^{*}

Writes Charles Viscount Hardinge in the biographical sketch of his father,

"At 1 p. m. the battle of Subraon was over. At 1.30 Colonel Wood, hardly recovered from his wound, was riding off to Sir J. Grey's Division at Harnku to order him to prepare for crossing the river immediately ; he then rode on to Firozpur, twenty-five miles from head-

^{*} P. 101 of the Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian,

quarters, to deliver the same order, and at 5 p. m. returned half-way to meet the Governor-General. On the 13th February, the whole army had crossed, with the exception of three brigades. On the 12th, the Governor-General himself with his staff crossed the bridge of boats. Abbott and Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) both superintended the operation."

Lord Hardinge (Rulers of India Series), p. 122.

That adept in occidental diplomacy, Major Broadfoot, was killed in the campaign. His diplomatic skill and intriguing nature succeeded in bringing about the war with the Sikhs. Had he been alive, he would have been conspicuous in this march on Lahore. But his place was taken by Major [afterwards well known as Sir Henry] Lawrence. This officer was as great an adept as his predecessor in the craft of occidental diplomacy. He carried on the negotiations and intrigues with the Lahore authorities which ended in the two Lahore treaties to be referred to presently.

That treacherous Rajput chief, Raja Gulab Singh, had managed affairs so adroitly that the British marched on in the land of the Sikhs quite unmolested and without being fired on by the enemy. Lord Hardinge also was not in a mood to fight.

The Sikh soldiers were not such a 'rabble' as they had been misrepresented by the English diplomatists. Although they had been defeated on the battlefields of Mudki, Firozeshah and Sobraon, no blame attached to them for those defeats. They

had been betrayed by their leaders, and it was the British who should have been ashamed of their conduct; for they who pray every day, "lead us not into temptations, but deliver us from all evils," led the non-Christian chiefs into temptations. Those chiefs, being Asiatics, in the simplicity of their hearts could not fathom the depth of duplicity, want of scruples and hypocrisy of the occidental diplomatists and were thus made instruments for the destruction of the independent existence of the Sikh Rāj.

Lord Hardinge considered it advisable to conclude peace with the Lahore Durbar. The Governor-General knew the annexation of the whole dominion of Maharaja Runjeet Singh was impossible. Writes Mr. William Edwards :—

"Annexation of the country was with the force at our disposal perfectly out of the question, had it been in other respects politic or desirable. This, in Lord Hardinge's opinion, it could not be, as the Punjab would never, he felt assured, repay the cost of its administration, and that of the large force which would be required to garrison it, and which being no longer available for the protection of our old territory, would have to be replaced by fresh masses of troops." (Pp. 105-106).

Raja Gulab Singh tried to persuade the Governor-General not to advance to Lahore. But the Governor-General did not act on the advice proffered by that traitor. In his "Reminiscences" (pp. 105-

112), Mr. William Edwards has given a graphic account of the march of Lord Hardinge to Lahore.

The first treaty of Lahore was concluded in March, 1846. By it the Sikh Raj not only lost its independence, but was shorn of some of its most valued possessions. But the ink on the treaty was hardly dry when a second one was forced on the Lahore Durbar. Perhaps the Governor-General was now prepared to annex the whole of the Punjab. But some pretext was necessary to lend the color of justification to his Machiavellian scheme. This was easily found in the conduct of the Lahore Durbar, at the head of which was Rajah Lal Singh. He had betrayed his own co-religionists and played into the hands of the Christians, from whom of course he expected some rewards. But when he found that Gulab Singh was rewarded for his treachery to the Sikhs with Kashmir, he cursed the British for their ingratitude to him.

Under these circumstances it is not improbable that he intrigued with the Muhammadan Governor of Kashmir to prevent its transfer to Gulab Singh. Writes Charles Viscount Hardinge in the biographical sketch of his father (p. 147):—

"The Shaikh Imam-ud-din, not without the connivance of Lal Singh and possibly other members of the Sikh Durbar, at last openly refused to carry out that clause of the treaty of Lahore by which Kashmir was to be

transferred to Gulab Singh. Without an hour's hesitation the Governor-General declared that the Treaty must be enforced by British troops.... But the Shaikh, who had at his disposal not more than 8000 or 9000 men, saw at once that his cause was hopeless. He hurried down to tender his submission in person, and proceeded to make disclosures which involved Lal Singh in his downfall.... The Kashmir insurrection and the treachery of Lal Singh led to a revision of that Treaty of Lahore, in a direction which the Governor-General had for some time been contemplating. In a despatch to the secret committee, dated from Simla, September 10th, 1846, after discussing the advisability of continuing the occupation of Lahore by British troops, he added:—

'The other course which it may be open to the British Government to take, and which has constantly occupied my attention, would be to carry on the Government of Lahore in the name of the Maharaja during his minority, a period of about eight years, placing a British Minister at the head of the Government assisted by a Native Council.... Accordingly, a new Treaty was signed. The Rani was excluded from all power, receiving a pension of £15,000 a year. A Council of Regency, consisting of eight Sardars, was appointed during the minority of Dhulip Singh; and it was stipulated that they should act under the control and guidance of the British Resident'."

The measures adopted by the Governor-General in forcing the second treaty on the Lahore Durbar were well calculated to try the patience of the Sikhs. Perhaps it was his intention to provoke them to further hostilities in order to reduce the rest of the dominion of the Maharaja Rnnjeet

Singh into a British territory. If such were his intentions he succeeded admirably. But the second Sikh War did not take place during the period he held the office of Governor-General in India. So the consequences of the second treaty of Lahore need not be discussed here.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

Hardinge's Treatment of Raja Pratap Sing

The deposed Raja of Satara, Pratap Sing, was kept a prisoner at Benares. His keeper was Major Carpenter. The Raja wrote a letter to Lord Hardinge protesting his innocence. In forwarding this letter, Major Carpenter, who believed in the innocence of that descendant of Shivaji, wrote that the Raja was in a position to prove his innocence. This was so unpalatable to the Governor-General, that he severely reprimanded him for expressing his views. Regarding Major Carpenter's letter to the Governor-General Mr. Ludlow writes that

"by this letter,—for the like of which, in the case of any ordinary felon, any governor of a gaol in England would be thanked by the Home Secretary, Major Carpenter only earned to himself a rebuke from Lord Hardinge. His declaration of his belief in the Raja's innocence was termed 'unbecoming and uncalled for'. No inquiry was instituted as to the new evidence which the Raja offered to bring forth. The Raja's wife had already fallen a victim to the climate of Benares. His own health was sinking fast. In spite of Major Carpenter's warning on the subject, he was left to die. He did die, in October, 1847,—protesting to the last that he was innocent, offering to prove his innocence. With this evil deed Lord Hardinge's name is inseparably connected." (*British India*, Vol. II, p. 154).

(Lord Hardinge's treatment of the Raja of Satara is described in detail in my *Story of Satara*.)

For reducing the independent existence of the Sikh Raj Sir Henry Hardinge was very handsomely rewarded. He was raised to the peerage and made a Viscount. The East India Company, generous with other people's money, voted a pension of £3000 a year to him out of Indian revenues.

But Hardinge was not content with the extinction of the independence of the Sikh Raj. As he was continuing the policy of his predecessor, Lord Ellenborough, he like him naturally had his eyes directed to Nepal and Oudh.

It is a fact that ever since the forcing of a British Resident on Nepal that country has been the scene of domestic feuds and bloodshed and murders. Writes Dr. Wright, the author of the History of Nepal, that from 1817, that is from the time of the appointment of a British Resident at the court of Nepal,

"The records of Nepal furnish little of interest except a history of intestinal struggles for power between the Thapa and Panre factions and futile attempts at forming combinations with other states in Hindostan against the British." (P. 54).

"The Nepalese have a proverb somewhat to the effect that with the merchant comes the musket and with the Bible comes the bayonet." (P. 68)

We suspect that the British Residents at

Nepal with their craft of occidental diplomacy used to succeed in creating these disorders. Their policy was to weaken Nepal and then to annihilate its independence. One of these disorders took place during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Hardinge, which must have gladdened the heart of his lordship very much. Says his son :

"This ghastly story of intrigue and massacre in Nepal must sound almost incredible to the present generation, ... To us at the time in India it recalled the bulletions of similar proceedings which we had been accustomed to receive from Lahore before the Sikh invasion." (P. 156).

Lord Hardinge also proceeded to Oudh "to warn" the King. The "game" was perhaps not yet ripe and so Oudh was not yet made a portion of the British territory.

The foreign policy of Hardinge was aggressive. He found little time to devote to the internal affairs of India. So during his tenure of office, no substantial reform in the administration of the country was carried out.

Hardinge professed to be a very zealous Christian. In the *Calcutta Review* (p. 529, Vol. VIII) it is stated that

"By his own example encouraging the observance of the Christian Religion,... The Notification of October, 1846 prohibiting Sunday labor is evidence of Lord Hardinge's sincerity; and will be long remembered to his honor. The Moslem and the Hindu, who worship their own

fashion, have now some proof that the Christian respects the faith he professes."

He took great interest in the services manned by his co-religionists and compatriots.

"The European soldier's kit, by a General Order of February 1846, is now carried at the public expense: the Sanitarium at Dugshae and the Barrack for European Artillery at Subathu are the work of Lord Hardinge" (*Ibid.*, p. 535).

When a change in the Ministry in England occurred in 1847, he resigned the post of Governor-General, to which office Lord Dalhousie was appointed. He left the shores of India on the 18th of January, 1848, with Sir Henry Lawrence and his personal staff.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

Lord Dalhousie's Administration

The native of Scotland bearing the surname of Ramsay but better known as Lord Dalhousie, was the last maker of the British Indian Empire proper, for after him no other portion of India has been dyed red.

This Scotch nobleman was unscrupulous in the extreme, and he believed, as an occidental diplomatist and follower of Machiavelli, that the end justifies the means. But perhaps he is not so much to be blamed as his masters, whose faithful though unscrupulous servant he was. One of his successors in the Governor-Generalship of India—a compatriot of his enjoying the name of Earl Elgin, did not hesitate to declare from his place in the Supreme Legislative Council of India that the representative of the Sovereign of England in India has no policy of his own but has to act upon the 'mandate' he receives from the Secretary of State for India. Lord Elgin was not a perfect adept in occidental diplomacy of the school of Machiavelli and Talleyrand and so he blurted out a state secret.

If we remember this theory of the 'mandate', we

shall be able to understand the land grabbing policy of the period during which Dalhousie was the Governor-General of this country.

He was not the originator of that policy ; he merely gave effect to it. It was the policy of that party of English politicians of which Macaulay and Lansdowne, Cobden and Bright were the most prominent members. Major General Briggs in a letter to Major Evans Bell, dated 8th May, 1872, wrote :—

“But perhaps I ought not to attribute so much to the personal or free action of Lord Dalhousie, for I have good reason to believe that in Lord Auckland’s time, long before the appointment of Lord Dalhousie, there was a conclave of whig Ministers and magnates at Lord Lansdowne’s place, Bowood, to discuss the policy of upholding or of absorbing the Native States, and it was decided that we should avail ourselves of all opportunities for adding to our territories and revenues at the expense of our allies and of stipendiary Princes like the Rajah of Tanjore and the Nawabs of the Carnatic and Bengal. In this direction, the Bombay Government set the example by annexing the inconsiderable principality of Colaba, under the pretext that an adopted son had no right of succession. This led the way to the more important and more impolitic cases, under Lord Dalhousie, of Jhansi and Nagpore. Lord Dalhousie only acted on the policy prescribed by the Ministers in England.” (*Memoir of General John Briggs*, p. 279).

Unfortunately for India, the man charged with the portfolio of Indian affairs during Lord Dal-

housie's Governor-Generalship was an ex-convict and an unscrupulous politician who, before being ennobled as Lord Broughton, was known as Sir John Hobhouse. Regarding Hobhouse's antecedents, it is recorded by an English historian that he was

"a man of ability but wanting in discretion, who had once been imprisoned for breach of privilege." (Keene's History of India, Vol. II, p. 153, footnote. 1st Edition of 1893).*

Such was the man chosen to be entrusted with the Indian affairs and it is no wonder that, unscrupulous as he was, he felt no compunction of conscience in inflicting miseries on the royal houses and peoples of India.

The annexations of the different independent states and territories of India during the regime of Dalhousie were brought about by means of show of force, bad faith by the violation of all treaties, and fraud and chicanery.

Two provinces—one in the West, that is the Pnnjab and another in the East, that is Pegu—were brought under the jurisdiction of England by the show of force, that is, war. Although not in chronological order, we shall deal with these two wars first.

* Hobhouse was also Dalhousie's uncle (Sir William Napier's Life of Sir Charles Napier, Vol. IV, p. 293).

THE SECOND SIKH WAR

Political and financial considerations rendered it impossible for Lord Hardinge to annex the whole of the Punjab after the first Sikh War. So after having shorn the Sikh Raj of some of its most important provinces and having imposed a very heavy war indemnity on the Lahore Durbar, to make virtue out of necessity, the Governor-General of India showed his magnanimity by leaving Duleep Singh as the ruler of a portion of the Punjab. But Duleep Singh was not recognized as an independent sovereign. No, the territory of which he was the nominal ruler was reduced to the condition of a Feudatory State. The second treaty which was forced on the Lahore Durbar was obviously intended to irritate the people of the Punjab and provoke them to hostilities. That was the policy which guided the occidental diplomats charged with the affairs of the Punjab.

After the first Sikh War, Sir Henry Lawrence was the Resident appointed at the Lahore Durbar. Although an adept in occidental diplomacy, yet he kept up the appearances of being a very pious Christian. So it is probable that had he remained some considerable time at Lahore after the conclusion of the Second Treaty forced on the Lahore Durbar, the existence of the feudatory Sikh Raj would have been prolonged for some time longer.*

* In his letter of the 29th April 1847, Sir Henry

But he left Lahore and was a fellow passenger in the same ship which carried away Lord Hardinge from the shores of India.

His brother Sir John (afterwards well-known as Lord) Lawrence was appointed to officiate for him. But he was not long in charge of the Lahore affairs. Sir Frederick Currie was appointed Resident at Lahore*. A worse selection for that post could not have been made. No doubt Sir Frederick was an able man and well versed

Lawrence as Resident of Lahore wrote to Lord Hardinge:—"The national independence of the Sikh character may dictate the attempt to escape from under foreign yoke : for however benevolent be our motives and conciliating demeanour, a British army can not garrison Lahore, and the fiat of a British functionary can not supersede that of the Durlar throughout the land, without our presence being considered a burden and a yoke."

* Dr. George Buist in his *Annals of India* for the year 1848 (p. 3) writes :—

"Fully in the confidence of Lord Hardinge, and understood to be the adviser or advocate of many of the ablest of his measures, he was appointed Resident at Lahore during the absence of Colonel Lawrence, as not only eminently qualified for the office by natural talent and perfect familiarity with the whole system of the policy desired to be pursued, but as being able to vacate the Residency on the return of the late Resident, and resume his seat at the Council Board without upsetting any arrangement or interfering with the plans or prospects of any one."

in the craft of occidental diplomacy. But he had his pronounced views regarding the Sikh Raj. Before the first Sikh War had taken place, he wrote to Major Broadfoot, in a letter dated Calcutta, January 19, 1845 :—

“If a genuine descendant of Runjeet were on the throne, with a capable minister, or even a tolerable aristocracy out of which to form a government, it might be a question with us whether, in return for Runjeet’s steady friendship, and his forbearance from taking advantage of us at times when he might have done so with present impunity to himself and infinite damage to us, we should aid his descendant in putting down the opposition of his own army and destroying hostile factions in his country. But in the present state of affairs in the Punjab such a measure is quite out of the question. It would be madness in us to think of expending blood and treasure to bolster up the puppet Dhuleep Singh, or to set up such a government as could be formed out of the elements that now exist at Lahore, which must owe its continuance henceforth to our power alone.” (Loc. cit., p. 268).

Referring to this letter, the author of the Career of Major Broadfoot says that it

“is interesting because the writer’s official position specially qualified him to express an opinion on the foreign policy of the Indian Government”. (*Ibid*)

From the appointment of this man there can be no doubt that the Indian authorities intended to provoke hostilities and thus to hasten the annex-

ation of the Punjab, an object which was so dear to their hearts. But before describing the steps taken by Sir Frederick Currie which were the proximate causes of the Second Sikh War, it is necessary to refer to some of the proceedings of the British Government ever since the forcing of the Second Treaty on the Lahore Durbar by Lord Hardinge towards the close of the year 1846. The Punjab was not only reduced to the unenviable position of a Feudatory State, but the members of the Sikh aristocracy of that land found themselves sold bound hand and foot to the tender mercies of the English. The occupation of the aristocracy was gone, and into every situation of honor and trust, an undesirable and unsympathetic alien of the Christian persuasion was thrust. Of course this was bound to irritate and try the patience of the self-respecting members of the Sikh aristocracy. Colonel Sir Henry Sleeman, the successful thief and thug catcher—for set a thief to catch a thief—and as perfect an adept in occidental diplomacy as it was possible for any follower of Machiavelli to be, knew very well the consequences that were sure to result from the policy which his compatriots were pursuing in the Punjab. He expressed his views on the subject so clearly in some of his letters to his friends that the following lengthy extracts from them are given below:—

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To the Hon. Sir T. H. Maddock

Jhansee, 18th May, 1848.

My dear Maddock,

Things are not going so well as could be wished in the Punjab; and it appears to me that we have been there committing an error of the same kind that we committed in Afghanistan—that is, taking upon ourselves the most odious part of the executive administration. In such a situation this should have been avoided, if possible. There is a kind of *chivalry* in this—if there is anything odious to be done, or repugnant to the feelings of the people, a young Englishman thinks he must do it himself, lest he should be thought disposed to shift off a painful burthen upon others; and he thinks it unbecoming of us to pay any regard to popular feeling. Of course, also the officers of the Sikh State are glad to get rid of such burthens while they see English gentlemen ready to carry them. Now, it strikes me that we might, with a little tact, have altered all this, and retained the good feelings of the people, by throwing the executive upon the officers of the Sikh State, and remaining ourselves in the dignified position of Appellate Courts for the redress of grievances inflicted by these officers in neglect of duty or abuse of authority. Our duty would have been to guide, control, and check, and the head of all might have been like the sovereign of England—known only by his acts of grace.

By keeping in this dignified position we should not only have retained the good feelings of the people, but we should have been teaching the Sikh officers their administrative duties till the time comes for making over the country; and the chiefs and Court would have found the task, made over to them under such a system, more easy to sustain. In Afghanistan we did the reverse of

all this, and became intolerably odious to the mass of of the people; for they saw that everything that was harsh was done by us, and the officers of the King were disposed to confirm and increase this impression because they were not employed. The people of the Punjab are not such fanatics, and they are more divided in creed and caste, while they see no ranges of snowy mountains, barren rocks and difficult passes between us and our reinforcements and resources; but it seems clear that there is a good deal of excitement and bad feeling growing up amongst them that may be very mischievous. All the newspapers, English and native, make the administration appear to be altogether English—it is Captain This and Mr. That, who, do, or are expected to do, everything; and all over the country the native chiefs will think, that the leaving the country to the management of the Sirdars was a mere mockery and delusion.

We should keep our hands as much as possible out of the harsh and dirty part of the executive work, that the European officers may be looked up to with respect as the effectual check upon the native administrators; always prepared to check any disposition on their part to neglect their duty or abuse their power, and thereby bring their Government into disrepute. Of course, the outrage at Mooltan must be avenged, and our authority there established; but, when this is done, Currie should be advised to avoid the rock upon which our friend Macnaghten was wrecked. We are too impatient to jump down the throats of those who venture to look us in the face, and to force upon them our modes of doing the work of the country, and superintend the doing it ourselves in all its details, or having it done by creatures

of our own, commonly ten times more odious to the people than we are ourselves.

Ever yours sincerely

W. H. Sleeman.

A Journey through the Kingdom of Oude in 1849-1850. Vol. I. Private correspondence. Pp. XXXIV-XXXVI. To Lt. General the Right Hon. Henry Viscount Hardinge, Jhansee, 15th, August, 1848,

My Lord,

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It was, I think, your Lordship's intention that in the Lahore state, we should guide, direct and supervise the administration, but not take all the executive upon ourselves, to the exclusion of all the old native aristocracy, as we had done in Afghanistan. This policy has not, I am afraid, been adhered to sufficiently; and we have, probably, less of the sympathy and cordial goodwill of the higher and middle classes than we should otherwise have had. But I am too far from the scene to be a fair judge in such matters.

The policy of interposing Hindoo native states between us and the beggarly fanatical countries to the north-west no wise man can, I think, doubt; for, however averse our Government may be to encroach and creep on, it would be drawn on by the intermeddling dispositions and vain-glory of local authorities; and every step would be ruinous, and lead to another still more ruinous. With the Hindoo principalities on our border we shall do very well, and trust that we shall long be able to maintain them in the state required for their own interests and ours.

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Believe me, with great respect,
Your Lordship's obedient, humble servant
W. H. Sleeman.

It is said that had the Multan affair been properly settled, there would not have been the second Sikh war and subsequent annexation of the Punjab. The province of Multan was annexed to the Sikh Raj by Maharaja Runjeet Singh in 1818 and it was farmed out to Dewan Sawun Mull, who was appointed its Governor.* On his death his son Dewan Mulraj became the Governor of that province. The Governor of Multan was more or less independent of the Sikh Raj. All that he was required to do was the regular payment of the tribute to the Sikh Government of Lahore. Thus he was a renter under the Sikh Government. The revenue of Multan was 35 lakhs of rupees a year and the amount which was paid to the Lahore Treasury was seventeen lakhs and a

* The physical improvement of the province effected by Sawun Mull has been borne testimony to by the Board of Administration of the Punjab in their first report for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51 upon that province. The Board wrote :—

“When Sawun Mull was entrusted with the vice-royalty of the country, a large portion of it was little better than a desert : war, rapine, and general insecurity had decimated a population, which for a long period, perhaps for more than a century, had not been numerous. He dug canals, and induced the people from neighbouring states to settle under his auspices. * * In the progress of years, tracts, for which Sawun Mull paid a trifle, yielded a large revenue.” Pp. 89-90.

half during the Governorship of Dewan Sawun Mull. But after the death of that Governor, Lal Singh on behalf of the Sikh Raj demanded an immense *Nuxerana* (feudal fine) from his successor Mulraj. The amount of *Nuxerana* was afterwards commuted to one of eighteen lakhs, which Mulraj agreed to pay within a certain time. But Mulraj did not pay any portion of the promised amount, for there was no regular Government at Lahore. He took advantage of the disorder and disorganization in which the Punjab was involved during the period which preceded the first Sikh War. On the reduction of the Sikh Punjab to the position of a feudatory state of the British, the claim was renewed and troops under the command of Lal Singh's brother, Bhugwan Singh, were sent to coerce Mulraj. The troops were defeated.

One of the districts, that of Junnak, however, was wrested from the Dewan and conferred on Bhugwan Singh.

Dr. Buist, on the authority of the *Delhi Gazette*, writes :—

“Dewan Moolraj was subsequently summoned to Lahore personally to settle his accounts, and came to the capital on the guarantee of the British officers, having good reason to believe himself the object of a scheme to take his life. During his visit to Lahore a settlement of a very favorable nature to him was made, and he was again confirmed in the government of Multan. On the downfall of Lal Singh, and the execution

of the second or minority treaty, which placed the whole of the Punjab at the disposal of the British Indian Government, the rights of Dewan Moolraj, so recently tacitly confirmed by Lord Hardinge, were respected. It appearing, however, subsequently, that it would be highly desirable to place the whole of the Kingdom of Dhuleep Singh on one and the same footing as to the settlement, &c., negotiations were, as we have every reason to believe, set on foot, to induce Dewan Moolraj to resign his charge,—he receiving, we presume, a fair equivalent for the loss entailed." (P. 5 of Annals of India for the year 1848).

The above differs somewhat from the accepted official version, which makes Moolraj as anxious to resign his post as Governor of Mooltan. Sir George Lawrence, a brother of Sir Henry and Sir John Lawrence, writes in his "Forty-three Years in India":—

"On the downfall of the Regency and the appointment of a British resident, Dewan Moolraj was confirmed in his Government. Suddenly in November, 1847, the Dewan re-visited Lahore and communicated to my brother John, the acting Resident, his desire to resign the Government of his province. My brother endeavoured to dissuade him from the step, but Moolraj persisted in his determination, requesting my brother to keep his resignation a profound secret from the Durbar, to which my brother consented." (P. 241).

It seems that the lot of Moolraj was made so hard and unbearable as to compel him to resign his charge. He had been made to surrender one district yielding an annual revenue of eight lakhs

and to add two lakhs to his annual payment to the Durbar. Mr. (afterwards Sir H. M.) Elliot in his "Note on the Revenues and Resources of the Punjab" (p. 40), dated 1st December, 1847, wrote that "the revenue which it (Mooltan) actually yields to Diwan Mulraj shows that his tribute is a very light one." According to the statement furnished by the officiating Resident in November, 1846, the total amount of the revenue of Mooltan as at that time constituted was 36,83,555 Rupees.

"The arrangement with Diwan Mulraj is to last for only three years, of which one has already expired. If it be our policy to increase the revenues of the Durbar at the expense of the Diwan when this term expires, a question which deserves grave consideration, it is evident that an increase may very reasonably be demanded by which the tribute may be raised at a first renewal of the lease to Rs 25,00,000 and at a second to Rs 30,00,000" (Ibid, p. 41).

At the time when Mr. Elliot indited his note, Mooltan used to pay to the Lahore Durbar Rs. 19,71,500 (Ibid, p. 33). Notwithstanding Mr. Elliot's statement that Mulraj's "tribute is a very light one," there can be no doubt that the Governor of Mooltan did not feel it so; otherwise at the end of one year of the above arrangement, that is in November, 1847, he would not have suddenly revisited Lahore and commnnicated to John Lawrence his desire to resign the government of his province. No, he must have also got an inkling

of the determination of the British Government to increase his tribute from 19,71,500 to 25 or even 30,00,000 Rupees.

John Lawrence persuaded Moolraj to reconsider his desire to resign. The latter returned to Multan and it was understood that he would retain his government for another year.

But before the expiry of one year John Lawrence was succeeded in the Residency at Lahore by Sir Frederick Currie. The new resident was perhaps a far greater adept in occidental diplomacy than any one of his predecessors. And as said before, he was perhaps appointed to the Residency at Lahore to provoke the Sikhs to hostilities and thus hasten the annexation of the Punjab. His pronounced views regarding Duleep Singh and the Sikh Government have already been quoted before.

Currie on his arrival at Lahore sought a quarrel with Mulraj. Sir George Lawrence admits that his brother John consented to keep Mulraj's resignation a profound secret from the Durbar. But Currie would not and did not keep it so, because he said that the Dewan's "resignation, so far from being a secret, was talked of in the bazars, and he had heard of it at Agra on his way to Lahore."*

In all probability there was no truth whatever

* Sir George Lawrence's Forty-three years in India, p. 242.

in what Currie said as to Mulraj's resignation being talked of in the bazars, and if it was so, no one in his senses could or would have charged Mulraj with having made the secret a public property. Does it not stand to reason that the occidental diplomatists themselves betrayed the confidence reposed in them by Mulraj and divulged the secret in order to gain their object?

Of course, everything was being done to make Mulraj disgusted with his position as Governor of Multan and induce him to resign. The British Indian Government were determined to introduce into Multan that system of administration which was prevalent in the North-Western Provinces. In his "Note on the revenues and resources of the Puhjab" to which reference has already been made above, Mr. Elliot wrote regarding Multan :

"This province has been compared to the entire Benares Division together with three districts of Allahabad and, therefore, would require for its Civil control—

2 Commissioners.

7 Judges.

9 Collectors." (Loc. cit. p. 46).

Of course all these functionaries were to be natives of England over whom Moolraj as Governor of Mooltan would have no control, or rather he was to be dictated to, insulted and domineered over by them in every manner possible. A self-respecting and spirited man like Moolraj could

not suffer such an arrangement taking place in the province which he and his father had ruled for more than a quarter of a century in a manner highly creditable to themselves and beneficial to their subjects.

Mr. Marshman wrote in the *Calcutta Review* for December, 1843, p. 241 :—

"Mulraj himself had always been regarded by the British authorities, and particularly by Mr. John Lawrence, as a fair specimen of an Asiatic ruler; and Mr. Agnew remarked, on his arrival, that the quiet aspect of Multan had not belied the accounts which he had heard of its excellent order and arrangement."

Of course the people of Multan were contented, happy and prosperous under their own system of government. But the occidental diplomatists of Christian persuasion had to provide for their own kith and kin and therefore they would not tolerate the existence of Mulraj. Under the governorship of Mulraj and his father, Multan had become so rich that those Britishers descended from the old sea-king robbers could not resist the temptation of appropriating its wealth for themselves and they thought they could squeeze out more from it by oppressing its inhabitants than did Mulraj or his father. Mr. Elliot wrote in the Note above-mentioned :—

"Under our management we might add 5,00,000 more for Mooltan," (*Loc. cit.* p. 48).

So Multan was marked out as the first victim. Sir Frederick Currie did not lose any time in negotiating with Moolraj and prevailed on the Lahore Durbar to induce him to resign. His resignation was accepted and one Khan Singh Man was appointed Governor of Mooltan on an annual salary of 30,000 rupees. He was to be governor in name only, the real authority being vested in the two English officers who accompanied him. He was not to do anything without consulting them. The two English officers were, Mr. Agnew, a Civilian, nominated to the office of Political Agent at Multan, and Lieut. Anderson, chosen as his Assistant.

Sir Frederick Currie arrived at Lahore on the 6th of March and within one month of his assuming the duties of the Residency at Lahore the two British officers were deputed to install Khan Singh about the 4th or 5th April, and they arrived at Mooltan on the 18th. They had an escort of about 350 men. What happened on their arrival at Mooltan was very fully described in the *Delhi Gazette*, from which the following extract is given below.

"They were received with all apparent frankness and cordiality and on the 19th Moolraj went through the ceremony of handing over the place to them. Agnew placed guards over the gates, and was issuing out of the last about 100 yards behind Anderson, who was riding along with Moolraj. Whilst in the act of mount-

ing his horse a couple of Sowars rode up and cut him down. Khan Singh, who was with him, immediately jumped off his horse and protected him from further injury, mounted him on an elephant, and conveyed him towards the eedgah outside the town, which had been assigned as their residence. They saw no more of Moolraj, . . . Directly they got into the eedgah, the guns of the place opened on them, and continued firing the whole day. The range, however, was too long, and no damage was done, as the building was substantial. . . . On the morning of the 20th, the Mooltaneees moved out and surrounded them. Khan Singh, in command of the troops, asked what was to be done? Agnew replied, fight it out to the last; on which the Sirdar ordered the infantry to reserve their fire until the enemy came close. On these approaching, the whole escort moved out, and went over to them. Agnew on this told the Sirdars to provide for their own safety: this they refused, but drew their swords, and expressed their resolution to stand by the British officers. Agnew had scarcely time to bid Anderson good bye, when the enemy rushed in upon them. Agnew presented his pistol at the first man; the piece missed fire, but he cut him down, when they were immediately both overpowered and put to death. . . . Khan Singh was wounded by a matchlock ball, and bound hand and foot. Sir Fred. Currie received the report, under Agnew's hand, of the state of affairs up to the evening of the 19th and the rest was supplied by native news-writers." (Buist's Narrative, p. 6).

Moolraj and his followers could not have helped acting otherwise than they did on this occasion. They were animated by the spirit of patriotism

and love of liberty and were not going to sell themselves into bondage without resistance to the foreigners. Colonel Sir Henry Sleeman, who possessed very intimate acquaintance with the character and feelings of the natives of India, was perhaps the only Englishman in India in 1848 who was in a position to fully understand the significance and meaning of the Multan disaster. In a letter dated Jhansi, 24th September, 1848, he wrote to Lord Dalhousie :—

To the Right Hon. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Jhansi. 24th September, 1848.

My Lord.

* * * * *

I hope your Lordship will pardon my taking advantage of the present occasion to say a few words on the state of affairs in the North-West, which are now of such absorbing interest. I have been for some time impressed with the belief that the system of administration in the Punjab has created doubts as to the ultimate intention of our Government with regard to the restoration of the country to the native ruler when he comes of age. The native aristocracy of the country seem to have satisfied themselves that our object has been to retain the country, and that this could be prevented only by timely resistance. The sending European officers to relieve the chief of Mooltan, and to take possession of the country and fort seems to have removed the last lingering doubt upon this point; and Moolraj seems to have been satisfied that in destroying them he should be acting according to the wishes of all his class, and all that portion of the population who might

aspire to the employment under a native rule. This was precisely the impression created by precisely the same means in Afghanistan; and I believe that the notion now generally prevalent is that our professed intentions of delivering over the country to its native ruler were not honest, and that we should have appropriated the country to ourselves could we have done so.

There are two classes of native Governments in India. In one the military establishments are all national and depend entirely upon the existence of native rule. They are officered by the aristocracy of the country, chiefly landed, who know that they are not fitted for either civil or military office under our system, and must be reduced to beggary or insignificance should our rule be substituted for that of their native Chief. In the other, all the establishments are foreign, like our own. The Sikhs were not altogether of the first class, like those of Rajputana and Bundelkhand, but they were for the most part; and when they saw all offices of trust by degrees being filled by Captain This and Mr. That they gave up all hopes of ever having their share in the administration.

Satisfied that this was our error in Afghanistan, in carrying out the views of Lord Ellenborough in the Gwalior State, I did everything in my power to avoid it, and have entirely succeeded, I believe; but it has not been done without great difficulty. I considered Lord Hardinge's measures good, as they interposed Hindu States between us and a beggarly and fanatical country, which it must be ruinous to our finances to retain, and into which we could not avoid making encroachments, however anxious the Government might be to avoid it, if our borders joined. But I supposed that we should be

content with guiding, controlling, and supervising the native administration, and not take all the executive upon ourselves to the almost entire exclusion of the native aristocracy. I had another reason for believing that Lord Hardinge's measures were wise and prudent. While we have a large portion of the country under native rulers, their administration will contrast with ours greatly to our advantage in the estimation of the people; and we may be sure that, though some may be against us, many will be for us. If we succeed in sweeping them all away, or absorbing them, we shall be at the mercy of our native army, and they will see it; and accidents may possibly occur to unite them, or a great portion of them, in some desperate act. The thing is possible, though improbable; and the best provision against it seems to me to be the maintenance of native rulers, whose confidence and affection can be engaged, and administrations improved under judicious management.

The industrial classes in the Punjab would, no doubt, prefer our rule to that of the Sikhs; but that portion who depend upon public employment under Government for their subsistence is large in the Punjab, and they would nearly all prefer a native rule. They have evidently persuaded themselves that our intention is to substitute our own rule; and it is now, I fear, too late to remove the impression. If Your Lordship is driven to annexation, you must be in great force; and a disposition must be shown on the part of the local authorities to give the educated aristocracy of the country a liberal share in the administration.

One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended in India is, I believe, the disposition on the part of the dominant class to appoint to all offices members of their own class, to the exclusion of the educated natives. This has been

nobly resisted hitherto; but where every subaltern thinks himself in a condition to take a wife, and the land opens no prospect to his children but in the public service, the competition will become too great.

* * * *

But the British Indian authorities were not honest in their professions. They wanted to swallow up the Punjab and hence they did not try to nip the Multan revolt in the bud. The Resident at Lahore did all he could to further exasperate the Sikhs and wound their feelings and susceptibilities by his very high-handed proceedings. Without any evidence he considered the Queen Mother, Rani Jhinda, to be implicated in the Multan affairs and took pleasure in practising refined cruelties on her. She was banished the province and kept a prisoner at Benares. It was not carried out with the unanimous consent of the Council of Regency—indeed it does not appear from the State papers that any one of the Sikh or Hindu members of that Council was consulted on the subject. In a despatch dated the 16th May, 1848, Sir Frederick Currie wrote:—

* * * *

“Maharance Jhunda Khore, the mother of Maharajah Duleep Singh, was removed from the fort of Sheikhopoor, *by my orders*, yesterday afternoon; and is now on her way, under charge of an escort, to Ferozepore.

“Her summary banishment from the Punjab, and residence at Benares, under the surveillance of the Governor-General's Agent, subject to such custody as will

prevent all intrigue and correspondence for the future' *seems to me* the best course which we could adopt."*

The words put in italics in the above extract clearly prove that the Resident himself was responsible for the step he took in banishing the Queen Mother from the Punjab. He admitted that there was no legal proof of her guilt and that a formal trial of her was undesirable.

"A formal trial of Maharajah Runjeet Singh's widow would be most unpopular and hurtful to the feelings of the people. * *

"Legal proof of the delinquency of the Maharanee would not, perhaps, be obtainable.†"

Yet he added with that consistency which befits only an occidental diplomatist that

"this is not a time for us to hesitate about doing what may appear necessary to punish State offenders, whatever may be their rank and station, and to vindicate the honour and position of the British Government. * * * *

"I propose, therefore, that the Maharanee be sent to Benares under a strong guard; * * * *

"At Benares, she should be subject to such surveillance and custody as will prevent her having intercourse with parties beyond her own domestic establishment, and holding correspondence with any person, except through the Governor-General's Agent."

The Maharanee was subjected to such persecutions as the followers of that creed only

* Punjab Papers, 1849, p. 168.

† *Ibid.*

among whom the Inquisition was a recognised institution know how to practise to perfection. Her treatment at the hands of the British functionaries was such as was designed and calculated to exasperate the Sikhs. Sir Frederick Currie himself wrote to the Governor-General on the 25th May, 1848:—

"The reports from Rajah Shere Singh's camp are that the Khalsa soldiery, on hearing of the removal of the Maharanee, were much disturbed; they said that she was the mother of the Khalsa, and that as she was gone and the young Duleep Singh in our hands, they had no longer any one to fight for or uphold, that they had no inducement to oppose Mulraj and if he came to attack them, would seize the Sardars and their officers, and go over to him."*

Shere Singh in his Manifesto also proclaimed:—

"It is well known to all the inhabitants of the Punjaub, to the whole of the Sikhs, and in fact to the world at large, with what oppression, tyranny and undue violence, the Feringhees have treated the widow of the great Maharajah Runjeet Singh, now in bliss.

"They have broken the treaty by imprisoning, and sending away to Hindustan, the Maharanee, the Mother of her people."†

Ameer Dost Muhammad also wrote to Captain Abbott §:—

"There can be no doubt that the Sikhs are daily

* Punjab Papers, p. 179.

† *Ibid*, p. 362.

§ *Ibid*, p. 512.

becoming more and more discontented. Some have been dismissed from service, while others have been banished to Hindustan, in particular the mother of Maharajah Duleep Singh, who has been imprisoned and ill-treated. Such treatment is considered objectionable by all creeds, and both high and low prefer death."

But the Christian authorities, intoxicated with power, paid no heed to all these voices of warning. No, it was their policy to exasperate the Sikhs and provoke hostilities in order to deprive them of their independence and earthly possessions. There can be no doubt that the ill-treatment of the Queen-mother by the Christians was one of the principal causes which brought about the Sikh war.

Not only the Governor of Multan was goaded to hostility, but the Sikh Governor of the Hazara province was being so systematically ill-treated and insulted by his foreign Christian subordinates that he considered that his as well as his country's honour and safety lay in driving the English out of the Punjab. The province of Hazara, although it fell to the lot of Gulab Singh of Kashmir, was subsequently exchanged for other territories and given over to the Government of Maharaja Duleep Singh. The venerable and much respected Sirdar Chuttur Singh Attareewala was appointed the Governor or Nazim of this province. His son, Rajah Sher Singh, was a member of the Council of Regency at Lahore. The manner in which

Sirdar Chuttur Singh was being treated led him to suspect that his own ruin and that of the Sikh Raj were objects predetermined by the English. His daughter was betrothed to the Maharaja Duleep Singh. To test the good faith of the alien Christian authorities, the Resident at Lahore was asked to fix a day for the marriage to take place. Lieut. (afterwards Sir H. B.) Edwardes wrote to the Resident on the 28th July, 1848:—

“He earnestly requested me to procure him an answer from you within ten days. The request seems strange at the present moment. The secret motives of men are difficult to divine; but there can be no question that an opinion has gone very prevalently abroad, and been carefully disseminated by the evil disposed, that the British meditate declaring the Punjab forfeited by the recent troubles and misconduct of the troops; and whether the Attareewalla family have any doubts or not upon this point themselves, it would, I think, be a wise and timely measure to give such public assurance of British good faith, and intention to adhere to the Treaty, as would be involved in authoritative preparations for providing the young Maharajah with a Queen. It would, no doubt, settle men's minds greatly.” (Punjab Papers, 1849, p. 271.)

Sir Frederick Currie's reply was a very stiff one, and it was couched in the phraseology of occidental diplomacy. He avoided giving any such assurance as Raja Sher Singh wished to elicit, but observed that

“Of course, with reference to the position of the

Maharajah, *nothing can be done in this case without the concurrence and approbation of the Resident.*"

Then he added that he would

"consult, confidentially, the members of the Durbar now at Lahore on the subject of the time at which the marriage should be celebrated."^{*}

Of course, the Christian Resident did nothing of the sort. His conduct impressed Sirdar Chuttur Singh with the belief that the English authorities did not entertain friendly feelings towards the Sikh Raj.

About this very time Captain Abbott, one of the Resident's Assistants who had been appointed to aid and advise Sirdar Chuttur Singh in the execution of his duties, was behaving in the most scandalous manner towards the Sikh Governor. He considered Chuttur Singh to be

"at the head of a conspiracy for the expulsion of the English from the Punjaub, and was about to head a crusade against the British forces at Lahore."[†]

Captain Abbott had at this time no reasonable grounds for suspecting the fidelity of that Chief. Yet he commenced annoying and persecuting that Chief in a manner which no man possessing any sense of self-respect would at all tolerate. He took

^{*} Punjab Papers, p. 272.

[†] *Ibid.* p. 279.

up his residence at a distance of thirty-five miles from that of Chuttur Singh, from whom he "shut himself out from all personal communication."* Regarding Captain Abbott's behaviour to the Sikh Governor, the Resident was forced to admit that

"The constant suspicion with which Captain Abbott regarded Sirdar Chuttur Singh, seems to have, not unnaturally, estranged that Chief from him."†

But Captain Abbott did something worse. The province of Hazara was inhabited by an armed Mahomedan population, which according to the official account was "warlike and difficult of control."§ Captain Abbott obtained influence over this population by distributing money and promise of an opportunity of revenge over the Sikhs, represented by him as the obstinate persecutors of the Mussalman faith. Having thus bought over the Mussalmans, he tried to pit them against the Sikhs and harass Chuttur Singh. The Sikh Governor was residing at Hurripore. Captain Abbott called out the armed Mussalman peasantry, who on the 6th of August "assembled in great numbers, and surrounded the town of Hurripore." In self-defence, the Sikh Governor ordered the troops, stationed for the protection of the town, to encamp on the

† *Ibid*, p. 285.

† *Ibid*, p. 279

§ *Ibid*, p. 18.

esplanade under the guns of the fort. The commandant of the troops was an American Christian named Colonel Canora. He refused to obey the orders of the Sikh Governor. He was not only guilty of gross insubordination, but loaded two of his guns with double charges of grape, and "standing between them with a lighted port fire in his hand, said he would fire on the first man who came near."* Some infantry soldiers were sent by Chuttur Singh to take possession of the guns. Colonel Canora ordered one of his havildars to fire on these soldiers. As this non-commissioned officer did not obey his orders, so he was cut down by Colonel Canora, who himself applied the match to one of the guns, which missed fire. At that moment he was shot down by two of the infantry soldiers.

So died Colonel Canora, who met with his deserts which he fully deserved. There should have been no pity for his fate, for his conduct was a great military crime. But his death furnished Captain Abbott with a handle to persecute the Sikh Governor. He was not ashamed to call the death of Colonel Canora "an atrocious deed," "a cold-blooded murder" and to speak of Chuttur Singh having "determined upon the murder" of Colonel Canora. The Resident, Sir Frederic Currie, however, did not

* *Ibid.*, p. 280.

agree with Captain Abbott in considering the death of Colonel Canora as "an atrocious deed" or "a cold-blooded murder." His opinion regarding the death of that American officer will be gathered from the following extracts of his letters to Captain Abbott:

"I cannot at all agree with you as to the character you assign to this transaction. Sirdar Chuttur Singh was the Governor of the province, military and civil, and the officers of the Sikh army were bound to obey him, the responsibility for his orders resting with him. Taking the worst possible view of the case, I know not how you can characterise it as a cold-blooded murder, as base and cowardly as that of Peshora Singh

....
"I have given you no authority to raise levies, and organise paid bands of soldiers, to meet an emergency, of the occurrence of which I have always been somewhat sceptical.

"It is much, I think, to be lamented that you have kept the Nazim at a distance from you; have resisted his offers and suggestion to be allowed himself to reside near you,

"None of the accounts that have yet been made justifies you in calling the death of Commedan Canora a murder, nor in asserting that it was pre-meditated by Sirdar Chuttur Singh. That matter has yet to be investigated." (Panjab Papers, 1849, pp. 313-316).

But Captain Abbott, determined upon destroying Chuttur Singh and the Sikh army, did not hesitate to adopt most unscrupulous and unfair means. In his own despatches he wrote :

"I assembled the Chiefs of Hazara; explained what had happened, and called upon them by the memory of their murdered parents, friends and relatives, to rise, and aid me in destroying the Sikh forces in detail. I issued *purwannas* to this effect throughout the land, and marched to a strong position." (*Ibid.*, p. 311).

Of course Sirdar Chuttur Singh had to do everything in his power to counteract the evil influences which Captain Abbott brought to bear against him. The Resident wrote to Captain Abbott that Chuttur Singh's sons complain that their father had been

"betrayed into misconduct by mistrust, engendered by your withdrawal of your confidence from him, and declared suspicions of his fidelity, and by fear at the Mahomedan population having been raised, as he believed, for his destruction and that of the Sikh army."^{*}

Captain Abbott did not pay any heed to what the Resident wrote to him. It may be that Sir Frederick Currie, determined upon provoking the Sikhs to hostility and thus justifying the annexation of the Punjab, was secretly glad at the conduct of Captain Abbott towards Sirdar Chuttur Singh, but to keep up appearances he wrote those letters extracts from which have been given above. Had the Resident been sincere in what he wrote, he should have at once ordered the removal of Captain Abbott from his post at Hazara. Accor-

* Punjab Papers, 1849, p. 296.

ding to the testimony of Sir Henry Lawrence and of Sir Frederick Currie himself, Captain Abbott's character was not such as to place him in political situations in hours of crisis. Regarding Captain Abbott, Lawrence wrote to Lord Hardinge in 1847:—

"Captain Abbott is an excellent officer; but he is too apt to take gloomy views of questions. I think he has unwittingly done Dewan Jowala Sahae injustice."*

Captain Abbott also, wittingly or unwittingly, did injustice to another Sikh Chief, named Jhunda Singh. Sir Frederick Currie wrote:—

"Captain Abbott wrote of Jhunda Singh as one connected with the extensive band of conspirators whom he considered as leagued to aid the Mooltan rebellion.

"Upon that occasion I explained to Captain Abbott, that if his opinion of Sirdar Jhunda Singh's disaffection rested on the facts he had mentioned, it was without due foundation; for that the Sirdar had closely and scrupulously obeyed my orders in every step he had taken."†

Regarding Abbott's capacity as a political, the Resident also wrote:—

"His Lordship will have observed a very ready disposition on the part of Captain Abbott to believe the reports that are brought to him of conspiracies, treasons, and plots, suspicion of everybody, far and near, even

* Punjab Papers, p. 30.

† *Ibid*, p. 328.

of his own servants, and a conviction of the infallibility of his own conclusions which is not shaken by finding time after time that they are not verified.”*

The Resident was thoroughly acquainted with the character of Captain Abbott and so it passes our understanding why he allowed the latter a free hand in the affairs of Hazara. Captain Abbott goaded Sirdar Chuttur Singh into open hostilities.†

* *Ibid.*, p. 285.

† Major Evans Bell in his “Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy” truly observes:

“When Chuttur Singh had committed himself beyond retreat by a series of acts of contumacy and hostility, and when Captain Abbott was proving himself fully equal to the occasion, that officer’s provocative policy was glossed over and consigned to oblivion. But there is nothing whatever in the Blue Book to show that the Resident ever saw reason to withdraw or modify his opinion that ‘the initiative was taken’ by Captain Abbott.” (p. 118).

* * * * *

“When Chuttur Singh found that his appeal to the President and the Durbar was fruitless; that Captain Abbott’s proceedings were not disavowed, or, to his knowledge, disapproved; and that no terms were offered to him but bare life, what could he think but that he had been marked down as the first victim in the general ruin of the Punjaub State? Already alarmed and disgusted by the Maharanee’s removal and ill treatment, and by the evasive answer as to the Maharaja’s marriage, his head may probably have been full of plots and pro-

It is necessary now to turn our attention again to Multan. Dewan Mulraj's revolt would have been crushed had troops been sent in large numbers to Multan in time. The Second Treaty forced on the Lahore Durbar in December, 1846, left all power in the hands of the British Resident: the members of the Council of Regency were intended to be merely his executive officers. The Khalsa troops were mostly disbanded and in their stead the Durbar was mulcted of a very large sum out of the revenues of the Sikh Punjab for the maintenance of the contingent furnished by the British Indian Government. Maharaja Duleep Singh was merely a feudatory prince and the State of which he was the nominal sovereign was reduced to the condition of a

jects, and he may have been intently watching the course of events, when Captain Abbott's initiative threw him into an equivocal position. When that officer was permitted to pursue what he himself called 'the work of destruction,' unproved, so far as Chuttur Singh knew,—when the plan of setting up Mahomedans against Sikhs, and reviving ancient blood feuds, was adopted and sanctioned by the highest British authorities, the old Sirdar's disaffection was confirmed. He was driven to desperation, he no longer resisted the importunities of the fanatic Sikhs among his followers and the troops. He plunged into open rebellion, and devoted himself to one last struggle for his religion and the Khalsa Raj." (Pp. 126—127).

feudatory one. Both civil and military power was taken away from him and his Durbar and placed in the hands of the Resident. Mr. Marshman in his History of India, (vol. III. p. 305) wrote :—

"The precautionary measures adopted by Lord Hardinge manifested equal foresight and vigour. He did not expect that a country teeming with disbanded soldiers, the bravest and most haughty in India, who had been nurtured in victory and conquest, and pampered with seven years of military licence, would be as free from disturbance as a district in Bengal. To provide for the prompt suppression of any insurrectionary movements which might arise, he organised three moveable Brigades, complete in carriage and equipment.

These were held in readiness at Lahore, Jullunder and Ferozepore, to take the field at the shortest notice".

Yet to make out a case against the Lahore Durbar and its Sovereign, the Resident thought it convenient and politically expedient to violate the provisions of the Bhairawal Treaty.

With that unscrupulous disregard for truth which marks occidental diplomacy, Sir Frederick Currie was not ashamed to write to Lord Dalhousie :

"Dewan Moolraj is an officer of the Sikh Government; he is in rebellion, . . . to the Sikh Durbar, and the orders of that Government. The coercion must come from the Sikh Government, unaided by British troops. if

possible. If it should be necessary to move a British soldier, the affair will be a serious one for the Durbar.”*

Surely, Aesop's wolf had not invented a more ingenious plea for devouring the lamb than this Christian diplomatist for swallowing up the Sikh Punjab. According to the articles of Agreement of the Bhairawal Treaty of December, 1846, the Lahore Durbar was made to subsidize the British troops for preserving “the peace of the country.” Yet in the hour of need the Resident did not “move a British soldier” to put down the rebellion in Multan. Sir Henry Lawrence in his article on the Indian army published in the *Calcutta Review* for March, 1856, quoted the following passage from the first Punjab Report:—

“One thousand (1,000) men (half Cavalry, half Infantry,) and two guns, put in motion within two hours of the news of a disturbance reaching any of our station, and able to traverse the country at the rate of twenty or thirty miles a day, will do more to secure the peace of the Punjab than the tardy assemblage of armies.”

Commenting on the above, Sir Henry wrote :—

“The above passages entirely express our opinion. There is nothing in the length or breadth of the plains of India that could for an hour stand against such a force. * * Had the ten thousand men that had been told off, on the N. W. Frontier to meet disturbance, promptly marched on Mooltan, in 1848, there would probably have

* *Ibid*, p. 133.

been no siege; or at least the affair would have been as insignificant as it proved momentous." *

But it was not the policy of the Resident to nip the Multan rebellion in the bud. Had he done so, the Sikh insurrection would not have grown out of it. † Sir H. B. Edwardes wrote in his work on "A Year on the Punjab Frontier," (Vol. II, p. 145):—

"It was my own belief at the time, that had the Mooltan rebellion been put down at once, the Sikh insurrection would never have grown out of it; it was a belief shared, moreover, (as well as I remember,) by every political officer in the Punjab, and I for one still think so now."

As said before, the Resident did not move a single British soldier to put down the Mooltan rebellion. It was not his interest and that of

* P. 186.

† Captain Trotter in his History of the British Empire in India, Vol. I, p. 134, writes:—

"If the delay in crushing the rebellion sprang in part from a secret hope of its spreading far enough to furnish Government with a fair excuse for annexing the whole dominions of Runjeet Singh, that excuse grew more and more feasible as week after week of the hot and rainy seasons slipped by. Lord Gough's ill-founded fear of a hot weather campaign, the Governor-General's willingness to accept the judgment of an old soldier against the bolder reasonings of a young one, the strange blindness of his Council to the true meanings of events so far away, concurred to ensure the very issues which Edwardes and Sir Frederick Currie might else have forestalled."

the British Indian authorities to have done so. The Lahore Durbar was asked to employ their own resources to put down the rebellion; and if they failed to do so, they were threatened with the annexation of their province. The Lahore Durbar tried to do as they were bid by Sir Frederick Currie. Sirdar Chuttur Singh's son, Raja Sher Singh, at the head of a large contingent of the Durbar troops, marched on Mooltan. Lieutenant (afterwards Sir H. B.) Edwardes, one of the assistants of the Resident on the frontier, raised levies of Muhammadans whose long-standing hatred against Hindus and Sikhs he turned into account, by leading them against Moolraj.* He was also reinforced by the troops of the Nawab of Bhawalpoor.

It is not necessary to note in detail the move-

* One of the Indian Mussalman correspondents of Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, wrote to him in a letter dated October 6th, 1848 :—

"Major Edwardes wrote to Futteh Khan Tawanah, to assemble and kill and plunder the Sikhs in Dera-Gazee-Khan and Bunnoo. But no sooner had he assembled his tribe than the Sikhs killed him * *. This Futteh's tribe of Tawanah, is a very strong people, and always refractory to Moolraj and the Lahore Durbar. When Major Edwardes was coming from Lahore to attack Moolraj, this chief joined him, and Edwardes appointed him Governor of Bunnoo and Dera-Gazee-Khan, and he was a loyal subject and so lost his life." (Life of Sir Charles Napier, vol. IV, p. 129.)

ments of the troops despatched against Mooltan. Suffice it to say here that Edwardes obtained two victories against Moolraj's troops, and when he appeared before Multan, he could have, according to his own showing, easily taken it, for which purpose, he proposed to the Resident to commence the siege of Mooltan forthwith, asking only for a few heavy guns, and an engineer officer with a detachment of sappers. * Again he wrote in his work already referred to before :—

"In June and up to the end of July [1848], I am quite sure that Lieutenant Lake's force and my own could have taken the City of Mooltan with the utmost facility ; for it was surrounded by nothing stronger than a venerable brick wall, and the rebel army was dispirited by its losses at Kineyree and Suddoosam. On this point neither Lieutenant Lake nor myself, nor General Cortlandt (who was an older, and therefore a steadier soldier than either of us) had ever any doubt." †

But no British troops were then sent to the help of Edwardes. §

* Punjab Papers, 1849, p. 223.

† A Year on the Punjab Frontier, vol. II, p. 403.

§ The Indian Mussalman correspondent of Sir Charles Napier accounts for the raising of the siege of Multan as follows :—

"As for Moolraj, when he saw that no British troops moved from Lahore, or the provinces, he tried another stratagem and began to play with Edwardes, and retreated after some partial fights. This encouraged Mr. Edwardes and he called for the Nawab's troops ; they

Sher Singh, who was sent to Mooltan, was not successful in his attempt to coerce Mulraj. The Sikh troops under him deserted him and joined Mulraj, because, as said before, they had become

both closed Moolraj and shut him up in the fort of Mooltan. Many people were joining Moolraj from Bhawalpoor and Punjaub, but he, I positively know, discouraged the Mussalmans and dismissed them with some promises, but he kept the Sikhs. He had always 15,000 good stout Sikhs, and was well able to crush Mr. Edwardes at any moment, but his object was to draw on some British troops. So he began to supplicate and pray for pardon and asked that his life might be spared, and his friends in Edwardes' camp gave out that he had undermined his seraglio and was about to poison himself; and Edwardes after those victories and reducing his enemy to such extremity as poison, really believed and thought himself Clive. Wellesley, and as some chose to call him, Pictou and Craufurd altogether. He did not think his glory would be complete, unless he took Moolraj unconditionally and hanged him where Messrs. Agnew and Anderson were murdered.

"But far from these, not only himself but Sir F. Currie were duped by the Sikhs and Moolraj; and when E. thought that Moolraj only held out for fear for his life, wrote to Sir F. and told him that if a single brigade and some guns would be sent down Moolraj would at once give up unconditionally. But at the same time everybody knew, * * that Moolraj was daily casting guns and had 15,000 men: * *

"* * The day General Whish arrived before Mooltan, he, Moolraj, came out to tell Edwardes that

quite disgusted with the treatment meted out to the Queen Mother by the Resident. Sher Singh himself would have joined Mulraj, if the latter had taken him. But Mulraj's suspicions were roused against him by the false letters of Edwardes, who always professed and pretended to be a very zealous Christian. Sir Charles Napier's Indian Mussalman correspondent wrote to him on October 6th, 1848:—

"Edwardes has been busy, writing false letters from General Shere Singh, to fall into the hands of Moolraj to create suspicion, in which he partially succeeded and prevented Moolraj attacking him."^{*}

In the meanwhile events were occurring in the north of the Punjab which made Sher Singh leave Multan. Sher Singh's father Chuttur Singh was being shamefully and disgracefully ill-treated by the British officers. The Indian Mussalman correspondent of Sir Charles Napier in the letter to which reference has already been made above wrote that

"The politicals are doing such deeds as to lose their trust and disgust the Sikhs. I am told Mr.

he did not want him to spare his life, and drove him out of his camp, and very nearly crushing him and his ally Bhawalpoor; but the Sikh allies interfered between Moolraj and flying Edwardes, and thus he was saved." (pp. 122-123, vol. IV.)

^{*} Life of Sir Charles Napier, vol. IV. p. 129.

Nicholson and Captain Abbott wrote to the Hazarees, that if they will drive Chuttur Singh out, three years' revenue should be remitted."

The manner in which Chuttur Singh was being persecuted and ill-treated by Captain Abbott has already been mentioned before. As the son of his father, it was the bounden duty of Sher Singh to come to Chuttur Singh's rescue. So he left Multan and traced his steps northward to join his father. The siege of Multan was now raised and events to which the British authorities were so longingly looking forward, happened in the Sikh Punjab.

The failure of the siege of Mooltan emboldened the Sikhs and they rallied round Chuttur Singh and Sher Singh to fight for their Khalsa Raj. The Sikhs are not to be blamed; for they had been so systematically maltreated, that they were provoked to hostilities. They would have been less than human beings had they not risen in arms to drive out the Christian intruders from their country. The Indian Mussalman correspondent of Sir Charles Napier wrote in the letter to which allusion has been already made before:—

"It is now many more times more difficult to subdue Punjab than 1846 when Lord Hardinge had the power to do so, because the object of the Sikhs then was to destroy their refractory troops, and the Sirdars accepted promises, nay took bribes, too, but now they will not take bribes, and animated with great hatred for the way

they were treated, and the Sikhs will turn out to a man, unless something extraordinary may happen to prevent, which I can not vouch for at present.”*

Yes, the Sikhs as a body had joined out of their common hatred of the English, whom they would have succeeded in driving out of their country, but for the Machiavellian policy the English adopted towards them. They pitted the Mussalmans against the Sikhs. It was with the support of the followers of the creed of Islam, that the English succeeded in defeating the Sikhs. Writing of the spread of the Sikh revolt, Captain Trotter in his History of the British Empire in India says of the British officers that

“Left to their own resources, namely, to their skill in turning to account the old-standing hatreds between Sikh and Mahomedan, these men long stood their ground amidst the surging floods about them, with a courage all the hardier as their hopes grew less.”†

It is sad to contemplate the want of patriotism, statesmanship and foresight exhibited by the votaries of the creed of Muhammad that they should have allied themselves with the English in their design to subvert the Sikh Raj. The fact can not be denied that the Muhamadans in the Punjab enjoyed complete religious

* P. 125, Vol. IV.

† Vol. I, p. 134.

toleration under the Sikh Raj. Thus Mr. R. W. Traford writes in the Punjab Notes and Queries, Vol. I, p. 61 :—

"The principal Queen of Maharaja Ranjit Singh lived at Shekhupura (Gujranwala District), where she built a *Masjid* for her Muhammedan subjects. In a similar spirit of liberality a *Masjid* was erected at Botala *Sivala* by a Sikh Sardar."

Maharaja Runjeet reposed entire confidence in his Mahomedan minister, Fakir Azizuddin. Yet members of the family of this Muhammadan minister, who, but for the patronage of Ranjeet Singh, would never have risen out of obscurity, proved traitors to the Sikh Raj. His brother Noor-ud-din was a member of the Council of Regency of Lahore, and Sir Lepel Griffin in his work on the Punjab Chiefs writes of him that "he at all times was ready to facilitate matters for the British Resident." It was by his advice that the Queen-Mother, Rani Jhinda, the widow of Maharaja Runjeet Singh, was ordered to be banished out of the Punjab and he personally saw to the order being carried out.*

Of the treachery of another member of the family of the Muhammadan minister, Sir Lepel Griffin writes :—

"Fakir Shamsuddin, second son of Nuruddin, was Thanadar of the Gobindgarh fort during the second

* Punjab Papers, 1849, p. 228.

Sikh War. In this position he behaved with great fidelity, and made over the fort to European troops at a time when any hesitation on his part might have produced serious results”⁴¹

What Griffiu calls “fidelity” was in reality “treachery.”

It is no wonder then that the Sikhs having traitors among their Muhommadan compatriots were easily overcome by their Christian antagonists.

It was not till October, 1848—when Mulraj had held out for six months—that the Sikh Sirdars of the Punjab made up their minds to join Chuttur Singh and make the Khalsa Raj independent of the English. The English also were not idle. They assembled the troops and the Commander-in-Chief Lord Gough had to take the field. The siege of Multan had been raised in September, 1848. But the British troops again invested it. The fort of Multan was a strong one and considered quite impregnable. Sir Charles Napier writing in August, 1848, to his brother Major-General W. Napier said:—

“If he (Lt. H. B. Edwardes) beats Moolraj, he will be safe; but if Moolraj gets an advantage Edwardes’ position will be dangerous, * *. If Moolraj’s men are

* The Punjab Chiefs, new (1890) Edition. Vol. I, p. 1109.

true, Edwardes can not take Mooltan; if they are false the town will open its gates.”*

So it was not altogether the sword on which the English depended for success in their campaign against the Sikhs. Occidental diplomacy was the more useful weapon to insure their success than military strategy or mere powder and shot.

It is not necessary to enter into details regarding the battles which were fought between the English and the Sikhs—the battles of Ramnagar, Chillianwalla and Goojerat. Lord Gough was outmanouvred by Sher Singh and the British forces were defeated by the Sikhs at Chillianwalla. This battle was the last one won by the Sikh soldiers on the plains of India.† It was fought on January 1849. But un-

* Life of Sir Charles Napier. Vol. IV, p. 106.

† Mr. Marshman writing of the battle of Chillianwalla, says that it was “one of the most disastrous engagements we have ever fought in India—an engagement, by which no one advantage was gained, and in which British troops were checked by a barbarian enemy who had not even the advantage of numbers....

“Our loss amounted to no less than 2,300 killed and wounded, of whom nearly 800 were slain. Twenty-six officers were killed on the spot, or died of their wounds; sixty-six were wounded. Her Majesty's 24th and the 30th and 56th native infantry were so entirely disabled, that they were compelled to be disjoined from the force, and sent back to Ramnuggar and Lahore. Her Majesty's 20th and the 24th native infantry lost

fortunately the Sikhs did not take full advantage of it. Of course, the Sikh soldiers were the best fighting men in the world. Mr. Marshman in his article on the Second Punjab war, published in the *Calcutta Review* for December, 1849, wrote:—

“Throughout the war, at Ramnuggur, at Chillianwallah, at Russul, at the passage of the Indus, the Sikh army waited for, escaped from or moved round the British, with the most perfect facility; crossed rivers, which occupied British troops many days; and, in every imaginable mode, demonstrated that the excellence of the British Commissariat was no match for the simplicity of the Sikh, and that men, who can bivouac in the open air, and live on parched grain, will march much faster than those who must have double tents, and carry their luxuries with them.”*

Sher Singh should not have left his intrenched position at Russul, in the immediate neighborhood of Chillianwalla, where he had taken up his quarters after that memorable victory. Writes Mr. Marshman:—

“The Commander-in-Chief rode over the ground, which the Sikhs had vacated, and the intrenchments which they had thrown up, and which it would have cost thousands of lives to capture. But the men and the cannon which should have defended them, were gone;

both their colours; the 25th and 26th lost each one; the 5th cavalry, lost the colour they won on the field of Maharajpore.” (*Calcutta Review*, December, 1849, p. 286).

* Pp. 267-268.

and it became manifest that the Sikh army of 30,000 men, with sixty guns, all lying within four miles of the British encampment, had marched round the army of the Punjab, had escaped the eyes of its Commander-in-Chief, and was now in his rear, in full march for Lahore."*

But Sher Singh could not reach Lahore, but was intercepted at Gujrat, where took place the last fight which crushed all hope of Sikh independence. The military strategy of the English at Gujrat was faulty. Writing of this, Sir Charles Napier said:—

"Grant and Lawrence are good men in their position and if we had a war I would put Grant at the head of a division; but neither of them are generals. Grant would be, if he had studied war, but he has not. The battle of Gujrat was his, and marked by a total absence of science. The Sikh army, not a manœuvring army able to change front in action, whose left rested on an impassable river, whose right was *'en l' air*, and weak as water, whose front was strong, ought to have been attacked on its right: and the more especially that its only line of retreat was through a pass on the right, and a rapid movement of our left, when winning, would have gained that pass, and driven the Sikhs into the river, the fords of which were guarded by us on the left bank, it was an adjutant-general's battle, not a scientific one."†

Regarding Sher Singh's mistake, Napier wrote:—

"His (Sher Singh's) position would have been very strong indeed had he made Goojerat the front of his

* *Ibid*, p. 287.

† Vol. IV, p. 282.

centre, instead of a support a mile in rear: that, or gone in rear of the pass altogether.”*

Again he wrote:—

“I told Shere Sing he should have fortified Goojerat as the centre of his position, instead of having it a mile in his rear; he said he had no power to do what he wished, the other Chiefs overruled him. He said his plan was to cross the Chenab and march on Lahore, and he evidently thought that Goolab Sing would then have joined him; indeed Lord Dalhousie told me he had proofs that such was Goolab’s design when opportunity offered. The plan appears to me excellent and had the people risen in Gough’s rear the old Chief would have been in a devil of a plight.”

It is not improbable that there was some treachery in the camp of Sher Singh which made him lose the battle of Gujrat and surrender himself and the Sikh troops unconditionally to the English.

At Multan also, Dewau Mulraj had to surrender himself after a gallant resistance of nine months unconditionally to the English. He could not hold out any longer, for he ran short of provisions and powder and shot, his magazine having caught fire and being destroyed.

Thus ended the second Sikh War in which the Sikhs fought very bravely, but had at last to surrender themselves to the English. Their national independence became a thing of the past and in after years they became servile followers of their masters.

* *Ibid*, p. 193.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

Annexation of the Punjab.

It has been said before that political and financial considerations made it impossible for Lord Hardinge to annex the whole of the Punjab after the first Sikh War. But the second or the Bhairawal Treaty, as it is called, which his lordship forced on the Lahore Durbar was worse than annexation of the land of the five rivers to the British territories. That treaty was intended to provoke hostilities, and then the appointment of Sir Frederick Currie as Resident, who had no love for Duleep Singh or the Khalsa Raj, was made with the secret object of exasperating the Sikhs, of goading them to war and of finally annexing their country. The English animated by that precept of Jesus which declared "Do unto others," etc., were clamorous for devouring the remnant of the kingdom of Runjeet Singh. This is evident from the letters addressed to the Governor-General of India (Lord Dalhousie), by "Economist," an officer of practical experience in the Punjab.* Just after the surrender of

* These letters were reprinted and published by the "Sun" printing press of Lahore in 1897. "Economist"

Dewan Moolraj at Mooltan, this officer addressed the first of his letters to Dalhousie, in which he advised his lordship to annex the Punjab. He wrote :—

“The arguments in favour of annexation of the Punjab are rather negative than positive—rather that no one can devise any other *possible* plan than that the acquisition itself is desirable.”

In the above sentence is struck the keynote of all his arguments for the annexation. He did not stop to consider whether such a measure was just or not. But he proceeded and said :—

“The question now to be decided is no matter of petty policy—no mere affair of Dulceep Sing or Sir Frederick Currie, nor even a purely *Sikh* question * * But it is now for you, my Lord, to fix the permanent limits of our Indian Empire. * * A lasting line of demarcation must be drawn ; permanent land marks must be set up ; and then, having disposed of our external defences, we may turn to internal management, and do what we have never yet done—make the country *pay*.”

It was on these grounds that this officer told Dalhousie to

“Hold it (Punjab) for good, or give it up for ever.”

To keep the people of the Punjab in subjection, he advised his lordship to grind them to poverty,

was Sir George Campbell, who rose to be the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

place the iron heel on their necks and rule them without any show of justice or mercy. He wrote :—

“ Do not buy the consent of such people to a ‘ treaty of annexation.’ Take a more straightforward and wiser course. In regard to those who have really some claim to be considered the *nobility* of the country, Sikh Chiefs, and Jagheer-possessing sodies, gooroos, &c.,— I would only say, keep them down as much as possible. A well satisfied and *unimpoverished* nobility may be all very well to European notions, but, if we are to rule in Asia, we are much better without them. * * Such people should be reduced to a reasonable subsistence, so that they may neither be driven entirely desperate, nor retain more than is good for them and for us.”

This was no doubt a counsel of perfection, on which it is needless to say that the Christian Government of India in those days always acted not only in the Punjab, but in other parts of India also.

The same writer pointed out the advantages of annexation as follows :—

I. It is easier (and especially so in India where the principle of passive obedience to the powers that be is so universal) to hold in check *disarmed* than an armed people.

II. A considerable force must always be maintained on the frontier of India. If this force occupies the Punjab the revenues of that country are available as an offset to meet a portion of the expense.....

III. By taking the Punjab we arrive at the natural

boundaries of India, and obtain a final settlement of the question.

IV. We shall be enabled to establish a sure defence against the hordes of Central Asia and the Russians, or any one else who may have an eye to the East....

V. Independent of the expense and anxiety of always keeping an army in the field east of the Sutlej, we have, as a question of humanity, to choose between a state of continual war and a secure peace.....

VI., If we do not keep the Punjab—what then? We must abandon the country and retire—our prestige will be ruined and our name will lose its spell. We shall have commenced a backward career. Is any one prepared to advocate this? I believe that it is impossible...

"...The Punjab must henceforth be held by British troops, and by British troops alone. The occupation must be complete as to manner—no *concurrent*, but an *exclusive* possession—complete as to place—of no *portion* of the country, *but of the whole*—complete as to time—for no term of years, but for a *permanency*."

He did not advise Lord Dalhousie to repeat the experiment of Lord Hardinge, the experiment of a double government in the Punjab. It must be admitted that there was some truth in his arguments. He wrote:—

"There is nothing on which so much depends as the feeling of self-responsibility. If the natives are left to themselves, they feel that every thing rests with themselves, and they are not altogether depraved. Take away this feeling—support them with a military force—interfere vexatiously in their civil system—and they become but the corrupt instruments of a corrupt system. They lose all power of doing good, and but apply their

remaining strength to do unmitigated evil for their own sordid and selfish ends. I utterly deny the *possibility* of a respectable native Government supported by our troops and over-ridden by our Politicals.... The natives cannot consider themselves the rulers of the country....

"The people of the country would not feel themselves thoroughly our subjects. They would be exposed to the evils of either system; they would be serving two masters. Unquiet and uncertainty must prevail, and all progress be much retarded."

But the strongest argument that he advanced for annexation of the Punjab was that might is right. He wrote:—

"People begin to discover that, in a country where from time immemorial might is right, we having the greatest might have also the best right.... it has become our duty as well as our right to hold."

Another argument which this officer urged in favour of annexation was that the continuance of the Sikh Raj would go against the interests of the Muhammadan population of the Punjab, because they assisted the English against the Sikhs and so the latter would make short work of them. He wrote:—

"After having stirred them (the frontier Musalman tribes) up to rebel against the Sikhs unassisted by our troops, how we are to persuade them to receive as the price of their exertions a yet heavier yoke, I don't know. Abbott's Hazarehs and Edwardes' Pathans can hardly consider themselves to be fighting merely on our account. They look on it as an opportunity of regaining their inheritance."

Of course, Lord Dalhousie was for annexation. Wrote the Christian officer :—

"I believe that your first thoughts were for annexation."

But Sir Henry Lawrence, who had returned and resumed charge of the Lahore Residency from Sir Frederick Currie in the beginning of January, 1849, was opposed to annexation. Wrote this Christian officer :—

"I understand, however, that Sir Henry Lawrence is opposed to it. Now, I would not for a moment be supposed to impugn the purity of that gentleman's motives, but I beg of you to remember that not only was he a principal artificer in the settlement which has just broken down, but under present arrangements he is King of the Punjab. As then, human nature is but human nature, you must regard Sir Henry not so much as an unbiassed adviser and a potentate pleading his own cause. * * * *

"To another opinion of Sir Henry's I would not be so tolerant. It is said that he has come back to declare that the 'Sikhs had been exceedingly ill used' and that if he had stayed there would have been nothing of the kind. Now this is, really, too much. * * *

"Altogether, I think that if Sir H. Lawrence says that the Sikhs were ill used after his departure, the charge is ungrateful and unfair."

Of course, this Christian officer considered the Treaty existing between the Christians and the Sikhs as so much waste paper. For, he wrote :—

"I am glad to find that the treaty seems to have died a natural death. No argument is hinged on *that* pretext, and the tenderest conscience may, therefore, throw over that consideration without fear of offence. In fact, the '*the Sikhs*' neither made the treaty nor broke it. The few individuals who went through the farce of consent were nominees of the British power. Duleep Sing was a mere piece of paper money, and is now as valueless as a note when the bank has broken."

The natives of England were afraid to annex the Punjab, because it was inhabited by martial tribes who might give trouble to their Christian rulers. Against this argument, the Christian officer wrote :—

"After all, *fear* is the prevailing argument against annexation. The *Times* talks of the martial tribes commencing with the Sutlej. But *you* are not 'afraid!' * * *

"But annex, if things are managed by people who understand them, the country will assume exactly the same phase as the Cis-Sutlej territory—* * *

"The broad fact remains, that in our own important possessions serious rebellion has throughout our history in India been *unknown*. Will you, then—can you, in the face of this all-powerful fact—give way to imaginary fear? * * * Annexation will bring safe and lasting peace."

Such were the arguments of this sagacious Christian officer for annexing the Punjab. And when Lord Dalhousie annexed that province he wrote his last letter in which he heartily congratulated his lordship.

On the 29th March, 1849, his lordship issued

a proclamation tolling the death-knell of the Sikh Raj.

Again, in his farewell minute, dated the 28th of February, 1856, Lord Dalhousie, with that unscrupulous disregard for truth which characterises occidental diplomacy, wrote:—

"The murder of the British officers at Mooltan, and the open rebellion of the Dewan Moolraj, were not made pretext for quarrel with the Government of Lahore. . . . The Sikhs themselves were called upon to punish Mool-paj as a rebel against their own sovereign, and to exact reparation for the British Government whose protection they had previously invoked.

"But when it was seen that the spirit of the whole Sikh people was inflamed by the bitterest animosity against us—when Chief after Chief deserted our cause, until nearly their whole Army, led by Sirdars who had signed the treaties, and by Members of the Council of Regency itself, was openly arrayed against us—when above all, it was seen that the Sikhs, in the eagerness for our destruction, had been combined in unnatural alliance with Dost Mahomed Khan and his Mahomedan tribes—it became manifest that there was no alternative left. The question for us was no longer one of policy or of expediency, but one of national safety.

"Accordingly, the Government put forth its power, After a prolonged campaign, and a struggle severe and anxious, the Sikhs were utterly defeated and subdued, the Afghans were driven with ignominy through the mountains, and the Punjab became a British province."

But that the annexation of the Punjab cannot be justified from moral considerations will be

admitted by all unbiased and fair-minded men. Regarding this annexation, Major Evans Bell truly observes:—

“Lord Dalhousie’s procedure in settling the future relations of the Punjab with British India after the campaign of 1849, just amounts to this:—a guardian, having undertaken, for a valuable consideration, a troublesome and dangerous trust, declares, on the first occurrence of those troubles and dangers, of which he had full knowledge and fore-warning, that as a compensation for his exertions and a protection for the future, he shall appropriate his Ward’s estate and personal property to his own purposes. And this, although the guardian holds ample security in his own hands for the repayment of any outlay, and the satisfaction of any damages he might have incurred, in executing the conditions of the trust.”*

The same author has very scathingly exposed the untruthful character of the statements contained in Dalhousie’s proclamation. Extracts from his writings are given below. He writes,

“During the period prescribed by the Treaty for the Maharaja’s minority, no crisis, no second struggle, could absolve the British Government from the obligations of guardianship and management, so long as it professed to fulfill those duties, and was able to do so without interruption.

“* * * * * supposing the rebellion had not been in the slightest degree provoked or extended by any error, excess, omission, or delay of the British Government,—

* Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy, p. 142.

Lord Dalhousie's case would not be in the least improved. Supposing that the surmise by which he attempted to justify the annexation, were demonstrably true, and that the Sikhs were really animated, from the first day of the occupation, with so deep and bitter a hostility, that they only watched their opportunity for revolt, and would never have been pacified without a second lesson, then I say that they were entitled to that second lesson without any extra charge. The State of Lahore had paid heavily in money, and in territory, for the first lesson; and we had undertaken, in consideration of an annual subsidy, secured on the public revenues administered by ourselves, to perform the office of teacher for a term of years. If unexpected difficulties had presented themselves in the performance of this office, we should even then, have had no right to complain. But it was not so. We understood quite well the nature of the evils to encounter and cure, and they were clearly aggravated by our own malpractice."

"The continued existence of this Regency, throughout the rebellion, proves that British responsibility and guardianship were never shaken off or shifted for a day. If indeed the British Resident had been driven from his position at Lahore; if he had lost the custody of the Maharajah's person; if he had been forced to abdicate for a time the functions of government, and the Ward had thrown off his tutelage, the guardian might have been justified in re-entering the country as a conqueror, and declaring all previous engagements to be at an end. But no such interruption ever took place. The Resident's authority as chief ruler of the Punjab was never suspended. During the rebellion, which in Lord Dalhousie's opinion warranted him in dethroning his Ward, the capital city was never disturbed; and the Government

of the Punjab, exactly as we had chosen to organise it,—including the Council of Regency,—was unaltered to the last. ...

“Lord Dalhousie totally fails to make out any violation of the Treaty against the Lahore State,—the only specific instance he adduces, the non-payment of the subsidy, being, as we have seen, a mere matter of account, by which the case is not modified to the prejudice of the State of Lahore. He contrives to fasten a plausible stigma of perfidy and violation of treaties upon the State of Lahore, only by ringing the changes through several paragraphs, upon the terms, ‘the Sikh nation,’ ‘the Sikhs,’ ‘the Sikh people,’ and ‘the Government,’ or ‘State of Lahore,’ until a thorough confusion is established. For these are not convertible terms.

“‘The Sikh people,’ * * is not a phrase synonymous with ‘the people of the Punjab,’ the great majority of whom took no share in the revolt, and felt no sympathy with it ; while at least 20,000 subjects of the Lahore State, enrolled in its service, fought on the side of the Government, and assisted in suppressing the rebellion.

“It is strange that Lord Dalhousie should have so completely overlooked the real difference between 1846 and 1849. The question of age was immaterial at both periods. There was no plea of annexation in 1846 when the warning was given and acknowledged, because the Maharajah was the reigning Prince of an independent state. In 1849 the actual ruler of the state was the British Resident, under the Governor-General’s instructions. * * * * *

“From the 16th of December, 1846, the date of the treaty of Bhyrowal, down to the 29th of March, 1849, when the Proclamation annexing the Punjab was issued, the Government of Lahore was in strict subordination

to the British Government ; and its subordination was never interrupted, suspended, or relaxed for a single day. If, indeed, the Government of Lahore could justly have been made responsible for any of the untoward events in 1848 and 1849, Sir Frederick Currie, the Resident, must have been the first person indicated, for he was the absolute head of that Government.”*

Of course, the annexation could not be justified from any moral considerations. But then “the official wolves,” with whom “the pretext of the muddied stream was always nigh at hand—” wolves like Dalhousie and his adviser Sir Frederick Currie, had bidden farewell to the dictates of their conscience, if they ever possessed one, and were not to be swayed by any moral considerations. There is very little doubt that Lord Dalhousie was assisted by Sir Frederick Currie in drawing up the Proclamation of the 29th March, 1849, sealing the doom of the Sikh Raj.

* Major Evans Bell's *Retrospects and Prospects of the Indian Policy*, Chapter VI.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

The Second Burmese War

The Second Burmese War was a wanton outrage on humanity, for there was no *causus belli* for it. With that unscrupulous disregard for truth which characterises Lord Dalhousie's state documents, he did not blush to write in his farewell Minute the following as justifying the war :—

"When little more than two years had passed [after the Sikh War], the Government of India again was suddenly engaged in hostilities with Burmah.

"Certain British traders in the Port of Rangoon had been subjected to gross outrage by the officers of the King of Ava, in direct violation of the Treaty of Yandaboo . . .

"Of all the Eastern nations with which the Government of India has had to do, the Burmese were the most arrogant and overbearing. . . .

"However contemptible the Burman race may seem to critics in Europe, they have ever been regarded in the East as formidable in the extreme. Only five and twenty years before, the news of their march towards Chittagong had raised a panic in the bazars of Calcutta itself; and even in the late War, a rumour of their supposed approach spread consternation in the British Districts of Assam and Arracan . . .

"Every effort was made to obtain reparation by friendly means . . . But every effort was vain . . .

"But our forbearance was fruitless. Accordingly, in the end of 1852, the British troops took possession of the Kingdom of Pegu, and the territory was retained, in order that the Government of India might hold from the Burman State both adequate compensation for past injury and the best security against future danger."

It is proper to say that the above is a tissue of falsehoods which occidental diplomatists know how to resort to to suit their convenience and purpose. Three years before Dalhousie penned his minute, Cobden had very scathingly exposed the immorality and injustice of the Burmese War in a publication which he very aptly named, "How wars are got up in India." No attempt was made by Dalhousie to controvert or deny the serious allegations made against the Indian Government by Cobden. Cobden's is a name held sacred in almost every household in England, for if the natives of that country to-day are enabled to get their bread cheap, it is not to a small measure due to the exertions of that English statesman. If the Englishman reveres his memory as that of a patriot, the Indian should look upon him as a philanthropist, for he tried to do justice to India.

It is a pity that none of the Christian writers of Indian history or of the biography of Lord Dalhousie has ever referred to Cobden's pamphlet on the Second Burmese War. Mr. F. W. Chesson in his note to the pamphlet says that this

"pamphlet was written in the summer of 1853, nearly

three years before the late Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General of India, had terminated that career of violence and spoliation which dazzled the nation by the meretricious lustre of its successes, but which, to the prescient eye of Mr. Cobden, who saw with painful clearness its injustice and immorality, was fraught with the greatest peril to the Empire. * * * * Mr. Cobden lost no time in disentombing the facts from the same official burial-ground [that is, Parliamentary papers], and with a result which will entitle his searching exposure of deeds that will not bear the light to the thoughtful consideration of all Englishmen who desire to make themselves acquainted with the true history of Indian misgovernment."

In the preface to his pamphlet, Mr. Gobden wrote :—

"I may say, by way of explanation, that the whole of the narrative is founded exclusively upon the Parliamentary papers, * * It should be borne in mind that the case, such as it is, is founded upon our own *ex parte* statement. A great many of the letters are mutilated: and, remembering that, in the Afghan papers, it is now known that the character of at least one of the Cabool Chiefs was sacrificed by a most dishonest garbling of his language, I confess I am not without suspicions that a similar course may have been pursued in the present instance. I will only add, then, bad as our case now appears, what would it be if we could have access to the Burmese "Blue Books," stating their version of the business?"

The stay-at-home English as well as Anglo-Indian writers on the Second Burmese War have tried to blame the government of Burma for having provoked the war by their insolence and ill-treatment

of British subjects trading in that country. Thus the historian of the Second Burmese War, one Lieut. W. F. B. Lawrie, says (p. 20):

"Latterly, our merchants at Rangoon, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty [of Yandabool], were subjected to a series of oppressions and exactions, which, if unredressed, must have obliged us to quit the port. * *

"It is unnecessary to enter into a detail of all the insults heaped upon us by the Burmese. Suffice it to mention one case of injustice and oppression, that of a British captain of a vessel, who, on the false representation of a Burmese* pilot, was placed by the governor of Rangoon in the stocks, and fined nine hundred rupees."

The facts which brought about the war with the Burmese have been very carefully set forth by Mr. Cobden in the pamphlet referred to above and which is compiled from Parliamentary papers. The opening sentence of his pamphlet is that

"In June, 1851, the British barque *Monarch*, of 250 tons, last from Moulmein, reached Rangoon, the principal port of the Burmese Empire. On the second day after their arrival, Captain Shepperd, the master and owner, 'was taken before the police to answer the charge of having, during the voyage, thrown overboard the pilot Esoph, preferred by a man named Hajim, a native of Chittagong, who stated that he was brother of the said pilot.'"† * * * *

* The pilot was not a Burmese, but a British Indian subject as will be mentioned presently.

† Papers relating to hostilities with Burmah presented to Parliament, June 4, 1852, p. 5.

"Captain Shepperd was mulcted in fines and fees to the amount of £46, and permission was then given him to depart; but when about to sail he was again detained, 'owing to a charge brought by a man named Dewan Ali (a British subject, employed in one of the Moulmein gunboats), calling himself a brother of the pilot, bringing forward a claim for a sum of 500 rupees, which he stated his brother had taken with him,*'. This led to a fresh exaction of £55." * *

Captain Lewis of the British vessel the *Champion*, which in August, 1851, arrived at Rangoon, from the Mauritius was mulcted by the governor in fines and fees to the amount of £70. The charges of murder and other offences were preferred against Captain Lewis by two Bengal coolies, who had secreted themselves on board his ship, with a view to return to their country and they were joined by some lascars and others of the crew, who deserted.

Mr. Cobden remarks and he has put in italics his remarks (p. 30, Edition of 1867) that

"It must be borne in mind that all the parties to these suits were British subjects; the governor of Rangoon had not been adjudicating in matters in which Burmese interests, as opposed to those of foreigners, were at stake."

But the two gallant captains in order to furnish the Christian Government of India with a handle to proceed against Burma—knowing that

* *Ibid.*

any complaint against any independent power of the East would be quite welcome to the British Indian authorities, appealed to the Indian Government for redress. Although they claimed together £1, 920, as compensation for ill-usage, etc, their claim was cut down by the Indian authorities to £920, that is, in the case of Captain Shepherd of the barque *Monarch*, Rs 3500 and of the *Champion* Rs 5600. A demand was made of the Burmese government for the payment of these sums as compensation for losses sustained by the two abovementioned officers. For our own part, we fail to see how according to any International Law, the Government of India could sit in appeal over the decisions of the court of any other independent country. But Burma was weak and the pretext of the muddied stream was necessary to the wolves of Anglo-India to swallow up that country.

The Government of India took up the complaint with great alacrity and eagerness. Two of the Queen's ships, the *Fox* and the *Serpent*,* under the command of Commodore Lambert, were lying in the Hooghly. Lord Dalhousie lost no time in despatching Commodore Lambert to Rangoon to demand reparation, that is, the payment of

* Their names quite justified the part they (or rather their commandants) played in provoking the war,

£920, of the Burmese authorities for the injuries sustained by Captains Shepperd and Lewis.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to state here that Dalhousie made a mistake* in entrusting Commodore Lambert with this diplomatic affair. Sir William Lee-Warner in his life of Lord Dalhousie (Vol. I. p. 417) writes :—

“As to the policy of the step taken by the Government of India, John Lawrence in a letter to Courtenay, the private secretary, asked, “Why did you send a Commodore to Burma if you wanted peace ?”

Lord Dalhousie also in a letter to his uncle, Lord Broughton, wrote on the 23rd of January, 1852, that “these Commodores are too combustible for negotiations.”

Notwithstanding the instructions given to Commodore Lambert to which reference will be made presently, the very fact of sending him at the head of a squadron to Rangoon makes one suspect that Dalhousie intended a rupture with Burma. It was not the duty of the Commodore to play the part of a diplomatist.†

* May it not be that Dalhousie selected Commodore Lambert and furnished him with secret instructions to provoke the Burmese to hostilities ?

† Regarding English diplomatists, General Gordon who met with his death at Khartum wrote in his journal (p. 158) :—

“I must say I hate our diplomatists. I think with

Mr. Cobden writes :--

"But where was the necessity for sending a squadron at all, until after a demand for redress had been made through a civilian, or at least a Company's officer, who * understood the customs of the country, and the more especially so, as it was the first complaint that had been officially presented to the Government of Burmah?" * (P. 100, 1867 edition.)

few exceptions they are arrant humbugs, and I expect they know it"

* The writer on the Burmese War in the *Calcutta Review* for July, 1852, quotes from the Treaties and Engagements between the Honourable East India Company and Native powers in Asia:

"Since this time [1840] all communications with the Burmese authorities have been conducted through the Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces."

Then the writer proceeds

"For twelve years then all negotiations with the Court of Burmah have been conducted through the intervention of the Tenasserim Commissioner; * * upon receipt of the representations of Captains Lewis and Shepperd, * the President in Council, * * intimated to Colonel Bogle, that Commodore Lambert had been instructed to proceed to Rangoon. * * Now this is the first point which is open to question. Why was the usual course of procedure departed from? Why was not Colonel Bogle ordered to conduct the negotiations in the usual way? * * But we do think that it would have been well if the ordinary channel of communication had first been tried, and Colonel Bogle had been instructed, without any demonstrations of hostile intentions in the first instance, to make a firm and decided

The instructions given to Commodore Lambert were that he should demand reparation from the Governor of Rangoon for the injuries sustained by Captains Shepherd and Lewis, but wrote Lord Dalhousie that

"It would be right that the Commodore should in the first instance be satisfied on this head (p. 32, Edition of 1867).

This implied that Commodore Lambert was to hear both sides and to inquire on the spot whether the compensation claimed was founded on justice.

The Commodore was furnished with a letter addressed to his Majesty the King of Burma which was to be forwarded to him "in the event of the Governor refusing or evading compliance." After forwarding the letter to the King at Ava, the Commodore was instructed to proceed to the Persian Gulf, whither his lordship understands he is under orders to proceed". (*Ibid*, p. 33.)

demand upon the King of Burmah for the dismissal and punishment of the offending officer, and ample pecuniary compensation to the aggrieved British subjects. * * But Lord Dalhousie thought that the more decided method of sending at once an armed envoy, 'a Cromwellian Ambassador', would have the effect of intimidating the Burmese authorities, and so avoiding the necessity of actual recourse to war." (P. 206-207.)

It seems that it was with the deliberable intention of provoking the Burmese to hostilities that Dalhousie departed from the usual course of procedure.

Dalhousie's instructions to the Commodore concluded as follows :--

"It is to be distinctly understood that no act of hostility is to be committed at present, though the reply of the Governor should be unfavourable, nor until definite instructions regarding such hostilities shall be given by the Government of India." (*Ibid.*)

The instructions were quite definite but these were all set aside by the gallant Commodore, who at the head of his squadron sailed from Calcutta and landed at Rangoon towards the end of November, 1851. No sooner had he landed there than he encouraged the British residents of that place to bring their complaints and alleged grievances against the Governor of Rangoon. But before the day (28th November) appointed by the Commodore on which the residents were requested to bring their grievances in writing, he wrote on the 27th November, "before", as Mr. Cobden observes, "a written declaration was in his hands", the following insulting letter to the Governor of Rangoon :--

"The object of my visit to Rangoon was at the request of the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, the Governor General of British India, to demand redress for insults and injuries you have committed on subjects belonging to her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria.

"Since my arrival so many more complaints have been made by persons residing at Rangoon who have a right to claim British protection that I have deemed

it my duty to withhold my original demand until I have again made known their complaints to his lordship." (*Ibid*, p. 35.)

But he did not wait for instructions from Dalhousie. On the very next day (*i.e.*, 28th November) he forwarded to the Governor of Rangoon for transmission to His Majesty the King of Burma the letter with which he had been furnished by the Government of India and which he had been instructed to make use of only "in the event of the Governor refusing or evading compliance". At the same time the gallant Christian Commodore wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of His Majesty the King of Ava. Of course the gallant Commodore thought it beneath his dignity to show any courtesy to the Governor of Rangoon, for in writing to him he made use of language as follows :--

"I shall expect that every despatch will be used for forwarding the same, and I hold you responsible for an answer being delivered in these waters within five weeks from this day." (*Ibid*, p. 36.)

The Commodore at the same time wrote an account of his proceedings to the Governor General of India, which he sent off to Calcutta by a steamer in charge of Captain Latter.

The list of grievances presented to the Commodore by the British residents was a long one, for it contained no less than 38 in number. No one in his senses would have attached any im-

portance to this document, for it bore no signatures of those who were alleged to have been the aggrieved persons and was curiously enough mostly without dates. But any stick is good enough to beat a dog with. So the list of alleged grievances which Cobden called "absurd" was considered sufficient to pick a quarrel with the Burmese Government.*

* Regarding these alleged grievances of the British residents at Rangoon, Ellenborough, who himself as Governor General of India knew how to get up wars in India, observed from his place in the House of Lords on February 6th, 1852 :—

"He also wished to know whether, before any requisition was sent to the King of Ava for reparation for the injuries inflicted on British subjects in Rangoon any trustworthy officer of ours was sent there to ascertain the truth of their representations, and the extent of the injuries inflicted ? He could recollect—it was not so distant an era—he could recollect the circumstances of a complaint which was brought under the notice of the British Government, by a certain Don Pacifico. Athens rejoiced in one Pacifico ; but he could assure their lordships that there were dozens of Pacificos at Rangoon. If there were not the grossest ignorance of or the strangest misrepresentations about Rangoon, on the part of those who have written about it, Rangoon was the sink of Asia—the Alsatia to which all men went who could not keep a footing elsewhere. Persons of European origin, who had discovered that Asia was too hot to hold them, lived in Ava, and generally went to Rangoon, and there, under the same, or perhaps

The demand which Commodore Lambert had made on the Governor of Rangoon "for an answer being delivered" to him "within five weeks from this day" (*i.e.*, 28th November), was complied with, for it arrived on the New Year's day, being a day within the limited time. The Buddhist sovereign of Burma, not desirous to go to war with the Christian Government of India, for he was conscious of his weakness, was quite willing and ready to accede to all the demands which had been made on him. To show his sincerity, he disgraced the Governor of Rangoon by recalling him and sending another nobleman to replace him. The Commodore even admitted that the King was sincere. On the 1st of January, 1852, he wrote to the Government of India that

"the Burmese Government have dismissed the

some other name, endeavoured to gain a new reputation or a new fortune. He should not wish the Government to take any political measures with regard to Asia, without sending an officer there to inquire into the circumstances. He regretted that this had not been done in the first instance; for it was reported that when the Commodore was sent to Rangoon with his fleet, he found circumstances very different from those which had been represented to him. The Don Pacificos pushed off their boats, and went on board with representations of the damage which they said they had sustained". (*Ibid.*, p. 38.)

Governor of Rangoon, and promised to settle the demand made on them by the Government of India.

"I am of opinion that the King is sincere, and that his Government will fully act up to what he has promised." (P. 43, *Ibid.*)

But this would not have served the purpose of the gallant Christian Commodore and so he tried to pick a quarrel with the new Governor, who arrived at Rangoon on the 4th January. The next day Commodore Lambert

"sent Mr. Edwards, the assistant-interpreter, to ascertain when it would be convenient for him to receive an officer with a letter stating the nature of the claims which the Government of British India had made on that of Burmah, and to say that when all had been adjusted he should do himself the honour of personally paying his respects to him: the reply to which was, that the Governor was ready at any time to receive communications from him; and the following day was fixed."* (Pp. 44-45, *Ibid.*)

At the instance of Mr. Edwards, the new Governor removed the embargo by which the inhabitants of Rangoon had been prevented from holding communication with the boats of the squadron. Referring to this act of the new Governor, Mr. Cobden* very truly observes:—

"It is important that this fact should be borne in mind, as an answer to the vague statements, for which no official proofs are afforded, that the new Governor

* Burmah Papers, 1852, p. 36.

had, on his first arrival, by his proclamation and other acts, shown an unfriendly disposition towards the British residents." (*Ibid*, p. 45.)

On the 6th January,

"the Commodore directed Captain Fishbourne, commanding Her Majesty's steamer *Hermes*, Captain Latter, and two officers of the *Hermes*, with Mr. Edwards, to proceed and deliver to the Governor the letter containing the demands he was charged to make. Captain Latter was at the time on board the *Proserpine*, finishing the Burmese translation of the letter which was to be given to the Governor; and to give him due warning of their approach, on his own responsibility, as there was no time to spare, he sent Mr Edwards on shore to him, to give notice of their coming, and charged him to say that, as he had already shown his friendly feelings by his amicable expressions of the day before, with reference to the time of receiving a communication from Commodore Lambert, there would be no necessity for making any display in receiving them, so that there could be no necessity for any delay". (*Ibid*, pp. 45-46.)

The Governor had consented to receive a *communication* and not a *deputation* from the Commodore, for no previous arrangement had been come to for its reception. Mr. Cobden says :—

"To all who are acquainted with the customs of the East, and the childlike importance which Oriental nations, and especially the Burmese, attach to the ceremonial of visits, it must be evident that the course about to be pursued was pretty certain to end unsatisfactorily. The Governor had expressed his readiness to receive a *communication*, not a *deputation*, from Com-

modore Lambert, and he had entreated the clerk of the interpreter to bring it himself. Mr Edwards could run in and out of his house freely, as bearer either of a message or letter, because, for a person of his inferior rank, no formal reception was necessary; * * An Englishman, in such a dilemma, would order his servant to tell an unbidden caller he was 'not at home.' In the East, if the unwelcome visitor present himself in the middle of the day, the answer is, 'My master is asleep.'"

The deputation who were bearers of the letter from the Commodore

"landed at about noon, and proceeded to Mr. Birrell's house to procure horses to take them up, as the distance was too much to walk in the sun." (*Ibid*, p. 47).

Regarding the letter, Mr. Cobden writes and he has put these words in italics:—

"There was nothing in the contents of the letter which in the slightest degree called upon the writer to force the Governor to receive it by the hands of a deputation."

Of course it was not possible for the Governor of Rangoon to have received the deputation without previous arrangement. Mr. Cobden justly says:—

"What should we think of an American deputation who required us to dispense with our Lord Chamberlain, Gold-sticks, and Beef-eaters, and receive them after the simple fashion of the White House at Washington? Might we not probably doubt if they were sober?" (*Ibid*, p. 58).

But the British Commodore considered the non-reception of the deputation and of their

"having been kept waiting for a full quarter of an hour in the sun"

a very sufficient cause of going to war with Burma, he did not consider it necessary to afford an opportunity to the Governor of Rangoon to explain or apologise for what had occurred or to refer the matter to the Government of India or that of Burma. It is recorded in the Parliamentary papers :—

"The Commodore forthwith directed a boat to be sent to summon some of the English residents from the shore. On their arrival, he warned them to be prepared to leave the town during the afternoon, and requested them to give notice to all other British subjects. * *

"The British subjects, men, women, and children, to the amount of several hundred, took refuge during the afternoon on board the shipping in the river and before the evening had set in, the vessels had commenced dropping down the river. * *

"It was dark before the Commodore issued orders to seize what was usually styled the Yellow Ship" *

which belonged to the sovereign of Burma and which was anchored a little above the squadron.

The very same day, the Commodore issued the notification of blockade in which he declared that,

"In virtue of authority from the Governor-General of

* Parliamentary Papers, 1852, p. 46.

India, I do hereby declare the rivers of Rangoon, the Bassein, and the Salween above Moulmein, to be in a state of blockade ; and, with the view to the strict enforcement thereof, a competent force will be stationed in, or near the entrance of the said rivers immediately." (Ibid, pp. 51-53).

Regarding the above notification, Mr. Cobden says

"that there does not appear in the whole of the papers presented to Parliament one word or syllable of remonstrance or remark on the part of the Governor-General in vindication of his own authority—no, not even after Commodore Lambert, as if in very derision and mockery, had in his notification declared the coast in a state of blockade, '*in virtue of authority from the Governor-General of British India.*'" (Ibid, p. 55).

But it never struck Mr. Cobden that Commodore Lambert might have possibly received secret instructions from the Governor-General of British India to enter upon hostilities with the Burmese nation. It is on this assumption only that we can explain his conduct and that of the Government of India towards the Burmese and also towards the Commodore. Writes Mr. Cobden :—

"It is a most perplexing fact throughout these papers, that, although it is apparent that the Governor-General perceives the rashness of the acts of Commodore Lambert, * * yet not one word falls from him to show that he was more than a passive looker-on at the contemptuous disregard of his own instructions !" (Ibid, p. 60).

This goes to confirm our suspicion of the Commodore having received secret instructions from the Governor-General of India to pursue the course which he did and which precipitated the war with the Burmese. Of course, the conduct of the gallant Commodore can not be defended by any unprejudiced man or a lover of fair play. Even the writer of the article on the Burmese War in the *Calcutta Review* for July, 1852, who appears from internal evidence to be none else than Mr. Marshman*, who, as the son of a clergyman,

* Mr. Marshman is mentioned several times in General Sir William Sleeman's *Journey through Oude* (Bentley, 1858)—see vol. ii, pp. 390, 397,—as the writer of "rabid articles" in favour of the absorption of Native States; and is stigmatised by Sir Henry Lawrence as "a perfect filibuster."—Kaye's *Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. II, p. 314.

Of course, Mr. Marshman did not support Lord Dalhousie's measures out of love for him. He was very amply rewarded for his writings. Thus Mr. J. L. Waller, in his evidence before the Select Committee on colonization in India on 8th June, 1858, being questioned,

"4988. Does it pay, as a mercantile speculation, to set up a newspaper to defend the Government in India?" said,

"I can state that the proprietor of a paper which defended the Government has retired with a handsome fortune, * * the "Friend of India" was notoriously, when I was in India, supporting the Government measures."

Of course, Mr. Marshman is alluded to in the above.

was brought up on the teaching of the Bible from his cradle and who, to exemplify that teaching of Christ which said "Do unto others," etc., was an unflinching supporter of Lord Dalhousie's acts of spoliation, could not defend the Commodore. He wrote :—

"We fully agree with Lord Dalhousie then, that Commodore Lambert could not pass over this act of studied contumely without notice. But to have noticed it *in some way* and to have avenged it *in the special way*, in which Commodore Lambert did avenge it, are two things altogether different: * * As the King had so promptly disavowed the conduct of the previous Governor of Rangoon, we think he was entitled to an opportunity of stating whether he approved of the doings of this one; and it does seem to us that no evil would have resulted, if the Commodore had done all that he did, with the important exception of the seizure of the "Yellow Ship," and had made a peremptory demand of the King that he should command the Governor to proceed on board the *Floa*. * * to make to Captain Fishbourne and the officers who had accompanied him, such an apology as Commodore Lambert should dictate to him. Whether the 'Golden Foot' would have acceded to this demand or not, we cannot determine. Very probably he would not; but his refusal would have put us into a more *comfortable* position in a national point of view than that which we actually occupy * * .

"The seizure of the King's ship was then the first act of war on our part."

Mr. Cobden observes:—

"The conduct of the Governor of Rangoon is now a

subject of minor importance—the question for the statesman, the historian, and the moralist is, were we justified, whatever his behaviour was, with the known friendly disposition of the King, in commencing war with the Burmese nation?" (*Ibid.*, p. 55.)

Of course, no British author has ventured to answer this question.

Great was the apprehension of the inhabitants of Rangoon at the seizure of the King's "Yellow Ship." Writes Mr. Cobden:—

"A covey of partridges with a hawk in view, ready to make its fell swoop, or a flock of sheep with a wolf's eyes glaring into the fold, could not shrink more timidly from that terrible and irresistible foe than did the Burmese officials at the prospect of a hostile collision with England. Captain Latter says that so great was their apprehension when the Commodore seized the King's ship, that 'they even seemed alarmed for the safety of their own heads.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 61.)

In vain did the Burmese officials entreat the English Commodore to release the King's ship. In vain did the Governor of Rangoon send the Dallah Governor to the Commodore to plead for him and overlook his fault if any. The Dallah Governor told the Christian Commodore

"that he had no doubt that when the King of Ava became acquainted with the insolent conduct of his subordinates to those who came to make a friendly communication, refusing to receive such communication, and thus

jeopardising his throne, he would visit them with con-
dign punishment.*

But the Commodore was not moved by the entreaties and pleading of the Burmese officials. He towed away the King's ship, which caused great catastrophe. In the words of the Christian Commodore :—

"Her Majesty's steam-sloop *Hermes*, with the King of Ava's ship in tow, passed us at half past nine [January 10th], when the stockade opened a sharp cannonade on her Majesty's ship *Fox*, which was instantly returned with shot and shell, and the Burmese battery was in a short time silenced. On the smoke clearing away not a person was to be seen on the shore or in the boats.

"Our fire, I have no doubt, must have done great execution, for I have reason to believe that at least 3,000 men were opposed against us."†

Commenting on the above, wrote Mr. Cobden :—

"On the 6th, at night, Commodore Lambert seized the King's ship, which he held in his possession at anchor opposite the town for three days, during which time the Burmese made no attempt to retake it; but on the contrary, conciliatory visits were paid to the Commodore by the authorities of the highest rank in the neighbourhood, * *. There is no reason to suppose that any act of hostility would have been committed had the King's ship been merely kept at anchor in the power of the British. But to have allowed a Burmese ship of war to be towed out of the river by foreigners, passing under

* Parliamentary papers, p. 43.

† *Ibid.*, p. 41.

the great stockade or battery without molestation, would have involved the disgrace and destruction of those who were responsible to the King of Ava for the protection of his property." (*Ibid*, p. 66.)

Technically, the Burmese fired the first shot. This is exactly what the Commodore and his officers were longing for. For, this furnished them with the handle to go to war with that Buddhist nation. Mr. Cobden has put the case very vividly when he says:—

"Let us suppose that, instead of Rangoon, the scene of these operations had been at Charleston. * * * * A ship of war belonging to the Government of the United States, lying at Charleston, is instantly seized and, notwithstanding notice was given that, if an attempt should be made to carry her off, the Commodore's ships would be fired upon from the shore, she is towed out to sea, the American battery opening fire as they pass and receiving in return a broadside which does 'great execution.' What would have been the response to this news when it reached England? Can any one doubt that one unanimous cry would have been raised for the disgrace and punishment of Commodore Lambert? And why is a different standard of justice applied in the case of Burmah? Ask your own conscience, reader, if you be an Englishman, whether any better answer can be given than that America is powerful, and Burmah weak." (*Ibid*, pp. 67-69.)

We suggest another answer. It is that the conscience of a Christian people is such an unknown and unknowable quantity that its existence

is to be doubted when dealings with non-Christian nations are concerned.

Mr. Cobden then proceeds :

"It might be expected that, having carried off a ship of war and killed a member of the Burmese forces, sufficient 'satisfaction' had been obtained for a claim of £920. But the coast of Burmah was still declared in a state of blockade." (*Ibid*, p. 69.)

Referring to the correspondence which took place between the Buddhist Burmese and the Christian English regarding the release of the King's ship and the conduct of the Governor of Rangoon, Mr. Cobden was forced to write :—

"The common sense and logic of the above correspondence, as well as its philanthropic sentiments, present, I am sorry to say, a most favourable contrast to the Christian side of this correspondence." (*Ibid*, p. 71.)

Lord Dalhousie was addressed by the Governor of Rangoon, through his Secretary Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Halliday. The Governor's letter elicited the following remarks from Mr. Cobden :—

"The letters of the Burmese authorities, translated into English, be it remembered, by a hostile pen, are remarkable for their terseness and clear common sense, and offer a striking contrast to the lengthy, rambling and inconclusive reasoning which characterises the British part of the correspondence." (*Ibid*, p. 76.)

The Governor's letter to Mr. Halliday, dated

Rangoon, February 2nd, 1852, concluded as follows :—

"Therefore, as soon as the officer which the Government of India is prepared to appoint in conformity with existing treaties, shall arrive, a satisfactory and amicable arrangement can be made of the payment of the 9,948 rupees extorted from Captains Lewis and Shepperd; also with reference to the re-delivery of the King of Ava's ship, seized by Commodore Lambert.

"With reference to the question of the disrespect said to have been shown to the deputation sent with a letter by Commodore Lambert, it should be borne in mind that the English officers have been stating their own version of the case, and consequently, whilst shielding themselves, they have thrown all the blame on the other side." (*Ibid*, p. 77).

But the Scotch Governor-General was thirsty to taste the blood of the Burmese. He was not inclined to maintain peace with the Burmese. Writes Mr. Cobden:—

"No sooner did it (the Rangoon Governor's letter) reach the Governor-General of India than he (with the Burmese ship of war still in his power) resolved to 'exact reparation by force of arms.' Orders were given for fitting out an armed expedition, and he now proclaimed as his ultimatum that, in addition to a compliance with the preceding demands, the Burmese should be compelled, as the price of peace, 'in consideration of the expenses of the expedition, and of compensation for property,' to pay ten lacs of rupees, or one hundred thousand of pounds." (*Ibid*, p. 78.)

Regarding the "Minute", an extract from which

only is published in the Parliamentary papers, which Lord Dalhousie wrote on the occasion, Mr. Cobden says :

"It has none of the dignity or force which properly belongs to a State paper. It dwells with a minuteness quite feminine upon details respecting points of ceremonial, and breaches of ceremonial, and breaches of etiquette ; but in arguing the main questions at issue the 'Minute,' in its present form, must be pronounced an unstatesmanlike, immoral, and illogical production." (*Ibid*, p. 78).

Mr Cobden then proceeds to demonstrate the unstatesmanlike, immoral and illogical nature of the Minute. He writes :—

"He (Lord Dalhousie) knew that an interval of thirty-five days was required for the receipt of an answer to a despatch sent to Ava from Rangoon, and there was the additional time necessary for sending a steamer from Rangoon to Calcutta, which, with delays, could not fairly be calculated at less than another week, making together forty-two days. Now from January 7th, the date of Commodore Lamberts' letter, to February 12th, the date of the 'Minute,' is just thirty-six days ; so that this hostile expedition against the Burmese nation was resolved upon before sufficient time had been allowed to the King to offer the explanation which he had been invited to give. A letter from the King was. * * * on its way, and actually reached the Governor-General's hands within a week of the date of his 'Minute'.

"But the unstatesmanlike fault (to use the mildest term) of the 'Minute' lies in this that whereas the specific charges are directed against the Governor of

Rangoon and him only, an assumption pervades the whole argument that the Burmese *Government* is the offending party: hence the vague and confused phraseology which sometimes speaks of the 'King,' in some places of "Burmah," and in others of the 'Governor of Rangoon.' * * *

"The offence offered to the majesty and power of England, in keeping the deputation waiting in the sun 'a full quarter of an hour,' is discussed in all its bearings; but there is not one syllable of allusion to the fact that Commodore Lambert had, in the teeth of instructions to the contrary, carried off a Burmese vessel of war, and done 'great execution' among those who attempted to oppose him." *Ibid*, pp. 79—80.

The war being resolved upon, it was prosecuted with great execution and slaughter of the Burmese. Mr. Cobden writes:—

"A war it can hardly be called. A rout, a massacre, or a visitation, would be a more appropriate term. A fleet of war-steamers and other vessels took up their position in the river, and on the 11th April, 1852, *being Easter Sunday*, they commenced operations by bombarding both the Rangoon and Dallah shores. Everything yielded like toywork beneath the terrible broadsides of our ships. * * * There is small room for the display of courage where there is little risk; * * *" (*Ibid*, p. 98).

There is no necessity of describing in detail the operations of the Second Burmese War. When the war was over a very large territory was wrested from the Buddhist sovereign of Burma and annexed

to the jurisdiction of the Christian Government of India. Writes Mr. Cobden :—

"These wars *are carried on at the expense of the people of India.* * * * What exclusive interest had the half-naked peasant of Bengal in the settlement of the claims of Captains Shepperd and Lewis, that he should alone be made to bear the expense of the war which grew out of them ?" * * * * (*Ibid*), p. 101.

"Lord Dalhousie begins with a claim on the Burmese for less than a thousand pounds ; which is followed by the additional demand of an apology from the Governor of Rangoon for the insult offered to our officers ; next his terms are raised to one hundred thousand pounds, and an apology from the king's ministers ; then follows the invasion of the Burmese territory ; when, suddenly, all demands for pecuniary compensation and apologies cease, and his Lordship is willing to accept the cession of Pegu as a 'compensation' and 'reparation' for the past. * * * " (*Ibid*, p. 104.)

The reasons which led Dalhousie to annex Pegu are thus set forth by the *Friend* (the enemy?) of India, which, as said before, was his lordship's organ. Wrote the above-mentioned journal :—

"In making Pegu British, we take from the kingdom of Burmah its chief financial resources, and its political strength ; we deprive it of the sinews of war. It is to this prostration of the power of the Burmese, and the dread inspired in the Court by our own power, that we must look for the security of our new border-line. For the last twenty-five years, they have occupied the territory lying between our own provinces of Arracan and of Moulmein. A line of hills separates the former

from Pegu : but there are three or four passes, through which a barbarian army, unencumbered with artillery and commissariat stores, might at any time have invaded the province, while Moulmein has always been open to incursion."

The Christian nations of Europe are worshippers of gold. Pegu was supposed to be rich in gold mines. One Rev. F. Mason, M. A., in his work on "Tenasserim ; or, Notes on the Fauna, Flora, Minerals, and Nations of British Burmah, and Pegu" wrote of gold being plentiful in Pegu. According to him,

"all the streams from the lofty granite mountains bring down their tribute of the precious metal." "There is a rumour widely current in Burmah, that valuable mines are known to the Burmese Court ; but the secret is strictly guarded, because the treasures of the earth are regarded as a kind of royal reserve-fund, only to be drawn upon in great emergencies."

Mr. Mason tried to prove that Pegu was the Ophir of Solomon ; the Talains called it *Suburnu-bhami*. Wrote Mr. Mason:—

"The ancient name of the Moubee, in the delta of the Irrawady, was Suvanna-nadee, or 'river of gold' ; indicating that Pegu was famous in antiquity for its gold ; and gold and silver appear to have been much more abundant than they are now, even three centuries ago." "The Sanskrit form of Suvanna is *Suvarna* ; and this, when the final syllable is dropped, is nearly identical with Soupheir, the Greek name of Ophir."

No wonder that the mammon worshipping

Governor-General Lord Dalhousie could not resist the temptation of annexing Pegu to British India.

The subjugation of the Burmese was not an easy matter. Writes Ludlow :—

“Pegu, after official annexation, was over-run with so-called robbers, declaring that if they had to give up the country to us it should be as a desert. The Peguese bitterly asked if this was to be our protection. Fortunately for us, an internal revolution broke out in Ava; a more peaceful monarch was set on the throne. But though peace was nominally re-established, quiet was not so late as April, 1855.” (*British India*, Vol. II, pp. 185-186).

The Second Burmese War was the last war fought by the East India Company which resulted in the augmentation of their territory.

APPENDIX

Mr. Cobden, in a footnote to the last page of his pamphlet, has given the following extract from a speech delivered by General Cass in the Senate of the United States, December, 1852:—

“ Another of the native Powers of Hindostan has fallen before the march of a great commercial corporation and its 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 of people have gone to swell the immense congregation of British subjects in India. And what do you think was the cause of the war which has just ended in the swallowing up of the kingdom of Burmah? The whole history of human contests, since the dispersing of the family of man upon the plains of Shinar, exhibits no such national provocation, followed by such national punishment. Political arithmetic contains no such sum as that which drove England to this unwelcome measure. Had we not the most irrefragable evidence, we might well refuse credence to this story of real rapacity. But the fact is indisputable that England went to war with Burmah, and annihilated its political existence, for the non-payment of the disputed demand of £ 990. So says the *London Times*, the authoritative expositor of the opinions and policy of England. ‘To appreciate’, says the impersonation of British feeling, ‘correctly the character of this compulsory bargain, the reader must recollect that the sum originally demanded of the Burmese for the indemnification of our injured merchants was £990, and Lord Dalhousie’s terms, even when the guns of our

steamers were pointed against Rangoon, comprehended, in consideration of the expenses of the expedition and of compensation for property, a claim only of £100,000. 'Well does it become such a people to preach homilies to other nations upon disinterestedness and moderation.'

CHAPTER XC

Acquisitions by Fraud

During Lord Dalhousie's tenure of office as Governor-General of India only two wars were fought which resulted in the annexation of the Punjab and a portion of Burma. But in wiping out the independent existences of many other principalities and native States of India, he did not appeal to the sword. To accomplish his object, he had to resort to fraud and not to force. Writes Sir J. W. Kaye:—

"He (Dalhousie) had then done with foreign wars; his after-career was one of peaceful invasion. Ere long there was a word which came to be more dreaded than that of Conquest. The native mind is readily convinced by the inexorable logic of the sword. There is no appeal from such arbitration. To be invaded and to be conquered is a state of things appreciable by the inhabitant of India. It is his "kismut", his fate; Gods' will. One stronger than he cometh and taketh all that he hath. There are, however, manifest compensations. His religion is not invaded; his institutions are not violated. Life is short, and the weak man, patient and philosophical, is strong to endure and mighty to wait. But Lapse is a dreadful and an appalling word; for it pursues the victim beyond the grave. Its significance in his eyes is nothing short of eternal condemnation."^{*}

* Sepoy War, Vol. I (1880), p. 69.

The word "lapse" had a peculiar meaning in the history of India in the fifties of the last century. It meant those native states which entered into an alliance with the English power of India were to lose their very existence at the sweet will of the alien Governor-General. It was Edmund Burke who, in his speech on the 1st December, 1783, on the motion for going into a Committee on Mr. Fox's India Bill, said:—

"I engage myself to you to make good these three positions: First, I say, that from Mount Inaus (Himalaya) ** where it touches us in the latitude of twenty-nine, to Cape Comorin, in the latitude of eight, that there is not a single prince, state, or potentate, great or small, in India, with whom they have come into contact, whom they have not sold. I say sold, though some times they have not been able to deliver according to their bargain. Secondly, I say that there is not a single treaty they have ever made which they have not broken. Thirdly, I say that there is not a single prince or state who ever put any trust in the Company who is not utterly ruined; and that none are in any degree secure or flourishing but in the exact proportion to their settled distrust and irreconcilable enmity to this nation.

"These assertions are universal; I say, in the full sense universal. They regard the external and political trust only, but I shall produce others fully equivalent in the internal."

The above was not altogether declamatory language which orators are in the habit of indulging—language in which truth is sacrificed to

make impressions on an audience by mere rhetorical expressions. No, every word of what Burke said was true and its truth was very painfully exhibited in Dalhousie's regime. The descendants of those princes with whose help the English succeeded in establishing their power in this country were very shamefully treated and on their death their principalities annexed in the teeth of existing treaties on the ground of alleged want of heir ! This sort of annexation was given the euphemistic name of "lapse."

The three Mahratta principalities of Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi and four minor ones were thus annexed in the regime of Dalhousie.

Of course, to justify his unjust and unjustifiable acquisitions, he resorted to hair-brained distinctions as regards the classifications of Native States. In a letter dated 13th June, 1854, he wrote to Sir Charles Wood :—

"I had a definite principle of distinction in my mind, and I think it is a sound one. There are three chief classes of Hindoo states in India.

"1st... Hindu sovereignties which are not tributary and which are not and never have been subordinate to a paramount power ;

2nd... Hindu sovereignties and chiefships which are tributary, and which owe subordination to the British Government as their paramount, in the place of the Emperor of Delhi, the Peishwa, etc :

3rd... Hindu sovereignties and chiefships created or revived by the Sanad (grant) of the British Government.

"Over principalities of the first class I contend that we have no power whatever, and have no right, except that of might, over their adoptions.

"Principalities of the second class require our assent to adoption, which we have a right to refuse, but which policy would usually lead us to concede."

"In the principalities of the third class I hold that succession should never be allowed to go by adoption."

Of course, no sensible man can find any distinction in the status of a native state of the 2nd or 3rd class mentioned by Dalhousie. Whatever the origin of a state, after its recognition as such, it should have been treated according to a uniform code of international law. But any pretext, however flimsy or plausible, was good enough with the Governor-General to swallow the native states of India.

Sir Charles Wood in replying to the above letter on the 9th of August, said :—

"To prevent mistakes, I will tell you how I distinguish them.

"*First.* States which have from a time antecedent to our rule been independent or quasi-independent, not tributary or owing more than nominal allegiance to any superior.

"*Secondly.* States dating from a similar period, but owing their origin distinctly to a grant from some authority to which we have succeeded, and tributary.

"Thirdly. States owing their origin to our grant or gift.

"In the first class I apprehend that an adoption properly made ought, as a matter of course, to be recognised. In the second, we may or may not recognise it as we choose, recognition being the general practice. In the third, if heirs fail, according to the terms of our grant, we annex."

Of course, in the above correspondence we do not perceive any expression of so-called Christian generosity or philanthropy. When political expediency necessitated the creation or revival of a state, its existence was not to be governed by the rules and customs of the tribe to which the ruling prince belonged but by the arbitrary policy of the alien Christians. Its extinction was to be apprehended at any moment. Had not the Indian Mutiny taken place in 1857, the fate of all the Native States of India would have been sealed. For it was as far back as 1834, that the Court of Directors of the East India Company had laid down their policy in regard to adoptions in these terms :—

"Whenever it is optional with you to give or to withhold your consent to adoptions, the indulgence should be the exception and not the rule, and should never be granted but as a special mark of approbation."

The Court of Directors did not classify the native states as Dalhousie did and so it is not too much to say that one and all native states

would have been annexed on the ground of alleged failure of heir and by lapse. Before Dalhousie's time several states had been annexed on the so-called ground of "lapse"—states which certainly were not "created or revived by the sanad (grant) of the British Government." The principalities of Kolaba, Mandavi and Umballa were annexed and treated as lapses by Dalhousie's predecessors.

The first Indian principality which Dalhousie treated as a "lapse" was the State of Satara.

CHAPTER XCI

The Annexation of Satara.

Mr. Robert Knight in his pamphlet on the Inam Commission Unmasked wrote :—

“Bajee Rao the last Peishwa.

“The circumstances under which Mr. Elphinstone’s proclamation of 1818, guaranteeing the landholders of the Peishwa’s territories in their possessions, was promulgated, must first come under review. When that manifesto was issued, the power of Bajee Rao, the Peishwa, was yet unbroken ; while the assurances it breathed, and the reputation of our Government for scrupulous adherence to its engagements, were among the most powerful causes which contributed to his ruin. It is hard to say whether the Mahrattas or our own Government attached the more importance to the appearance of that manifesto. It was carefully timed upon the fall of Satara, up to which date the pursuit of the Peishwa had been productive of nothing important, if we except the political effect of holding him up as a fugitive in the eyes of the country. The repulse at Kirkee, and the stand of the grenadiers at Korygaom, were all the successes of the campaign ; and the historian of the war has distinctly affirmed that, in the various skirmishes which ensued, no advantageous result had been gained by either party. The truth is, we fought Bajee Rao first with the proclamation, and then with the Satara family, which most opportunely

fell into our hands at Ashtah, some ten days after its appearance. The assurances of the proclamation, and the reinstatement of the Rajah of Satara, ruined the Peishwa ; and our deliberate withdrawal now from the pledges then given, merits the reprobation of every conscientious man, however specious the arguments upon which the withdrawal has been recommended."

[The Inam Commission Unmasked, by Robert Knight, pp. 45-46.]

Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone had to recognise the descendant of Sivaji as the ruler of the Mah-rattas, otherwise it would have been impossible for him and the British to make the people of the Deccan give up the cause of the fugitive Peishwa Baji Rao. But after getting the Satara prince in his clutches he did not fulfil all those promises which he had made to him.* The name of the Satara prince

* The following will show the nature of the promises made to the Satara prince.

In a *bakhar* or historical sketch written by one Balwant Rao Chitnavis, which was translated into English by Dr. Milne who had retired from the service of the East India Company as President of the Medical Board of Bombay, it is stated that after the British Government had formed an alliance with Bajee Rao, an agent was deputed to the Governor-General to solicit that the management of the country might be made over to the Raja, and was informed that the request could not be acceded to until the existing treaty had been violated when his Highness might rest assured "that he being the possessor of the dominion it should revert to him." In

was Pratap Singh. He was a minor when he was used as a tool by the British to serve their purpose. After Baji Rao had made his submission and was granted a pension and jaghir at Bithur, Pratap Singh was recognised by the British as the Sovereign of Satara. Captain Grant Duff was appointed Resident at his court and he was to conduct the affairs of the State during the minority of the Prince. When the Prince attained majority and became the ruler of his principality, he was found to be a very intelligent and shrewd man and far above the average of Indian princes. It was a certain Roman who used the metaphorical expression of cutting tall poppies. Prince Pratap Singh was a tall poppy in the estimation of the "pious Christian" Governor of Bombay—Sir Robert Grant, a son of that Charles Grant who was the reputed "Christian Director of the East India Company." So he issued the fiat to crush Pratap Singh. And it was done. The prince was deposed and sent

this "Historical" sketch, Mr. Elphinstone's breach of faith is referred to. He is said to have promised that in case the Peishwa violated the treaty or levied war, then his Highness the Maharaja should be confident of his word, which he had just pledged for the restoration of his government, requesting that this promise might not transpire.

That Mr. Elphinstone never contradicted the above-mentioned statements, although these were published while he was alive, surely proves their genuineness.

in captivity to Benares. His brother was appointed ruler of Satara in his stead.

Towards 1848 both the brothers died. Unfortunately none of them had any male child. But both the brothers had, according to Hindoo Law, adopted sons who possessed every right to inherit the sovereignty of Satara. But Satara was annexed on the plausible plea that there was no legal heir to its throne.* Scotch logic was made use of to come to this conclusion. But the

* Mr. W. M. Torrens, M. P., wrote:

"Treaties have throughout all time been for the most part brief in language, general in the terms employed, and confessedly intended, not as exhaustive anticipations of all imaginable contingencies, but as laying down broadly, and in simple forms of speech, the outlines of peace and amity; upon the implied condition that the application of these terms to any and every case that might thereafter arise should be such as the common understanding of both communities would admit, or the judgment of an impartial arbiter declare. Tested by this obvious rule of international right, the guarantee of perpetual inheritance was undoubtedly intended, and undoubtedly understood, to imply the devolution of title, dignity and power to whatever heirs could from time to time establish their respective claims,—not according to the *lex loci* of the foreign and alien party to the compact, but according to the *lex loci* of the state whose autonomy the treaty had been confessedly framed to assure." (*Empire in Asia, how we came by it: a book of confessions*, p. 357, Panini Office reprint.)

real reason for this act of spoliation and gross violation of all treaties with Satara has been mentioned by Sir William Lee-Warner*, who writes :—

"It must also be noted that while Lord Dalhousie's mind was yet open, the very first letter which he received at Calcutta from Hobhouse, dated the 24th of December, 1847, contained this obvious incitement to annexation :—

"The death of the ex-Raja of Sattara certainly comes at a very opportune moment. The reigning Raja is, I hear, in very bad health, and it is not at all impossible we may soon have to decide upon the fate of his territory. I have a very strong opinion that on the death of the present prince without a son, and no adoption should be permitted, this petty principality should be merged in the British Empire; and if the question is decided in my "day of sextonship," I shall leave no stone unturned to bring about that result. But, of course, I should like to have your opinion on the subject."

The ex-convict Hobhouse who indited the above letter was an uncle of Dalhousie. And the Scotch "Laird of Cockpen" was very glad to do all that his ex-convict uncle desired him to do. Commenting on the above letter, Sir William Lee-Warner writes :—

"Did ever Governor-General enter upon a line of policy with stronger pressure from higher authority ?"

Of course had Dalhousie been an honest man he would not have felt bound to obey the mandate

* Life of Lord Dalhousie, Vol. II, p. 158.

of the higher authority. But the conscience of the Christian statesmen of England and Scotland can not be relied upon when Indian questions are to be decided.

Of course, there was no justice or honesty in the step which Dalhousie took or was made to take in annexing Satara. The partisans of annexation, who were mostly Scotch, like the Duke of Argyll, Sir Louis Jackson, &c., say that no wrong was committed in thus acquiring that principality and incorporating it with the British Raj. With them the end justifies the means and so they do not scruple to resort to any act of occidental diplomacy based on Machiavellian policy to serve their purpose. Wrote one Anglo-Indian author :—

"States, or bodies politic, are to be considered as moral persons, having a public will, capable and free to do right and wrong, inasmuch as they are collections of individuals, each of whom carries with him into the service of the community the same binding law of morality and religion which ought to control his conduct in private life. The Law of Nations is a complex system composed of various ingredients. It consists of general principles of right and justice, equally suitable to the government of individuals in a state of natural equality, and to the relations and conduct of nations ; of a collection of usages, customs, and opinions, the growth of civilisation and commerce ; and of a code of positive law." *

* Sir Henry S. Maine's Lectures on International Law, p. 33.

Maine quotes an American jurist, who writes:—

"The Law of Nations, unlike foreign Municipal Law, does not have to be proved as a fact. The Law of Nations makes an integral part of the laws of the land. Every nation, on being received at her own request into the circle of civilised governments, must understand that she not only attains rights of sovereignty and the dignity of national character, but that she binds herself also to the strict and faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages which have obtained currency amongst civilised states, and which have for their object the mitigation of the miseries of war." *

The Satara Raj did not pay any tribute to the British Government. In the petition submitted to the Queen Victoria, in 1874, the widowed Rani of Satara made out a strong case, showing that the Satara Raj was an independent State just like Switzerland, and so the British Government had no right to interfere with the laws and customs which regulated its succession.

The annexation of Satara was the first one carried out by Dalhousie on the doctrine of what he was pleased to euphemistically call "lapse." Yes, it was "lapse" of all morals on the part of the British and not of heirs of the prince which brought the Satara Raj under the yoke of those aliens.

For further details regarding the Satara question or questions, see my *Story of Satara*.

* *Ibid*, p. 37.

CHAPTER XCH

Annexation of Nagpore

The annexation of Satara served as a precedent to the Scotch "Laird of Cockpen" to annex Nagpore in 1854. The last Raja of Nagpore, named Raghojee Bhonsla the 3rd, died on the 11th December, 1853, without leaving a son. And this served as an excuse for the "swallowing up" of this State by the Governor-General. From all the accounts which we have of this last Raja, it is evident that he was an intelligent prince and that he governed his principality well. Yet Dalhousie was not ashamed in writing of this Raja after his death as "having lived and died a seller of justice, a miser, a drunkard, and a debauchee." Of course, it was all false; but it served the purpose of the Governor-General to write like this. Otherwise no case could have been made out for this spoliation.

On the death of the Raja, his grandmother, the widow of Raghojee Bhonsla the 2nd, who had been regent during the minority of the last Raja, adopted the deceased Raja's grandnephew, named Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao. The widows of the Raja

also gave their consent to this adoption. The ceremonies of adoption were performed and the funeral rites of the deceased sovereign were celebrated by his adopted son.

The Resident, Mr. Mansel, would, as an occidental diplomatist, neither forbid nor give any "special encouragement" to the adoption until he received orders from the supreme government on the subject.* Lord Dalhousie on the 28th January, 1854, recorded a minute in which he declared that the sovereignty of Nagpore had "lapsed to the paramount power, for there was no heir or representative of the Bhonsla family or even a claimant to the throne of Nagpore." The Christian lord conveniently ignored all the assurances which had been given to the House of Nagpore by the Government whom he represented in India. The treaty contracted by the Christian Government of India with that of Nagpore was one of "perpetual friendship and alliance" and the State of Nagpore was officially declared in 1826 to be "one of the substantive powers of India."

As a substantive power of India, the Nagpore sovereign or his representative could adopt a son in the failure of a male issue according to the customary laws of his tribe and religion. Colonel Sutherland, Governor-General's Agent in Central

* First Nagpore Blue-book, 1854, p. 56.

India, in a letter dated 25th August, 1841, gives the following opinion with reference to adoption:—

“There may be some difference of opinion on the subject of the right of a widow to adopt a son, where she was not enjoined or permitted to do so by her husband; where she had his authority, her right to do so would not, I think, be questioned anywhere in Rajpootana; and even where she had not his authority, her right would, I think, in most cases be recognised; the adoption being of course made *from the nearest of kin to her deceased husband* although even in this respect great latitude is allowed.”

Major Evans Bell in the chapter on the Right of Adoption in his work “The Empire in India” (p. 144), writes:—

“Sir Richard Jenkins, in his Nagpore Report of 1827 (p. 146), declares the rule that had been observed in seating the Rajah, then a minor, on the throne, and that should be observed in choosing his successor from the female line, in ‘case he should die without leaving a son. That rule was to choose the nearest male descendant of the last Rajah who had any.’ According to that rule the late Rajah’s grand-nephew, the great grandson of Rughojee the second’s daughter and that Rajah’s ‘nearest male descendant, was chosen and adopted as a son, on the death of his grand-uncle, the late Rughojee the 3rd of Nagpore. Lord Dalhousie, without inquiry or notice, declared the Bhonsla family to be extinct, and the Nagpore State to have ‘lapsed’ for want of an heir.”

In another portion of the same work from which the above extract is given, Major Bell writes:—

“In the year 1844 the Governor-General in Council, in

reply to the Resident Colonel Spiers' request for instructions in the event of the Rajah dying without issue, made a distinct recognition of the right of adoption by the Rajah, and by members of the family in case of his death without having made an adoption. The passage to which I allude is the more worthy of attentive consideration, because it is quoted in Lord Dalhousie's Minute, p. 26, as a proof that the question of adoption was '*left open*' by the Government of India. But the passage will not bear such a construction. It is as follows:—

'In the event of the death of the present Rajah, without leaving children, or *an adopted son*, you should make arrangements for conducting the Government of Nagpore, pending the orders of the Government of India, which orders will be based on the circumstances that may present themselves at the time, *and the right to make the adoption which might be considered to attach to any surviving member of the Rajah's family.*'

"The right of the Rajah himself to adopt a successor (*which Lord Dalhousie denied*) is here clearly recognised, while, to say the least, no doubt, no hint of disapproval is thrown out against the contingent right of the widow or other surviving relative to adopt on behalf of the deceased Rajah. The ordered reference to Calcutta in such a case is obviously intended to guard against a disputed adoption, but conveys no doubt as to the general right."^{*}

To quote the same author again:—

"The Ranees of Nagpore were treated in exactly the same manner as those of Satara. They were never invited to express an opinion on the subject of the

* *Ibid*, pp. 200-201.

succession; and the grounds of the decision of Government, annihilating their sovereignty and their family, were never communicated to them. They were abruptly told that there was no heir to the musnud, and that the Rajah's dominions had 'reverted to the British Government,' and not another word of explanation was vouchsafed to them. A year or so after the annexation, they were able, in common with the general public, to inspect Lord Dalhousie's minute of the 28th January, 1854, penned about a month after the Rajah's death, in which his grand-nephew and heir, their adopted son, is styled 'a Mahratta youth', and a 'stranger', and in which without any inquiry having been made, without any facts or information whatever, but by a purely *a priori* argument,—* * Lord Dalhousie proved to the satisfaction of Mr. Halliday and Mr. Dorin, that the Ranees' natural jealousies, 'their feelings and interests', *must*, make them averse to the continuance of the Raj in the person of an adopted son, and it would really be inhuman to encourage them to adopt ”*

There was one member of the Governor-General's Council, by name General Low, who was opposed to the annexation of Nagpore. He protested against the minute of Lord Dalhousie proclaiming the extinction of the Bhonsla State. In his minute his Scotch Lordship had used language which more befitted the lips of a Court jester or a dramatic actor than a statesman conducting the serious business of a kingdom. Lord Dalhousie had written in his Minute :—

* *Ibid*, pp. 43-44.

"I am well aware that the continuance of the Raj of Nagpore under some Marhatta rule, as an act of grace and favour on the part of the British Government, would be highly acceptable to native sovereigns and nobles of India ; and there are, doubtless, many of high authority who would advocate the policy on that special ground. I understand the sentiment and respect it ; but remembering the responsibility that is upon me, I cannot bring my judgment to admit that a kind and generous sentiment should outweigh a just and prudent policy."

Of course no serious statesman would use language like that quoted above. The minute of General Low was a protest against Lord Dalhousie's wild statements. Wrote that gallant military officer in his minute dated February 10, 1850 :—

"If Great Britain shall retain her present powerful position among the States of Europe, it seems highly probable that, owing to the infringement of their treaties on the part of native Princes and other causes, the whole of India will, in the course of time, become one British province ; but many eminent statesmen have been of opinion that we ought most carefully to avoid unnecessarily accelerating the arrival of that great change ; and it is within my own knowledge that the following five great men were of that number—namely, Lord Hastings, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Lord Metcalfe."

In the course of the same minute, he wrote again :—

"When I went to Malwa, in 1850, where I met many old acquaintances, whom I had known when a very young man, and over whom I held no authority, I found

succession; and the grounds of the decision of Government, annihilating their sovereignty and their family, were never communicated to them. They were abruptly told that there was no heir to the musnud, and that the Rajah's dominions had 'reverted to the British Government,' and not another word of explanation was vouchsafed to them. A year or so after the annexation, they were able, in common with the general public, to inspect Lord Dalhousie's minute of the 28th January, 1854, penned about a month after the Rajah's death, in which his grand-nephew and heir, their adopted son, is styled 'a Mahratta youth', and a 'stranger', and in which without any inquiry having been made, without any facts or information whatever, but by a purely *a priori* argument,—* * Lord Dalhousie proved to the satisfaction of Mr. Halliday and Mr. Dorin, that the Ranees' natural jealousies, 'their feelings and interests', *must*, make them averse to the continuance of the Raj in the person of an adopted son, and it would really be inhuman to encourage them to adopt **

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In the course of the same minute, he wrote again :—

"When I went to Malwa, in 1850, where I met many old acquaintances, whom I had known when a very young man, and over whom I held no authority, I found

these old acquaintances speak out much more distinctly as to their opinion of the Satara case ; so much so, that I was, on several occasions, obliged to check them. It is remarkable that every native who ever spoke to me respecting the annexation of Sattarah, asked precisely the same question : 'What crime did the late Rajah commit that his country should be seized by the Company ?' Thus clearly indicating their notions, that if any crime had been committed our act would have been justifiable, and not otherwise."

He also wrote that

"In one respect, the natives of India are exactly like the inhabitants of all parts of the known world ; they like their own habits and customs better than those of foreigners."

Sir John Kaye in the second chapter of the first volume of his great work, "A History of the Sepoy War in India," referring to Low's minute writes :—

"Having thus in unmeasured opposition to the Dalhousie theory flung down the gauntlet of the old School at the feet of the Governor-General. Low ceased from the enunciation of general principles, and turned to the discussion of the particular case before him. He contended that the treaty between the British Government and the late Rajah did not limit the succession to heirs of his body, and that, therefore, there was a clear title to succession in the Bhonslah family by means of a son adopted by either the Rajah himself or by his eldest widow, in accordance with law and usage. The conduct, he said, of the last Prince of Nagpore had not been such as to alienate his right : he had been loyal to

the Paramount State, and his country had not been misgoverned: there had been nothing to call for military interference on our part, and little to compel grave remonstrance and rebuke. For what crime, then, was his line to be cut off and the honours of his house extinguished for ever? To refuse the right of adoption in such a case would, he alleged, be entirely contrary to the spirit, if not to the treaty. * * * *

"Of such opinions as these Low expected no support in the Council-chamber of Calcutta—no support from the authorities at home.* It little mattered, indeed, what the

* Of course the authorities at home, those who called themselves Radicals or Liberals in politics, were in favor of absorbing the native states of India.

It should be borne in mind that the policy of annexations by lapse was the policy enunciated by the Liberals when in office in 1834. So Sir Charles Wood wrote on the 8th of March, 1854, to Lord Dalhousie:

"You will have seen by a former letter that I encouraged your annexation of Nagpur, to which I have heard of no objection, even from John Mill, who is the great supporter of Indian independence in the East India House."

On the 8th April Hogg wrote to Dalhousie:

"We shall probably have a discussion some time or other respecting Nagpur. There never was, and could not be a clearer case. Still Sullivan, at the dinner to Lord Harris, selected that occasion as appropriate for declaring his opinion that the annexation of Nagpur exceeded in iniquity the Russian aggression."

Of course, Sullivan spoke the truth, but this was unpalatable to the Liberal authorities at home, because they did not lose anything material and so perceptible

latter might think, for the annexation of Nagpore was decreed and to be accomplished without reference to England."

So Nagpore was annexed and great indignities were inflicted on the widowed Ranees of the Palace. Almost all their jewels and other state as well as private furniture were seized and sold to the highest bidders. Writes Sir John Kaye :—

"that which might soon have faded into an idea was rendered a galling and oppressive reality by the spoliation of the palace, which followed closely upon the extinction of the Raj. The live stock and dead stock of the Bhonslah were sent to the hammer.

"It must have been a great day for speculative cattle-dealers at Seetabaldee when the royal elephants, horses, and bullocks were sold off at the price of carrion, and a sad day, indeed, in the royal household, when the venerable Bankha Bae, with all the wisdom and moderation of four score well-spent years upon her, was so stung by a sense of the indignity offered to her, that she threatened to fire the palace if the furniture were removed. But the furniture was removed, and the jewels of the Bhonsla family, with a few propitiatory exceptions, were sent to the Calcutta market. And I have heard it said that these seizures, these sales, created a worse impression, not only in Berar, but in the surrounding provinces, than the seizure of the Kingdom itself."

In a footnote Kaye writes :—

"Between five and six hundred elephants, camels,

by the physical senses, by encouraging their tool in India to annex territories on any flimsiest pretext whatever.

horses, and bullocks were sold for £1300. The Ranees sent a protest to the Commissioner, and memorialised the Governor-General, alleging, in the best English that the Palace could furnish, that "on the 4th instant (Sept.) the sale of animals, viz., bullocks, horses, camels, and elephants, commenced to sell by public auction and resolution—a pair her hackery bullocks, valued 100 rupees, sold in the above sale for 5 rupees."

But the secret reason for annexing the dominion of Nagpore was that which had prompted the Scotch Christian Laird to wrest Berar from the Nizam. Nagpore was a great cotton producing province and there was possibility of developing or rather exploiting its resources by the natives of Great Britain. From an article on the Central Provinces published in the *Calcutta Review* for 1863, written presumably by Sir Richard Temple, some of the real reasons for annexing Nagpore can be guessed. The writer says:—

"The policy of the Government of Lord Dalhousie has secured to us a province not much inferior to Oude or the Panjab in resources and capabilities, and superior to them in climate. It has given us a province which, with some extension, and under the direction of a master-mind, will be inferior to few others in British India. It contains some stations superior in climate to any others in India, those on the Himalayan ranges alone excepted. The elevations of the Vindhyan and Mahadeva ranges offer retreats, pleasant as any which could be found away from Simlah, Darjeeling or the Neelgherries.

"No one now wishes to see the old regime restored.
* * The policy of Mr. Mansel has long been forgotten. * * "

Then the writer refers to the difficulty that would have been experienced in conquering Nagpore. He writes :—

"A kingdom constituted like that of Nagpore might have been difficult to conquer but when once annexed, . . . was easy of retention. The officers of the King, were paid by him, were grateful to him, were dependent on him. *They were not easily seduced*, and the opposition they might make would be considerable. With the fall of the King, however, they were obliged to succumb, and no fears were entertained but from the other branches of the reigning family."^{*}

The words italicised in the above extract tell their own tale. It would seem that the Christians who pray every day, "Lead us not into temptations but deliver us from all evils," must have tried the experiment of seducing the officers of the Nagpore Raj and because they failed in seducing them, they thought that the Nagpore Raj was growing strong and therefore it was necessary to annihilate its existence.

N. B. Major Evans Bell has discussed at great length the question of the annexation of Nagpore in his two works, *viz.* :—"The Empire in India" and "Prospects and Retrospects of Indian Policy."

* Calcutta Review, Vol. XXXVIII (1863), pp. 230-231.

CHAPTER XCIII

The Annexation of Jhansi.

Jhansi, a district in Bundelkhand, was in the times of the early Peishwas governed by an officer who was styled Subadar of Jhansi. He had only the temporary command of the district. "But one of them," to quote the words of the Marquess of Hastings, "who was a man of head as well as of courage, succeeded in making the soobadarship hereditary in his family, maintaining in other respects towards the Peishwa relations of fealty with some pecuniary payments."*

The British Indian Government negotiated a treaty with this hereditary Subadar of Jhansi in 1817. The treaty which was ratified by the Governor-General on the 18th day of November, 1817, distinctly laid down in its second article that

"The British Government, with a view to confirm the fidelity and attachment of the government of Jhansie consents to acknowledge and hereby constitutes Row Ram Chund, his heirs and successors, hereditary rulers of the territory enjoyed by the late Row Sheo Bhow at

* Marquess of Hastings' Private Journal, p. 313, Panini Office reprint.

the period of the commencement of the British Government," etc.

The language of the article of the treaty does not certainly convey the idea of the British Government having made the grant of the territory of Jhansi to its then Subadar Row Ram Chund, or even if it did so, it did not stipulate that it would lapse to the British Government on the failure of heir of the body of the Subadar. But when the last Raja* of Jhansi died on the 21st November, 1853, the kinsman whom he had adopted as his son was not recognised by Dalhousie and so the principality was annexed owing to so-called "lapse." In a Minute, dated the 27th of February, 1854, in which Lord Dalhousie proclaimed the annexation of Jhansi, he wrote :—

" There is no heir of the body of the late Raja—there is no heir whatever of any Raja or Subedar of Jhansi with whom the British Government has at any time had relations : the late Raja was never expected by his own people to adopt, and a previous adoption by the Raja, whom the British Government constituted hereditary chief of Jhansi, was not acknowledged by the British Government. Wherefore it follows that the right to refuse to acknowledge the present adoption by Gangadhar Rao is placed beyond question."

It was convenient for the Governor-General to resort to lies and deliberate misrepresentation of

* The title of Subadar was changed to that of Raja in 1832 during the *regime* of Lord William Bentinck.

facts in order to achieve his end. Major Evans Bell, in his two works on the "Empire in India" and "Prospects and Retrospects of Indian Policy", has very thoroughly exposed the lies contained in Dalhousie's minute on the annexation of Jhansi. He writes :—

"Of the regularity of the adoption in every point of view there never was any doubt or question raised, * * Indeed the adoption was recognised as regular and irreversible, * * The decision of the Government on that point is summed up in the following words, 'The adoption was good for the conveyance of private rights, though not for the transfer of the Principality.' * * * *

"* * by the treaty of 1817, it was certainly not contemplated by either party to the treaty that the heir of a Soobadar of Jhansi could under any circumstances fail to be his successor. No other law was intended or thought of except the Hindoo law of inheritance, in which adoption is an ordinary and essential incident. No article or stipulation in the treaty gave us the right to interfere with the operation of the Hindoo law, to mutilate it or to substitute any other law of descent."

Lord Dalhousie, in the minute above referred to, quoted a memorandum written by Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1837 as an authority for the prerogative of confirming or invalidating adoption in dependent states. But Major Bell has no difficulty in exposing that Dalhousie was not honest in his

* The Empire in India, pp. 202-203.

citation of the authority of Lord Metcalfe. For he wrote that Metcalfe's,

"opinion, as may be very easily shown, was directly contradictory of that supposed imperial right.

"Lord Metcalfe, in reference to the Chiefs of Bundelcund, observes that there is a wide distinction to be drawn between 'sovereign princes' and 'jagheerdars,' between those in possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold grants of land or public revenue, by gift from a sovereign or paramount power."

Then quoting *in extenso* from Metcalfe's memorandum, Bell wrote :—

"It will be observed how restricted a right of resumption is allowed by Lord Metcalfe. Even in a case of Jagheerdars, he considers that the sovereign only has the power of refusing to sanction adoptions, when '*the terms of the grant limit succession to heirs male of the body*'. But although this paragraph is quoted by Lord Dalhousie in support of his argument for the annexation of Jhansi, it is obvious that it was intended to refer to a totally different class of possessions; and moreover even if Jhansi were reducible to the category of Jagheers or grants of land, there is no limitation of the grant, confining its 'succession to heirs male of the body'

"But the Rajah of Jhansi was clearly not a Jagheerdar, nor did he, as erroneously stated several times in the late Governor-General's Minute, hold his Principality as a grant; nor did either his father Sheo Rao Bhow, or his nephew Ram Chand Rao receive it as a 'gift' from the British Government."^{*}

* *Ibid*, p. 205.

"There was no gift, because Ram Chand Rao was already in possession; there was no pretension to the relations of sovereign and subject, for there already existed relations of amity and defensive alliance; there was no grant made, no sunnud issued, but a new treaty was concluded between two states. The Rajah of Jhansi was not a Jagheerdar, 'but a hereditary ruler,' a Hindu Prince."⁷⁷

Referring to the adoption in 1835 which, Lord Dalhousie wrote, "was not acknowledged by the British Government," Bell said:—

"The facts are very different.

"There was a disputed succession in 1835: there were four claimants. *The fact of the adoption was denied* by the adverse parties. * *

"It is to be observed, therefore, that in 1835 the adoption or nomination was doubtful; in 1853 the adoption was not doubtful, * * . There is no parallel here: no precedent can be founded on the decision of 1835.

* * * *

"The fact is, that the settlement of 1835 was not a decision of our Government at all, but that of a certain party in the Jhansi Durbar. The only decision at which our Government arrived was the decision of not deciding, interposing or even advising in the dispute. The Political Agent was authorised to recognise Raghonath Rao, the deceased Rajah's uncle, who was in actual possession, but no opinion was given as to his right; and these qualifying expressions were added, 'It being presumed that he is able to establish his authority;

* *Ibid.*, p. 209.

and that his succession will be acknowledged by disinterested parties at Jhansi'."*

In his "Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy" (p. 24), Bell wrote:—

"We have seen how eagerly Lord Dalhousie accepted an imaginary chain of precedents offered to him for general use. Sattara and Nagpore were annexed on the strength of those precedents. To aid in the particular destruction of the petty State of Jhansi, he tried to extract a direct precedent from its own annals. There was no such precedent; and he could only create the phantom by a perversion of the facts before him."

But the Christian statesmen of England who were entrusted with the Government of India lacked all sense of justice and humanity when dealing with the people and princes of India. They annexed Jhansi with a light heart, but they did not reckon the cost they had to pay for this annexation when the Ranee of Jhansi in 1858 took the field against the troops led by British officers.

* *Ibid*, pp. 213-214.

CHAPTER XCIV.

Other Annexations by Lapse

In 1849, Sambalpur in the Central Provinces (now transferred to Bihar and Orissa), and Jaitpur in Bundelkhund were annexed by Lord Dalhousie on the doctrine of "lapse." Applying the same principle, Dalhousie absorbed Tanjore in 1855.*

* Major Evans Bell writes :

"The highest legal authority in England, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, emphatically denounced the Tanjore spoliation. * * "

Then in a footnote to the above, he adds :—

"Kamāchi Bai, the senior widow of the Rajah of Tanjore, filed a bill in the Supreme Court of Madras, to recover possession of her deceased husband's private property, which had been sequestered by the local Government. The Court decided in her favour. The Government of Madras carried the case in appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The decree of the Supreme Court of Madras was reversed, because the Lords of the Privy Council held that the seizure was 'an act of State,' and therefore not questionable in any municipal court. But Lord Kingsdown, who delivered the judgment, made use of the following emphatic language :—

"It is extremely difficult to discover in these papers

Major Evans Bell wrote :—

"Wallajah, who found the British in possession only of Madras and Cuddalore, made successive grants, by *sunrud*, of Poonamallee and other talooks, to round off the Company's domain ; and in 1763 he made over to his allies the district formerly called the Jaghire, now the Zillah of Chingleput, with a revenue of eighteen lacks of rupees. The English Company, though rapidly acquiring a superiority of material power, were still technically and formally feudatories of the Nawab, and held all their territory, except the town of Madras, as jaghires under *sunrud* from him as sovereign of the country ; and these technical and formal relations between the two parties were not only left intact by the treaty of 1801, but have

any ground of legal right, on the part of the East India Company, or of the Crown of Great Britain, to the possession of this Raj, or of any part of the property of the Rajah on his death ; and, indeed, the seizure was denounced by the Attorney-General (who, from circumstances explained to us at the hearing, appeared as Counsel for the Respondents, and not in his official character for the Appellants) as a most violent and unjustifiable measure. The Rajah was an independent sovereign of territories undoubtedly minute, and bound by treaties to a powerful neighbour, which left him, practically, little power of free action ; but he did not hold his territory, such as it was, as a fief of the British Crown, or of the East India Company ; nor does there appear to have been any pretence for claiming it, on the death of the Rajah without a son, by any legal title, either as an escheat or as *bona vacantia*."

never been disputed or questioned either before or since the death of the late Nawab in 1855.....”*

On the death of the last Nawab Mohamed Ghaus of Carnatic in October, 1855, Azim Jah was not granted that title. At that time Lord Harris was Governor of Madras. In one of his minutes, he wrote that

“the semblance of royalty, without any of the power, is a mockery of authority which must be pernicious—that it is impolitic and unwise to allow a pageant to continue, which, though it has been politically harmless, may at any time become a nucleus for sedition and agitation.”

Dalhousie endorsed this minute of Harris and so one ancient royal house of India was wiped out of existence.

It has been said by an English writer that

“one cannot fail to be struck with the frequency of death without heirs among Indian sovereigns from the moment when the policy of annexation is proclaimed by a Governor-General.”—Ludlow’s *British India*, Vol. II, p. 190.

We have shown in a previous chapter how the British invaders of Afghanistan were bribing the Afghans to ‘bring in the heads of one or two of the *Mufsid*s’ by the offer of ‘10,000 rupees for each head, or even 15,000 rupees’. (Kaye’s *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 4th Edition, Vol. II, p.

* The Empire in India p. 97.

218). Is it any wonder that resort might have been made to the same procedure towards the Indian princes without heirs which was so successful in Afghanistan? Is it not suggestive of foul play to account for the frequency of death without heirs among Indian sovereigns when Dalhousie announced his policy of annexation by "lapse"?

CHAPTER XCV.

Confiscation of Berar

Dalhousie had dealt blows to the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. He also intended to wipe out the existence of the Muhammadan powers of India. When he came out to India, there were two large dominions under Muhammadan suzerains in India. These were, in the north, the Kingdom of Oude, and, in the south, the Nizam's dominions. The revenues of each of these principalities amounted to several millions of pounds sterling, for they were very fertile tracts of land and one of them at least was known to contain mines. It was difficult for the Governor-General to restrain his greed. So he intended to swallow up both these principalities. Wrote Mr. Robert Knight :—

"About the year 1851 the policy in the ascendant at Calcutta was that of 'getting rid of intervening Principalities.' Every native state was considered merely 'an exceptional jurisdiction,' * *. The ruling maxim declared that the existence of so many sovereignties and chiefships, interspersed with our own territory, was in many ways inimical to good government, and to the welfare and prosperity of the people; and that, 'on every fair occasion, their number ought to be diminished.' * * Native States could not be reformed—they were incorri-

gible and even if they could, the task would not be a politic or profitable one for us to undertake. *The two great Mussalman States, Hyderabad and Oude, were marked down for annexation, and the process of undermining them, as the Blue Books tell us, was only delayed by the wars in the Punjab and Burmah.* When the time for business came, Oude was annexed; Hyderabad was pushed on the road to ruin; and Lord Dalhousie waited for 'the crash' ".*

Lord Dalhousie, with his policy of annexing Native States, eagerly turned his attention to Hyderabad. Because there was something rotten in the administration of this state, he thought therefore he had a right to absorb it. The language which he used in addressing the Nizam was the most insulting one imaginable.

Because the Nizam was weak, he had to tamely submit to it. To force the Nizam to maintain the Contingent and to pay for it in addition to the Subsidiary force which he had to maintain and pay for by the Treaty of 1800, Lord Dalhousie wrote personally to the Nizam a letter on the 6th June, 1851, in which such insulting expressions were used as it was dangerous for the Nizam "to provoke the resentment of the British Government," "whose power can crush you at its will," and telling him that "the independence of his sovereignty" stood in "imminent danger." The Nizam was advised to disband "those turbulent mercenaries

* The Statesman, July 1, 1880, p. 162.

the Arab soldiery," and also to make an effort for "the early liquidation of the accumulated debt." If he was unable to do so, he must "forthwith make over" to the British Government certain frontier districts.

As said before, the Nizam was weak and so he had to tamely submit to the insults heaped upon him by the Governor-General. In fact it seems that Lord Dalhousie, realizing the weakness of the Nizam, went on adding insults to injuries on that ruler.

The Nizam was not indebted to the Indian Government. But then the alliance between the two Governments resembled that of the Giant and the Dwarf. The Government of India had been regularly and mercilessly bleeding the Mussalman ruler of the Deccan.

But up to the middle of the nineteenth century the affairs of the Nizam were not so well managed as they ought to have been. His territories were the scenes of fights and bloodshed. Referring to Berar, writes a well-known Anglo-Indian author:—

"Petty local revolts were common; the Deshmukhs stood up for their hereditary rights; the farmers took what they could by main force; and there was frequent faction-fighting in the towns between Rajputs and Mussalmans. * *

"This country was harried from time to time by bands of men under leaders who set up in defiance of the

government on various pretexts, but always with the real object of plundering. * *

"Throughout these troubles the behaviour of the Hindu Deshmukhs and other pargana officers was most significantly treasonable against the Nizam's Government. They did their best to thwart his commanders and to abet the Pretenders, although the rebel bands plundered and ravished wherever they went." (Lyll's Berar Gazetteer [1870], pp. 131-132.

The Nizam had already been paying a large sum for the maintenance of the Company's troops under the subsidiary alliance. But these troops were of no use to him to put down the local petty revolts in his dominion. He was being pressed to have a contingent in his employ for the purpose of putting down these local revolts.

"The Nizam was told that he was bound by treaty, which was untrue, to maintain the contingent, and he was told, which was likewise untrue, that the duties performed by the contingent were not such duties as devolved properly on the subsidiary force. Thus the Nizam was given to understand, . . . that if he gave up the contingent he would practically lose all military protection whatever, and all the benefits of the Treaty of 1800."*

He was unjustly made to pay for the Contingent, with reference to which the Marquis of Hastings wrote, as published in "Hyderabad Papers", 1824 :—

"It is perfectly true that these troops are in fact more ours than those of the Sovereign by whom they

* The Statesman for July 1, 1880, p. 178.

are maintained. Now would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we should sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity?"

In the same Minute he also says that it would be "impolitic to let an over-refinement cause our open abrogation of such an inexpensive addition to our strength."

But then to maintain this "most preposterous example of our national nepotism", as the Contingent was called by Mr. Knight, the Muhammadan ruler of the Deccan Hyderabad was made to run into debt to the East India Company, and to obtain satisfaction for that debt, demands were made upon his fertile frontier districts.

It was under such pretexts and pretences that the Nizam was deprived of his richest province. But Berar was a cotton growing country and that was the secret reason of Dalhousie's confiscating it. Although it was solemnly declared that the occupation of Berar would be only temporary, it was never restored to him to whom it legally belonged. Half a century later, another Viceroy—a model Christian, because he was the son of a Christian divine and so reared on the teachings of the Bible from his very cradle, accomplished what Dalhousie had left undone. Curzon made the Nizam give up Berar in permanent lease to the Christian Indian Government.

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Of course it was the intention of Lord Dalhousie to annex the whole dominion of the Nizam to the British Government and the confiscation of Berar was meant to be the preliminary step—the introduction of the thin end of the wedge, as it were, into the body politic of the Nizam. But fortunately for the latter, in Sir Salar Jang he possessed a minister who was equal to Dalhousie in diplomacy and statecraft. So it was no easy thing for the Scotch Christian Laird to overreach the Muhammadan statesman who was at the helm of the Nizam's affairs. And this happy circumstance explains why Hyderabad did not share the same fate as Oude.

CHAPTER XCVI.

The Annexation of Oude.

Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, in his journal, dated October 8th, 1850, wrote :—

“ When Dalhousie’s father was Commander-in-Chief here [in India], he visited the King of Oude at Lucknow, and made a point of introducing her ladyship, which the King did not understand at all, and fancied the Laird wanted to sell her ! After a short time his Majesty of Oude said to his attendants, ‘that will do ; take her away ! ’ ”

Commenting on the above, Sir William Napier, the brother and biographer of the conqueror of Sind, wrote :—

“ This should certainly have figured among the reasons for annexing Oude. It would have been stronger than anything yet adduced for that spoliation.”*

The annexation of Oude, which was the last annexation effected by Dalhousie, was the most unjustifiable one from every point of view—whether moral or political. Almost all right-thinking politicians—not compatriots or friends and admirers of that Scotch Laird—have condemned

* The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, G. C. B., by Lieutenant General Sir W. Napier, K. C. B. 2nd Edition, 1857, Vol. IV, p. 296.

that annexation in most unmeasured terms—some calling it even 'Dacoity in Excelsis.' Historians have referred to this annexation as the most important contributing cause of the Sepoy Mutiny. It is, therefore, necessary to know the facts and circumstances which preceded the annexation of Oude.

Oude was one of those principalities which were erected when the Moghul Empire was *in extremis*—when the regal sceptre was about to pass away from the hands of the descendants of Babar and Akbar. The early rulers of Oude were called Nawab Viziers. They were not independent sovereigns, but were considered to be the hereditary ministers of the Moghul Emperors of Delhi. Their position was, in this respect, somewhat analogous to that of the Peishwas in Maratha history. But the rulers of Oude gradually threw away the mask of dependence on the Delhi Emperors. And when the English succeeded in gaining a footing in the country, they encouraged the rulers of Oude to become independent of the influence of Dehli. The climax was reached when the Marquess of Hastings made the Oude ruler "King" and styled him "His Majesty."

Although the Oude ruler was promoted to the kingship, yet no liberty of action in any shape or form was accorded to him; he was made to depend on the English more and more every day. All

semblance of power was being taken away from him.

Having drawn the ruler of Oude into the net of what the British called friendship, they took delight in clipping his wings and making him helpless.

The rulers of Oude were sold by the British—nay, they were being bled, whenever the British required their blood to improve their anaemic condition. Wrote Sir Henry Lawrence in the *Calcutta Review* for January, 1845:—

"No portion of India has been more discussed in England than Oude. Afghanistan and the Punjab are modern questions, but for half a century, country gentlemen have been possessed of a vague idea of a province of India, nominally independent in its home relations but periodically used as a wet-nurse to relieve the difficulties of the East India Company's finances. The several attacks that were made on Warren Hastings, Lord Wellesley, and the Marquis of Hastings, have all served to keep up the interest of the Oude question. * * We are among those unfashionable people who consider that politics and morals can never be safely separated; that an honest private individual must necessarily be an honest official, and *vice-versa*; but we confess that we have been staggered by a study of Oude transactions. Most assuredly Warren Hastings, Lord Teignmouth, Lord Wellesley, Lord Hastings, and Lord Auckland would never have acted in private life, as they did in the capacity of Governors towards prostrate Oude. * *

"Oude affords but a discreditable chapter in our Indian annals, and furnishes a fearful warning of the lengths to

which a statesman may be carried, when once he substitutes expediency and his own view of public advantage, for the simple rule of right and wrong. The facts furnished by every writer on Oude affairs all testify to the same point, that British interference with that province has been as prejudicial to its Court and people as it has been disgraceful to the British name. To quote the words of Colonel Sutherland, an able and temperate writer, 'there is no State in India with whose Government we have interfered so systematically and so uselessly as with that of Oude.' He most justly adds, 'this interference has been more in favour of men than of measures.' * * In short, wherever we turn, we see written in distinct characters the blighting influences of our interference.

* * * * *

"If ever there was a device for insuring malgovernment, it is that of a Native Ruler and Minister, both relying on foreign bayonets, and directed by a British Resident. Even if all three were able, virtuous, and considerate, still the wheels of Government could hardly move smoothly. * * Each of the three may work incalculable mischief, but no one of them *can* do good if thwarted by the others."

The above is a true description of the unhappy and unenviable position in which the rulers of Oude had been placed by the British Government of India. It is not necessary to mention in detail the transactions of the English with Oude from the time of Warren Hastings. But it is only proper here to mention that that which gave the English what they considered to be their right in meddling with the affairs of Oude was.

the Treaty of 1801 whereby the British Government bound itself "to defend the territories which will remain to his excellency the Vizier against all foreign and domestic enemies." All the troubles of Oude originated from and were due to this interference of the British. Half a century's interference of the British with the affairs of that State did not lead to their improvement in any way. When Lord Dalhousie assumed charge of the office of Governor-General of India, Oude affairs had come to such a pass that the Governor-General thought that they required his interference. But this interference meant extinction of that kingdom. But before accomplishing the object so dear to his heart, he deputed a diplomatist who was a successful catcher of thugs and thieves—for set a thief to catch a thief—to Oude to report on its affairs. Sir William Sleeman was the diplomatist chosen for this task. He was sent as political resident to Lucknow.

The English had been long casting their eyes on Oude with greed. They were coveting it. The author of the article on the "physical capabilities of Oude" in the *Calcutta Review* for June, 1856, wrote:—

"No climate can, however, be finer than that of Oude during the cold season, * *"

Then referring to the climate of the Terace forest, the same writer proceeded :—

"From October up to the commencement of the rainy season no climate of Europe is more delightful and 'were it not', we quote our own words published a year ago in a Calcutta journal, 'for the arbitrary government of the king, which is a serious obstacle to every enterprise, a bold and venturesome planter would within a very short period be able to make a fortune' * * *

"This subject, one so important for proving the capabilities of Oude, we some time ago discussed in a daily journal nearly in the following words:

"The enterprising merchant, if his movements were not hampered by the vexatious obstacles, which the feudal lords of the country, as well as the native officers of the king, invariably throw in the way of all commercial undertakings, would not fail to make a large fortune, if he collected and despatched the many articles of commerce which are now allowed to be wasted unprofitably.'"

Regarding the fertility of Oude, a British writer theorized as follows:—

"The fertility of many portions of the land has often, strange as it may appear, been enhanced by the oppression of the Governors of districts, and the mutinous dispositions of the land-holders. These being at war with their sovereign have escaped into the jungles; and their lands being allowed to lie uncultivated they are enabled to recover themselves from over-cropping. They are perhaps converted into meadows for pasturage, and while they are such, are manured by the dung of the cattle and deer; and by being swamped in the rainy season, are impregnated with the above mentioned

* *The Calcutta Review*, Vol. XXVI (1856), pp. 422-23.

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Without annexation, the exploitation of Oude by the English was not possible. Hence the absorption of this kingdom was deemed of primary importance by the British Christians, who were commanded by the God whom they worshipped, "Thou shalt not steal."

But the natives of Oude were against their province being annexed to the territory of the East India Company. At a private meeting of 200 chiefs which took place on the 18th August, 1855,

"It was determined to spend £150,000 a year to prevent annexation, by bribery and agitation. Kasim, an old chief of ninety-five, was elected president and spoke two hours till he fainted. He had been born, he said, under the Oude crescent; the greatness of the royal house was fallen, but their people still respected them. It was of no avail, he said, to resist the Company. If the firman of annexation should overtake them, they must bow to it; but fight meanwhile with the endurance of the ox and the fox's cunning. The Nazarenes love gold; the men of Oude loved their wild freedom more. Let them give gold to the Christians from the royal and private treasuries—to hungry chiefs, to greedy agitators. Were not these men the same as their predecessors? The chiefs sided with him. But bolder counsels were urged in other quarters. Pamphlets appealing to Musalman fanaticism were largely circulated. Of one of these, "The Sword the Key of Heaven and Hell," 300 copies

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were seized by the Indian Government of Cawnpore." (Ludlow's British India, Vol. II, pp. 208-209.)

The Anglo-Indians were crying aloud for the annexation of Oude. Some of those Britishers who had been in the pay of the King of Oude and had eaten his salt, forgetting all sense of gratitude, and honor, if ever they possessed any, wrote books inventing alleged acts of oppression and cruelty of the King. One of such books saw the light of day in London in 1855. It is named, "The Private Life of an Eastern King. By a Member of the Household of his late Majesty, Nussir-u-Deen, King of Oude."

The writer was the portrait-painter to the last King of Oude, and so he had an opportunity of observing the interior of Court life in Oude. Because this Christian was trusted by his Mussalman royal master, therefore he took delight in betraying his trust and abused the King. It was in reviewing this work that the *Calcutta Review* of July, 1855, which was at that time, we believe, edited by the celebrated Scotch Christian Missionary, Dr. Duff, published an article, entitled "The age of conquest; is it past?" The writer of the article advocated the conquest and annexation of Oude. He wrote:—

"The age of conquests has *not* passed, nor is it passing; it proceeds, with greater or less rapidity, in every corner of the earth. * * England, while repudiating

conquest, goes on conquering, annexes a new territory in every half decade, and annihilates some barbarian tribe in every two years. It is true, the last named power believes herself free of any such design. She does not, however, draw back her hand; and the only consequence of her prudery is, that her conquests are without system, made often at the wrong moment, and generally three times as costly as they need have been. She destroys the dynasty of Runjeet, and leaves the seeds of rebellion, because she will not 'conquer.' She annexes Pegu, and makes a virtue of abstaining from the 'conquest' of the remainder of the kingdom. In short, despite Manchester men and able editors, cotton manufacturers and philanthropic dreamers, she is as much pledged to advance as the Romanoffs or the States."

Then the Christian writer dilated on the virtues of conquering states and compared them with those which are "non-conquering". He wrote:—

"The Oriental Empires have ceased to conquer, and are ceasing to exist. Everywhere around is the sound of the crumbling of rotten thrones."

Then he philosophised :

"If then, throughout the world, progress and conquest are in fact united, is it not just possible that they may also be united of right? Is there not some faint probability, that conquest may be right as well as inevitable, and that the Manchester school are committing not only a blunder but a crime in resisting it."

Then, referring to Oude, he wrote:—

"This kingdom of Oude is perhaps the best illustration of English blundering on the subject of conquest."

After having alluded to the existence of oppressions in Oude, the writer proceeded :—

"Here we have a vast scene of oppression, * * This alone, upon our principles, would justify conquest, having for its sole excuse the termination of such oppression. But there is more than this. The oppression exists solely because we arm and defend the oppression. * * We can stop the oppression. Two lines in the *Gazette* would banish the whole crew, King, eunuchs, women and chuckladars, into their natural insignificance. There is no army in Oude. The Hindu population is wholly on our side. The relatives of our sepoys, of both creeds, are most anxious for the annexation, and the remaining Mussalmans are not sufficiently united or sufficiently aggrieved for hostile action. Two regiments of Europeans would be sufficient, and two regiments of Europeans we can spare.

"But one argument remains.—It is alleged by some whose Hinduism leads them to sympathize deeply with the Native Princes that to annex Oude would be to violate engagements. We may deprive the King of the power to do evil, but we may not strip him of his revenues. They are to be paid in order that he may live in luxury. It needs little argument to shew that these revenues belong to the country, and not to any individual house. His hereditary right is one of government, not property."

The Christian writer concluded his article by saying that

"If conquest is occasionally right in itself, if it is specially right, when, by refraining from it, we are supporting crime, if we are so supporting crime in Oude, and if the claims of the only person who professed to

have rights are nil, then Oude, we conceive, should be annexed. There is no cause for delay. Even as we write there is a faint sound of a religious war, which, at all hazards, and at any cost, must be prevented. The only method of preventing it is by annexation."

After the annexation of Oude, Lord Dalhousie left India. It was the last principality in India that was annexed to the dominion of the East India Company.

The rise of the British supremacy may be said to have reached its last stage with the administration of Dalhousie. Sir Edwin Arnold, in his history of the Marquis of Dalhousie's administration of British India, writes:—

"The administration of British India, under the Marquis of Dalhousie, consummated a policy, and closed a period. . . . Beneath his rule the territory of 'the British merchants trading in the East' received its latest extension; and at his departure, the sun of their power verged to a stormy setting."

But for the second Afghan War, which took place some twenty-three years, and the third Burmese War some thirty years after Dalhousie's departure, the boundaries and contents of the Indian Empire would not have exceeded the limits assigned to them by him. His acquisitions by fraud and force and "bad faith" were meant to be the last of empire-building in India.

CHAPTER XCVII

Reflections on the Company's Charter of 1853.

On every occasion of the renewal of the charter of the Company, the authorities paraded their philanthropic motives to make the world believe that India was to be governed not for the benefit of the natives of England but for that of the people of India. Thus in 1813, it was considered to be the *duty* of England "to promote the interest and happiness of the inhabitants of the British dominions" in India, and so a sum of not less than one lac of rupees in each year was ordered to be set apart and applied to the revival and improvement of literature and encouragement of the learned natives of India. In 1833, it was enacted,

"That no native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of his Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, color, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company."

But between 1833 and 1853, the British dominions in India had swelled to such a large extent by means of fraud and force, which had been twice declared by the British Parliament to be

"repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of" England, that it was not considered any longer necessary to keep up the mask of philanthropy. It is, therefore, that the Charter Act of 1853 does not contain any section which may be construed in any way as conferring any privileges on the natives of India. It was tacitly understood that India was not to be governed for the benefit of its inhabitants. India was to be regularly exploited and its natives to be Anglicised. These are the impressions which are forced on one's mind by reading the voluminous evidence recorded by the Select Committees of both Houses of the British Parliament in the inquiry preceding the renewal of the Charter. Much stress was laid on public works—which meant Railway construction—education and spread of Christianity. Of course the Railways would benefit England and its shop-keepers. Education was not to be based on national lines, but it was to be imparted from political motives to make the natives loyal. Evangelization of the Indians was meant to achieve the same end.*

* Macaulay's object in introducing English education in India was to denationalize Indians. In a letter to his father written from Calcutta in 1836, he said:—

"It is my firm belief that if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence."

(See my *History of education in India under the rule of the East India Company*, pp. 105—106).

One of the alleged causes of the Mutiny is said to have been the alarm felt by the natives of India at their religions and religious institutions being in danger of subversion. The manner in which Christian ministers of faith were encouraged to give evidence before the Parliamentary committees and the insulting tone in which they were accustomed to speak of the religious institutions, ceremonies and prophets of the natives would lend color to the belief of the natives that the Government of the country wished to subvert their religions. In his evidence on 22nd March, 1832, Captain T. Macan told the Commons' Committee that

"We have never interfered directly with their religion, though they begin to complain, that if we do not directly interfere, we at least wink at, if not encourage, interference."

Then he was asked :

"To what circumstances do you particularly refer ?
—I refer to the sentiments of many talented natives, Mahomedans, who have spoken to me of the countenance shown by Government to Missionaries and to the excesses to which missionaries have gone in censuring their religious habits, even in the streets. One of those missionaries mentioned to the mixed population he was addressing, 'that they hoped for pardon through the intercession of Mahomet, but that he was in Hell at present, and that they all would follow him if they persisted in their belief of his doctrines.'"

Every countenance was given to the Mission-

aries and Christianity and nothing was done for Muhammadanism or Hinduism or for the institutions of either faith.

Under these circumstances it is small wonder that the Charter Act of 1853 and the conduct of the Parliamentary Committees in reporting evidence of the witnesses examined by them, were in no small measure responsible for the terrible catastrophe which destroyed the existence of the Company of Merchants to whom was entrusted the government of India.

CHAPTER XCVIII

The Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Lord Canning, who succeeded Lord Dalhousie as the Governor-General of India, was destined to be the last nominee of the East India Company to that high appointment. Notwithstanding the self-laudation of that Scotch "Laird of Cockpen," it was obvious that the high-handed manner in which that Marquis had conducted the affairs of India did not bode good to that country. It did not require the vision of a prophet to see the cloud on the political horizon of India, not bigger than a man's hand, threatening the fate of that land. Lord Canning said it and said so in England when he was appointed as Governor-General of India. And not long after he had assumed that office in March, 1856, his prediction came to be fulfilled by the outbreak known as the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Just as fifty years before, the Mutiny at Vellore was due to the English riding roughshod over the religious and caste prejudices, usages and customs of the non-Christians, so after half a century, when they had brought more territory of India under the rule of their countrymen, they considered it

no longer necessary to pay any attention to the feelings and sentiments of the Hindus and Muham-madans. Christianity and Christian missionaries were being openly patronised by the Company's Government. The Indian people naturally felt alarmed that the Christian Government meant to destroy their religious and social institutions. Mr. Nolan (History of the British Empire, Vol. II, p. 706) writes :—

“The Government ... became less careful of offending the religious prejudices of the soldiers. Instances had occurred of these prejudices having been invaded in various ways without creating revolt, but the Government did not know that in every such case bad feeling was created, which was quietly but actively diffused.”

It was in this spirit of neglecting to consult the religious prejudices of Hindu and Muham-madan Sepoys that greased cartridges were served out to them. On the 22nd of January, 1857, Captain Wright of the 10th Native Infantry at Dum-Dum reported that

“a very unpleasant feeling existed among the native soldiers who were at the depot for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges, some evil-disposed person having spread a report that it consisted of a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows.”

There is no denying the fact that the report spread was founded on truth, as no precaution had been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat.

The "greased cartridge" served the purpose of a blazing torch applied to the inflammable material that had been collected together by Dalhousie and his predecessors.

In its issue of 9th August, 1896, under the heading "The Bengalee Press, how to deal with it," wrote the *Pioneer*, a well-known Anglo-Indian daily :—

"We know how Englishmen within the memory of living men treated their own newspaper writers ... If a gentle and graceful writer forgot himself so far as to call the Prince Regent 'an Adonis of forty,' he got two years' 'hard.' If a clergyman praised the French revolution and advocated Parliamentary reform and fair representation, he was condemned to work in iron manacles, to wade in sludge among the vilest criminals."

The writer advocated the infliction of the same punishment on an Indian who dared to write on the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

It has been very unsafe for an Indian to write on that subject with that freedom and impartiality which its importance demands and deserves. We shall, therefore, content ourselves by quoting the views of Britishers as to the causes of that event in the history of Christian rule in India.

The name of Mr. Drummond is not so well-known in India as it deserves to be. He was a Member of Parliament during the years which witnessed the Indian Mutiny, and the transfer of

India from the hands of merchants to the Crown. As a Parliamentary, he had not such a brilliant career as John Bright. But, nevertheless, his sympathy for the natives of India was as genuine as that of the great Quaker statesman. Therefore no apology is needed for the following quotation from his speech delivered in 1858 :—

“Mr. Rees states, in his *Narrative*, that the conduct of many of our young officers towards the natives is cruel and tyrannical ; while the *London Quarterly* declares that the behavior of Europeans is marked by a high degree of pride and insolence. Lord William Bentinck said, that the result of his observation was, that the European generally knew little or nothing of the customs and manners of the people ; and Mr. Fraser Tytler asserts, that the servants of the Company are the least able to supply correct information upon these subjects. Now, if we are proud of our aristocracy and mindful of their dignity, how can we think that these things do not rankle in the breasts of men, who can trace up their hereditary rank and their possessions to a period anterior to the time of Alexander the Great ? Are we so foolish as to imagine that, because they do not retort and insult upon the moment, they do not feel it ? We may depend upon it, that the Italian proverb is true, in India as everywhere else—‘Vengeance sleeps long, but never dies.’ * * *

“The people of India having been subjected to such treatment, is it surprising that they should hate us ? Mr. Fraser, a gentleman quoted by Mr. Norton, states, that the people generally are dissatisfied, and that they have too much cause to be so. He adds, that there is disaffection enough for half a dozen rebellions.

"Now the root of the whole evil is the doctrine that India is a country to be *exploited* for the benefit of the Civil Service. If we are going to look upon India as we have looked upon it hitherto as a mere place of plunder for English officials, we shall surely lose it, and shall deserve to lose it."—Mr. Drummond's speech on the Government of India, June 7th, 1858.

"Vengeance sleeps long, but never dies." We are accustomed to hear Englishmen say that England has made India, that India never existed as India until the natives of England went there, and that the Mahomedans were cutting the throats of the Hindus. If such are the facts, then the natives of India should have been grateful to the natives of England and there was no occasion for the Mutiny to occur. But let a few British writers speak of the early British administration of India. It is not necessary to quote Burke and Sheridan, who exposed the maladministration of Warren Hastings, for their speeches are well known to all readers of English literature. Besides, they lived in the 18th century. Let us see what British authors of the 19th century have said of the British administration of India before the Mutiny period.

Herbert Spencer is not a sentimentalist. He is a philosopher and a deep thinker. His writings will last as long as the English language itself. Listen to his remarks then on the British administration of India :—

"The Anglo-Indians of the last century whom Burke

described as 'Birds of prey and passage in India' showed themselves only a shade less cruel than their prototypes of Peru and Mexico. Imagine how black must have been their deeds, when even the Directors of the Company admitted 'that the vast fortunes acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a scene of the most tyrannical and oppressive conduct that was ever known in any age or country. Conceive the atrocious state of society described by Vansittart, who tells us that the English compelled the natives to buy or sell at just what rates they pleased on pain of flogging or confinement. Judge to what a pass things must have come when, in describing a journey, Warren Hastings says; 'Most of the petty towns and *Serais* were deserted at our approach.' A cold-blooded treachery was the established policy of the authorities. Princes were betrayed into war with each other; and one of them having been helped to overcome his antagonist, was then himself dethroned for some alleged misdemeanour. Always some muddied stream was at hand as a pretext for official wolves. Dependent Chiefs possessing coveted lands were impoverished by exorbitant demands for tribute and their ultimate inability to meet these demands was construed into a treasonable offence, punished by deposition. Even down to our own day kindred iniquities are continued. Down to our own day, too, are continued the grievous salt monopoly, and the pitiless taxation, that wring from the poor ryots nearly half the produce of the soil. Down to our own day continues the cunning despotism which uses native soldiers to maintain and extend native subjection, a despotism under which, not many years since, a regiment of sepoy was deliberately massacred, for refusing to march without proper clothing. Down to our own day, the police authorities league with wealthy

scamps, and allow the machinery of the law to be used for the purposes of extortion. Down to our own day, so-called gentlemen will ride their elephants through the crops of impoverished peasants and will supply themselves with provisions from the native villages without paying for them. And down to our own day, it is common with the people in the interior to run into the woods at sight of a European." (*Social Statics*).

Every educated native of India should try to read Sir John Kaye's History of the Sepoy War, for that gifted historian has given an unprejudiced account of the British administration of India preceding the Mutiny. In describing the work of Lord Dalhousie in India, Sir John Kaye writes:—

"He (Lord Dalhousie) never doubted that it was good alike for England and for India that the map of the country which he had been sent to govern should present one surface of Red. * * * He commenced his career at a time when the ablest of our public functionaries in India had forsaken the traditions of the old school—the school of Malcolm, of Elphinstone, and of Metcalfe—and stood eager and open-armed to embrace and press closely to them the very doctrine of which they perceived in Dalhousie so vigorous an exponent * * * As his workmen were admirably suited to his work, so also was the field, to which he was called, the one best adapted to the exercise of his peculiar powers. In no other part of our Empire could his rare administrative capacity have found such scope for development. For he was of an imperious and despotic nature, not submitting to control, and resenting opposition; and in no situation could he have exercised a larger measure of power in the face of so few constitutional checks. His capacities required

free exercise, and it may be doubted whether they would have been fully developed by anything short of this absolute supremacy. * * And he was successful beyond all example, so far as success is the full accomplishment of one's own desires and intentions. But one fatal defect in his character tainted the stream of his policy at the source, and converted into brilliant errors some of the most renowned of his achievements. No man who is not endowed with a comprehensive imagination can govern India with success. Dalhousie had no imagination. Lacking the imaginative faculty, men, after long years of experience, may come to understand the national character ; and a man of lively imagination, without such experience, may readily apprehend it after the intercourse of a few weeks. But in neither way did Dalhousie ever come to understand the genius of the people among whom his lot was cast. He had but one idea of them—an idea of a people habituated to the despotism of a dominant race. He could not understand the tenacity of affection with which they clung to their old traditions. He could not sympathise with the veneration which they felt for their ancient dynasties. He could not appreciate their fidelity to the time-honored institutions and the immemorial usages of the land, * *

* He could not see with other men's eyes ; or think with other men's brains ; or feel with other men's hearts. With the characteristic unimaginativeness of his race he could not for a moment divest himself of his individuality, or conceive the growth of ancestral pride and national honor in other breasts than those of the Campbells and the Ramsays.

"And this egotism was cherished and sustained by the prevailing sentiments of the new school of Indian politicians, who, as I have said, laughed to scorn the doctrines

of the men who had built up the great structure of our Indian Empire, and by the utterances of a Press, which, with rare ability, expounded the views of this school, and insisted upon the duty of universal usurpation. Such indeed, was the prevailing tone of the majority, in all ranks from the highest to the lowest, that any one who meekly ventured to ask, 'How would you like it yourself?' was reproached in language little short of that which might be fitly applied to a renegade or a traitor. To suggest that in an Asiatic race there might be a spirit of independence and a love of country, the manifestations of which were honorable in themselves, however inconvenient to us, was commonly to evoke as the very mildest result the imputation of being 'Anti-British,' whilst sometimes the 'true British feeling' asserted itself in a less refined choice of epithets, and those who ventured to sympathise in any way with the people of the East were at once denounced as 'white niggers.' Yet among these very men, so intolerant of anything approaching the assertion of liberty by an Asiatic people, there were some who could well appreciate and sympathise with the aspirations of European bondsmen, and could regard with admiration the struggles of the Italian, the Switzer, or the Pole to liberate himself, by a sanguinary contest, from the yoke of the usurper. BUT THE SIGHT OF THE DARK SKIN SEALED UP THEIR SYMPATHIES. They contended not merely that the love of country, that the spirit of liberty, as cherished by European races, is in India wholly unknown, but that Asiatic nations, and especially the nations of India, have no right to judge what is best for themselves; no right to revolt against the beneficence of a more civilised race of white men, who would think and act for them, and deprive them, for their own good, of all their most cherished rights and their most valued possessions."

continued

Says another English writer :—

“One of the most graphic of our writers on India, Dr. Russell, has remarked on the indifference manifested in England on the abuse of power, thousands of miles away : how in spite of the marvellous eloquence of Burke and his colleagues, the accusations against Warren Hastings, though of the gravest kind, were received with indifference by the people, because the acts referred to were perpetrated in such a far country ; whereas, had they been done in the Channel Islands, in Ireland, or in Scotland, the intelligence would have been received with a general burst of indignation. ‘To-night I hear,’ says the same writer,—it is in 1858—‘that the menagerie of the King of Oude, as much his private property as his watch or turban, were sold under discreditable circumstances and his jewels seized and impounded, though we had no more claim on them than on the Crown diamonds of Russia. Do the English people care for these things ? Do they know them ? The hundred millions of Hindustan know them well, and care for them too. * * * *

“With all its glories, conquests, triumphs, spoils, the Government of the East India Company in India was tainted from the very first with mighty vices, and these became more flagrant as time gave to the various abuses the impunity or even the authority derived from prescription. For generation after generation, the great aim and object of the servants of the Company, from the high civil and military functionaries downwards was to squeeze as large as possible a fortune out of the country as quickly as might be, and turn their backs upon it for ever, so soon as that object had been attained, and the last golden harvest had been shaken down from the pagoda tree. In perfect truth has it been said that if the native rulers chastised the people with whips, the

European master chastised them with scorpions, and that the subjugated race found the little finger of the Company thicker than the loins of the worst and most dissolute of their native princes. * * * None but the wilfully blind could assert or even affect to believe that the English rule in India was popular among the inhabitants."

Who were the Mutineers ? They were principally (a) the Marathas, who had been perhaps the greatest sufferers, for the Peishwa had been deposed and his adopted son—Nana Saheb—did not receive any justice at the hands of the East India Company ; the Maratha states of Satara, Nagpur and Jhansi were annexed ; (b) the Mussalmans of the North-Western Provinces who witnessed the overthrow of the Royal houses of Delhi and Lucknow ; and (c) also the *Purbias* or Hindus of Oude. It was these three classes which used to furnish sepoy to the East India Company. The sepoys revolted because they saw the destruction of the landed aristocracy of the country, and the ill-treatment their fellow-countrymen received at the hands of the new masters of the land. The causes of the Mutiny may be described to be the "*Bad Faith*" of the British rulers of India towards Indian princes on the one hand, and the ill-treatment of the natives of India by the British ruling class on the other.

It is not necessary to write in detail about the spread of the revolt in the different provinces and

towns of India and the manner in which it was put down by the British. There are several admirable works on the subject, the most comprehensive being that of Kaye and Malleon, which may be consulted profitably by those who are interested in it.

The Indian Mutiny could not have been suppressed but for the help given to the British by the Sikhs and the Gurkhas.

Sir John Lawrence was the administrator of the Punjab when the outbreak took place in Delhi, Lucknow and other places in India.

It was thought that the Sikhs who had hardly a decade before been made to lose their independence by the English would have gladly embraced the opportunity afforded by the revolt in Hindustan to join the Mutineers to regain their lost independence from the hands of men of alien race and creed. But such not having been the case was to be attributed to their demoralization under the foreign yoke. How the Sikh Chiefs were treated by their English conquerors is thus described by the Scotch "Laird of Cockpen" in writing to the Directors of the East India Company on August 25, 1849 :—

"Stripped of all rank, deprived of all property, reduced, each of them, to a monthly pittance of two hundred rupees, confined within narrow limits, and then

watched, well knowing that an attempt at flight would be made at the risk of their lives."^{*}

The two brothers, Sir Henry and Mr. John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, as members of the Punjab Board, could not pull on together. The former wanted to be fair and just to the Punjab Chiefs and tried to lessen the weight of the chain by which they were held in subjection, whereas the latter wanted to practise refined brutalities on the newly subjugated non-Christian people of the Punjab. No wonder that he found favour with the Governor-General of India, who abolished the Punjab Board, removed Sir Henry Lawrence from the land of the Five Rivers, and made John Lawrence the sole autocrat of that province by appointing him its Chief Commissioner. How heartless and cruel John Lawrence was is to be gathered from his brother Sir Henry's farewell letter to him, dated Lahore, 20th January, 1853. He wrote:—

"As this is my last day at Lahore, I venture to offer you a few words of advice, which I hope you will take in the spirit it is given in, and that you will believe that, if you preserve the peace of the country and make the people high and low happy, I shall have no regrets that I vacated the field for you. It seems to me that you look on almost all questions affecting Jageerdars

^{*} Bosworth Smiths' *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. I, p. 287.

and Mafcedars in a perfectly different light from all others : in fact, that you consider them as nuisances and as enemies. If any thing like this be your feeling, how can you expect to do them justice, as between man and man ? I think we are doubly bound to treat them kindly, *because they are down*, and because they and their hangers-on have still some influence as affecting the public peace and contentment. I would simply do to them as I would be done by.”*

It does not appear that Sir Henry's advice had much influence on his brother John in his treatment of the people of the Panjab.

When the Mutiny broke out, the people of the Punjab were kept loyal by being *plundered* of their wealth.

“The forced loan at the rate of 6 per cent. interest, which early in the Mutiny had been levied by order of Sir John Lawrence on different districts of the Punjab, had been raised with some difficulty ; for the visits of the tax-gatherer are never pleasant, and the money-loving Sikh was not likely to give his money readily in support of a doubtful cause ; but raised it had been. And it proved a master-stroke of policy, for it supplied us with funds when we needed them most sorely, and bound the landowners and merchants to the cause of our Government by ties the force of which they could not fail to recognize.”†

* *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, by Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Vol. II, p. 195.

† Bosworth Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. II, p. 308.

The murder in cold blood and with inhuman atrocities of some of the Sikh Gurus at Delhi by order of the degenerate later Moghul sovereigns made the Sikhs take the vow of revenge on that capital of the Moghuls. The loot of Delhi was a day-dream with the followers of Guru Govind and Banda. Sir John Lawrence took advantage of their day-dream and despatched them in numbers to that unhappy capital to realize it.

"The Sikhs, among whose traditional day-dreams the sack of Delhi had ever been prominent, now found themselves within reach of the realisation of their fondest wishes. No scruples restrained them.....Their natural astuteness,had taught them how to discern the lurking places of concealed treasure. It might be buried beneath the floors of their houses or bricked up in their walls. In the former case it might be ascertained by pouring water through the crevices, for if the space below were excavated it would soon filter down; if not would return to the level of the floor. In the latter, the wall might be sounded, as a physician sounds the chests of a patient; and the results of this process of auscultation were very convincing to our Sikh comrades.... It was clearly ascertained that large quantities of plunder were handed over walls to their brethren below, and that afterwards numbers of laden carts passed out at the opposite gates of the city. . . ." (Kaye's *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. III, p. 640).

✓ It was thus that, with the aid of the Sikhs, the mutiny was suppressed, which made Sir John Lawrence write to Sir Frederick Currie, in 1858 :—

"Under the mercy of God the loyalty and contentment

of the people of the Punjab has saved India. Had the Punjab gone we must have been ruined." *

During the Nepal war, Oude was made the base of operations and its sovereign advanced money to Lord Hastings to prosecute the war against the Gurkhas. This was rankling in the breast of those mountaineers, and so on the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, the sturdy Highlanders crossed their frontiers to carry fire and sword through Oude. Sir Jang Bahadur boasted of having "massacred five or six thousand" subjects of Oude on his "way to Lucknow." The Gurkhas became rich by the plunder of Lucknow. The son of Wajid Ali Shah appealed, without success, to the ruler of Nepal to make common cause with the Mutineers against the English.

It is necessary to consider how far the atrocities and barbarities attributed to the Mutineers are true, and if true, whether such atrocities are unprecedented in the annals of mankind. The natives of Hindustan have been painted in the blackest colour possible by the Christian people of the West. British historians of the Indian Mutiny have abused in no measured terms the natives of India for their alleged atrocities on English men, women and children at Delhi, Cawnpore and

* Bosworth Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. II, p. 335.

Jhansi. An allegation like this is easier to make than to disprove. It is the memory of these alleged barbarities on their women and children which still rankles in the breasts of the natives of England, and which makes anything approaching friendship or good feeling between natives of England and India impossible. There can be no doubt that there is a great deal of falsehood and exaggeration in the British narrative of Indian atrocities and barbarities. Lying is a virtue not solely monopolized by "vile Asiatics," but is equally laid claim to by Europeans.

Regarding these alleged atrocities, Mr. Justin McCarthy writes :—

"The elementary passions of manhood were inflamed by the stories, *happily not true*, of the wholesale dishonour and barbarous mutilation of women. * * * As a matter of fact, no indignities, other than that of the compulsory corn-grinding, were put upon the English ladies. * There were no outrages, in the common acceptation of the term, upon women. No English women were stripped or dishonored, or purposely mutilated." History of Our Own Times, Vol. iii.

Granting even that the Mutineers were guilty of the alleged atrocities, which must certainly then be unreservedly condemned, we should consider whether such atrocities are unprecedented in the annals of mankind. An English writer says :—

"It is only with a painful moral effort that one can dwell with cool and deliberate judgment on this subject :

but it is highly necessary to call attention to the fact that there is not anything peculiarly 'Asiatic' in the authentic horrors of Jhansi, Delhi and Cawnpore. In the outbreak of an exasperated people, and especially where a marked distinction of race adds rancour and terror to the feelings of the insurgents, extermination is always their plan. It was so during the Greek uprising of 1821, when upwards of twenty thousand Turks, a peaceful agricultural population—men, women and children—were murdered in cold blood 'as a necessary measure of wise policy,' according to Hetairists, 'because the Turkish population in Greece was small and could not be removed.' (Findlay's *Greek Revolution*, Volume I, pp. 172, 182, 187, 188)." Torrens' *Empire in India*, page 5.

The Duke of Cumberland and his followers were Europeans and Christians. What did they do upon their Scotch co-religionists and to a certain extent their fellow-countrymen ?

"After the victory of Culloden the Duke of Cumberland advanced with the army into the Highlands, as far as fort Augustus, where he encamped. He then sent off detachments on all sides to hunt down the fugitives, and lay waste the country with fire and sword. The castles of Glengarry and Lochiel were plundered and burned : every house, hut, or habitation met with the same fate without distinction ; all the cattle and provisions were carried off. The men were shot on the mountains, like wild beasts, or put to death in cold blood without form of trial. The women, after having seen their husbands and fathers murdered, were violated, and then turned out naked, with their children, to starve on the 'barrane' heaths. One whole family was shut up in a barn and burnt up to death.

"The Duke's ministers of vengeance carried out their work so promptly and thoroughly that in a few days there was neither house, cottage, man or beasts, to be seen in the compass of fifty miles. All was ruin and desolation, silence, solitude, and death."

We have also to consider whether, after the suppression of the Mutiny, innocent citizens were not unnecessarily killed. The truth of this assertion even the *Pioneer* does not deny. For that paper says :—

"It is true that after the capture of cities like Lucknow and Cawnpore too many innocent Hindus were summarily tried and executed on the information given by their spying countrymen, which could not be sufficiently sifted."

Mark, the *Pioneer* says "innocent Hindus" only were executed, as if "too many innocent" Mussalmans also were not the victims of the wrath of the enraged natives of England engaged in the task of suppressing the Mutiny. But then we forget that the *Pioneer* has to befriend the Muhammadans and does not wish to remind them that too many of their innocent co-religionists were summarily tried and executed after the suppression of the Mutiny.

But was it on the information of the "lying" natives of India that "too many innocent Hindus were summarily tried and executed"? Let us see

what English authors have to say on the subject. Sir John Kaye writes:

"Martial Law had been proclaimed ; those terrible Acts passed by the Legislative Council in May and June were in full operation ; and soldiers and civilians alike were holding Bloody Assizes, or slaying Natives without any assize at all, *regardless of sex or age*. Afterwards the thirst for blood grew stronger still. It is on the records of our British Parliament, in papers sent home by the Goveonor General of India in Council that 'the aged women, and children, are sacrificed, as well as those guilty of rebellion, They were not deliberately hanged, but burnt to death in their villages, perhaps now and then accidentally shot. Englishmen did not hesitate to boast or to record their boasting in writing, that they had spared no one, and that peppering away at niggers was very pleasant pastime, enjoyed amazingly. And it has been stated, in a book patronised by high official authorities, that 'for three months eight dead-carts daily went their rounds from sun-rise to sun-set to take down the corpses which hung at the cross-roads and market places and that 'six thousand beings had been thus 'summarily disposed of and launched into eternity', An Englishman is almost suffocated with indignation when he reads that Mr. Chambers or Miss Jennings was hacked to death by a dusky ruffian, but in Native histories or, history being wanting, in native legends and traditions, it may be recorded against our people, that mothers and wives and children, with less familiar names, fell miserable victims to the first swoop of English vengeance , and these stories may have as deep a pathos as any that rend our own hearts. It may be, too, that the plea of provocation, which invests the most sanguinary acts of the white man in this deadly struggle with the attributes

of righteous retribution, is not wholly to be rejected when urged in extenuation of the worst deeds of those who have never known Christian teaching." Kaye's *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. II.

Sir Charles Dilke says :—

"Those who doubt that Indian Military service makes soldiers careless of men's lives, reckless as to the rights of property, and disgraceful of human dignity, can hardly remember the letters which reached home in 1857, in which an officer in high command during the march upon Cawnpore reported, 'good bag to-day, polished off rebels,' it being borne in mind that the 'rebels' thus hanged or blown from guns were not taken in arms, but villagers apprehended 'on suspicion.' During this March atrocities were committed in the burning of villages and massacre of innocent inhabitants at which Mohamed Toglak himself would have stood ashamed, and it would be to contradict all history to assert that a succession of such deeds would not prove fatal to our liberties at home." Dilke's *Greater Britain*.

Again, the same author writes :—

"The two favourite Anglo-Indian stories are that of the native who being asked his religion, said, Me Christian—me get drunk like Massa, and that of the young officer who, learning Hindoostanee in 1858, had the difference between the negative "ne" and the particle "ne" explained to him by the moonshee, when he exclaimed, 'Dear me! I hanged lots of natives last year for admitting that they had not been in the villages for months. I suppose they meant to say that they had not left their villages for months.' *It is certain that in the suppression of the Mutiny hundreds of natives were hanged by Queen's Officers who, unable to speak a word of any native language, could*

neither understand evidence nor defence." Dilke's *Greater Britain*.

Many a joke has been cracked at the expense of the English-educated native of India for his quaint and unidiomatic use of the English language. Several books on "Babu" English have been written. But there was never any human life sacrificed by "Baboo English." On the other hand, many natives of England have murdered many Indians owing to their ignorance of Indian languages and of the customs and manners of the natives of India.

It is an ill-wind that blows nobody any good. Did the Mutiny then produce no beneficial effect? Certainly, the Mutiny was not without its lessons. Mr. Digby in his work, "India for Indians and for England" writes:—

"Without shedding of blood there is no remission. * * The English people will learn by one way only. They would not displace the Company of merchants from supreme rule in India until there had been a frightful Mutiny due to misgovernment,"

Mr. Justin McCarthy says:—

"The Indian Mutiny startled the public feeling of England out of this state of unhealthy languor. . . Some eminent Englishmen were found to express alarm at the very sanguinary methods of repression and punishment that were in favour among most of our fellow-countrymen in India." *History of Our Own Times*,

It should be remembered that but for the

Mutiny, the Proclamation of Queen Victoria, which is looked upon by the natives of India as the Magna Charta of their liberty, would never have been issued.

CHAPTER XCIX

The Transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown.

The charter of the East India Company used to be renewed after every twenty years. The period for which the Government of India was to be vested in the Company used to be specified in the Charter Act. The Company's Charter was renewed for the last time in 1853. But singularly enough, the period for which the Company was to sway the destinies of the peoples and princes of Hindustan was not specified therein. There was then something in the Act from which it was not unreasonable to deduce that the Company was doomed to extinction. The people of England were fast developing into an industrial nation. The free trade principle which they came to act upon, chiefly through the powerful speeches and writings of Cobden, Bright and other radicals in politics, and which was chiefly meant to make their bread cheap, made them naturally look upon India as supplying their bodily needs and satisfying their inner man. The sonorous and high-sounding phrase, "development of the resources of India", meant that India should be bled mercilessly and also that

India was not to be for Indians, who should be treated as foes and aliens in the land of their birth. The existence of the East India Company stood in the way of the "development of the resources of India" in that rapid manner which the natives of England desired.

Then again, the natives of England were desirous of colonising India and the East India Company stood in the way of their doing so.

These were perhaps the principal reasons which made the natives of England agitate for the abolition of the East India Company and the transfer of the Government to the Crown.

Whether such a transfer would be beneficial to the natives of India, never entered into the calculation of the agitators, whose conduct was being guided by the principle of "enlightened selfishness." They were only looking for an opportunity to get the object so dear to their heart effected. The outbreak of the Sepoy Revolt afforded them that opportunity. To prevent the recurrence of such an insurrection, the drastic remedy was proposed that the Government of India should be transferred from the Company to the Crown.

In the beginning of the year 1858, when the proposal of the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown was made by the natives of England, the East India Company presented a petition to both Houses of Parliament.

It was presented to the House of Commons by Mr. J. Baring on the 9th and to the House of Lords by Earl Grey on the 11th February, 1858. The petition was drawn up by Mr. John Stuart Mill, who was an employe in the India House. This petition is reproduced as an appendix to this chapter.

The petitioners very pointedly drew the attention of the Houses to the doctrine which was then being promulgated "that India should be administered with an especial view to the benefit of the English who reside there."

As if to confirm and emphasise this doctrine, the House of Commons ordered on the 16th of March, 1858, the appointment of a Select Committee "to inquire into the progress and prospects, and the best means to be adopted for the promotion of European colonization and settlement in India, especially in the Hill Districts and healthier climates of that country ; as well as for the extension of our commerce with Central Asia."

After this need any one wonder that the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown was made *solely* with the "view to the benefit of the English?" The interests of the natives of India were meant to be sacrificed by the transfer for the benefit of the natives of England.

It is not necessary here to refer at length to the discussion and speeches which the Petition of the Company evoked in both Houses of Parliament.

That able lawyer and writer, Sir George Lewis, made a speech in the House of Commons on the 12th February, 1858, in which he condemned the East India Company because

"It is a maxim in mechanics that nothing is stronger in a body than its weakest part. It is not at moments of calm and prosperity that defects in our institutions are discovered."

He was not for mending, but for ending the Company because of its "defects."

Such were the arguments of others also who took part in the discussions.

Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe had also written that it would be better for India, if her Government were transferred from the Company to the Crown. Said he:—

"Although it seems to be a matter of indifference to the native population whether India be governed through the Company, or directly by the Ministers of the Crown, it is not so to another class of subjects.

"The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's service, and to these might be added generally the East Indians of mixed breed, will never be satisfied with the Company's Government. Well or ill founded, they will always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exclusion; * * For the contentment of this class, which, for the benefit of India and the security of our Indian Empire, ought greatly to increase in numbers and importance, the introduction of a King's Government is undoubtedly desirable.

"A King's Government is also the one which is most

likely to be permanent, as the Company's hold under a Charter must be liable to periodical changes and reversions, whether for renewal or subversion."—Kaye's *Selections from Metcalfe's Papers*, pp. 164-165.

So the fate of the East India Company was sealed and India came under the direct rule of England.

* "At a later period of his life, Sir Charles Metcalfe, with a greatly enlarged knowledge of European politics, saw occasion to modify the opinion here expressed in favor of the government of India directly by the Crown. Government by the Crown is in reality government by a parliamentary majority, and Sir Charles Metcalfe used to say, that if that were applied to India our tenure of the country would not be worth ten years' purchase."

(Kaye's *Selections from Metcalfe's Papers*, p. 165).

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XCIX.

Petition of the East India Company

*Presented to the House of Commons by Mr. T. Baring on
9th and to the House of Lords by Earl Grey on
11th February, 1858.*

To the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and the Honourable
the Commons of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, in
Parliament assembled,

HUMBLY SHEWETH,

That your Petitioners, at their own expense, and by the agency of their own civil and military servants, originally acquired for this country its magnificent empire in the East.

That the foundations of this empire were laid by your Petitioners, at that time neither aided nor controlled by Parliament, at the same period at which a succession of administrations under the control of Parliament were losing to the Crown of Great Britain another great empire on the opposite side of the Atlantic.

That during the period of about a century which has since elapsed, the Indian possessions of this country have been governed and defended from the resources of those possessions, without the smallest cost to the British Exchequer, which, to the best of your Petitioners' knowledge and belief, cannot be said of any other of the numerous foreign dependencies of the Crown.

That it being manifestly improper that the administra-

tion of any British possession should be independent of the general Government of the empire, Parliament provided, in 1783, that a department of the Imperial Government should have full cognizance of, and power of control over, the acts of your Petitioners in the administration of India: since which time the home branch of the Indian Government has been conducted by the joint counsels, and on the joint responsibility of your Petitioners and of a Minister of the Crown.

That this arrangement has at subsequent periods undergone reconsideration from the Legislature, and various comprehensive and careful Parliamentary inquiries have been made into its practical operation: the result of which has been, on each occasion, a renewed grant to your Petitioners of the powers exercised by them in the administration of India.

That the last of these occasions was so recent as 1853, in which year the arrangements which had existed for nearly three-quarters of a century, were with certain modifications, re-enacted, and still subsist.

That, notwithstanding, your Petitioners have received an intimation from her Majesty's Ministers of their intention to propose to Parliament a Bill for the purpose of placing the government of His Majesty's East Indian dominion under the direct authority of the Crown—a change necessarily involving the abolition of the East India Company as an instrument of government.

That your Petitioners have not been informed of the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Ministers, without any previous inquiry, to come to the resolution of putting an end to a system of administration, which Parliament, after inquiry, deliberately confirmed and sanctioned less than five years ago, and which, in its modified form, has not been in operation quite four years,

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and cannot be considered to have undergone a sufficient trial during that short period.

That your Petitioners do not understand that Her Majesty's Ministers impute any failure to those arrangements, or bring any charge, either great or small, against your Petitioners. But the time at which the proposal is made compels your Petitioners to regard it as arising from the calamitous events which have recently occurred in India.

That your Petitioners challenge the most searching investigation into the mutiny of the Bengal army, and the causes, whether remote or immediate, which produced that mutiny. They have instructed the Government of India to appoint a commission for conducting such an inquiry on the spot. And it is their most anxious wish that a similar inquiry may be instituted in this country by your [Lordships'] Honourable House; in order that it may be ascertained whether anything either in the constitution of the Home Government of India, or in the conduct of those by whom it has been administered, has had any share in producing the mutiny, or has in any way impeded the measures for its suppression; and whether the mutiny itself, or any circumstance connected with it, affords any evidence of the failure of the arrangements under which India is at present administered.

That, were it even true that these arrangements had failed, the failure could constitute no reason for divesting the East India Company of its functions, and transferring them to Her Majesty's Government. For, under the existing system, Her Majesty's Government have the deciding voice. The duty imposed upon the Court of Directors is to originate measures and frame drafts of instructions. Even had they been remiss in this duty,

their remissness, however discreditable to themselves, could in no way absolve the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, since the Minister for India possesses, and has frequently exercised, the power of requiring that the Court of Directors should take any subject into consideration, and prepare a draft despatch for his approval. Her Majesty's Government are thus in the fullest sense accountable for all that has been done, and for all that has been forborne or omitted to be done. Your Petitioners, on the other hand, are accountable only in so far as the act or omission has been promoted by themselves.

That, under these circumstances, if the administration of India had been a failure, it would, your Petitioners submit, have been somewhat unreasonable to expect that a remedy would be found in annihilating the branch of the ruling authority which could not be the one principally in fault, and might be altogether blameless, in order to concentrate all powers in the branch which had necessarily the decisive share in every error, real or supposed. To believe that the administration of India would have been more free from error had it been conducted by a Minister of the Crown without the aid of the Court of Directors, would be to believe that the Minister, with full power to govern India as he pleased, has governed ill because he had the assistance of experienced and responsible advisers.

That your Petitioners, however, do not seek to vindicate themselves at the expense of any other authority. They claim their full share of the responsibility of the manner in which India has practically been governed. That responsibility is to them not a subject of humiliation, but of pride. They are conscious that

their advice and initiative have been, and have deserved to be, a great and potent element in the conduct of affairs in India. And they feel complete assurance that the more attention is bestowed and the more light thrown upon India and its administration, the more evident it will become that the government in which they have borne a part has been not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among mankind; that, during the last and present generation in particular, it has been, in all departments, one of the most rapidly improving governments in the world; and that, at the time when this change is proposed, a greater number of important improvements are in a state of more rapid progress than at any former period. And they are satisfied that whatever further improvements may be hereafter effected in India can only consist in the development of germs already planted, and in building on foundations already laid, under their authority, and in a great measure by their express instructions.

That such, however, is not the impression likely to be made on the public mind, either in England, or in India, by the ejection of your Petitioners from the place they fill in the Indian administration. It is not usual with statesmen to propose the complete abolition of a system of government, of which the practical operation is not condemned, and it might be generally inferred from the proposed measures, if carried into effect at the present time, that the East India Company having been intrusted with an important portion of the administration of India, have so abused their trust as to have produced a sanguinary insurrection, and nearly lost India to the British empire; and that having thus crowned a long career of misgovernment, they have, in deference to

public indignation, been deservedly cashiered for their misconduct.

That if the character of the East India Company were alone concerned, your Petitioners might be willing to await the verdict of history. They are satisfied that posterity will do them justice. And they are confident that even now justice is done to them in the minds, not only of Her Majesty's Ministers, but of all who have any claim to be competent judges of the subject. But though your Petitioners could afford to wait for the reversal of the verdict of condemnation which will be believed throughout the world to have been passed on them and their government by the British nation, your Petitioners cannot look without the deepest uneasiness at the effect likely to be produced on the minds of the people of India. To them, however incorrectly the name may express the fact, the British Government in India is the Government of the East India Company. To their minds the abolition of the Company will, for some time to come, mean the abolition of the whole system of administration with which the Company is identified. The measure, introduced simultaneously with the influx of an overwhelming British force, will be coincident with a general outcry, in itself most alarming to their fears, from most of the organs of opinion in this country as well as of English opinion in India, denouncing the past policy of the Government on the express ground that it has been too forbearing and too considerate towards the Natives. The people of India will at first feel no certainty that the new Government, or the Government under a new name, which it is proposed to introduce, will hold itself bound by the pledges of its predecessors. They will be slow to believe that a Government has been destroyed only to be followed by another which

will act on the same principles and adhere to the same measures. They cannot suppose that the existing organ of administration would be swept away without the intention of reversing any part of its policy. They will see the authorities, both at home and in India, surrounded by persons vehemently urging radical changes in many parts of that policy. And interpreting, as they must do, the change in the instrument of government, as a concession to these opinions and feelings, they can hardly fail to believe that, whatever else may be intended, the Government will no longer be permitted to observe that strict impartiality between those who profess those opinions and its native subjects which hitherto characterized it; that their strongest and most deeply-rooted feelings will henceforth be treated with much less regard than heretofore; and that a directly aggressive policy towards everything in their habits, or in their usages and customs, which Englishmen deem objectionable, will be no longer confined to individuals and private associations, but will be backed by all the power of Government.

And here your Petitioners think it important to observe that in abstaining as they have done from all interference with any of the religious practices of the people of India, except such as are abhorrent to humanity, they have acted not only from their own conviction of what is just and expedient, but in accordance with the avowed intentions and express enactments of the Legislature, framed "in order that regard should be had to the civil and religious usages of the Natives," and also "that suits, civil and criminal, against the Natives," should be conducted according to such rules "as may accommodate the same to the religion and manners of the Natives." That their policy in this respect has been successful, is evidenced by the fact, that during a mili-

tary mutiny, said to have been caused by unfounded apprehensions of danger to religion, the heads of the Native States, and the masses of the population, have remained faithful to the British Government. Your Petitioners need hardly observe how very different would probably have been the issue of the late events, if the Native princes, instead of aiding in the suppression of the rebellion, had put themselves at its head, or if the general population had joined in the revolt: and how probable it is that both these contingencies would have occurred, if any real ground had been given for the persuasion that the British Government intended to identify itself with proselytism. And it is the honest conviction of your Petitioners that any serious apprehension of a change of policy in this respect would be likely to be followed, at no distant period, by a general rising throughout India.

That your Petitioners have seen with the greatest pain the demonstrations of indiscriminate animosity towards the natives of India, on the part of our countrymen in India and at home, which have grown up since the late unhappy events. They believe these sentiments to be fundamentally unjust; they know them to be fatal to the possibility of good government in India. They feel that if such demonstrations should continue, and especially if weight be added to them by legislating under their supposed influence, no amount of wisdom and forbearance on the part of the Government will avail to restore that confidence of the governed in the intentions of their rulers without which it is vain even to attempt the improvement of the people.

That your Petitioners cannot contemplate without dismay the doctrine now widely promulgated that India should be administered with an especial view to the

benefit of the English who reside there; or that in its administration any advantage should be sought for Her Majesty's subjects of European birth, except that which they will necessarily derive from their superiority of intelligence, and from the increased prosperity of the people, the improvement of the productive resources of the country, and the extension of commercial intercourse. Your Petitioners regard it as the most honorable characteristic of the government of India by England, that it has acknowledged no such distinction as that of a dominant and a subject race; but has held that its first duty was to the people of India. Your Petitioners feel that a great portion of the hostility with which they are assailed, is caused by the belief that they are peculiarly the guardians of this principle, and that so long as they have any voice in the administration of India, it cannot easily be infringed. And your Petitioners will not conceal their belief that their exclusion from any part in the Government is likely, at the present time, to be regarded in India as a first successful attack on that principle.

That your Petitioners, therefore, most earnestly represent to your [Lordships'] Honorable House, that even if the contemplated change could be proved to be in itself advisable, the present is a most unsuitable time for entertaining it; and they most strongly and respectfully urge on your [Lordships'] Honourable House the expediency of at least deferring any such change until it can be effected at a period when it would not be, in the minds of the people of India, directly connected with the recent calamitous events, and with the feelings to which those events have either given rise or have afforded an opportunity of manifestation. Such postponement, your Petitioners submit, would allow time for a more mature consideration than has yet been given, or can be given

in the present excited state of the public mind, to the various questions connected with the organization of a government for India; and would enable the most competent minds in the nation calmly to examine whether any new arrangement can be devised for the home Government of India uniting a greater number of the conditions of good administration than the present; and if so, which among the numerous schemes which have been, or may be, proposed, possesses those requisites in the greatest degree.

That your Petitioners have always willingly acquiesced in any changes which, after discussion by Parliament, were deemed conducive to the general welfare, although such changes may have involved important sacrifices to themselves. They would refer to their partial relinquishment of trade in 1813; to its total abandonment, and the placing of their Commercial Charter in abeyance, in 1833; to the transfer to India of their commercial assets, amounting to £15,858,000, a sum greatly exceeding that ultimately repayable to them in respect of their capital, independent of territorial rights and claims; and to their concurrence, in 1853, in the measure by which the Court of Directors was reconstructed, and reduced to its present number. In the same spirit, your Petitioners would most gladly co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in correcting any defects which may be considered to exist in the details of the present system; and they would be prepared, without a murmur, to relinquish their trust altogether, if a better system for the control of the Government of India can be devised. But, as they believe that in the construction of such a system there are conditions which cannot, without the most dangerous consequences, be departed from, your Petitioners respectfully and deferentially submit to the

judgment of your [Lordships'] Honourable House their view of those conditions; in the hope that if your [Lordships'] Honourable House should see reason to agree in that view, you will withhold your legislative sanction from any arrangement for the Government of India which does not fulfil the conditions in question in at least an equal degree with the present.

That your Petitioners may venture to assume that it will not be proposed to vest the home portion of the administration of India in a Minister of the Crown, without the adjunct of a Council composed of statesmen experienced in Indian affairs. Her Majesty's Ministers cannot but be aware that the knowledge necessary for governing a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, requires as much special study as any other profession, and cannot possibly be possessed by any one who has not devoted a considerable portion of his life to the acquisition of it.

That in constituting a body of experienced advisers to be associated with the Indian Minister, your Petitioners consider it indispensable to bear in mind that this body should not only be qualified to advise the Minister, but also, by its advice, to exercise, to a certain degree, a moral check. It cannot be expected that the Minister, as a general rule, should himself know India, while he will be exposed to perpetual solicitations from individuals and bodies, entirely ignorant of that country, or knowing only enough to impose on those who know still less than themselves, and having very frequently objects in view other than the interests or good government of India. The influences likely to be brought to bear on him through the organs of popular opinion will, in the majority of cases, be equally misleading. The public opinion of England, itself necessarily unacquainted with

Indian affairs, can only follow the promptings of those who take most pains to influence it, and these will generally be such as have some private interest to serve. It is, therefore, your Petitioners submit, of the outmost importance that any council which may form a part of the Home Government of India should derive sufficient weight from its constitution, and from the relation it occupies to the Minister, to be a substantial barrier against those inroads of self-interest and ignorance in this country from which the Government of India has hitherto been comparatively free, but against which it would be too much to expect that Parliament should of itself afford a sufficient protection.

That your Petitioners can not well conceive a worse form of Government for India than a Minister with a Council whom he should be at liberty to consult or not at his pleasure, or whose advice he should be able to disregard, without giving his reasons in writing, and in a manner likely to carry conviction. Such an arrangement, your Petitioners submit, would be really liable to the objections, in their opinion, erroneously urged against the present system. Your Petitioners respectfully represent that any body of persons associated with the Minister, which is not a check, will be a screen. Unless the Council is so constituted as to be personally independent of the Minister, unless it feels itself responsible for recording an opinion on every Indian subject and pressing that opinion on the Minister, whether it is agreeable to him or not ; and unless the Minister when he overrules their opinion, is bound to record his reasons, their existence will only serve to weaken his responsibility, and to give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures in the framing of which those qualities have had no share.

That it would be vain to expect that a new Council could have as much moral influence, and power of asserting its opinion with effect, as the Court of Directors. A new body can no more succeed to the feelings and authority which their antiquity and their historical antecedents give to the East India Company than a legislature under a new name, sitting in Westminster, would have the moral ascendancy of the Houses of Lords and Commons. One of the most important elements of usefulness will thus be necessarily wanting in any newly constituted Indian Council, as compared with the present.

That your Petitioners find it difficult to conceive that the same independence in judgment and act, which characterizes the Court of Directors, will be found in any council all of whose Members are nominated by the Crown. Owing their nomination to the same authority, many of them probably to the same individual Minister, whom they are appointed to check, and looking to him alone for their reappointment, their desire of recommending themselves to him, and their unwillingness to risk his displeasure by any serious resistance to his wishes, will be motives too strong not to be in danger of exercising a powerful and injurious influence over their conduct. Nor are your Petitioners aware of any mode in which that injurious influence could be guarded against, except by conferring the appointments, like those of the judges, during good behaviour; which, by rendering it impossible to correct an error once committed, would be seriously objectionable.

That your Petitioners are equally unable to perceive how, if the controlling body is entirely nominated by the Minister, that happy independence of Parliamentary and party influence, which has hitherto distinguished the

administration of India and the appointments to situations of trust and importance in that country, can be expected to continue. Your Petitioners believe that in no Government known to history have appointments to offices, and especially to high offices, been so rarely bestowed on any other considerations than those of personal fitness. This characteristic, but for which in all probability India would long since have been lost to this country, is, your Petitioners conceive, entirely owing to the circumstance that the dispensers of patronage have been persons unconnected with party, and under no necessity of conciliating Parliamentary support, that, consequently, the appointments to offices in India have been, as a rule, left to the unbiassed judgment of the local authorities, while the nominations to the civil and military services have been generally bestowed on the middle classes, irrespective of political considerations, and, in a large proportion, on the relatives of persons who had distinguished themselves by their services in India.

That your Petitioners, therefore, think it essential that at least a majority of the Council which assists the Minister for India with its advice, should hold their seats independently of his appointment.

That it is, in the opinion of your Petitioners, no less necessary that the order of the transaction of business should be such as to make the participation of the Council in the administration of India a substantial one. That to this end, it is, in the opinion of your Petitioners, indispensable that the despatches to India should not be prepared by the Minister and laid before the Council, but should be prepared by the Council and submitted to the Minister. This would be in accordance with the natural and obvious principle that persons chosen for their knowledge of a subject should suggest the mode

of dealing with it, instead of merely giving their opinion on suggestions coming from elsewhere. This is also the only mode in which the members of the Council can feel themselves sufficiently important or sufficiently responsible to secure their applying their minds to the subjects before them. It is almost unnecessary for your Petitioners to observe, that the mind is called into far more vigorous action by being required to propose than by merely being called on to assent. The Minister has necessarily the ultimate decision. If he has also the initiative, he has all the powers which are of any practical moment. A body whose only recognized function was to find fault, would speedily let that function fall into desuetude. They would feel that their co-operation in conducting the government of India was not really desired; that they were only felt as a clog on the wheels of business. Their criticism on what had been decided without their being collectively consulted would be felt as importunate, as mere delay and impediment, and their office would probably be seldom sought but by those who were willing to allow its most important duties to become nominal.

That with the duty of preparing the despatches to India, would naturally be combined the nomination and control of the home establishments. This your Petitioners consider absolutely essential to the utility of the Council. If the officers through whom they work are in direct dependence upon an authority higher than theirs, all matters of importance will in reality be settled between the Minister and the subordinates, passing over the Council altogether.

That a third consideration, to which your Petitioners attach great importance, is, that the number of the Council should not be too restricted. India is so wide

a field, that a practical acquaintance with every part of its affairs cannot be found combined in any small number of individuals. The Council ought to contain men of general experience and knowledge of the world; also men especially qualified by finance and revenue experience, by judicial experience, diplomatic experience, military experience. It ought to contain persons conversant with the varied social relations and varied institutions of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North-Western Provinces, the Punjab, and the Native States. Even the present Court of Directors, reduced as it is in numbers by the Act of 1853, does not contain all the varieties of knowledge and experience desirable in such a body. Neither, your Petitioners submit, would it be safe to limit the number to that which would be strictly sufficient, supposing all the appointments to be the best possible. A certain margin should be allowed for failures, which, even with the most conscientious selection, will some times occur. Your Petitioners moreover can not overlook the possibility that, if the nomination takes place by a Minister at the head of a political party, it will not always be made with exclusive reference to personal qualifications: and it is indispensable to provide that such errors or faults in the nominating authority, so long as they are only occasional, shall not seriously impair the efficiency of the body.

That while these considerations plead strongly for a body not less numerous than the present, even if only regarded as advisers of the Minister, their other office, as a check on the minister, forms, your Petitioners submit, a no less forcible objection to any considerable reduction of the present number. A body of six or eight will not be equal to one of eighteen in that feeling of independent self-reliance which is necessary to induce

a public body to press its opinion on a Minister to whom that opinion is unacceptable. However unobjectionable in other respects so small a body may be constituted, reluctance to give offence will be likely, unless in extreme cases, to be a stronger habitual inducement in their minds than the desire to stand up for their convictions.

That if, in the opinion of your [Lordships'] Honourable House, a body can be constituted which unites the above enumerated requisites of good government in a greater degree than the Court of Directors, your Petitioners have only to express their humble hope that your endeavours for that purpose may be successful. But if, in enumerating the conditions of a good system of home government for India, your Petitioners have in fact enumerated the qualities possessed by the present system, then your Petitioners pray that your [Lordships'] Honourable House will continue the existing powers of the Court of Directors.

That your Petitioners are aware that the present Home Government of India is reproached with being a double Government; and that any arrangement by which an independent check is provided to the discretion of the Minister will be liable to a similar reproach. But they conceive that this accusation originates in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the Home Government of India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive departments. The executive Government of India is and must be, seated in India itself. The Court of Directors is not so much an executive as a deliberative body. Its principal function, and that of the Home Government generally is not to direct the details of administration, but to scrutinize and revise the past acts of the Indian Govern-

ment : to lay down principles, and issue general instructions for their future guidance, and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures, which are referred home for approval. These duties are more analogous to the function of Parliament, than to those of an Executive Board : and it might almost as well be said that Parliament, as that the Government of India, should be constituted on the principles applicable to Executive Boards. It is considered an excellence, not a defect, in the constitution of Parliament, to be not merely a double but a triple Government. An executive authority, your Petitioners submit, may often with advantage be single, because promptitude is its first requisite. But the function of passing a deliberate opinion on past measures, and laying down principles of future policy, is a business which, in the estimation of your Petitioners, admits of and requires the concurrence of more judgments than one. It is no defect in such a body to be double, and no excellence to be single : especially when it can only be made so by cutting off that branch of it which by previous training is always the best prepared, and often the only one which is prepared at all, for its peculiar duty.

That your Petitioners have heard it asserted that, in consequence of what is called the double Government, the Indian authorities are less responsible to Parliament and the nation, than other departments of the government of the Empire, since it is impossible to know on which of the two branches of Home Government the responsibility ought to rest. Your Petitioners fearlessly affirm, that this impression is not only groundless, but the very reverse of the truth. The Home Government of India is not less, but more responsible, than any other branch of the administration of the State : inas-

much as the President of the Board of Commissioners, who is the Minister for India, is as completely responsible as any other of Her Majesty's ministers, and in addition, his advisers also are responsible. It is always certain, in the case of India, that the President of the Board of Commissioners must have either commanded or sanctioned all that has been done. No more than this, your Petitioners submit, can be known in the case of the head of any department of Her Majesty's Government. For it is not, nor can it rationally be supposed, that any Minister of the Crown is without trusted advisers: and the Minister for India must, for obvious reasons, be more dependent than any other of Her Majesty's Ministers, upon the advice of persons whose lives have been devoted to the subject on which their advice has been given. But in the case of India, such advisers are assigned to him by the constitution of the Government, and they are as much responsible for what they advise as he for what he ordains: while in other departments the Minister's official advisers are the subordinates in his office—men often of great skill and experience, but not in the public eye; often unknown to the public even by name; official reserve precludes the possibility of ascertaining what advice they give, and they are responsible only to the Minister himself. By what application of terms this can be called responsible government, and the joint government of your Petitioners and the India Board an irresponsible Government, your Petitioners think it unnecessary to ask.

That without knowing the plan on which Her Majesty's Ministers contemplate the transfer to the Crown of the servants of the Company, your Petitioners find themselves unable to approach the delicate question of the Indian

Army further than to point out that the high military qualities of the officers of that army have unquestionably sprung in a great degree from its being a principal and substantive army, holding Her Majesty's commission and enjoying equal rank with Her Majesty's officers, and your Petitioners would earnestly deprecate any change in that position.

That your Petitioners, having regard to all these considerations, humbly pray your Honourable House, that you will not give your sanction to any change in the constitution of the Indian Government during the continuance of the present unhappy disturbances, nor without a full previous inquiry into the operations of the present system. And your Petitioners further pray that this inquiry may extend to every department of Indian administration. Such an inquiry, your Petitioners respectfully claim, not only as a matter of justice to themselves, but because, when for the first time in this century, the thoughts of every public man in the country are fixed on India, an inquiry would be more thorough, and its results would carry much more instruction to the mind of Parliament and of the country, than at any preceding period.

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CHAPTER C

The Proclamation of the Queen Victoria.

The Sepoy Mutiny had not been yet quelled when the Government of India was transferred from the Company to the Crown. Under the circumstance it was the most diplomatic move on the part of the Queen Victoria and her advisers to issue the Proclamation. It was calculated to smooth the ruffled feelings of the people and reconcile them to the rule of England. And the Proclamation succeeded most admirably in its object or objects.

The natives of India, in the simplicity of their hearts, look upon the Proclamation as the Magna Charta of their liberties. Much nonsense is talked by those who take their stand on this Proclamation and demand equal rights and privileges with British citizens. Such deluded men should be reminded of what the celebrated English historian, [Mr. Freeman, wrote of proclamations in general.

"... But when we come to manifestoes, proclamations. ... here we are on the very chosen region of lies, ... He is of childlike simplicity indeed who believes every act of Parliament, as telling us, not only what certain

august persons did, but the motives which led them to do it; so is he who believes that the verdict and sentence of every court was necessarily perfect righteousness, even in times where orders were sent beforehand for the trial and execution of such a man."—Freeman's *Methods of Historical Study*, London, 1886, pp. 258-259.

They should also be reminded of what that well-known jurist, Sir James Stephen, said regarding the Queen's Proclamation. That eminent lawyer said that the Proclamation was merely a ceremonial document. It was not a treaty and so it did not impose any responsibility and obligation on the English people.

We should not also forget why it was necessary to issue the Proclamation in November, 1858—a proclamation full of noble and philanthropic sentiments. Ever since the outbreak of the Mutiny, the stay-at-home natives of England were talking of avenging the ill-treatment which their kith and kin had received in India at the hands of the natives. India was no longer to be governed for the benefit of the natives of India. A Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed in March, 1858, "to inquire into the progress and prospects, and the best means to be adopted for the promotion of European colonization and settlement in India, especially in the Hill Districts and healthier climates of that country, as well as for the extension of our commerce with Central Asia."

It was under the above circumstances necessary to do something to cover the ulterior designs of the English people by the show of philanthropy. This most probably accounts for the genesis of the proclamation.

Assuming even for the sake of argument that the Queen Victoria issued that proclamation out of love for the people of India, that is to say, that she was prompted by pure philanthropy, she knew that, being a constitutional sovereign, she could not compel her ministers to carry into execution all that she had laid down in the Proclamation. The English monarch is merely an ornamental figure-head and hence the English proverb which says that kings and queens can do no wrong. The converse of that proverb is also applicable to the kings and queens of England, that is, they cannot set any wrong right. They cannot go against the wishes of the English people. It is on record that the Proclamation when first drafted by one of the Ministers of the Queen did not meet with her approval. In the *Review of Reviews* for April, 1897, Mr. W. T. Stead wrote :—

“The Queen was abroad when the first draft of the Proclamation reached her. It was a miserable, jejune document, without heart in it or religion, and withal it had the incredible ill-taste to allude to the power the Government possessed of undermining native religions

and customs. The Queen was revolted at the threat. The Proclamation would never do :—

“Her Majesty disapproves of the expression which declares that she has the power of ‘undermining the Indian religions’. Her Majesty would prefer that the subject should be introduced in a declaration in the sense that the deep attachment which Her Majesty feels to her own religion, and the comfort and happiness which she derives from its consolation, will preclude her from any attempt to interfere with the native religions, and that her servants will be directed to act scrupulously in accordance with her directions.”

“But she was not satisfied with merely indicating objections in detail ; she had the whole Proclamation rewritten. She wrote :—

“The Queen would be glad if Lord Derby would write it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female Sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people on assuming the direct government of them and after a bloody civil war, giving them pledges which her future reign is to redeem and explaining the principles of her government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive on being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following the train of civilisation.”

“The Proclamation was rewritten ‘entirely in the spirit of your Majesty’s observations.’ But still the Queen was not quite satisfied, so she added in her own hand to the last sentence these words :—

“May the God of all power grant to us and those in authority under us strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people !”

The Queen being an intelligent sovereign knew that the original proclamation as drafted by her Minister would have estranged the feelings of the people of India and so had the phraseology of the Proclamation altered.

But the people of India are of childlike simplicity to have put any faith in the Proclamation. One is forced into the belief that the Proclamation was issued to cover the ulterior designs of the English people for the exploitation of India.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER C

Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India

Victoria, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America and Australia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the Government of the territories in India heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company.

Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful, and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter, from time to time, see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

And we, reposing special trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and counsellor, Charles John, Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories and to administer the government thereof in our name, and

generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the right, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own: and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity, and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise

favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.

And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge,

We know, and respect, the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

Already, in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment

which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:

Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except these who have been, or shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in apportioning the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in the credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

It is our royal pleasure, that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next.

When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in

their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.

CHAPTER CI

The End of the Company's Rule

With the Proclamation of the Queen Victoria, read by Lord Canning on the 1st of November, 1858, in Allahabad, terminated the rule of the East India Company. Allahabad forms an important landmark in the history of the Christian Power in India; for, it was here that Clive obtained the Dewany of Bengal from Shah Alam on the 12th of August, 1765. The termination of the government of the Christian merchant "adventurers" who were "not gentlemen," was announced in that city standing at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna. The natives of Great Britain were certainly not proud of the rise of the Christian Power in India, or of the deeds of the East India Company which won an empire for them in the Orient. Writes an English historian that—

"The establishment of the English power in India is an ugly one. It begins in feebleness and cowardice, it is pervaded by rapacity, it closes with a course of fraud and falsehood, of forgery and treason, as stupendous as ever lay at the foundation of a great empire. My Lord Macaulay, in that brilliant passage which opens his biographical sketch of Clive, expresses his astonishment at the little interest which we take in the story. I do not

know any stronger instance of the short-sightedness of clever men when they only recognise the moral sense as something to flavour a narrative, as you might flavour a pudding with allspice or with mace. Our own consciences will long, ere this, have given the answer ... It is the instinctive hypocrisy of shame which has kept us Englishmen aloof from the tale of the rise of our Indian empire. I suppose that the son of a transported convict in Sydney, whose father has won a fortune for him, who is rising in station and consideration himself, who is received at Government house, subscribes to charities, sits in front-pews at church, likes nothing less than to be reminded of the notorious robberies and burglaries by which his father won for himself a free passage to the antipodes, and if they happen to be recorded in the Newgate Calendar, would only be the more careful to exclude that exciting work from his library. Is it not so with us? Is it not in human nature that we should dislike to be reminded of the crimes which Clive and Warren Hastings, and all that shameless generation which surrounded them, committed for our benefit? I thank God that, until the Whig essayist and cabinet minister, no man had yet had the hardihood to see the picturesqueness of this shameful story, to measure its capabilities as the subject of a brilliant article in a review." (*British India, its races and its history*, by John Malcolm Ludlow, Vol. I, pp. 198-199).

The passage quoted above shows how the Indian empire of the East India Company was gradually built up. The merchant "adventurers" never scrupled to make use of any means, fair or foul, to get their purposes served, and amass earthly riches, play the "nabobs" and promote industries in

their native land from the "plunders piled from kingdoms not their own." It was thus that England destroyed the trade and industries of India.

Regarding the government of the East India Company the author quoted above wrote:—

"The present system of Indian Government of which that body forms yet the most prominent organ,—cumbersome, wasteful, inefficient, and dishonest as a piece of administrative machinery—, as a form of rule peculiarly ill adapted to fix the affections and loyalty of the native races of India,—has failed in practice in every one of the requisites of good government.

"It has failed to give security to person or property throughout by far the greater portion of India: sometimes by leaving the subject exposed to the open violence of brigands; always by placing him at the mercy of oppressive and fraudulent officials.

"The judicial system is dilatory, costly, and inefficient.

"The revenue system—contrary to almost every sound principle of political economy—seems devised in its different branches so as to promote the largest possible amount of oppression, extortion, and immorality.

"As a matter of fact, the population are in most parts of the country sinking alike in physical condition, and in moral character.

"Many of the above-mentioned evils are of British introduction; others have been aggravated under British rule.

"The good which has been done,—due in almost every instance to the special efforts of individuals, and generally

thwarted at first,—has been for the most part extremely trifling, or partial and superficial.*

"The most magnificent public works, such as the Canals of the North, and its one metalled road, become wholly insignificant when compared with the vast number of works executed in native times,—many, in some districts, most of which remains yet in a state of decay, though the cess payable for their maintenance or the increased assessment due in respect of the surplus value which they are supposed to create, may still be exacted.

"A wholly new vice—drunkenness—has been introduced among the Hindoo population, is largely spreading and is fostered by the exigencies of the public revenue.

"In that part of India which lies most open to independent observation,—Bengal,—sullen discontent is declared to characterise the rural population. (*Ibid*, pp. 335-337).

No one can deny the fact that India has benefited by the abolition of "the Society of Adventurers" called the East India Company.

* The famines of particular districts which revenue oppression did not allow the cultivator to meet when they occurred, which public works could invariably have prevented, must have swept away more lives than the lauded "humane" measures of the suppression of suttee, infanticide, etc., can ever have preserved.

APPENDIX

The Colonisation of India

When the East India Company obtained the Dewany of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, they knew that their tenure of the country was not based on conquest, and hence they could not set to work to colonize it with their own compatriots and co-religionists; though the policy which they adopted in governing the country—a policy the immediate effect of which was seen in the terrible famine in Bengal in 1770, was well calculated to achieve that end. The American colonists at that time also had not thrown off the British yoke and so there was no surplus population in England to be spared to colonize India.

But it seems that during the regime of Mr. Warren Hastings, the colonization of India was taken into consideration. Two of his councillors were strongly opposed to it. That foresighted statesman, Sir Phillip Francis, in his Minute published in the Bengal Revenue Consultations, dated 12th May, 1775, wrote :—

“1. If nothing but grants of waste lands were in question, it would still be an object of serious consideration, *first, to the British Government, whether or not it would be advisable to encourage colonisation here.*

* * * *

"4. The soil of right belongs to the natives. Former conquerors contented themselves with exacting a tribute from the lands, and left the natives in quiet possession of them.

"To alienate them in favour of strangers may be found a dangerous as well as an unjust measure. We cannot understand the arts of cultivation in this soil and climate, so well as the natives. The landholder will consider us with jealousy and hatred, as the invaders of his rights and property. The ryots, attached by custom, religion and prejudice, to the authority of their ancient masters, will not readily submit to labour for new ones, to whom they are not bound by any natural relation of manners or religion, or by reciprocal obligations of protection and dependence. A few Europeans will be thinly scattered over the face of the country ; the native inhabitants will desert it."

* * * *

Again, in an introduction to a publication, intitled "Original Minutes of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, on the settlement and collection of the Revenues of Bengal, with a plan recommended to the Court of Directors in January 1776," Sir P. Francis wrote :—

"As a question at least it deserves to be considered whether it may not be essential, not only to the internal prosperity of the country, but to its dependence on Great Britain, that the Europeans in Bengal, should be limited to as small a number as the services of the Government will admit of.

"The acquisition was made, and has hitherto been

preserved by a British force which has borne no proportion to that of the natives. Under a mild and equitable Government, under such a one as it is our own greatest interest no less than our duty to give them, they are incapable of rebellion or defection. Their patience and submission to their rulers in the last twenty years are sufficient to show how much they can endure. *On the other hand, as we increase the number of those who can only exist at the expense of the country, we load our Government with useless weights, and add to its embarrassments without adding to its strength.*

"Whether these Europeans are directly employed or not in the service of Government, there is no fund but the public revenue out of which they can derive a subsistence. One way or other, it is paid for by the country, and one way or other, must become chargeable to Government.

"Exclusive of public employments or contracts with the India Company, there is no fair occupation for the industry of Europeans in Bengal. Every enterprise they engage in, whether of foreign commerce or internal improvement, leads them into distress if it does not end in their ruin. Even of adventurers pursuing every mode of acquisition that offers, very few, if any, have succeeded. But these are people to whom no encouragement should be given. *Their residence in the country, especially in the remoter parts, harasses the people and alienates them from their natural habits of submission to any power that protects them.*"

Mr. Monson, another member of Mr. Warren Hasting's Council, wrote :—

'The question now before the Board, on which I am

required to give an opinion, may be considered in a political view :

1st. *Whether it is for the interest of Great Britain to colonize in East India.*

2nd. *Whether such a colony would be of advantage to the India Company.*

"The migrations to countries believed to be the regions of wealth would be so considerable, that the mother country would soon feel the dire consequences of them.

"Every person who comes into this country is impressed with the idea of making, in a short time, a very considerable independent fortune.

"The means to be pursued for this end operate to the impoverishment and destruction of the country. If Europeans were allowed to hold farms, as their influence is great, they would in some degree oppress the natives,**

"Their manner of life will not permit them to give equal profits to the Government with the natives, as their expense on every article of subsistence is more considerable; consequently, the Europeans will be in a worse condition than the natives, or Government must be satisfied with a less revenue from the lands, in order to enable them to live.

"The few wants of the natives, who are satisfied with the mere necessities of life, will allow them to pay larger taxes to Government from the same quantity of land, in the same state of culture, than an European can afford to do; it is evident, therefore, that it cannot be for the interests of the Company to allow Europeans to become landholders.

"The uncultivated lands, under a mild and fixed Government, might soon be brought into culture by giving premiums and making advances of money to the natives.

"Providence has ordained, by her formation of the constitution of Europeans, that they should not become the cultivators of this country; they can only be task-masters, and will enrich themselves, having no permanent interest here, to the prejudice of the natives, and to the loss of Government."

Marquis Cornwallis, in the course of a letter to Mr. Dundas, dated London, 7th Nov. 1794, wrote:—

"And I am strongly impressed with a conviction that it will be of essential importance to the interests of Britain that Europeans should be discouraged and prevented as much as possible from colonizing and settling in our possessions of India."

At a Court of Directors held on Wednesday, the 4th February, 1801, the following resolutions were read and the Court approved thereof:—

"Resolution Second. That it is equally the interest of the nation, and the duty of the Company, to guard against all principles and measures which, by an indefinite enlargement of the present channel of communication, in their nature tend to the introduction, immediate or gradual, of such an open intercourse, and its probable consequent colonization.

* * * *

"Eleventh. That if to this aggregate capital, which may be termed the present maximum of the native stock of British India for a trade to Europe, it became a practice to add capital belonging to private residents in Great Britain, and transplanted to India for the purpose of forcing the productions of that country beyond the ability of its own means, this would be the introduction of one of the first principles of the Colonial or West Indian

system: and if it were sanctioned, directly or impliedly, by any public regulation, it would tend greatly to extend the relations and intercourses between those countries, and this, as well as to supersede covertly, if not openly, the prohibitions to Europeans to occupy lands there, which prohibition is already in a variety of instances, dispensed with; and thus, without any certainty of ultimate commercial benefit to the British Empire at large, a change would be commenced in the present system of Indian policy which is allowed to be the best for the maintenance of those distant possessions."

But with the free influx of Europeans permitted by the Charter Act of 1813, and the annexation of the mountainous tracts both of the Himalayan and the Deccan ranges, some people of England set on foot an agitation for the colonization of India. But to cover their ulterior designs, the agitators had to wear the mask of philanthropy. In a pamphlet entitled "A View of the Present State and Future Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonization of India," the reputed author of which was one Mr. Crawford, it is stated that—

"Although there may be no room for colonisation, there is ample room for settlement, in a country of fertile soil, far more thinly peopled, after all, than any part of Europe, and a *country without capital, knowledge, morals, or enterprise*. * * Our countrymen, living amongst them, will instruct them in arts, in science, and in morals; the wealth and resources of the country will be improved; the Hindus will rise in the scale of civilization, * *"

He concluded this pamphlet thus :—

"We repeat, that the only suitable and efficient means

of improving our conquered subjects—the only means by which one people ever conferred lasting and solid improvement upon another is a free and unshackled intercourse between the two parties.”

Colonization was advocated on the score of philanthropy, because this, it was said, would lead to the improvement of the natives. What the consequences would have been, if India had been colonised at that time, is all a matter of conjecture; they might or might not have been good for the Indians. In other parts of the world, as a matter of fact, the results have not been good for the natives. The reasons will be clear from what Huxley has written.

“The process of colonization presents analogies to the formation of a garden * * . [The colonists] set up a new Flora and Fauna and a *new variety of mankind*, within the old state of nature * * Considered as a whole, the colony is a composite unit introduced into the old state of nature: and, thenceforward, a competitor in the struggle for existence, to conquer or be vanquished (Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics and other Essays*, vol. IX. p. 16.)

“* * * [The colonist] would, as far as possible, put a stop to the influence of external competition by thoroughly extirpating and excluding the native rivals, * * * the obstacles to the full development of the capacities of the colonists * * would be removed by the creation of artificial conditions of existence of a more favourable character.” [*Ibid*, p. 18.]

The natives of India [being more civilised and

numerous than the natives of the colonies, the results here would not probably have been exactly the same.

Mr. Frederick Shore was also an advocate of the colonization of India. In his "Notes on Indian Affairs," he treats of the subject at some length and tries to meet the arguments of those who were opposed to it. According to him, the arguments advanced against colonization were:—

"1st. That the rich settler would supplant the natives in the possession of the soil:

"2nd. That were the country overrun with the lower class of Europeans they would ill-treat the natives, and, from their irregular and disorderly habits, commit many crimes * * ;

3rdly. That as soon as India was tolerably well-peopled with English settlers, it would become independent of the mother-country."

After disposing of the first two objections, he has devoted some considerable space to the consideration of the third. Referring to this, he writes:—

"It is indeed probable that, in the course of time, India will emancipate itself from England, * * The probability is, that India will be independent of England long before that event could be produced by colonization. and that, so far from being a means of accelerating that catastrophe, it would rather retard it, * * * * But there are other consequences which would ensue from colonization, whose operation would be more immediately felt by the existing directors of the Indian administration

and it is the apprehension of these which forms the true reason of the strenuous opposition hitherto made against colonization.

"These are first, that the present oppressive system of Government towards the natives would be exposed by the new settlers. The people of India are obliged to bear it, as they possess no means of averting it, or making their complaints known; but Englishmen would not submit so quietly; they would at least make themselves heard in England, where public opinion would demand an alteration in the system.

"Secondly, that, before long it would be found absolutely necessary to appoint residents in India to many situations from which they are now excluded; and this would diminish the patronage of the home authorities.

He favoured colonization on the ground that:—

"Such a body of settlers, having every thing to loose and nothing to gain, by the subversion of the British power, would, in the event of any disturbance or insurrection, exert all their influence, and induce their native dependents and connections to do the same, in support of Government; whereas, so different is the feeling of the natives towards the British authority, that when a disturbance arises, those who do not take part in it stand aloof, and will rarely give any assistance to the Government."

Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord William Bentinck used arguments similar to the above in favor of the settlement and colonization of their compatriots in India.

It was no wonder then that the Charter Act of 1833 afforded greater facilities to Europeans desi-

rons of settling and colonizing in India. In fact, that Act encouraged the colonization of India by Europeans.

Mr. Brian Houghton Hodgson, the well-known Resident of Nepal, was a great advocate of the colonization of the Himalayas by Europeans. His paper written in December, 1856, is a very important contribution to the literature on this subject. He wrote :—

"I say, then, unhesitatingly, that the Himalaya generally is very well calculated for the settlement of Europeans, and I feel more and more convinced, that the encouragement of colonization therein is one of the highest and most important duties of the Government,

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"I trust, therefore, that the general subject of the high capabilities of the climate and soil of the Himalayas and their eminent fitness for European colonization having once been taken up, will never be dropped till colonization is a '*fait accompli*,' and that the accomplishment of this greatest, surest, soundest and simplest of all political measures for the stabilitation of the British power in India, may adorn the annals of Lord Canning's administration.

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"A word as to the native population, in relation to the measure under contemplation. In the first place, the vast extent of unoccupied land would free the Government from the necessity of providing against wrongful displacement; and, in the second place, the erect spirit and freedom from disqualifying prejudices, proper to the Himalayan population would at once make their protection from European oppression easy, and

would render them readily subservient under the direction of European energy and skill to the more effectual drawing forth of the natural resources of the region."

In concluding his paper he wrote that he would encourage "the starving peasantry of Ireland and of the Scotch Highlands to colonize the Himalayas":—

"By free grants for the first five years, and by a very light rent upon long and fixed leases thereafter, looking to compensation in the general prestige of their known forthcomingness on the spot, and assured that, with the actual backing upon occasions of political stress and difficulty of some fifty to one hundred thousand loyal hearts and stalwart bodies of Saxon mould, our Empire in India might safely defy the world in arms against it."

In a footnote, Mr. Hodgson added :—

"To ward off Russian power and influence, we are just now entering on a war (in Persia) as immediately and immensely costly, as full of perplexities and difficulties, even in any of its better issues. Were one tenth, nay, one-fifteenth, of the money which that war, if it last, will cost, bestowed on the encouragement of European settlements in the Himalaya, we might thus provide a far more durable, safe and cheap barrier against Russian aggression, and should soon reduce her land-borne commerce with Eastern Asia to *Nil*."

The far-seeing statesmanship of Francis, Monson, Cornwallis and others, who helped to lay the foundation of the British Empire in India, was at a discount and the opinions of men like Crawford, Frederick Shore, Metcalfe, Bentinck and Hodgson found favor with the people of England.

Although the authorities never openly gave countenance to colonization, yet after the outbreak of the Sepoy Revolt of 1857, the colonization of India was loudly called for by the people of England. An English journalist wrote :—

"Time has brought most people now-a-days to the opinion that the great Mutiny was in a great measure the result of a vicious system, maintained for years, by which India was held as an appanage of the Civil Service. The immigration into India of independent Europeans, who would, if admitted, have taken root in the country, and who might even by mere numbers have prevented the rising, was discouraged and almost prohibited. The result was that the governing class—the Covenanted Civil Service—formed the only avenue to anything like power or distinction : it gradually absorbed the control of the army as well as the civil administration of the country, and it broke down at once and utterly in the time of trial."¹

The colonization of India was being loudly demanded by the people of England. Thus wrote Sir Edward Sullivan, Baronet :—

"Every nation, without exception, that has hitherto reduced another to permanent subjection, has, more or less, cemented conquest by colonization ; and it is an undoubted fact that, in proportion to the number and strength of these colonies, their rule was more powerful and more enduring.

"It would almost appear as if colonization is the only condition on which Providence will permit the substitu-

* The Saturday Review for Jan. 23, 1876, p. 146.

tion or lengthened subjugation of one race by another ; and as far as history hitherto instructs us, permanent conquest is but another word for vigorous and successful colonization. Up to this period, England has in no degree colonized India, or encouraged an amalgamation of races ; nor is there any probability, not to say possibility, of her doing so."—Sullivan's *Letters on India*, 1858, pp, 24-25.

So a Select Committee of the British Parliament was appointed in 1858, to consider the question of colonization and settlement of India by Britishers. At this distance of time, the two Reports issued by the Committee are very interesting reading.

It seems that all the enactments made to encourage the settlement of the English were not enough to induce them to colonize India. Hence special measures were to be adopted to convert India into a colony of England. On the 16th March 1858, it was ordered by the House of Commons—

"That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the progress and prospects, and the best means to be adopted for the promotion of European colonization and settlement in India, especially in the Hill Districts and healthier climates of that country ; as well as for the extension of our Commerce with Central Asia."

Towards the closing days of November, 1907, the following telegram was to be seen in the papers of most of the countries of the world:—

Prince Buelow has introduced a bill in the Reichstag, for a grant of a further £ 20,000,000 to continue the

Germanization of the Polish provinces by means of German settlers, and conferring powers of compulsory expropriation.

(Reuter's Service.) London, Tuesday. (Novr. 26, 1907),

England could have done the same thing for the English settlers in India as Germany did for the Germanization of Poland. In fact, Mr. Hodgson had suggested the adoption of such a measure.

But the members of the Committee on Colonization above referred to, could not recommend such a procedure. None of the witnesses who appeared before the above Committee even suggested such a course. But as usual with the Anglo-Indian authorities, they were encouraging Englishmen to settle in India by pecuniary aids from the money taken from the Indian tax-payer. India was expected and made to a certain degree to pay for her being converted into an English colony.

Take, for instance, the case of tea plantations. How the tea-planters were assisted in this industry will be evident from the following questions put to, and the answers given to them by Mr. J. Freeman who appeared as a witness before the Select Committee on colonization.

"1922, Are you not aware that both in Assam and Kumaon the Government established tea-plantations for the express purpose of trying experiments, for the sake of the settlers, and with the avowed object of handing over their plantations to the settlers, as soon as the ex-

periment had been shown to be successful, and as soon as settlers could be found willing to take them ? That is what I refer to ; that in the first mootings of the cultivation of tea the Government took the initiative and encouraged it, and went to some expense in taking the necessary steps towards it. Then some European took it up on a large scale, and that attempt was not successful ; but somewhere about 14 years ago, in consequence of this new arrangement, where the Government gave them more favourable terms about the land that they were to concede to them, from that arose the present Company, *which has carried it out in a very extensive way, which without the English settlers and their capital I doubt would ever [have] been effected.*

"1923. Did not the Government in fact bear the whole of the expense of the experiment, and hand over, both in Assam and Kumaon, their plantations to the settlers on very liberal terms ? That I am unacquainted with ; I will not say that it was so or that it was not so.

"1924. Did not the Government send Mr. Fortune, and others before him into China to get seed, and to get tea-markers, Chinese, and otherwise, to inform them as to the Chinese system of culture, for the express purpose and sole object of instructing the settlers in India ? I do not know for certain whether that experiment was made by the Government ; I believe it was so ; but I know that Chinamen were brought in the first instance. It was hoped, through them, that the natives in India would get an insight into the cultivation of tea, but it failed, so far."

Thus it will be seen how the European tea-planters have been benefited at the expense of the natives of India. But the Government have never

done anything to encourage any purely Indian concern as they have done the tea industry carried on by Anglo-Indians. The fling at the natives of the country by the witness, which we have italicized in the above extract, is quite senseless, for no native has ever been encouraged in the same manner as the European settlers.

It is for the benefit of the European tea-planter, that that Act was passed which the late Hon'ble Rai Bahadur Kristo Das Paul, C.I.E., was compelled to condemn as legalising slavery in India.

The Indian Government very generously offered to assist the Iron manufacturers of England if some of them came to settle in India. Thus the same witness was asked:—

"1927. Are you aware that the Government have recently sent out a gentleman conversant with the iron manufacture, and with him several assistants, to the province of Kumaon, to introduce the iron manufacture there? I have read of it, but we offered to do everything at our own expense.

"1928. And the Government have stated that, as soon as the experiment is shown to be successful, they are willing to hand over the works to any Englishman that will undertake them?—Yes, that may be, * * *."

Comments on the above are superfluous. Again from time to time Indigo-planters have received pecuniary aids from Government at the expense of the Indian taxpayer.

If the Indian Government spent money in

building roads and railways in India, these seem to have been made with, among others, the object as set forth by one Mr. J. Dalrymple who appeared as a witness before the above Committee. He was asked :—

"3551. And with more perfect laws, and the facility of roads, canals, and rivers, you yourself know of no other place where better fruits for enterprise exist than in Bengal?—Certainly not,

"3552. In your long experience you have realized those results? Yes."

Facilities of communication seem to have been made to help colonization. Thus one Mr. W. Theobald was asked :—

"867. Increasing communication and increasing commerce, therefore, will greatly increase the hold of England upon India? Yes, I think so."

Facilities of communication with England have resulted in saddling India with a large increase of English Civil and Military officers and other classes of English officials, for many more are required to do the work of those who are absent on leave. The above-named witness was asked :—

"1278. Do not you think the facilities that have hitherto existed, of overland communication, for civil officers visiting their native country, has diminished that necessary class of civil servants that, previously to the introduction of the overland route, existed; that is to say, the overland facilities reduce the available number of officers for the duties of the state? Very much so, no doubt.

"1279. At present there is generally a greater number absent than before the introduction of steam? Yes, I think so,

"1280. And that would naturally call for an increase of that service? Yes.

* * * *

"1282. Does not the facility of coming home encourage a greater number to come home than did come home round the Cape, having a six months' voyage staring them in the face? Yes, no doubt."

Railways were constructed, and roads and waterways were neglected, because they would not be convenient means of travelling for the British capitalists. Major-General G. B. Tremeneere, in his evidence before the above Committee, on the 15th April, 1858, said:—

"Colonization cannot proceed in India as it does in Australia or Canada; it must spring from the upper, rather than the lower ranks of society, by the settlement of capitalists: that is, from the capitalist rather than from the labourer.

* * * *

"The state of the existing means of travelling in India is sufficient alone to prevent the country and its resources from becoming known to capitalists. The ordinary mode of travelling is either by marching in stages from 12 to 14 miles a day, or travelling by dawk in a palanquin. Capitalists will not submit to this tardy mode of progress. I conceive that if railways existed, places holding out prospects of profitable investment would be readily visited, and capitalists would then

judge for themselves of the advantages to be gained by settlement.

* * * *

"I conceive that before capital can be attracted to India, it is necessary to give the greatest facility for intercommunication. Both the agricultural and the mineral resources of the different localities could then be readily inquired into on the spot. Those resources would not only be accessible to capitalists but would be placed within easy communication one with the other, which is not the case now."

This witness pleaded for the construction of railways as the best means for colonization of India. He was asked:—

"98. One portion of the inquiry which has been devolved upon this Committee by the House of Commons is the possibility of availing ourselves of the climate of the hill stations of India for colonization and settlement; have you ever turned your attention to that subject? I think one of the most important things that could be done would be to make the hill stations accessible by railway from the plains."

He was asked by Sir Erskine Perry :—

"100. Do you mean for commercial purposes? For commercial purposes, as well as for the purpose of settlements in the hills."

The hills of India were suggested for colonization and the plains for settlement of Europeans in India. Thus one Mr. J. G. Waller as a witness be-

fore the above Committee was asked by Mr. Vansittart.—

"5200. You have been in the Hill Station of Darjeeling? Yes.

"5201. What are its capabilities for English colonists and settlers? Its capabilities are very great, and it invites colonization to such an extent, that even the laboring classes may settle there. I think the resources of the hills are boundless for the purposes of colonization. In the plains we can only have what I understand by the word 'Settlement'."

* * * *

"5204. In your answer to question No. 4857, you say 'I think that the climate offers no serious impediment whatever to the settlement of Europeans;' are the Committee to understand from this that colonization is practicable in the plains of Bengal? No; I used the word 'settlement,' that I intended to cover the whole of India; Europeans may settle there, although they may not colonize; that is, you cannot introduce labourers into the plains of India: but if you have 500 Europeans settled in Bengal now, as far as climate is concerned, there is no reason why you should not have 5,000."

According to another witness, the whole of India, like Algeria, could be colonized and settled by Europeans. Mr. J. Freeman was asked:—

"1750. Do you think colonization can be effected in any part of India in the same manner and to the same extent as Algeria has been colonized? I think that colonization can be extended in India, but there are two kinds of colonists for India, whereas, in Algeria, there is only one kind of colonist that is absolutely necessary one to work

the land. But in India there is room for two colonists, one with capital and directing capabilities, enterprise, and perseverance, using the native for carrying out his purposes, and one a colonist to work the land himself under particular conditions and circumstances ; if you encourage and render your institutions rationally fit for the higher grade of these, you will confer the greatest benefit on the country, but the latter must be always more or less limited, but they would be of great use to the country, for other reasons.

"1751. You instanced the colonization in Algeria as a proof that it may be extended in India ; therefore I asked, 'Do you think that it can be carried on to the same extent in India as in Algeria ?' In every part I should say not, but in many parts I should say it might. In Algeria a large grant was made to a company on condition that within a certain number of years, they should establish so many villages and should have so much land in cultivation ; and people were induced to resort there, and they have succeeded and they have introduced large permanent pasture lands by irrigation and so forth, and the cultivation of wheat and tobacco. &c., to a very great extent ; and this is partly by European labour and partly by the labour of the natives of the country ; and that climate, it strikes me, is quite as warm as the climate in many parts of India ; the heat is just as great, and there are the same difficulties as to the oppressiveness of the heat to be overcome there as by the Europeans in India. Then, if you come to the northern parts of India and to the hilly ranges there, I think, the climate and soil are quite fit for purposes of that kind ; and if settlements were established there to induce people to settle, it would be an advantage in having a European force at hand as in the military colonies in Algeria."

In order to make colonization possible and successful, it was necessary that a very large number of Englishmen should be brought out to India. It was with this object in view that some of the witnesses urged the necessity of appointing Englishmen in preference to Indians to all the posts of trust and responsibility. Thus to gain their end these witnesses did not scruple to paint the natives of India in the blackest color possible and say things regarding them which were false. Major General G. B. Tremenhoe in his evidence before the Committee on the 20th April, 1858, said:—

“European settlement in India might probably be promoted by a further increase of the members of the Uncovenanted Civil Service. Their ranks are recruited from young men who, in many instances, have been brought up in India ; they have small pensions, and after serving the Government for a period of years, are very likely to become good settlers. Their local experience will induce them to take advantage of opportunities for profitable investment, which in the course of their career would be surely forced upon their observation. The strength of the regular civil service is too small for a country of such vast extent. They work hard, and are a most exemplary body of men ; but there is a limit to individual exertion, and they look to England as their ultimate home. A certain proportion of highly educated civilians is absolutely necessary but much of the ordinary civil business, both revenue and magisterial, might be better administered if a larger number of moderately paid officials were employed.

"340. You think that they would be brought into more immediate contact with the natives? Yes, they would become acquainted with the resources of the country, and by retiring on smaller pensions, would be more likely to settle in India than the civilians of the present day.

"341. Besides the advantages which you have already proved what advantages do you think might arise from the training establishments in the Himalayas which you have suggested? Besides the benefit to be derived, in a material point of view, from establishments in the Himalayas for training Europeans in the practical sciences, other advantages would follow which might be of the greatest value to the future of India. At present the standard of morality amongst all classes of the native community is so low, that the pure stream of English law is polluted by the corruption of the native officials who compose the machinery of the civil courts, and are the only instruments which our civil officers can employ. Ability, a fair reputation, quickness in writing the Persian and Hindoostanee languages, and an aptitude for business secure employment to a native. High moral qualities, if only based on the principles inculcated by their own religious creeds, would have influence if they could be found; but unfortunately, these native subordinates and the whole class from which they are derived are notoriously deficient in good principles, and they counteract the efforts of Government to administer strict justice to the people. The people themselves have no greater respect for truth or upright dealing; they will institute against one another, prosecutions of the most serious character, on the most false pretences, and support them by a cloud of witnesses; even when they have a just cause for litigation, they know that if they do not possess

the means to bribe freely they cannot succeed : and the feeling among them is, that the party who can pay the most to the subordinate officers of the court, is sure to gain the day. The best way to cure this evil is to make moral worth and character, the chief qualifications for employment by the State. It is not by books, nor by teaching, that any appreciable progress will be made towards improvement of the national character of the natives. More may be done by the living example of numbers of Englishmen, trained up among them from their infancy in the principles of the Christian religion who by reason of their moral superiority, will obtain the precedence in all public employments, and in the favour of the State."

Then this witness was asked :—

" 385. As a question of policy and justice, do you advocate the employment of Europeans in offices which are now filled by natives of the country in preference to the natives ? I do as a first measure, until you can obtain those qualities which, I presume, the Europeans would possess. I think the quality of the instrument should be looked to, and not the mere national character of the employed. If you could obtain natives possessing the same principle as Europeans, I would have them employed by all means, and I would give them the preference ; but until you can do that, let them see that those are the qualities which are required.

" 386. I presume you are of opinion that we should not govern India for our own purpose solely, but for the benefit of the inhabitants ? I conceive that the employment of high principled instruments under the Government, would be doing more justice to the people of the country than the employment of others who are corrupt, although they may be of the same nation."

It was suggested by many witnesses that Englishmen should be appointed to such posts as those of Munsifs, Sudder Ameens, Darogas, &c. Thus the above witness was questioned :—

“ 454. Do not you think, with regard to the salaries that the Sudder Ameens and Moonsifs draw, that we could get young men of good education and family to go out from this country to fill those situations? No doubt, at the same time their instruction would have to begin in India, and they would require a long apprenticeship.”

Then this witness was again asked :—

“ 474. Would it be just to exclude the native? Certainly it would not be just to exclude the native, but I would simply employ the European until you could have a native of the proper standard.

“ 475. Is it not something like the old adage of not allowing a boy to go into the water until he can swim, not employing the natives till they are fit for employment? If you show men what qualifications are requisite for employment, it is their fault if they do not come up to that standard; if you give them an opening, and say we will employ you if you exhibit certain qualifications, I conceive there is no hardship in keeping them out of employment till those qualifications are produced.”

Another witness before the above Committee examined on 27th April, 1858, was asked :—

“ 1285. Until the moral code of the Mussulman and the Hindoo is higher, are you of opinion that in the interests of India and its people they should not, unless in exceptional cases, be employed in responsible positions? Certainly, I think the creed of caste and the

creed of the Mussulman is a bad creed for persons entrusted with the administration of justice; * *

"1286. As regards the police ** that respectable Europeans should fill the place of darogah, and that even in subordinate positions to those the steady intelligent European would fill the places well?—Yes," * *

Mr. G. MacNair was examined before the above Committee on 6th May, 1858. He was asked:—

"2059. In what situations under Government do you think more Europeans could be employed than are employed now?—In all the public offices, such as the Treasury, the Home and Foreign Departments, the Military, Public Works, Salt and Opium, Stamp Office, Mint, Post Office, &c; there is at present a very large establishment of native writers in these departments; some of them receiving from £100 to £300 per annum, and even more, who do very little work; they are nearly all mere machines, who copy well, but cannot draught or write a letter of any consequence; for the present pay of these native establishments I should say a much more efficient European establishment could be kept, which would be a good training school for higher appointments to get on from their own merits and exertions.

* * * *

2071. "Do not you think that depriving them of those offices would have a deteriorating effect upon their education generally, and that there would be less encouragement held out to them to educate themselves than now?—It might be to a certain extent, but not very much,

* * * *

"2074. Do not you think it is only fair, as far as

you can, to employ the natives of the country in the Government of their own country? If you could employ them beneficially, and you could put dependence upon them, it would be so, but if you cannot get trustworthy people it is not even for the benefit of their own native class to employ them. * * * *

"2092. You said that you thought the servants of the Government should be found among the European settlers? Yes, as much 'as possible. I think it would be a great inducement for Europeans to go to India to qualify themselves for those appointments. * * * *

2322. Would it be just and fair towards the people of the country to take all the employment out of their hands, and give it to the English?—If you can not find natives fit for those employments, you must employ Europeans.

"2323. How are the natives to be made fit without being employed? You may make them fit for some of the appointments, but it is difficult to make them correct or honest without more European superintendence.

"2324. Are they likely to be made correct or honest if they are not tried? They do not seem to improve in that respect.

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"2326. You think that it is possible to teach boys to swim without allowing them to go into the water? No. I do not.

2327. *Chairman.* Do not you think it would be an advantage for them to see a man swim who could swim better than themselves? Yes, I think that they would get benefit from the example."

Mr. N. B. E. Baillie was also a witness before

the above Committee on 1st June, 1858. He was asked :—

"4587. Do you object to natives being appointed to high official situations ? Yes, I do ; my reasons in both cases are political. I would say that with regard to the appointment of the natives to higher situations, that I was asked the question when examined before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1853. I then said that I thought that they were improving very much, and that intellectually, I thought they might be considered qualified for higher situations. * * I then gave my opinion entirely as a judicial question. * Now it is given upon political grounds. I think, politically, the natives should not be appointed to those high situations."

The witnesses wanted the wider employment of English agency in India and yet they gave evidence of the inefficiency and incompetency of the then existing agency—that is, the members of the Covenanted Civil Service. Thus Mr. Freeman in his evidence before the above Committee, on 4th May, 1858, said :—

"If they (the Civil Servants) were only properly trained in their profession, good masters of the languages, had more intercourse with and much more real knowledge of the character and ways of dealing of the natives, I would not wish to see better men in India."

If the covenanted civilians were inefficient and did not perform their duties properly, it was preposterous to expect that uncovenanted European officers would be a better set of people. By the inefficiency and incompetency of European emplo-

yees, the natives of India would be the sufferers. Well, that did not enter into the calculation of those who advocated the more extensive employment of the Europeans in India on the score of colonization.

The improvement of land tenure to facilitate its possession by the Englishmen was also suggested. Thus Mr. J. Freeman, in his evidence before the Committee on the 29th April, 1858, was asked:—

"1654. With regard to the land, can you make any suggestion which would improve the tenure of land, and facilitate the possession of it by Europeans?—Certainly; in the country, where most of the land is occupied in one way or another, except in the Sunderbunds, there is a difficulty to surmount. Those gentlemen who have invested their capital in indigo and so forth, have managed it in this way: for the sake of peace and quietness they have come in as purchasers of leases for 8, 9 or 10 years, they have purchased putnee talooks or perpetual leases. Therefore when this unfortunate sale law comes into effect upon an entire Zemindary, these are all swept away.

"1655. You wish some measure like Mr. Grant's sale law, which should give the lessee a security that his large tenures, unprotected by the sale law tenure, should not be destroyed by the sale of the Zemindary?—That is one thing: our other method is to rent the land from the small tenant; * *"

He and several other witnesses like him were for extinguishing the rights of the ryots in Lower Bengal with a view of putting the English planter in possession of the fee-simple of the land.

One of the alleged reasons hindering the colonization of India by natives of England was their apprehension of being subjected to the jurisdiction of native Indian judges and magistrates and what they were pleased to call "Black Acts." Thus wrote the London *Times* in 1858 :—

"If any thing can more clearly illustrate the sense of security in which Indian officials in spite of all warning have indulged, it is that at the very time when this alarming mutiny was about to burst forth in the Bengal Presidency, it was actually proposed so to remodel the criminal jurisdiction of the country, as to subject the few Englishmen scattered over Hindostan to the anomalies of native law, to the tyrannies of native witnesses, * * to the ignorance of native jurymen, * * and to the tender mercies of native magistrates, armed with a power of summary jurisdiction, unknown even in England, and by means of which an Englishman might be confined in their vile prisons, amidst all the fierce heat of India, for as much as two years."

Mr. J. P. Wise as a witness before the above Committee on the 11th May, 1858, said :—

"Suppose these Black Acts had been carried into law as was desired just previous to the breaking out of this rebellion, the scattered Europeans as a preparative measure might have been lodged in goal".

Then he was questioned by a member of the Committee,—

"2651. I think you stated that it was the object to drive the European settlers out?—Yes, one would suppose so.

"2652. To whom do you impute that object; was it the effect of the laws or was it the intention of those who passed the laws? The laws would have that effect".

"2653. You do not mean to say that any Government would desire to drive settlers out?—One would suppose not, but practically that is the effect".

An attempt was made during the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon to empower native Indian judges and magistrates to try European criminals. But such a hue and cry was raised by "the Pucca born Britons" and the Eurasians that Lord Ripon's Government had to tamely yield to the agitators.

The Government of India by the East India Company was not favorable to colonization. To give an impetus to colonization, as one of its objects, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the transfer of the Indian Government from the Company to the Crown was effected. This transfer benefited the English colonists. Mr. J. Freeman in his evidence before the Committee, was asked:—

"1567. What effect do you think the transfer of the Government from the Company to the Crown will have on colonization or British settlement?—Colonization as applied to India in the present circumstances would have a very great effect I have no doubt; because the change in the form of Government from the Company to the Queen leads one to expect ulterior reforms more closely connected with India itself".

Mr. G. MacNair, in his evidence before the above Committee, was asked :—

"2581. What is your opinion with reference to the interests of settlers of the present proposed change of Government from the Company to the Crown?—It would be very beneficial, and would give every one more confidence in the Government".

Mr. J. T. Mackenzie as a witness before the Committee, on 18th May, 1858, was asked :—

"3721. Do you think that the transfer of the Government of India to the Crown would or would not increase the stability of our rule in that country? Ever since I have been in India, and at home, I have constantly advocated that; it would give a great stability to our rule, India being governed in the name of the Queen; * *

"3722. Do you think that such a transfer would be favorable to the increased settlement of Europeans in India?—Unquestionably it would, if added to good Government."

Mr. J. G. Waller, in his evidence before the Committee on 3rd June, 1858, being questioned—

"4841. What would you enumerate among the principal objections to the settlement of Europeans in India?" said—

"I think I have enumerated several; but there is one other which is of such importance that I cannot with justice to the subject omit it. I think that the transfer of the authority of the Government from the Corporation which now represents the Crown, by virtue of a trusteeship, is absolutely necessary. *If it be the real intention of the English Government to encourage the settlement of*

*Englishmen in India, and to give full scope to private enterprise for the accomplishment of those objects connected with India, which Government alone can never effect, * * Englishmen, I am persuaded, and the history of the past proves it, will not accept the intervening authority of any Corporation, as a Government, in lieu of the direct authority and power of the Crown, and the fundamental principles and laws of their own constitution. * * I think that the substitution of the authority and name of the Crown is essentially requisite to prepare the way for those sweeping changes in the Government of India which must follow almost immediately, not only to induce and encourage colonization, but to keep our hold over that immense extent of country."*

It is a remarkable fact which must be greatly regretted that the two Parliamentary Reports from the Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement (India) have not received any attention at the hands of Indian publicists.

But with all the Laws and Regulations which afford facilities to the English people to colonize India, colonization has not progressed very rapidly. India for the Englishmen, it is said, possesses few charms. Mr. Townsend writes:—

Colonization of India.

"This absence of white men is said to be due to climate, but even in 'the Hills' no one settles. Englishmen live on the sultry plains of New South Wales; Americans, who are only Englishmen a little desiccated, are filling up the steamy plains of Florida; Spaniards have settled as a governing caste throughout the tropical sections of the two Americas; Dutchmen

dwell on in Java; but the English, whatever the temptation, will not stay in India. No matter what the sacrifice, whether in money or dignity or pleasant occupation, an uncontrollable disgust, an overpowering sense of being aliens inexorably divided from the people of the land, comes upon them, and they glide silently away." * *

Meredith Townsend's Asia and Europe, p. 87.

The real reasons for the slow colonization of India seems to us to consist in the facts that India is a large country and well-peopled and it was not a very easy task to displace the millions who inhabit it, and also in India being not rich in gold, silver and diamond mines like Peru, Mexico, California, Australia and South Africa. India is mainly an agricultural country and hence less attractive to the European goldhungerers. Major-General G. B. Tremenhoe in his examination before the Committee on the 20th April, 1858, being asked:—

"412. * * Why does not he (the Englishman) go to India as well as to Australia?"

answered—

"There are more enticing objects in other countries. The finding of gold, the production of copper, and mines generally, offer much greater inducement than the slow profits derived from agricultural produce."

But now that several mines of gold and other minerals have been discovered in India, India is becoming more and more attractive to the Europeans.

It is not to be wondered at if rapid colonization of India takes place now.

The promotion of Eurasians to the class of Anglo-Indians and the large amount of money which is being spent on their education and the creation of domiciled Europeans as "statutory natives" will also facilitate the colonization of India. The conspicuous absence of "statutory natives" and "Anglo-Indians" (or Eurasians) in the ranks of the provincial judicial services, which tax intelligence to the utmost, for as a matter of fact, members of these services, administer law and justice much better than judges belonging to the "Heavenborn Civil Service," is to be explained on no other hypothesis than their unfitness for appointment to them. And hence every attempt is made to educate them to enable them to take their place in those services.

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ERRATA

- Page 1 for "Chaper" read "Chapter."
- " 4 line 4 from bottom, for "Government " read
" Government."
- Page 29 line 10 for "1885 " read "1858."
- " 67 " 8 for "solicary " read "solitary."
- " 158 " 10 for "couvetously " read "covetously."
- " 201 " 3 from bottom for "*Naturalists* " read
"*Naturalist*."
- Page 215 line 11 for "bulletions " read "bulletins."
- " 246 " 4 from bottom for "epeak " read "speak."
- " 263 " 15 for "on" read "in."
- " 264 " 12 for "Britise " read "British."
- " 273 " 4 omit "the."
- " 281 " 14 for "Gobden " read "Cobden."
- " 291 " 10 from bottom for "Asia " read "Ava."
- " 302 " 5 for "member " read "number."
- " 322 " 2 from bottom for "Internation " read
" International."
- Page 329 line 15 for "1856 " read "1854."
- " 343 " 19 omit "the."
- " 353 " 15 for "passessed " read "possessed."
- " 366 " 14 for "Lord Canning said " read "Lord
Canning saw."
- " 378 " 11 for "wander " read "wonder."
- " 384 " 14 for "spying " read "lying."
- " 405 " 4 for "outmost " read "utmost."
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